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Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 31; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100802206533

1521-0731

Donald J. Reed,

Military Strategy and Technology

Abstract Fifth generation warfare has arrived and is irreversibly changing the character and nature of human conflict. It confronts the United States with the evolving strategic dilemma of not only dealing with the War on Terror, but of simultaneously crafting strategies that look beyond military preparedness for past wars and embrace the perspective of national preparedness for the spectrum of future conflicts. This article uses four essential elements of war—the new domains of conflict, the changing nature of adversaries, the changing nature of objectives, and the changing nature of force—to build a generational typology of war and conflict that informs the characteristics of fifth generation warfare. The resultant model produces two outcomes: First, it demonstrates how recent events such as the rise of computer hackers, the 2001 anthrax and the 2003–2004 ricin attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the emergence of Al Qaeda demonstrate characteristics of fifth generation warfare. Second, it illustrates the way in which these events are unique indicators of a future in which non-state entities are increasingly able to wage war on equal footing with nation-states. The article concludes that the United States must embrace fifth generation warfare if it is to successfully confront these threats that have taken on new and heretofore unimagined forms in the postmodern era of war. Acknowledgments The conclusions and recommendations stated in this article are solely the author's and do not reflect the position of U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or agency representative interviewed or consulted for background research. This article acknowledges the men and women of all walks of life who have answered America's call to secure its freedom in the years after 9/11 and who, through their selfless sacrifice, have been forever changed. Particularly, may the service of those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, and those who have been wounded, never be forgotten. Notes 1. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), p. xv. 2. Ralph Peters, New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy (New York: Sentinel, Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2005), p. 12. 3. Report Of The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat, June 2006, 21–22. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/hpsci0606.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007). 4. John Arquilla, Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School. Student notes from a lecture given on networks and netwar at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, to graduate students in Cohorts 403 and 404, on 12 July 2005. 5. Arthur Cebrowski, "Transformation and the Changing Character of War?" Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Transformation Trends (17 June 2004), p. 4. Available at http://afei.org/transformation/documents/TransformationTrends-17June2004Issue.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007) 6. Thomas X. Hammes, Colonel, USMC, The Sling and the Stone (St. Paul, Minnesota, Zenith Press, 2004), p. 3. 7. Sun Tzu, The Illustrated Art Of War, The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 28. 8. Alan D. Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International Security 17(3) (winter 1992), pp. 59–90. Available at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm (accessed 1 October 2007). Beyerchen takes the concept of chance as a function of analytical blindness, resulting in an inability to see the universe as an interconnected whole, from the writings of nineteenth-century mathematician Henri Poincaré, as well as the writings of Prussian philosopher-general Carl von Clausewitz. 9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 134–136. 10. William S. Lind; Keith Nightengale, Colonel (USA); John F. Schmitt, Captain (USMC); Joseph, W. Sutton, Colonel (USA); and Gary I. Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," The Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22–26. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm (accessed 1 October 2007). 11. William S. Lind, "Fifth Generation Warfare?" Center for Cultural Conservatism, Free Congress Foundation (February 2004), p. 1. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm (accessed 1 October 2007). 12. Ibid., p. 1. Lind defines the modern era of war as dating from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and establishes the emergence of fourth generation warfare as marking the end of the modern era although he does not tie it to a specific event. 13. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, p. 14; Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War." Hammes uses the description of the first three generations of war from the Lind et al. article as a basis for his description of the development of fourth generation warfare. In this reference he makes only passing mention of fifth generation warfare, which he says he is certain is currently developing somewhere in the world. 14. Thomas X. Hammes, Colonel, USMC, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, FIFTH EMERGES," Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Military Review (May–June 2007), p. 20. