Syria's State Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the Regime
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/19436149.2012.717798
ISSN1943-6157
Autores Tópico(s)Turkey's Politics and Society
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 The principal exception as of early July 2012 is the apparent defection of Manaf Tlas, son of former Defense Minister, Mustapha Tlas, and a commander of one of the elite brigades in the Syrian Republican Guard. Notably, General Tlas was sidelined or 'sent home' in summer 2011 after exhibiting a critical attitude toward the regime's handling of the uprising. Other defectors with seemingly important 'official' positions, including ambassadors, are usually not part of the regime core. Cautious interpretation of every case is advised. 2 'Para-official' refers to individuals related to others that actually have an official position within the state apparatus. Often, they exercise power themselves, depending on their personality and proximity to the levers of power. 3 Close relatives of those who hold power within the state—these individuals hold no official position but often wield considerable power while exhibiting equal devotion to the regime. A modal example is Rami Makhlouf, the president's cousin who has no official position but is considered one of the most influential men in Syria. 4 Perhaps the best example of such partnerships can be gleaned from the dismal results of Investment Law #10 of 1991 and the numerous presidential decrees that directly preceded the law. See Khalid Abdul Nour (Citation2000) al-Qita' al-Khas fi Thill al-Himaya [The Private Sector in the Shadow of Protection], Paper No. 13, 2000 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April 25); and Raymond Hinnebusch (Citation1996) Democratization in the Middle East: The Evidence from the Syrian Case, in: Gerd Nonneman (ed.) Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspective, pp. 153–166 (London: Lynne Rienner). 5 The difference here speaks to the kind of economic development the regime pursued, one that is marked by a severely controlled pattern of economic growth that prevents the emergence of powerful industrial social forces. Alternatively, industrial deepening would have required more far-sighted economic planning that subordinates political imperatives, as well as a more open political and economic system that does not hinder ingenuity and other price-setting mechanisms. For a comparative account of the Syrian case in this regard, see David Waldner (Citation1999) State Building and Late Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); for a comparative account on the requirements and challenges of industrial deepening drawn from cases in Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell (Citation1979) Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California). 6 Although official statistics do not exist on class distribution in Syria, independent analysts and economists who work on demographic distribution, urbanization and labor concur with the figures presented in the book by Volker Perthes (Citation1995) The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris), which remains the best rough estimate for class distribution; see especially, table III.2 on p. 118. Among economists interviewed on this topic are Rizqallah Hilan, Arif Dalila, Sa'id Nabulsi, Nabil Marzouq and Nasir Nasir. 7 The trio of Uthman al-'A'idi, Sa'ib Nahhas and Abdul Rahman al-'Attar often are referred to as the first batch of the new private bourgeoisie in Syria. However, several other individuals have surpassed both their reputation and their wealth, including relatives of the Asad, Makhlouf, Shalish and other politically prominent families. 8 The wealthiest individuals, groups and families in Syria usually are involved in the commerce, service and manufacturing sectors, in both exports and imports. The Sanqar family is an example: three enterprising brothers, who are involved in the importation of luxury cars, own restaurants and provide the local market with various agricultural products. The Sa'ib Nahhas group is perhaps the epitome of business diversification in Syria, spanning nearly all sectors, including commerce, agriculture, industry, transportation and tourism. Whereas Nahhas declined personal interviews, the records of his businesses are made public through the variety of brochures published by his office in Damascus. 9 It is noteworthy that the category of the state bourgeoisie is not a distinct one in the Syrian public's imagination, discourse or creative production. More often than not, people refer to such categories in political not economic terms such as 'the officials' (al-mas'ulin) or, less often, 'men of the authority' (rijal al-silta) even if they are depicting their wealth. Alternatively, they lump the state bourgeoisie and the private bourgeoisie under the term 'the parasitic class' (al-tabaqa al-tufailiyya). Although some academics and social critics use the literal term for the state bourgeoisie' (burjwaziyyat al-dawla), it is largely absent from visual, print and audible media. The significance of this lack can be traced back to the absence of open discourse on such matters: most social sectors in Syria take the abuse of political authority to be the primary culprit, with the economic enrichment derived therefrom being a consequence of political corruption. The abstraction involved here is linked to the absence of open discourse on the regime and perhaps to the fear of cutting too close to the bone by inadvertently relating corruption to the regime directly. 10 See Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114; and Alan Richards & John Waterbury (Citation1996a) A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press), p. 201. 11 See John Waterbury (Citation1991) Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(1), pp. 1–17. 