Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law
1984; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 13; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/467747
ISSN1537-5366
Autores Tópico(s)Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessEfficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of LawDavid FriedmanDavid FriedmanPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 13, Number 2Jun., 1984 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467747 Views: 21Total views on this site Citations: 48Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1984 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ilia Murtazashvili, Yang Zhou Complex externalities, pandemics, and public choice, Public Choice 192 (Oct 2023).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01104-6Eduardo Blasco, David Marcos Nulla Libertarian Poena Sine NAP: Reexamination of Libertarian Theories of Punishment, Studia Humana 9, no.22 (Aug 2020): 83–89.https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2020-0016Pedro Naso, Erwin Bulte, Tim Swanson Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone, European Journal of Political Economy 61 (Jan 2020): 101819.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101819Lisa R. 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