Discourse on democratisation by Russian and Chinese political elites
2012; Routledge; Volume: 28; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/21599165.2012.669732
ISSN2159-9165
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoAbstract This article seeks to examine and compare the parameters of discourse of contemporary Russian and Chinese political elites regarding democracy. It focuses on the question of the extent to which Russian and Chinese political elites have acknowledged the validity of constructs of Western liberal democracy. I argue that democracy is conceived instrumentally as a means to economic modernisation. The central dilemma facing both leaderships has been how to adapt elements of the liberal democratic model, while ensuring the maintenance of vertical political controls. Keywords: ChinaChinese Communist Partycivil societydemocratisationRussian Federationruling parties Notes The term siloviki, derived from silovye struktory (force structures) in Russian, is generally considered a faction within the Russian leadership oriented toward control over economic assets, drawn from former and current members of the military, law enforcement, and security forces. See Bremmer and Charap (Citation2006). In a recent article in this journal, Urban and Khestanov (Citation2011) argue that Medvedev's pallid 2010 presidential address was a deliberate jettisoning of reformist rhetoric in the hopes of securing elite support for a 2012 presidential campaign. A classic formulation of interest group articulation in the Soviet Union is found in Skilling and Griffiths (Citation1971). For an investigation of the democracy movement in the early 1980s, see Nathan (Citation1985). Chinese discourse does not make a clear cut distinction between political reform (zhengzhi gaige) and democracy (minzhu) in terms of content, although the latter is undoubtedly the bolder and more provocative concept. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.html (accessed 21 January 2008); and http://www.10npc.org.cn/english//news/231852.html (accessed 29 January 2008). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.html (accessed 21 January 2008). http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml (accessed 22 February 2008); http://archive.kremlin.ru/ng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029_type82912_87086.shtml (accessed 27 September 2010). http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/296. See, for example, the works of Dahl (Citation1971, Citation1998). In addition, Yu's book, Democracy is a good thing, has been published in English by the Brookings Institution with an introduction by Cheng Li (Yu Citation2008). This point is also noted by Sirke Makinen in her discussion of Vladislav Surkov (Makinen Citation2011). The need to modernise society as a prerequisite for the construction of an innovative economy is a particular theme of Vladislav Surkov. See Makinen (Citation2011). There is vast literature on democratic transitions. A primary contribution is the four-volume series edited by O'Donnell et al. (Citation1986). In his 1990 book on democratic transitions, Giuseppe di Palma criticised the ‘dismal science of politics (or the science of a dismal politics) that passively entrusts political change to exogenous and distant social transformations’ arguing that neither a democratic political culture nor political legitimacy were preconditions for the process of democratic legitimisation. See di Palma (Citation1990, pp. 4, 144–155). ‘Wen Jiabao receives an exclusive interview from NHK in Tokyo on 1 June (Full Text)’ (Citation2010). Lam (Citation2010). The letter sent in October 2010 by a group of party elders to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, calling for freedom of the media in China, pointedly noted that even China's premier did not enjoy free speech. This letter can be found in Chinese and in English translation on the website of the China Media Project, at http://cm;hju.hk/2010/10/13/8035 (accessed 27 October 2010). http://www.inopo.ru/page642/club/page483/ (accessed 30 October 2010). See, for example, Medvedev's cautions against ‘permanent revolution’ in his article ‘Forward Russia’. Democracy: the development of the Russian model was published in 2008, in conjunction with the Centre for Political Technologies, while Russia of the twenty-first century: image of a desired tomorrow was released in 2010. See Institute of Contemporary Development (Citation2008, Citation2010). http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2010/01/22/2000_type82913_223914.shtml (accessed 15 October 2010). For a transcript of Putin's remarks and his implicit rebuttal of Medvedev see http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2010/01/22/2000_type82913_223914.shtml (accessed 15 October 