12 See John Waterbury (Citation1991) Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(1), pp. 13–14. 13 The closest would be the power struggle of 1984 between President al-Asad and his brother Rif'at and the succession crisis that preceded and directly proceeded Asad's death in June of 2000. For more on the infamous Rif'at al-Asad challenge, see Patrick Seale (Citation1988) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris). 14 A high level public sector official was most direct in relaying to me the existential dilemma many of them face in that sector: 'we have committed grave mistakes in the past, and people will not remember who among us was not directly involved… neither will the regime excuse us now for abandoning it.' (Author interview, Damascus, June 1, 1999.) Other interviews with high-level public sector officials were infinitely more discrete and more useless in interpreting their real attitudes. The above-quoted individual started with a typical Syrian resigned attitude by telling me 'They will all lie to you, they are all scared to death of saying what's in their heads… sometimes when we are drinking together, I have to remind them that I am [a friend].' (The closest would be the power struggle of 1984 between President al-Asad and his brother Rif'at and the succession crisis that preceded and directly proceeded Asad's death in June of 2000. For more on the infamous Rif'at al-Asad challenge, see Patrick Seale (Citation1988) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris)) Many of those we could call members of the state bourgeoisie—especially those not tied directly to the regime—would like to be dissociated from the state, but know well that the consequences are most uncertain, both economically in terms of their livelihood and politically in terms of their security under changing circumstances. The import of such attitudes is latent: if or when the current regime falls apart, few would come to its rescue if they could afford otherwise. In the meantime, state employees—especially those outside the military and security apparatuses—would hold on steadfastly to the public and governmental sectors. They are rational actors in a system that has managed to align calculated rational behavior with the regime's most pressing interest: its survival through state dominance. 15 Hostility toward the regime should be differentiated from criticism of the regime: the regime would tolerate criticism, especially since the late 1990s, so long as the president and sect are not the object, but it would not, and has not since 1970, tolerated any signs of hostility. Thus, while hostility is almost impossible to observe publicly, it is ubiquitous in private, especially among the social sectors that have seen their fortunes decrease dramatically and among those who have had their political voices castrated: primarily the urbanized working classes and the Islamists—both categories dwell in more traditional urban quarters—but also within society at large, including the legions of disaffected youths without job opportunities and civil society advocates. As Lisa Wedeen points out, it is difficult to discern what people really feel, but the manifestation of increasing dissatisfaction in the less-controlled media, and in 'encrypted' novels, art, cartoons, televisions shows and films, is unmistakable; see further Lisa Wedeen (Citation1999) Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). More often than not, the culprit is a public official, even if he is thoroughly humanized and his objectionable behavior diluted, such as in the famous television sitcom 'Yawmiyat Mudir 'Aam' [The Daily Life of a General (Public Sector) Manager]. The message is clearer in other works, such as the film Nujoum al-Lail, which symbolically depicts the domination of cities by unsophisticated individuals (from the countryside) who are ruthless plunderers. 16 See, for instance, Riad Saif, Safqat 'Uqud al-Khilyawi [The Cellular Telephone Contracts], a controversial paper presented by MP Riad Saif to the Syrian Parliament on August 14, 2001. The paper exposes the scandal of the cellular telephone contracts between the government and individuals affiliated with the state but acting as private businessmen. These contracts proved to be extremely costly for the government and highly profitable for the local contractors, who belong to the Makhluf family, Hafiz al-Asad's in-laws. The telecom market is only the latest to be seized by men of power and wealth in Syria, by now a predictable occurrence with regard to lucrative new markets. 17 See Manfred Halpern (Citation1963) The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press); and Alan Richards & John Waterbury (Citation1996b) Contradictions of State-Led Growth, in: Alan Richards & John Waterbury (eds.) A Political Economy of the Middle East, pp. 205–221 (Boulder: Westview Press). 18 See Michael C. Hudson (Citation1999) Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 15; and Hudson (Citation1987) Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics, Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 22(2), pp. 157–171. Perhaps no other country in the Middle East fits Hudson's designation of a mukhabarat state better than Syria (the literal translation is 'security services state,' which refers to the ubiquity of such agencies). 19 Author interviews with former Ba'thists, all of whom acknowledged being disillusioned with the post-1970 gradual marginalization of socialist Ba'thist ideology; interviews were conducted in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama, August 1998 to June 1999. These observers make a distinction between what Hinnebusch considers the 'pillars of the Ba'th' (including army, party and bureaucracy) and the actual dominance of the security apparatuses that undermined the authority of the Ba'th party qua ideological party. See further R. Hinnebusch (Citation1990) Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 144–152. 