Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Defending Democracy? Assessing the OAS's 2002 Diplomatic Intervention in Haiti

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 14; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13698249.2012.706953

1743-968X

Heather Smith-Cannoy,

Marine and Offshore Engineering Studies

Abstract Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) have vastly different capacities for intervening in conflicts in their member states. The Organization of American States (OAS), a regional IGO in Latin America, has the capacity to intervene diplomatically to defend democracy in the hemisphere. This article examines how well the OAS applied these diplomatic tools in defense of democracy in Haiti following the 2000 political crisis. I argue that the OAS achieved some success in Haiti, particularly the Electoral Technical Program. However, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the OAS missed key opportunities to invoke their strongest diplomatic tools in defense of democracy in Haiti. Notes 1. The original members included: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras (membership suspended in 2009), Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The membership of the OAS has expanded beyond the original 19 members and now also includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Cuba (membership reinstated in 2009), Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago. 2. OAS Charter, Article 1. 3. OAS Charter, Article 25. The CBMs are a more recent development and are enshrined in the OAS' 1995 Declaration of Santiago and 1998 Declaration of San Salvador. 4. OAS Charter, Article 25. The CBMs are a more recent development and are enshrined in the OAS's 1995 Declaration of Santiago and 1998 Declaration of San Salvador. 5. OAS, Peace Americas: Bulletin of the Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions – Peace Fund 1/1 (2009), online at < www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/publications/>. 6. More information on the OAS's role in facilitating peace between Honduras and Nicaragua can be found on the OAS's website: < www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/hondurasandnicaragua/>. 7. Mark Peceny and William Stanley, ‘Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America’, International Organization 55/1 (2001) pp.149–82. 8. Barry S. Levitt, ‘A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter’, Latin American Politics and Society 48/3 (2006) pp.93–123; Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, ‘The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership’, Latin American Politics and Society 43/1 (2001) pp.103–26; see also Tom Farer, ‘Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere’ in Tom Farer (ed.) Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Sovereignty in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 1996). 9. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 2005). 10. On the organizations website, the OAS refers to the General Assembly as the ‘supreme organ’ of the OAS: < www.oas.org/en/about/our_structure.asp>. 11. OAS Charter, Article 1. 12. Skidmore and Smith (note 9) p.409. 13. Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America’, International Organization 47/3 (1993) pp.411–41. 14. OAS. AG/RES. 1080. 5 Jun. 1991. 15. OAS. Inter-American Democratic Charter, 11 September 2001, online at < www.oas.org>. 16. OAS. Inter-American Democratic Charter, 11 September 2001, online at < www.oas.org>. 17. The OAS intervened in Haiti in 1991 following a coup and the establishment of authoritarian rule. 18. In 1992 Alberto Fujimori suspended the Constitution, dissolved congress, and arrested many of his critics which prompted the OAS to intervene. 19. President Jorge Serrano also initiated an autogolpe in 1993 by suspending provisions of the constitution, dismissing judges from the Supreme Court, and dissolving congress. Like the autogolpe the year before in Peru Serrano's actions prompted OAS action. 20. OAS intervention in Paraguay followed a civil military crisis in 1996 which pitted the Army Chief, who refused a presidential order to relinquish his position against the President. 21. In 2002 the Venezuela military attempted to depose Hugo Chavez and install Pedro Carmona. However internationally unpopular Chavez was the democratically elected President of Venezuela and the coup that ousted him prompted OAS intervention. 22. Ecuador is slightly different from the other examples because the OAS invoked the IADC but not Resolution 1080 to intervene. OAS intervention in Ecuador followed a constitutional crisis brought on by President Lucio Gutierrez's allies in Congress who oversaw the firing of Supreme Court justices. 23. Marc Lacey, ‘Latin America Still Divided Over Coup’, The New York Times (5 June 2010). 