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Psychophysics as a science of primary experience

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09515081003727392

1465-394X

Jiřı́ Wackermann,

Embodied and Extended Cognition

Abstract In Fechner's psychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integral psychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of perceptual situations involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integral psychophysics as a scientia prima, logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology. Keywords: CommunicationIntegral PsychophysicsMeasurementPerceptionPrimary Experience Notes [1] Quote translated by the author. In German original: "Nun aber, wie werde ich mit meinem bischen Mathematik dieß neue große Gebiet beherrschen können? Beherrschen gewiß nicht; aber doch vielleicht beginnen. … Aber den Fortbau freilich werde ich Andern überlassen müssen" (Fechner, 2004 Fechner, G. Th. (2004). Tagebücher 1828 bis 1879 (A. Meischner & I. Altmann, eds.). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner [Google Scholar], p. 410). [2] The present essay is a synthesis of two earlier papers published in Fechner Day proceedings (Wackermann, 2007 Wackermann, J. 2007. "Psychophysics, or algebra of primary experience?". In Fechner Day 2007, Edited by: Mori, S, Miyaoka, T and Wong, W. 51–56. Tokyo: International Society for Psychophysics. [Google Scholar], 2008a). However, the genealogy of the underlying ideas is more complex. The concept of 'integral psychophysics' was presented first at the conference Toward a Science of Consciousness, Budapest, July 2007. The interpretation of psychophysical experiment as a communication between the experimenter and an instructed subject was suggested at the workshop Taking Perspectives in Sciences, Freiburg, April 2008. A common predecessor of these particular presentations was the article by Wackermann (2008b Wackermann, J. 2008b. "Jenseits der psychophysischen Dualität: Wirklichkeit des Geistes [Beyond psychophysical duality: The spiritual reality]". In Geist als Ursache? Mentale Verursachung im interdisziplinären Diskurs [Mind as a cause? Mental causation in the interdisciplinary discourse], Edited by: Peschl, MF and Batthyany, A. 189–221. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. [Google Scholar]), published only in German language. [3] This and the following quotations are taken from the American edition (Fechner, 1966 Fechner, GTh. 1966. Elements of psychophysics (Vol. I, D. H. Howes & E. G. Boring, eds., H. E. Adler, trans.), New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. [Google Scholar]); some minor imperfections of the translation have been tacitly rectified. [4] Cf. chapters 5 and 6 of Heidelberger's (2004 Heidelberger, M. 2004. Nature from within: G. Th. Fechner and his psychophysical worldview (C. Klohr, trans.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. [Google Scholar]) monograph on Fechner. [5] Here we adopt a 'nominalist' notion of a law as an observational regularity, in line with the instrumentalist/empiricist tradition of Mach, Duhem, and others; cf. also Wackermann (2006 Wackermann, J. 2006. Rationality, universality, and individuality in a functional concept of theory. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 62: 411–426. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). [6] Fechner's "measurement formula" [Maßformel] was formally derived in chapter 16 of his Elements via integration of Weber's law. It is, however, possible that Fechner originally conceived a more general idea than a single-valued function. The report on his celebrated 'revelation' on 22 October 1850 was written post hoc and does not give quite a clear account of its content. As is obvious from Fechner's diary (Fechner, 2004 Fechner, G. Th. (2004). Tagebücher 1828 bis 1879 (A. Meischner & I. Altmann, eds.). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner [Google Scholar], p. 409f) as well as from his 'Outline' (Fechner, 1987a Fechner, G. 1987a. Th., Outline of a new principle of mathematical psychology (E. Scheerer, trans.) Psychological Research, 49, 203–207 [Google Scholar])—cf. also Scheerer, 1987 Scheerer, E. 1987. The unknown Fechner. Psychological Research, 49: 197–202. [Google Scholar], p. 198—Fechner was preoccupied with summation of increments of energy [lebendige Kraft] of the stimulus giving rise to a subjective sensation, but he was not referring explicitly to Weber's law. It seems that Fechner's insight was elicited by the relation between arithmetic and higher-order series, which he used as a metaphor for the psychophysical relation in Zend-Avesta (not included in Fechner, 1987a Fechner, G. 1987a. Th., Outline of a new principle of mathematical