20 Independent Syrian analysts who experienced the tense period leading up to, and proceeding, the Corrective Movement in 1970 openly admit that President al-Asad had no choice but to tolerate the excesses of his aides. It was either to allow those who surrounded him to loot, or to suffer along with them at the hands of competing factions and societal forces. Others are far more critical. They claim that Asad knew well what he was doing and opened the door quite willingly and widely to the kind of corrupt behavior that the Ba'th officially condemned henceforth. The latter critics emphasize that this was unavoidable, but not an accident. The Asad faction of the Ba'th had alienated the more refined Ba'thists and attracted the careerist and more self-serving individuals. These, they claim, were the people with whom Asad had surrounded himself since he occupied his post as Defense Minister in 1966. The behavior of the top political elite in the Ba'th party after 1970, according to one informant, reflects the 'unfolding of their yet unsatisfied desires… political, financial, social, and sexual.' Fortunately, or perhaps not, Asad's principal desire was political power, as opposed to the assorted bag of desires that some of his aides pursued. This, they claim, kept him focused and allowed him to manipulate those who surrounded him. He made sure, one critic claims, that they individually amounted to very little in terms of power: 'without him, they were all zeros, and they all knew it, all the way up to the most powerful among them. Only when you put him in the picture, as the number "1," do these zeros acquire meaning and power.' But by no means was Asad personally opposed to much of their behavior, critics assert in responding to the common thesis of a good man surrounded by a nasty bunch. Short of encouraging it, he protected many of the most notorious 'men of the regime' for decades. These men, who kept by Asad's side, became the cornerstones of the state bourgeoisie in the 1990s. Source: Various conversations and interviews with independent Syrian critics, Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, December 1998. See also Hanna Batatu (Citation1999) Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 230–233. 21 Such committees would be entitled 'Commission of Inquiry into Illicit Gains.' See Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, p. 215. 22 Only when such figures cross a political line do their economic activities become subject to scrutiny, as with the removal of Bashir Najjar from his security post in 1999. 23 See, in Batatu's Syria's Peasantry, the chapter entitled The Causal Factors Behind the Ascent of the Lesser Rural or Village Notability, pp. 155–162, particularly the section on The Rural Penetration of the State Bureaucracy, p. 160. 24 Though a minority in Syria, Christians, comprising around 11 percent of the population, historically have been among the more privileged classes, largely because of the kind of professions they have taken up and the kind of support they received either from relatives abroad or from foreign powers in the past two centuries. For more on minorities and their historical presence, see Nikolaos Van Dam (Citation1996) The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party (London: I.B. Tauris); and Philip Khoury (Citation1987) Syria and the French Mandate: the Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 25 See Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, pp. 218–224. 26 That requirement may apply only to those in the top rungs of the state bourgeoisie, if only for the small number of those usually understood to be in that category; see Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114. 27 These levels of power and the discussion below are based on B. Haddad (Citation2012a), Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 28 Some individuals in this category officially have left the political scene but remain intimately involved in political decision-making and processes of allocating economic surplus and resources. Prominent among such individuals is Muhammad al-Khuly, former president Hafiz al-Asad's brother-in-law, and other members of the Asad family, particularly his own brothers and their offspring. 29 See Timeline: Syria, BBC News. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east, accessed December 27, 2001. 30 It is reported that Maher al-Asad, Bashar's brother, who occupies increasingly important roles within the military, shot his brother-in-law, Asif Shawkat, during a dispute over how to proceed after Asad's death in June 2000. Although a well-known incident among most observers, this episode was never written about in the Syrian press. Author's interviews, Damascus, July–August 2001. 31 This occurs primarily in the automotive sales sector, where members of this sub-stratum, usually the younger generation, are attempting to take over the car dealership businesses of a host of private sector actors. Often, they enter into temporary partnerships that end up in buying out private partners, as with the Sang Yong dealership that previously was owned by MP Ma'moun al-Homsi. Not incidentally, al-Homsi was arrested on dubious charges after initiating a hunger strike on August 8, 2001 and was charged with inciting sectarian strife. See al-Hayat, August 8 and 10, 2001, p. 1; and Bassam Haddad (Citation2001) Business as Usual in Syria? Middle East Report Press Information, Note 68, September 7. 32 See Bradford L. Dillman (Citation2000) State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-Seeking and Failed Development (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 11–15. 