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Spinoza's Concept of Substance and Attribute: A Reading of the Short Treatise

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09608780903339087

1469-3526

Francesca di Poppa,

Political Theology and Sovereignty

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1My thanks to Peter Machamer , the public present at the 2006 South Central Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville (especially Jacob Adler and Steve Daniel), and the anonymous referees at British Journal for the History of Philosophy for their extremely helpful comments. Thanks to Peter Muhlberger for his help with editing. 2All references to Spinoza are from The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, vol. 1 (from now on. 'Curley'). Dutch references are from Benedicti de Spinoza Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt, edited by Van Vloten and Land (from now on 'Opera'). References to Descartes are from Philosophical Writings of Descartes, edited by Cottingham, Stoothoof and Murdoch (CSM) and Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Adam and Tannery (AT). 3See Filippo Mignini, 'Données et problèmes de la chronologie spinozienne entre 1656 et 1665'; also 'La cronologia e l'interpretazione delle opere di Spinoza', and his edition and translation (in Italian) of Korte Verhandeling, van God, de Mensch, en deszelvs Welstand. 4Although the only two surviving manuscripts of the Short Treatise are in Dutch, there is agreement among interpreters that Spinoza must have composed the original in Latin. In the Introduction to his Italian translation of the Short Treatise (Spinoza: Korte Verhandeling), Mignini offers a detailed discussion of the various hypotheses, endorsing the conclusion above. In Chapter 8 of his Spinoza: A Life, Nadler argues that it is very implausible that Spinoza would have composed a philosophical work in Dutch, 'given his confessed discomfort in expressing himself on philosophical matters in that language' (186, fn 15). One good reason for this discomfort is that, as Curley points out in his Editorial Preface to the Short Treatise, the Dutch language lacked a systematic philosophical lexicon at the time. 5Curley, I, 66; Opera, IV, 7–8. 6Curley, I, 68; Opera, IV, 10. In the final section of this paper I will elaborate on Spinoza's use of the term 'predicated'. 7Saccaro del Buffa argues that the substance-attribute equivalence is present only at an early stage of Spinoza's philosophical development. 10Curley, vol. I, p. 239; Opera, IV, 118. 11Curley, vol. I, p. 262; Opera, IV, 143. 8See also the Cartesian definition of substance in the Second Set of Replies to the Meditations (Def. V). What exists in a subject is, by definition, a non-substance (a mode, a property or an attribute; for Descartes' distinction, see The Principles of Philosophy I, 56). 9Descartes adds that, the only substance that is absolutely ontologically independent is God. Everything else needs God's concurrence in order to exist. 12Spinoza does not directly argue for God's simplicity. However, divine simplicity is implied in Spinoza's conclusion that God is extended. The conclusion is that considering God as an extended substance does not conflict with divine simplicity, because extended substance has no parts. If Spinoza did not consider God a simple being, he would not have felt the need to prove that an extended substance has no parts. See his Short Treatise Ch. II. 13There are good textual reasons to believe that at this stage Spinoza already believed that what can be conceived through itself also exists through itself, i.e. what is conceptually independent is ontologically and causally independent, and vice versa (I will not discuss this in detail). Therefore, the ontological priority of the One Being would undermine the independence of the substances. 14In ch. 13 of her Alle origini del panteismo, Saccaro Del Buffa identifies in Abram Cohen de Herrera's Neoplatonic-kabbalistic treatise Gate of Heaven (Puerta del Cielo), in particular, in its discussion of the relation of the sefirot and Ein Sof (the One), the source for Spinoza's concept of substances-attributes. There are reasons to consider Herrera relevant to Spinoza's philosophical development. Saccaro Del Buffa rightly points out that the discussion of the sefirot or emanations, a term that Herrera also translates as 'attributes', is important. However, her interpretation is problematic, because, like Plotinian emanations, the sefirot are caused by the One, and in no sense do they constitute him, as the substances-attributes should. I discuss my view on Herrera's influence on Spinoza in 'Abraham Cohen Herrera: Understanding a Possible Source for Spinoza's Concept of Expression'. 15I believe that the previous remarks constitute serious objections to interpreters who ascribe to Spinoza a 'bundle theory of substance' in Ethics, such as Martial Gueroult in his Spinoza, vol. I: Dieu (in particular, Chapter I). This is not the right place to argue against Gueroult's interpretation of attributes in details. I wish to remark, however, that Gueroult does not address the question of the relationship between the component substances-attributes and the one substance. Moreover, he fails to explain how his interpretation is consistent with Ethics I, P10 Sch. Here Spinoza makes two important claims: that a plurality of attributes does not imply a plurality of substances, and that only one substance exists. 