Foreign policy change in a polarized two-party system: Greece and Turkey’s EU candidacy
2015; Routledge; Volume: 15; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14683857.2014.1002293
ISSN1743-9639
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoAbstractThis article aims to theorize about how dynamics of party competition influence government decisions to engage in foreign policy change. It shows how a focus on the functioning of polarized two-party competition in Greece in the late 1990s sheds light on crucial questions concerning the content, timing and institutionalization of Greece’s decision to allow the EU to grant Turkey candidate-member status. The article problematizes this foreign policy change as a decision influenced, among other factors, by the demands of party competition, and especially the strategy of the then ruling socialist party. More generally, this article shows how a focus on party politics complements in various interesting ways our understanding of foreign policy decisions and foreign policy change. Party system dynamics are shown to act as significant intervening factors between determinants of foreign policy usually analyzed in the literature and eventual foreign policy change.Keywords: foreign policyforeign policy changepolitical partiesGreek–Turkish relationsparty systemspolarizationPASOKGreek foreign policyHelsinki AcknowledgementsAngelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos thanks participants in the EWIS workshop for their comments, and especially Kai Oppermann. Gratitude is due to Rory Costello at Limerick who suggested improvements over multiple readings of earlier drafts. He also thanks two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, as well as the editors of this journal. The usual disclaimer applies.NotesA first version of this article was presented in the workshop ‘Theorising Domestic and International Constraints on Foreign Policy Decision Making’ of the 1st European Workshops in International Studies (EWIS, Tartu, June 2013).1. By the mid-1990s the issues Turkey considered ‘open’ were: (a) The demarcation of the continental shelf, (b) demarcation of territorial waters, (c) demarcation of the air space over the Aegean, (d) militarization of Eastern Aegean islands, (e) sovereignty over specific islands and islets, (f) the limits of each country’s operational air control over the Aegean Sea. For a thorough presentation of the legal parameters of these issues and an effort to present both sides of the argument, see Heraclides (Citation2007, 217–382).2. See also the discussion in Economides (Citation2005) and Moumoutzis (Citation2011).3. This can be read inversely as well: The explanation one wants to prioritize to explain change informs how much of a change one thinks Helsinki is.4. On a theoretical discussion of the role of ideas in political change see, among others, Blyth (Citation2003).5. Imia was the closest Greece and Turkey ever came to war. However, previous crises were also perceived as very dangerous in Greece. The 1987 Aegean crisis had forced then Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who had instituted a policy of ‘no dialogue’, to enter into discussions with Turkey.6. This should be the norm in two-party systems. See Downs (Citation1957) for the classical statement.7. This is in essence an expansion of the argument of Mavrogordatos (Citation1984), while Kalyvas’ (Citation1997) analysis also agrees with it.8. PASOK went through a brief period of reassessment of its foreign policy in the late 1980s, following the 1987 crisis that almost led to armed engagement with Turkey. Andreas Papandreou accepted a dialogue process with Turkey on some of the bilateral issues (chiefly the continental shelf). But he quickly reverted to his old positions, also because his domestic position was becoming increasingly tenuous politically and electorally.9. Important works on foreign policy change are, among many, Gustavsson (Citation1999), Goldmann (Citation1988), Holsti (Citation1982) and Welch (Citation2005).10. On foreign policy and political parties see, among others, Hofmann (Citation2013), Kaarbo and Beasley (Citation2008) and Rathbun (Citation2004).11. Notice analogies with debates in international relations (especially constructivist) literature on the relationship between actors and the social structures they are embedded in (see Dessler [Citation1989] for the classical epistemological statement).12. Here, I follow Vernardakis’ (Citation2011) view of PASOK-ND competition in the 1980s and the early 1990s as reflecting tangible policy and social divides in Greece. Kalyvas (Citation1997) challenges the view that PASOK and ND were genuinely separated by policy even in the 1980s.13. 50% of the population still was claiming in opinion polls in October 1999 to be against lifting the veto on Turkey (Tsakonas Citation2010, 216, note 309).14. See PASOK and ND’s opinion poll standing throughout 1999–2000 in Simitis (Citation2005, 645).15. On PASOK’s long-standing anti-Right polarization strategy, see the very good discussion in Eleftheriou and Tassis (Citation2013, 134–48).16. Further cementing this argument, during the second Simitis government (2000–2004) Greece also proceeded to completely Europeanize its approach to the Balkans and the Macedonia name-dispute, by leading the drive to accept the Western Balkan countries as EU candidates. Again, this was far from PASOK’s populist positions up until the mid-1990s and its vehement opposition to Mitsotakis’ efforts to reconcile Greece’s Balkan policies and European membership.17. See Simitis’ speech presenting PASOK’s program ahead of the April 2000 elections, March 29, 2000, accessible in his personal webpage www.costas-simitis.gr. Also Economides (Citation2005, 481–7).18. Statements Simitis made at the presentation of the PASOK program for the April 2000 elections on March 29 2000, and at PASOK’s central electoral rally, April 7 2000, accessible in his personal webpage www.costas-simitis.gr.
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