33 Most prominently in this respect, the customs officers in charge of traffic across the Lebanese borders since 1976, as well as those in similar positions along the Syrian–Turkish borders in the early 1980s, have found themselves in positions that allow them to accumulate untold wealth—as well as free products—simply by accepting 'gifts' as compensation for turning a blind eye to cross-border shipments. Indeed, some of the fiercest administrative struggles within the military concern the occupation of such posts at the end of the incumbents' terms. This applies to the high level generals and, usually, their own officer crews who move around with them. Such wholesale team changes have made corruption at land borders far more efficient and far less likely to be cracked down upon. To illustrate the point further, see A. Dalila (Citation1999) 'Ajz al-Muwaazanah al-'Aamah wa Subul Mu'aalajatuhu [The General Budget Deficit and Methods for its Treatment], Paper No. 9, 1999 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April 20), in which he outlines the 'lost income' of the Syrian government, income that goes right back to Syrian officials and para-officials (e.g., relatives of the top elite who wield power through such ties or through quasi-official appointments by their kin). 34 It is no surprise that generals like Ghazi Kan'an and Shafiq Fayyad literally have created islands of wealth and power as a result of Syria's involvement in Lebanon and of their commanding army and intelligence positions there. Such high-level generals do not, and cannot, operate by themselves. They receive assistance from both horizontal and vertical networks that share an interest in promoting semi-legal and illegal avenues of accumulating wealth and securing their positions. 35 This movement in the direction of regime soft-liners and reformers subsided after Hafiz al-Asad's death, which left most reformers in disarray and allowed the security hardliners to play a more decisive role in Syria's domestic politics. 36 Author's interviews with former public sector officials, September 1998–May 1999. 37 See Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power; and Hinnebusch, Democratization in the Middle East. 38 A clear indication of the 'tenure' of such individuals is the length of time in which they remain either as members of the Regional Command or within the elite regime circle, often as provincial governors or heads of the myriad popular organizations that span Syria. Between 1985 and 2000, for instance, the Regional Command members remained the same, largely because of continuous postponement of the Regional Command Conference. Even in the 2000 reshuffle, two-thirds of the members remained on board. 39 This term refers to competition between two parties where one party is heavily supported by the state. The outcome of such 'competition' is invariably favorable to the state. 40 It is important to note here that some economic public sector managers would fight for maintaining the dominance of the public sector, but these are individuals who have largely kept to the rules and regulations set by the public sector—e.g., they live on their relatively meager salaries as opposed to other public sector managers who benefit from a variety of opportunities and abuse institutional privileges—and who have not ventured into the private sector. Thus, they have a real and honest interest in maintaining their positions and, by connection, the public sector. Their behavior and lifestyles, and their, at most, modest wealth, vastly differentiate them from those we consider to be part of the state bourgeoisie. 41 See Nabil Marzouq (Citation1998) al-Tanmiya wa al-'Ummal [Development and Labor], Paper No. 17, 1998 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, March), p. 309. 42 General social subsidies have decreased significantly, from 8.23 percent in the early 1980s to 2.44 percent in the early 1990s, and along with them the additional subsidies for public and government sector workers (See Nabil Marzouq (Citation1998) al-Tanmiya wa al-'Ummal [Development and Labor], Paper No. 17, 1998 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, March), p. 314). None the less, these workers receive guaranteed health and other benefits that are not available to those employed in the private sector. 43 On August 27, 2001, the government announced a 25 percent raise in the minimum wages and salaries of 1.4 million public sector workers (with their families, they constitute 45–50 percent of the Syrian population of 17 million). The last such raise occurred in 1994 (a 30 percent raise), but was literally gobbled up by dramatic inflation in 1994–96. For more information on the state of the Syrian labor market, see Sa'id Nabulsi (Citation1999) Tasheeh Bunyat al-'Amalah al-Suriyya [Correcting the Structure of Syrian Labor], Paper No. 11, 1999 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April 5), pp. 343–361. 44 See Rislan Khaddour (Citation1999) al-Athaar al-Iqtisadiyyah li-Thahirat al-Fasad al-Idari [The Economic Effects of the Phenomenon of Administrative Corruption], Paper No. 2, 1999 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, February 23). 45 See Waterbury, Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie; and Richards & Waterbury, Political Economy of the Middle East, pp. 201–204. 46 In fact, this tenuous relationship to assets has pushed civilian members of the state bourgeoisie toward establishing, if not relying on, relationships with various top officials in the army and security apparatuses in Syria. 47 See Patrick Seale (Citation1990) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press); and Timeline: Syria, BBC News. Interestingly, the chronology provided by the BBC highlights the 'Rif'at Sacked' section as one of five other major events in a Syria timeline that stretches from 1970 to 2001. 