An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies
1974; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/466782
ISSN1537-5285
AutoresGeorge A. Hay, Daniel J. Kelley,
Tópico(s)Public Procurement and Policy
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessAn Empirical Survey of Price Fixing ConspiraciesGeorge A. Hay and Daniel KelleyGeorge A. Hay Search for more articles by this author and Daniel Kelley Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 17, Number 1Apr., 1974 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/466782 Views: 82Total views on this site Citations: 163Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1974 The University of Chicago Law SchoolPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Enrique Andreu, Damien Neven, Salvatore Piccolo Price Authority and Information Sharing with Competing Supply Chains, International Journal of Industrial Organization 105 (Feb 2023): 102926.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102926Linda D. Hollebeek, V. Kumar, Rajendra K. Srivastava, Moira K. 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