2010). Medvedev indicated that he agreed with some but not all of the policy recommendations presented in the 2010 INSOR report. See ‘Russian think-tank director interviewed on “modernization” agenda’ (Citation2010). Perhaps the most outspoken member of INSOR is Evgenii Gontmakher, who was a signatory, along with a number of well-known political activists, to a letter sent to Medvedev in February 2011 expressing grave concern for the future of Russia. See ‘Russia cannot go on like this’ (Citation2011). For a discussion of the Chinese conception of civil society and its variant translations, see Ma (Citation2006, pp. 18–22). Also see Yu (Citation2008, pp. 37–38). For an example of Chinese endorsement of civil society as a construct, see ‘Full text of joint statement of 10th China–EU Summit’ (Citation2007). To be sure, numerous examples exist of citizen protests in Russia and China. The Federation of Russian Car Drivers has organised thousands of car owners to protest import duties, gas prices, and police corruption. In the summer of 2010, Russian environmentalists temporarily blocked the construction of a highway through the Khimki forest near Moscow. China experiences literally tens of thousands of political protests each year. Although the Chinese government is vigilant regarding expressions of dissent from intellectuals or ethnic minorities – such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs – it typically chooses to ignore or provide discretionary concessions to striking workers. These protests do not conform to the ideal model of state–citizen interactions set forth in Russian or Chinese elite discourse but they are typically issue related, locally based, and do not call into question the legitimacy of the regime. For a discussion of protests in China, see Cunningham and Wasserstrom (Citation2011). Debra Javeline and Sarah Lindemann-Komorova argue, contrary to the conventional Western view, that the 2006 NGO law and its amendments have not increased the difficulties that Russian NGOs encounter, nor have pro-Western Russian NGOs been excluded from state funding (Javeline and Lindemann-Komorova Citation2010). Also see Javeline and Lindemann-Komorova (Citation2008). ‘Chinese NGOs – Carving a Niche Within Constraint’ (Citation2007). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.html (accessed 21 January 2008). In a July 2006 interview with Ekspert, Medvedev voiced reservations about the concept, noting that it ‘was far from an ideal term’ as it implied that Russia was less than a complete democracy. Putin also appeared to distance himself when he noted, in response to a question at the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2006, that sovereignty and democracy were two different things, occupying two different spheres. See Medvedev (Citation2006) and Putin (Citation2006b). For further discussion, see ‘Russian President Putin's criticism of “sovereign democracy”’ (Citation2006). See Surkov's remarks at http://www.edinoros.ru/print.html?id=230750 (accessed 23 January 2008). The leading voice for Chinese liberalism in the CCP in the 1990s was Li Shenzhi (deceased 2003). Although retired after Tiananmen, Li eventually emerged as the Deputy President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences where he proved to be a mentor to a number of younger scholars. See Fewsmith (Citation2008b, pp. 133–139) and Feng (Citation2008). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/03/content_818952.html (accessed 22 October 2010); also see Wen (Citation2007). http://en.gpf-yaroslavl.ru/presscenter/publications/Speech-of-President-of-Russia-Dmitry-Medvedev-at-plenary-session-of-Global-Policy-Forum-The-Modern-State-Standards-of-Democracy-and-Criteria-of-Efficiency (accessed 14 October 2010). http://slon.ru/articles/141684/index.php?PRINT=YARD-Y&ID=141684 (accessed 10 October 2009). See, for example, Dahl (Citation1971). Dahl also presents a classic rendition of the pluralist model in Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city (Dahl Citation1961). A July 2011 survey by the Levada Centre indicated that 55% of Russian respondents considered that democracy was necessary for Russia, a decline of 12 points from the 2007 survey. In addition, 45% of Russians expressed a preference for a distinctly Russian form of democracy in conformance with Russia's special conditions, compared to 23% who preferred a form of democracy practiced in the developed states of Europe and America. http://www.leavad.ru/press/20111081003.html (accessed 23 August 2011). http://en.gpf-yaroslavl.ru/presscenter/publications/Speech-of-President-of-Russia-Dmitry-Medvedev-at-plenary-session-of-Global-Policy-Forum-The-Modern-State-Standards-of-Democracy-and-Criteria-of-Efficiency (accessed 14 October 2010).
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