16Curley I, 151; Opera, IV, 94. 17Curley I, 88; Opera IV, 30. The footnote (fn a) should be read in its context. The chapter discusses those properties that have traditionally been considered 'attributes of God', such as 'cause of all things', 'eternal', and 'simple'. The footnote, however, explains that these properties are not real 'attributes', but propria: properties without which God would not be God, but that do not constitute him as God. Rather, they follow from its essence. The real attributes are 'substances', or things that have been defined as substances. 18Two of these sources are J. M. Lucas and Colerus (J. Köhler), Spinoza's earliest biographers. Lucas' biography 'The Life of the Late Mr. de Spinoza', was translated and edited by A. Wolf: The Oldest Biography of Spinoza. See Nadler, Spinoza: A Life. 19See Wiep van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza: an Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic, 201. The passage mentioned is in Meyer's Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture, 240–1. 20Descartes calls God a substance when reminding us that God is, properly speaking, the only real substance, for example in Principles, I, 52 (CSM, I, 210; AT VIII, 24). God is called a Being in several places: in particular, in Meditations (including Descartes' replies) and the Principles of Philosophy I. 21Curley I, 75; Opera IV, 16. Reede: Dat gy dan, o Begeerlijkheid, zegd, verscheide zelfstandigheden te zien, dat is, zeg ik u, valsch; want klaarlijk zie ik dat 'er maar een Eenige is, de welke door zig zelve bestaat, en van alle de andere eigenschappen een onderhouder is. 22This is my translation in English from Saccaro Del Buffa's translation in Italian on page 183 of her Alle origini del panteismo, Chapter 9, where she criticizes Mignini's version. 23A possible response to my argument would be to suggest that Reason is not objecting to the idea of many substances, but to the idea of distinct substances, i.e. substances independent of each other; but this does not solve the problem. First, Spinoza does maintain that substances-attributes are distinct. It is because they are distinct that Spinoza concludes that they must inhere in the one Being: otherwise, one could not explain the 'unity of reality', including the mind–body union. Second, it is unclear what the meaning of 'substance' would be, if it did not include ontological independence (which Spinoza denies of substances-attributes). If, however, we read 'substance' as 'what the Cartesians call substance', the passage can be easily seen as an argument showing the inconsistency of Cartesian substance dualism. 24I follow Curley (fn. 5 to page 74) in accepting this emendation. 25Curley I, 74; Opera IV, 15–16. 26In this context, Spinoza uses the terms 'attributes' and 'modes' as if they were interchangeable. Both are treated as inhering in a more basic ontological layer, the substance, as properties. In the second part of this paper, I will show that in fact Spinoza draws an important distinction between attributes and properties. 27An interesting footnote (fn e) at this point states that unity would not be possible between substances that have nothing in common with each other, 'like thought and extension, of which we nevertheless consist'. This is an obvious reference to the Cartesian notion of the mind–body union. Notice that, just like Descartes, Spinoza at this point takes a form of mind–body union as a basic fact. For Spinoza, however, the fact of the mind–body union proves that extension and thought cannot be two separate substances. 28Curley I, 70; Opera IV, 11. 29'Real' here means 'really existing'. 30Curley I, 70; Opera IV, 11. 31This passage is also quoted by Saccaro del Buffa as evidence for the substances-attributes interpretation. 32The discussion following the passages makes it clear that Spinoza's goal was to support the unpalatable conclusion that extension is an attribute of God. The quoted passages conclude that, unless extension is an attribute of God, extended things, which we know to exist, cannot exist. He then proceeds to reject the traditional objections to the doctrine of a corporeal God, such as the problem of divisibility. 33While the existence of thinking substance is beyond doubt for Descartes (from the Cogito), the existence of bodies is proved only after a long detour through God. See Meditations III and VI. 34In Letter 2 to Oldenburg (September 1661), Spinoza defines 'attribute' as 'whatever is conceived through itself and in itself (concipitur per se et in se), so that its concept does not involve the concept of another thing' (Curley I,165; Opera III, 5). The focus is clearly on conceptual independence. I will discuss Spinoza's revision of the notion of the attribute soon. 35 Do you claim that, if we clearly understand one thing apart from another, this is not sufficient for the recognition that the two things are really distinct? If so, you must provide a more reliable criterion for a real distinction – and I am confident that none can be provided. What will you suggest? Perhaps that there is a real distinction between two things if one can exist apart from the other? But now I will ask you how you know that one thing can exist apart from another.