psychology (E. Scheerer, trans.) Psychological Research, 49, 203–207 [Google Scholar]). We conjecture that Fechner already had an intuitive idea of isomorphism between the physical and the mental domain, that is, a correspondence between functions, not just between numerical values. For Fechner, an experimental physicist of the mid-19th century, such a notion must have been elusively abstract; and so he could not but cast the idea into a simple functional form y = f(x), by analogy with the known laws of physics. [7] Concerning relations between Mach's and Fechner's thought, cf. Banks, 2003 Banks, EC. 2003. Ernst Mach's World elements. A study in natural philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Google Scholar], chapter 6; Heidelberger, 2004 Heidelberger, M. 2004. Nature from within: G. Th. Fechner and his psychophysical worldview (C. Klohr, trans.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. [Google Scholar], chapter 4; and Heidelberger, 2010 Heidelberger, M. 2010. Functional relations and causality in Fechner and Mach. Philosophical Psychology, 23(2): 163–172. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. [8] Cf. Banks, 2003 Banks, EC. 2003. Ernst Mach's World elements. A study in natural philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Google Scholar], 2010. [9] Indeed, 'ego' [Ich] is for Mach only a name for one particularly stable aggregate of elements; it is nothing like an observer existing beyond and independently from the world elements. In Mach's view there is no place for an absolute subject detached from the world's content: "The ego must be given up." [Das Ich ist unrettbar.] (Mach, 1959 Mach, E. 1959. The analysis of sensations and the relation of the physical to the psychical (C. M. Williams, trans.), New York: Dover. [Google Scholar], p. 24). [10] Or, from a Machian point of view, rather crypto-metaphysical. Cf. "Mach played Fechner, the psychophysicist and anti-metaphysician, against Fechner, the atomist and metaphysician" (Heidelberger, 2004 Heidelberger, M. 2004. Nature from within: G. Th. Fechner and his psychophysical worldview (C. Klohr, trans.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. [Google Scholar], p. 162). [11] E.g., in his Mechanics (Mach, 1989 Mach, E. 1989. The science of mechanics: A critical and historical account of its development (6th ed., Th. J. McCormack, trans.), La Salle: Open Court. [Google Scholar], p. 604); cf. also Banks, 2003 Banks, EC. 2003. Ernst Mach's World elements. A study in natural philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Google Scholar], p. 126. [12] As seen above (note 6), our reading of Fechner reveals two lines of thought: (i) speculative and metaphorical, based on the idea of isomorphism, exposed in Zend-Avesta (Fechner, 1851); (ii) positive and empirical, based on the Maßformel and developed in Elements (originally published 1860), where there may be only a distorted version of Fechner's original vision, due to limitations of the mathematical apparatus at his avail. An elaboration of the isomorphism idea would have to lead to a broader concept virtually contained in formula (2). [13] In his Analysis of Mind (Russell, 1921 Russell, B. 1921. The analysis of mind, London: Allen & Unwin. [Google Scholar]) and elsewhere. Russell not only explicitly refers to James but also combines his 'pragmatic' view with the (then novel) behaviorism. [14] For a general review of neutral monism, see Stubenberg (2005 Stubenberg, L. 2005. Neutral Monism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [Google Scholar]); concerning Mach's version of neutral monism, see Banks (2010 Banks, EC. 2010. Neutral monism reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology, 23(2): 173–187. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). [15] The special variant of phenomenological epoché from "objective sciences" and their results was proposed in Husserl's last major work, Crisis (1970 Husserl, E. 1970. The crisis of european science and transcendental phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. [Google Scholar]); for a comprehensive summary see Spiegelberg, 1994 Spiegelberg, H. 1994. The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction, , 3rd, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Google Scholar], pp. 141ff. [16] However, the life-world domain is a structured field of primary experience, not just an amorphous mass of 'elements' sensu Mach. Phenomenology intends a turn 'to things themselves,' but not beyond things. In analyses of primary experience, the qualitative 'elements' may play an auxiliary role as abstractive moments of experience, but not its 'stuff' or 'substance'. [17] To be unambiguously clear about this point: we do not consider the physical (matter) as the unconditional fundament of the world, a condition of possible experience. Rather we adhere to the notion of the 'physical' as a coherent complex of descriptions, obtained by abstraction from the primary experience. [18] Protophysics, founded by German mathematician and philosopher Hugo Dingler (1881–1954) and little known outside of German-speaking countries, has significantly contributed to the understanding of conceptual / instrumental conditions of measurements of extensive quantities such as length, duration, and mass (Janich, 1997 Janich, P. 1997. Das Maß der Dinge. Protophysik von Raum, Zeit und Materie [Measure of things. Protophysics of space, time and matter], Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [Google Scholar]). Psychophysics, on the other hand, may complement the protophysical approach by the study of those physical continua which are mapped onto special sensory domains (visual, tactile, etc.). [19] "Wie ist die Objektivität der Physik möglich?" (Lorenzen, 1968 Lorenzen, P. 1968. Methodisches Denken [Methodical thinking], Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [Google Scholar], pp. 142–151). [20] Translated by the author. In French original: "Nous reconnaissons … la légitimité et même la nécessité d'une physique rudimentaire, qui ne tiendrait compte que des caractères les plus apparentes des phénomènes, d'une physique toute naïve, dans laquelle nos impressions sensorielles seraient directement interprétées comme les symptômes évidents de realités pratiquement assurées" (Gonseth, 1936 Gonseth, F. 1936. Les Mathématiques et la Réalité. Essai sur la méthode axiomatique [Mathematics and reality. Essay on the axiomatic method], Paris: Blanchard. [Google Scholar], p. 60f). [21] For a review of early criticism and Fechner's defense, see Heidelberger, 2004 Heidelberger, M. 2004. Nature from within: G. Th. Fechner and his psychophysical worldview (C. Klohr, trans.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. [Google Scholar], p. 207ff. [22] In German original: "Wenn es Fechner in seiner Psychophysik gelungen ist, selbst die einzelnen Empfindungen zu messen, so kann man doch über die Bedeutung dieses Masses zweifelhaft sein. Eine Empfindung von grösserer Intensität ist immer auch eine von anderer Qualität und das Fechner'sche Mass ist dann wohl mehr ein physikalisches als ein psychisches" (Mach, 1969 Mach, E. (1969). Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit [History and root of the principle of the conservation of energy] (J. Thiele, ed.). Amsterdam: Bonset [Google Scholar], p. 58). These words are part of a concluding general remark [Allgemeine Bemerkung], where Mach defines the aims and scopes of three major scientific disciplines, namely physics, psychology, and psychophysics. [23] However, the additional specification "simple physical stimuli" is quite misleading. There is no direct correspondence between conceptual simplicity of a physical condition (stimulus) and phenomenal simplicity of the corresponding percept. For example, a luminous stimulus composed of different wavelengths may elicit a simple, elementary perception of 'pure' colour. By contrast, cutaneous stimulation with a weak (below pain threshold) electric current—which is arguably a physically simple stimulus—may instigate a phenomenally complex somatosensory response. [24] This is, in Austin's words, "a typically scholastic view attributable, first, to an obsession with a few particular words … and second, to an obsession with a few half-studied 'facts'" (1962, p. 3). As for the latter, Austin explicitly warns against "such illusions as 'the argument from illusion'" (1962, p. 4). [25] Cf. Austin (1962 Austin, JL. 1962. Sense and sensibilia, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Google Scholar]) and Ryle (1949 Ryle, G. 1949. The concept of mind, London: Hutchinson. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). [26] This should not be misunderstood as a brute eliminativism: saying that "sensation is no-thing," we simply say that "there is no thing-like entity called 'sensation'." Of course we do not deny that we are beings capable of sensing and feeling; but we suggest that the term 'sensation' should be reserved for an act of sensing and not be used to denote its reified outcome. [27] "The input to a sensory system is the physical stimulus and the output is sensation … if the device were a photo cell … we would measure the output in voltage or current as a function of energy input" (Gescheider, 1997 Gescheider, GA. 1997. Psychophysics: The fundamentals, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. [Google Scholar], p. 183). This analogy may apply to sensory systems as far as they are conceived as transducers of physical