24. This conclusion is supported by the findings in both D.S. Boniface, A Democratic Norm for the Western Hemisphere? An Analysis of the Organization of American States, 1991–Present, Working Paper Prepared for the Latin American Studies Association Conference, Las Vegas, NV, 7–9 October 2004; Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, ‘Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America’, Latin American Politics and Society 49/2 (2007) pp.1–31. 25. For more on the OAS's failure to intervene in Paraguay and Bolivia, see Dexter S. Boniface, ‘The OAS's Mixed Record’ in Thomas Legler, Sharon Lean, and Dexter Boniface (eds) Promoting Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2007) pp.40–62. 26. The official condemnations are contained in OAS, CP/RES. 567/91 and the sanctions are in OAS, MRE/RES.2/91 and 3/92. 27. Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (note 24). 28. Heraldo Munoz, ‘The Right to Democracy in the Americas’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 40/1 (1998) pp.1–18. For a more critical assessment of the OAS efforts to intervene in support of democracy, see Richard Bloomfield, ‘Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime’, Washington Quarterly 17/2 (1994) pp.157–69. 29. For more on this mission, visit the OAS's Peace Mission homepage: < www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/>. 30. For more on this mission, visit the OAS's Peace Mission homepage: www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/ 31. For more on this mission, visit the OAS's Peace Mission homepage: www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/ 32. For more information, visit the OAS's Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation homepage: < www.oas.org/en/spa/deco/moe.asp>. 33. The OAS authorized this distribution in CP/RES. 831.1342/02. For additional information about how the money was spent, see OAS Permanent Council, ‘Quarterly Report on the Use of Funds Allocated Under Resolution CP/RES. 831. 1342/02. Between 1 October − 31 December 2005’, 3 May 2006, online at < www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/reports/>. 34. In 2008 the EU donated US$492,809.00 to the OAS, and in 2009 the EU donated US$501,658.00 to the OAS. Additional information available online at < www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/perm_observers/contributions.asp>. 35. In 2008 Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Greece contributed to OAS missions. China and South Korea also contributed to OAS efforts. Additional information available online at < www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/perm_observers/contributions2008.asp>. 36. OAS Department of International Affairs (DIA), ‘DIA Activities with Permanent Observers 2009’, online at < www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/perm_observers/contributions.asp>. 37. OAS Charter, Article 2. 38. My thanks to Oya Ozkanca for drawing my attention to this issue. 39. OAS. MRE/RES. 2/91, 3/91. 40. On this point, see Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (note 24) p.13. 41. Before Aristide's reinstatement, there was also an OAS civilian mission (OAS-DEMOC). 42. Yasmine Shamsie, ‘Building “Low-Intensity” Conflict in Haiti: The OAS Contribution’, Third World Quarterly 25/6 (2004) pp.1097–1115. 43. Don Bohning, ‘Vote Turnout High in Haiti Despite Risk’, Miami Herald 22 May 2000. 44. Alex Dupry, The Prophet and the Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community and Haiti (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield 2007) p.138. 45. Alex Dupry, The Prophet and the Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community and Haiti (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2007) p.138 See also Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002). 46. United States, Department of State, ‘Haiti: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’, Washington, DC, 2001. 47. United States, Department of State, ‘Haiti: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’, Washington, DC, 2001 48. OAS, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the OAS Mission and the Joint OAS/CARICOM Mission to Haiti’, Washington, DC, 2001. 49. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, ‘Haiti Needs Help, Washington Declines’, Washington Report on the Hemisphere 21/5 (2001). 50. OAS, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the OAS Mission and the Joint OAS/CARICOM Mission to Haiti’, San Jose, Costa Rica, 2001. 51. OAS, ‘Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti’, San Jose, Costa Rica, 2000. 52. Dupry (note 44) p.144. 53. In a fascinating discussion, Dupry explains that the group consisted of neo-Duvalierists, centrists, and social democrats. See Dupry (note 44) p.147. 