(Second Set of Replies to the Meditations, in CSM, vol. II, p. 95, AT VII, 132) Descartes' claim that a substance can only have one attribute follows, I believe, from the fact that, for Descartes, what can be really and distinctly perceived could have been created by God as really distinct. If a substance had more than one attributes, then we would perceive clearly and distinctly things that are not really distinct (and then God could be a deceiver). 36 Ethics I D3: Curley I, 408; Opera I, 37. 38Chapter III, fn.a: Curley I, 80; Opera IV, 21. Notice the distinction between what is 'substantive' (substantiva), i.e. a layer beneath adjectives, and what is 'substantial' (zelfstandigs), i.e. that through which a substance exists as such. Chapter III begins the explanation of what Spinoza calls the propria of God. Important discussions of the distinction between propria and attributes are in Deleuze's Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza as well as in Gueroult's Spinoza, vol. I: Dieu. 37Fn. E: Curley I, 64; Opera IV, 6. This note has been considered by some as an interpolation, but (as will be seen from the next quote) it is perfectly consistent with Spinoza's overall discussion. 39Some have pointed out (for example, Pierre Machery in his 'Spinoza: est-il moniste', in Spinoza: puissance et ontologie, 39–53) that, in so far as the term 'one' refers to an 'ontologization' of unicity, it is misleading. As Spinoza wrote in Metaphysical Thoughts, Chapter 6, God can be called 'one' or 'unique' in some improper and negative sense, because there cannot be a plurality of substances. As Spinoza himself did in Metaphysical Thoughts, I find the dispute on whether the substance is 'one' of little philosophical interest. 40I will soon address the passages in which Spinoza writes that attributes are 'predicated' of nature. 41Curley I, 147; Opera IV, 90. 42Curley I, 84; Opera IV, 26. 43This passage shows that Spinoza took the reality of matter, motion, and rest as a brute fact. He did not feel the need to argue against an idealistic, Parmenidean metaphysics where the plurality of things is nothing but appearance. There is another passage where it is clear that Spinoza takes our experience of nature as including both bodies and minds for granted. There has to be only one substance, Spinoza argues, because otherwise we could not explain the unity that we perceive in nature. Interaction and unity would be impossible for a plurality of substances with different attributes. See Curley I, 70; Opera IV, 11. 44This is the Cartesian extension (the extended substance that depends only on God in order to exist). For Descartes, what makes matter move ultimately is God's causal agency. A number of interpreters are still debating on what exactly 'horizontal causation' is in Cartesian physics (Garber, Gabbey, Machamer and McGuire, Hatfield, Schmaltz and others). 45Curley I, 72–3; Opera IV, 14. 48Curley I, 419; Opera I, 46. 46Much has been written about the meaning of the term 'expression', especially in French and Italian scholarship (in Shirley's most recent edition of Spinoza's complete works the term 'expression' is not even included in the admittedly selective Index), but addressing the existing literature, in particular Deleuze's groundbreaking Expressionism in Philosophy – Spinoza, would be beyond the scope of this paper. 47Curley I, 409; Opera I, 37. 'Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantia constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit'. 49The products or effects, of God's activities of self-expression are the modes, not the attributes. Referring to the attributes as a first layer of expressive activity (as Deleuze does) is inconsistent with Spinoza's ontology, which includes only the one substance and its modes. Therefore, I prefer to say that the attributes are expressings, rather than expressions (though I do admit that it is a rather awkward term). 50This is a revision of Bennett's reading of attributes as basic ways of being in his A Study of Spinoza's 'Ethics'. 51In Letter 2 to Oldenburg, Spinoza calls God a Being, not a substance. In this letter, Spinoza refers Oldenburg to an attached draft of his philosophy, proved 'in the geometrical manner'. The draft is unfortunately lost, though scholars attempted to reconstruct it from the bits and pieces quoted by Spinoza in his correspondence. These early letters refer to a philosophical system that it not yet Ethics, but that has made significant steps in that direction. For example, 'substance' is defined in the Dutch version of Letter 4 in Nagelate Schriften as 'that which is through itself and conceived through itself'. The Latin version in Opus Posthumum has 'quod per se et in se concipitur'. However, in the previous Letter 2, Spinoza had made it clear that 'substantia non posse produci, sed quod sit de ipsius essentia, existere' (substance cannot be produced, but it is of its essence to exist), thus establishing the ontological independence of substance. While God is defined as a Being (Ens), not as a substance, the definition of substance and the statement that 'in reality there exist only substances and their modes' (no mention of Being) show that Spinoza is moving in the direction of defining God as the only substance. See Letters 2 and 4 to Oldenburg; Curley I, 164–8 and 170–2; Opera III, 4–7 and 9–11. Interesting clarifications about the development of Spinoza's concept of the attributes can be found in his letter to De Vries (Letter 9, probably from early 1663).