48 Former Prime Minister al-Zu'bi immediately was expelled as a member of both the Ba'th Party and its regional command upon official reports that accused him of being 'heavily involved' in corruption and of committing acts 'that conflict with the values, morals, and principles of the party and constitute a transgression of the law, creating severe damages to the reputation of the party and state and to the national economy.' A long list of associates and other 'corrupt' officials was drafted and people were arrested or 'called in' by the dozens. Most significant among those were the former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Salim Yassin, and Minister of Transportation, Mufid Abd-ul-Karim. Al-Zu'bi was reported to have committed suicide while under house arrest. See the weekly Al-Wasat No. 437 (June 12–18, 2000), p. 12. 49 In theory and in practice, the Syrian constitution promulgated under Asad in 1973 (three years after the Corrective Movement) vested vastly disproportionate power in the hands of the executive, often at the expense of all other branches of government. In practice, the judiciary has been replaced by the Ba'th Party's Regional Command, itself made up of the most powerful members of the state bourgeoisie. See the charts on the make-up of the Syrian Ba'th's Regional Command after 1975 in Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, pp. 332–353. 50 For various examples, see Dalila, The General Budget. 51 See Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114. 52 For further study of the neglect of SOEs, consult the economic series volumes published by the Economic Sciences Association in the mid- to late 1990s, a time when such criticism leveled at the public sector dinosaurs was somewhat encouraged by the then-up-and-coming 'heir,' Bashar al-Asad. See especially the 1998 and the 2000 lecture series, including Arif Dalila's (Citation2000) oddly titled al-Qita' al-'Am fi Suriya: min al-Himaya ila al-Munafasa [The Public Sector in Syria: From Protection to Competition], Paper No. 14, 2000 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, May 2). 53 For instance, upward mobility within the public sector usually is tied to one's membership in the Ba'th Party, itself a position that requires renouncing of potentially opposing views, making promotion synonymous with consent vis-à-vis one's superiors. Other methods include the offering of privileges for those who cooperate among the most outspoken members of the GFTU. Author's interviews with public sector workers in the Health and Industry Departments, November–December 1998, Damascus. 54 Various off-the-record conversations between the author and former public sector officials (September 1998–May 1999), including an interview with a former communist who serves as an academic advisor for the GFTU, April 21, 1999. Such information is naturally without documentation because of the political sensitivity and informal nature of such prevalent partnerships between officials and private businessmen. 55 Various off-the-record conversations between the author and former public sector officials (September 1998–May 1999), including an interview with a former communist who serves as an academic advisor for the GFTU, April 21, 1999. Such information is naturally without documentation because of the political sensitivity and informal nature of such prevalent partnerships between officials and private businessmen 56 The financial and logistical affairs of their private business partners, who usually formally own their joint assets, are facilitated directly by their partners in officialdom, often with no more than a phone call that urges bank officials to approve loans or customs officers to allow entry of shipments through land borders. Author interviews, Damascus, March 8, 1999. 57 According to a former official at the Commercial Bank of Syria, such trends can be observed best in reverse, since no member of government would vocalize this desire for being acknowledged as a member of the private bourgeoisie: i.e., prominent business leaders, including figures like Abd-ul-Rahman al-'Attar, are quick to deny any affiliation with officials, whether or not they work together. Moreover, established businessmen like al-'Attar would flatly distinguish themselves even from other businessmen who are known to be/have been the protégés of officials or security service men. It is such attitudes toward the new bourgeoisie and its protectors—as parasitic bourgeoisie—that many among the state bourgeoisie would like to overcome. Interviews with al-'Attar, and other established businessmen who wish to remain anonymous, Damascus, May 9, 1999 (with al-'Attar) and Aleppo, April 3, 1999 (noteworthy here is that al-'Attar himself is considered by most Syrians as a member of the new bourgeoisie as well as a pioneer among the 'trio' who cooperated with the state in the mid-1970s, including Sa'ib Nahhas (who ultimately declined to be interviewed) and 'Uthman al-'A'idi (residing in Paris). The salience of this attitude toward the new bourgeoisie—state or private—in society at large is well documented even in the state-run press, especially the 'Economic Page' of the daily Tishreen and The Ba'th newspaper weekly supplement, al-Ba'th al Iqtisadi (which was published regularly until the year 2000). More blunt depictions of this attitude appeared in the two publications that were licensed after Bashar's succession, the economic Al-Iqtisadiyya and the satirical al-Domari. Though they are still in circulation, both publications' freedoms were curtailed along with the arrests of civil society activists in September 2001. 58 See Haddad, Business as Usual. 59 It is important to emphasize the rational motivation for protecting a minoritarian regime and not confine the motives to sectarian ones. The reason is simple: even anti-sectarian strongmen within the regime are likely to face a similar fate to that dealt to everyone else in the regime in case of a regime collapse. Hence, the behavior of protecting the regime is, first and foremost, rationally and not primordially motivated. 60 Se
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