quantities; e.g., energy density of the stimulus is the input, cell membrane potential or neuronal firing rate is the output. But then functional relations obtained in this way belong entirely to the physical domain. The proclaimed identity of a neural state with a 'sensation' remains without clarification or justification. [28] Whether "A's 'green' is the same as B's 'green' "—a classic example of a "philosophical" pseudoproblem, that is, a meaningless question (Bridgman, 1927 Bridgman, PW. 1927. The logic of modern physics, New York: MacMillan. [Google Scholar], p. 30f)—is obviously totally irrelevant for the agreement between A and B upon the given situation. [29] Modern introductions into sensory physiology or psychophysics usually ignore the situational component of the experimental setup, and focus on its conceptual skeleton: an exposure of a sensory system (defined in the language of neurophysiology) to an external stimulus (defined in the language of physics). A researcher trained in this easy-going approach may find a phenomenological account of the experimental situation just a verbose, irrelevant diversion. In our approach, phenomenology of natural or artificial perceptual situations is a prerequisite for the understanding of the meaning of a psychophysical experiment; cf. Renqvist-Reenpää, 1936 Renqvist-Reenpää, Y. 1936. Allgemeine Sinnesphysiologie [General outline of sensory physiology], Wien: Springer. [Google Scholar], p. 2ff. [30] Properties of physical reality are not given a priori; they are found in the course of inventions of material or symbolic transformations of world-states. The operations involved are contained in definitions of physical quantities (Bridgman, 1927 Bridgman, PW. 1927. The logic of modern physics, New York: MacMillan. [Google Scholar]). Practical measurements are mostly of derived nature, i.e., involving some mediating steps from the observed phenomenon to the fundamental definition (e.g., measurement of intensity of electric current via deflection of a wire coil placed in a permanent magnetic field). [31] This induces a minimal arithmetic structure in the domain of measurement results. The refinement from integer indices to the field of rational numbers is a matter of standard theory (Helmholtz–Hölder); cf. Weyl, 1949 Weyl, H. 1949. Philosophy of mathematics and natural science (O. Helmer, trans.), Princeton: University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 30ff. [32] A similar concept based on the notion of equivalence was proposed by Y. Renqvist-Reenpää, who identified 'sensations' [Empfindungen] with 'classes obtained by content abstraction' [Inhaltsabstraktionsklassen] (Renqvist-Reenpää, 1936 Renqvist-Reenpää, Y. 1936. Allgemeine Sinnesphysiologie [General outline of sensory physiology], Wien: Springer. [Google Scholar], p. 7). [33] It is assumed, for simplicity, that the light rays only minimally deviate from the view axes, and that the reflection characteristic is uniform within that range of angles. [34] Of special interest is emergence of unique sensory dimensions, which perhaps can be modeled and understood as a result of a 'natural factorisation' of primary experience. [35] There is a striking parallel between the programme sketched above and W. Köhler's (1920 Köhler, W. 1920. Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand. Eine naturphilosophische Untersuchung [Physical configurations in the rest and in the stationary state. A study in natural philosophy], Braunschweig: Vieweg. [Google Scholar]) attempt to make the notion of Gestalt a conceptual basis of physics as well as of psychology. The fact that he had written two differently phrased introductions to his work—one for philosophers and biologists, another one for physicists—is symptomatic for a deep gap between the disciplines. Limitations of space do not allow us to explore further multiple relations between topics of our interest and Köhler's work. [36] Or, as Mach remarked: "a philosophy is involved in any correct view of the relations of special knowledge to the great body of knowledge at large—a philosophy that must be demanded of every special investigator" (Mach, 1989 Mach, E. 1989. The science of mechanics: A critical and historical account of its development (6th ed., Th. J. McCormack, trans.), La Salle: Open Court. [Google Scholar], p. 610); cf. also Wackermann, 2006 Wackermann, J. 2006. Rationality, universality, and individuality in a functional concept of theory. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 62: 411–426. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], section 5. [37] In German: "Was ist wirklich?" (Schrödinger, 1989 Schrödinger, E. 1989. Mein Leben, meine Weltansicht [My life, my world-view], Zürich: Diogenes. [Google Scholar], pp. 119–182).