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/hammes_5gw.pdf (accessed 1 October 2007) Here, Hammes has given more thought to the succession of generations of war. He argues that the appearance of later generations of war does not necessarily equate to the disappearance of earlier generations of war. Rather, nation-states will engage in various generations of war according the means available to them. 15. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, p. 2. 16. Ibid., p. 3. 17. Abu 'Ubeid Al-Qurashi, "Fourth-Generation Wars," The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series—No. 344. Available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page = archives&Area = sd&ID = SP34402 (accessed 29 July 2007). 18. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, p. 14. 19. Ibid., p. 290. 20. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, FIFTH EMERGES," p. 23. In this example, Hammes uses the phrase "nets-and-jets" war to describe the second alternative form of fifth generation warfare he proposes: "Fifth-generation warfare will result from the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be marked by the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of biotechnology. 5GW will truly be a nets-and-jets war: networks will distribute the key information, provide a source from which to recruit volunteers; the jets will provide for worldwide, inexpensive, effective dissemination of weapons." 21. William S. Lind, "Fifth Generation Warfare?" p. 2. 22. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 20. 23. Ibid., p. 25. 24. Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. 25. Ibid, p. 75. 26. Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, p. 20. The concept of Information Age domains of war is taken from this source. Available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf (accessed 30 September 2007). 27. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 32. 28. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3–0, Operations, 2001, pp. 1–10. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007). This reference states clearly that, "The military objective in war is rapid, decisive victory." 29. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 20. 30. Jason Lyall and Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III, "The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective (Draft)," Paper presented at the 102nd Annual Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 2006, p. 14. Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151620_index.html (accessed 29 September 2007). This citation is taken from a copy provided to the author by e-mail from Lieutenant Colonel Wilson on 29 April 2007. 31. Dexter Filkins, "Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive In Iraq," New York Times (2 December 2005). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/02/international/middleeast/02insurgency.html (accessed 1 October 2007). 32. Ibid. Statement attributed to Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Rand Corporation. 33. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, FIFTH EMERGES," p. 21. Hammes refers to the October 2001, anthrax attack on Capitol Hill as possibly the first example of a fifth generation warfare attack. Because investigation has failed to reveal the perpetrator of the attack he assumes it was executed by an individual or a very small group. 34. Department of The Army, Field Manual 101–5–1, Operational Terms And Graphics (1997), pp. 1–47. Available at http://www12.georgetown.edu/students/organizations/rotc/resources/101–5–1.pdf (accessed 1 October 2007). 35. Major Douglas J. DeLancey, "Adopting the Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege Model of Defeat Mechanisms Based on Historical Evidence and Current Need," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, First Term AY 00–01, p. 20. Available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb = getRecord&metadataPrefix = html&identifier = ADA393858 (accessed 29 August 2007). DeLancey's monograph discusses the concept of defeat mechanisms that originated with United States Army Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege. Wass de Czege, founder of the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies, formulated the concept of three basic operational defeat mechanisms, each with a distinct historical foundation, and each with advantages and disadvantages based on the situation in which they are employed. According to Wass de Czege, attrition, dislocation, and disintegration are the three defeat mechanisms, and they may be employed independently or in combination. Attrition emphasizes the physical dimension of warfare and the destruction of enemy sources of power. The destruction must take place at a higher rate than the enemy can recover. Dislocation orients on the enemy's leadership, rendering his plans and options irrelevant; rapidly changing the conditions so that the enemy cannot seize the initiative. Finally, disintegration focuses on the state of mind of enemy combatants, attacking the will of soldiers to resist—eroding the cohesion and teamwork of the enemy. 36. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, p. 14. 37. Donald J. Reed, "On Killing al-Zarqawi—Does United States Policy Know Its Tools in the War on Terror?" Homeland Security Affairs Journal (July 2006), p. 1. Available at http://www.hsaj.org/?article = 2.2.2 (accessed 1 September 2007). 38. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000). Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000). Hammes, The Sling and The Stone. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War. 39. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 226. 40. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. x. 41. Ibid., p. 153. 42. Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, p. 20. 43. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (2006), p. II-1. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007) The strategic level of war is divided into national strategic, sometimes referred to as policy or grand strategy, and theater strategic. The national strategic level involves national policy development and national government to government interactions. The strategic level of war is concerned with the art and science of employing national power. The operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. The tactical level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of battle. Across time and space, the strategic level establishes the ends, or objectives, of war; the operational level establishes the ways of achieving strategic objectives, and links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives; and the tactical level is the use of armed forces in combat to directly defeat an opponent as the means of achieving strategic objectives. 44. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. xii. 45. Ibid., p. 154. 46. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 80. 47. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat, p. 24. 48. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, Order Code RS21973, 16 November 2004, p. 4. 49. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, FIFTH EMERGES," p. 17. According to Hammes, some terrorist websites have discussed using chemical plants or shipments of chemicals to cause mass civilian casualties similar to the casualties that occurred in Bhopal, India, in 1984, when industrial gas fumes enveloped the city and killed thousands of people; or the 1947 disaster in Texas City, Texas, when a ship with 8,500 tons of ammonium nitrate on board blew up in port and killed nearly 600 people. 50. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 154. Liang and Xiangsui attribute the philosophy of achieving objectives "by fair means or foul" as the most important spiritual legacy of Italian Renaissance political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. They refer to the use of means without constraint to achieve objectives in warfare. 51. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat, p. 10. This report gives as further reference: Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West," Time, 11 January 1999. It quotes a December 1998 interview in which bin Laden was asked if he was attempting to acquire chemical or nuclear weapons. It quotes bin Laden's response as saying: "Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims." 52. Lyall and Wilson, "The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective (Draft)," p. 14. 53. Ibid., p. 3. 54. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 122. 55. Jason Lyall and Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare," p. 19. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/∼jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf (accessed 1 October 2007). Paper presented before the Defense Science Board in April 2007. This citation is taken from a copy provided to the author by e-mail from Lieutenant Colonel Wilson on 29 April 2007. 56. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, p. 290. 57. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 104. 58. Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), p. 399. 59. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, Order Code RS33123, 22 January 2007, p. 2. 60. Ibid., Summary. 61. Christopher Rhoads, "Cyber Attack Vexes Estonia, Poses Debate," Wall Street Journal Online (18 May 2007). Available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117944513189906904-__3K97 ags67ztibp8vLGPd70WXE_20070616.html?mod = tff_main_tff_top (accessed 20 October 2007). 62. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, Order Code RS31787, 5 June 2007, p. 13. 63. Jeanne Meserve, "Official: International Hackers Going after U.S. Networks," Cable News Network (19 October 2007). Available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/19/cyber.threats/index.html (accessed 19 October 2007). Statement attributed to Mr. Joel Brenner, the National Counterintelligence Executive. 64. Ibid. 65. The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, NSTAC Report to the President on International Communications, (16 August 2007), p. 6. Available at http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/reports/2007/NSTAC%20International%20Report.pdf (accessed 22 September 2007). 66. Public Broadcasting System, FRONTLINE Program, Cyber War!, 24 April 2003. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/#maze (accessed 22 September 2007). 67. Loeb, Vernon, "NSA Adviser Says Cyber-Assaults On Pentagon Persist With Few Clues," Washington Post (7 May 2001), p. A02. Available at http://lists.jammed.com/ISN/2001/05/0030.html (accessed 22 September 2007). 68. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, Order Code RS31787, 5 June 2007, p. 11. 69. Nathan Thornburgh, "The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried to Stop Them)," Time (29 August 2005). Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 70. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, Order Code RS32411, 15 March 2007, p. 30. 71. Ibid., p. 31. 