54. CARICOM is a regional inter-governmental organization composed of 15 Caribbean states, including Haiti. 55. OAS, ‘Fifth Report of the Mission of the OAS to Haiti’, Port-au-Prince, 2002; see Appendix III: Elements of a Successful Compromise. 56. For example, one of the armed groups changed its name from ‘The Cannibal Army’ to ‘The Gonaives Resistance Front for the Overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.’ 57. OAS, CP/RES. 806. 1303/02. 16 Jan. 2002. 58. Visit the OAS's Secretariat for Political Affairs for additional information: < www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/>. 59. OAS, ‘Special Mission of the Organization of American States for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti: Work Plan Proposal for the period July 2004-June 2005’, Port-au-Prince, 2004, pp.9–11. 60. Ibid., p.2. 61. Dupry (note 44) pp.154–5. 62. The chimeres turned against Aristide because they blamed Aristide for the murder of one of their leaders Amiot Metayer. Metayer used violent tactics against the CD, ostensibly on the orders of Aristide but western states and organizations claimed that Aristide arrest him. When Metayer's body was discovered following his meeting with a government official the chimeres switched their loyalty and rose up against Aristide. See Dupry (note 44) p.166. 63. Tim Weiner and Lydia Polgreen, ‘The Aristide Resignation: The Turmoil; Haitian Rebels Enter Capital; Aristide Bitter’, The New York Times 2 Mar. 2004. 64. Kirstin Kramer, Taking a Closer Look at Washington's Anti-Aristide Game Plan for Haiti, Washington Report on the Hemisphere, Washington, DC, 24 Jun. 2004; Jessica Leight, Giving Haitian Self-Rule a Bad Name, Washington Report on The Hemisphere, Washington, DC, 18 Jun. 2004. 65. CARICOM, ‘Statement on Haiti Issued by the Fifteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads Government of the Caribbean Community’, Braseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis, 24–25 Mar. 2004. 66. Kirstin Kramer, CARICOM's Action on Haiti: Honor for a Few, Shame for Most, Washington Report on the Hemisphere, Washington, DC, 12 Aug. 2004. 67. United Nations Security Council. S/RES/1542. 30 Apr. 2004. 68. MINUSTAH Mission Background, online at < www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>. 69. MINUSTAH Mission Background, online at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml 70. OAS, ‘Special Mission of the Organization of American States for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti: Work Plan Proposal for the period July 2004–June 2005’, Port-au-Prince, 2004. 71. Dupry (note 44) p.173. 72. I am grateful to Stefan Wolff for pointing this out. 73. OAS, AG/RES (34/04), 8 Jun. 2004. Operative Clause 7. 74. OAS/UN, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States Concerning Electoral Assistance to Haiti’, Washington, DC, 2004. OAS, CP/INF 5104 (04). 75. These numbers were provided by Elizabeth Spehar, the General Coordinator of the OAS Program of Electoral Technical Assistance in Haiti. Her presentation was part of an OAS Forum, ‘Democratic Stability in the Americas: The Institutional Role of the OAS’, Santo Domingo, 2006. 76. OAS Press Release, ‘OAS Secretary General Hails Decision to Declare Rene Preval Winner of Haiti's Presidential Elections’, 16 Feb. 2006 (E-029/06). 77. OAS Charter, Article 106. 78. OAS, ‘Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, 23 Feb. 2005 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122). See Chapter IV, para. 120. 79. OAS (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122), 23 Feb. 2005, Chapter IV, paras. 125–31. 80. Ibid., paras. 132–6. 81. Ibid., para. 137. 82. Ibid., paras. 139–42. 83. Ibid., paras. 142–5. 84. OAS, CP/RS. 861 (1400/04), 19 Feb. 2004. See Operative Clauses 1, 2, and 4, respectively. 85. OAS, CP/RS 862 (1401/04), 26 Feb. 2004. 86. OAS, AG/RES (34/04), 8 Jun. 2004. 87. Amnesty International, ‘Haiti Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Last Chance for Haiti’, New York, 2004. 88. OAS Charter, Articles 2, 3, and 9. 89. UNDP, Human Development Indicators, online at < http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/>. 90. To assess the extent to which Haiti's level of democracy rebounded since the 2006 election I rely on the Polity IV Project 2008 country report for Haiti. See Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Gurr, ‘Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009’, online at < www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>. 91. On this point, see Dupry (note 44). 92. , p.173. 93. Shamsie (note 42) p.112. 94. Dupry (note 44) p.138. 95. See Dupry (note 44). See also Walt Bogdanich and Jenny Nordberg, ‘Mixed U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos’, The New York Times 29 Jan. 2006. 96. Bogdanich and Nordberg (note 95).