72. Department of Defense, National Defense University, Center for Counterproliferation Research, Anthrax in America: A Chronology and Analysis of the Fall 2001 Attacks (Working Paper), November 2001, p. 5. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/ANTHRAX%20CHRONOLOGY.pdf (accessed 5 October 2007). 73. Allan Lengel, "Little Progress In FBI Probe of Anthrax Attacks," Washington Post (16 September 2005), p. A01. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/15/AR2005091502456_pf.html (accessed 24 September 2007). 74. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Amerithrax Fact Sheet, September 2006. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithrax_factsheet.htm (accessed 24 September 2007). 75. Center for Counterproliferation Research, Anthrax in America: A Chronology and Analysis of the Fall 2001 Attacks (Working Paper), p. 8. 76. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Amerithrax: Linguistic/Behavioral Analysis, 9 November 2001. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithrax.htm (accessed 25 September 2007). 77. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press Release, Ricin Letter, 24 February 2004. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel04/ricin022304.htm (accessed 25 September 2007). 78. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism, Order Code RS21383, 4 February 2004, p. 1. 79. Associated Press, "Ricin Investigation Focuses on Mysterious 'Fallen Angel'," USA TODAY (5 February 2004). Available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004–02–05-fallen-angel_x.htm (accessed 25 September 2007). 80. Michael D. Lemonick, "Homegrown Terror," TIME (16 February 2004). Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040216–588396,00.html (accessed 25 September 2007). 81. Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged al-Qaeda Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (September–October 2004, vol. 27, iss. 5), p. 355. 82. Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation into the London and Madrid Subway Bombings of 2005 and 2004, p. 47. Available at http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/docs/working_papers/Capstone-FinalProduct-PH12–7–06.pdf (accessed 18 September 2007). This working paper is an outcome of Professor William W. Keller's "Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack" Capstone course from the spring of 2006. 83. Jonathan B. Smith, "The Madrid Train Bombing and the Emergence of Al Qaeda 2.0: A Case of Politics, Force Multiplier Effects and Engaging the 'Far Enemy,'" Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice, Issues in Terrorism, Case Study #1 (25 February 2005), p. 2. Available at http://www.whisprwave.com/msu-hs-class/issues-in-terrorism/madrid-train-bombing.htm (accessed 19 September 2007). 84. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, p. 4. 85. David E. Kaplan, "Paying For Terror," U.S. News & World Report (5 December 2005), p. 44. 86. Lia and Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies," p. 355. 87. Ibid., p. 356. 88. Ibid., p. 369. 89. Ibid., p. 371. 90. Director of National Intelligence. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland," July 2007, p. 6. Available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf (accessed 26 September 2007). 91. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "Brutal Reality: The War is Fueling Global Jihad," New York Daily News (21 February 2007), p. 15. See also http://www.newamerica.net/events/2007/the_iraq_effect (accessed 21 February 2007). 92. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database can be found at http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp (accessed 4 April 2007). 93. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat, p. 5. 94. Ibid., p. 14. 95. Ibid., p. 12. 96. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Five Years Later: Funding For Defense, Military Operations, Homeland Security, And Related Activities Since 9/11, 7 September 2006, p. 1. 97. Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2004), p. 100. 98. 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Available at http://niallferguson.org/publications/A_World_Without_Power_as_published_in_Foreign_Policy.pdf (accessed 5 October 2007). 101. Henry A. Kissinger, "America's Assignment," Newsweek (8 November 2004), p. 34. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6370244/site/newsweek/ (accessed 5 October 2007). 102. The principles of war for the postmodern era are derived from two sources. The principles of objective and offensive are adapted from the principles of war found in Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Appendix A. The principles of omnidirectionality, synchrony, unrestricted measures, asymmetry, and assurance are adapted from the "essential principles" for "beyond-limits combined war" found in Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 177. 103. Peters, New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy, p. 124. 104. Ralph Peters, "The Roots of Today's Wars," USA Today (28 February 2007), p. 11A. Available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2007–02–27-oplede_x.htm (accessed 5 October 2007). 105. Anthony Cordesman, "Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 November 2005. Available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051107_counterinsurg.pdf (accessed 5 October 2007). 106. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, DC (September 2004), p. 34. Available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004–09-Strategic_Communication.pdf (accessed 5 October 2007).