From Pigeons to Crystals: The Development of Radio Communication in U.S. Army Tanks in World War II
2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 67; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1540-6563.2005.00126.x
ISSN1540-6563
Autores Tópico(s)Italian Fascism and Post-war Society
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1. J. P. Harris, “The Myth of Blitzkrieg,”War in History 3 (1995): 335–52; Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984); Robert S. Cameron, “Americanizing the Tank: U.S. Army Administration and Mechanized Development Within the Army, 1917–43” (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1994, provided by the author); John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); cf. Robert H. Larson, review of Liddell Hart and the Weight of History by 2. Frank E. Owens, “Anatomy of Defeat: France 1940,”Army (December 1972): 32–38; Dulaney Terrett, United States Army in World War II: the Technical Services: the Signal Corps: the Emergency (to December 1941) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956); George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, Dulaney Terrett, United States Army in World War II: the Technical Services: the Signal Corps: the Test (December 1941 to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957); George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, United States Army in World War II: the Technical Services: the Signal Corps: the Outcome (Mid‐1943 through 1945) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1966); George Raynor Thompson, “The Signal Corps In World War II,”The Story of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, ed. Max L. Marshall (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965), passim.3. Other early advocates of the use of tanks in the United States included Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adna Chaffee, who became the first commanding general of Armored Force in 1940. John Broom, “FM 100‐5 Field Service Regulations 1941: Armored Force and the Conduct of the 1944 European Campaign” (paper delivered at the Siena College [New York] Symposium on World War II, 3 June 1994); George F. Hoffman, “The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: the Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army's Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine,”Journal of Military History 62 (January 1998): 101–34; Robert W. Grow, “The Ten Lean Years: from the Mechanized Force (1930) to the Armored Force (1940),” Research Collection of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI) (February 1967): 1, 7–9, 65, 68, 71, 75, 82, 90; Jeffrey Johnstone Clarke, Military Technology in Republican France: the Evolution of the French Armored Force 1917–40 (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1968), 207; Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt (Harrisburg, Pa: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1947), 22; Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 208; for French tanks and doctrine, see Clarke, also Robert A. Doughty, Seeds of Disaster (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1985); Cameron; Kenneth Macksey, The Tank Pioneers (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1981), 122, 172; Kenneth Macksey, Panzer Division (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 10; Kenneth Macksey, Guderian (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), 61; Kenneth Macksey, Tank Force (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 17, 22, 96.4. Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the Message Through (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 230; Cameron, 383, 386, 389, 396, 397, 399, 567; Terrett, 154; Bateman, 27. 5. House, 49, 50; Owens, 34, 35, 38; Clarke, 207; Citino, 191, 192; Jeffrey A. Gunsberg, “The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12–14 May 1940: the First Great Tank Battle,”Journal of Military History 56 (April 1992): 242; Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 192, Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: Collier–Macmillan, 1989), 180; Doughty; Macksey, Panzer Division, 10, 38; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 78, 80, 85–87, 136, 172; Macksey, Tank Force, 17, 31; Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), 175.6. James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 374; House, 52–58; Van Creveld, Technology and War, 190; Macksey, Guderian; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 119; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine Books, n.d.). 7. The U.S. Army waited until 1957, twenty years and a world war after the Germans, to upgrade its armored divisions’ signal component from company to battalion. House, 52–58; Roger Edwards, Panzer (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 107; John Keegan, Guderian (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), 54, 69; Owens, 34; Van Creveld, Technology and War, 180; Guderian, 17, 18, 26, 75; Citino, 203–04; Murray, 374; Macksey, Guderian, 50, 51, 67; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 119. The National Defense Act of 1920 was Congress’ attempt, on the advice of the Executive Branch, to enact into law the lessons of World War I concerning all aspects of defense, from the size of the peacetime Army to the role of the Reserves and the National Guard, all the way down to details—such as abolishing the infant Tank Corps and putting tanks into the Infantry Branch. The Act did not, however, abolish the Signal Corps as some signalmen feared. Nor did the Act establish an Air Force separate from the Army, as airmen wanted; that would have to wait until 1947, after another world war. There were, in all this, various political and bureaucratic pressures and counterpressures, but the details are far too many for this article. 8. Terrett, 18, 84, 86, 137, 139, 154, 155; Cameron, 386, 389; House, 69–76; Grow, 1, 7–9, 65, 68, 71, 75, 90; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 14, 23; Bateman, 27, 28; Van Creveld, Technology and War, 180; Raines, 231; Gillie, 22; Kenneth Macksey, Tank Warfare (New York: Stein and Day, 1972), 82. 9. Armored Force Command and Center, “The Armored Force Command and Center Study No. 27, History of the Armored Force,” (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, USAMHI), 4, 9; Grow, 1, 7, 8, 58, 65, 68, 71, 75, 90; House, 76; Bateman, 27. 10. Grow, 1, 7–9, 58, 65, 68, 71, 75, 82, 90; Armored Force Study, 4; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 23; Broom, Siena Paper. 11. Cameron, 389, 396, 567; Terrett, 137, 154; Bateman, 27; Raines, 231; Broom, Siena Paper. 12. Cameron, 383, 397, 399, 400, 549; Terrett, 84–86; Bateman, 27, 28. 13. Cameron, 383, 397, 399, 400; Grow, 1, 7–9, 65, 68, 71, 75, 90; Broom, Siena Paper. 14. House, 77; Terrett, 163; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 23; Gillie, 186; Armored Force Study, 7, 9; Broom, Siena Paper. 15. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, United States Army in World War II: the Army Ground Forces: the Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 67; Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 198; Broom, Siena Paper. 16. Terrett, 139, 156, 160, 164; Thompson, Test, 71; Cameron, 549; Greenfield, 106; Bateman, 27, 28; George Forty, United States Tanks of World War II in Action (Poole and Dorset, U.K.: Blandford Press, 1983), 35. 17. Karl G. Larew, “December 7, 1941: The Day No One Bombed Panama,”The Historian 66.2 (2004): passim; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 174–75.18. They were right. At the height of the U.S. Army's participation in World War II, the Armored Forces used as much wire as infantry formations of the same size despite the tankers’ lusting after radios, radios, and more radios. Terrett, 145, 154, 164, 186–93; Thompson, Outcome, 124; Roman J. Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics from Normandy to Lorraine (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 214. 19. Terrett, 141, 142, 146, 180; Armored Force Study, 38, 39, 84; Raines, 230; Thompson, Test, 71; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 176. 20. Terrett, 137, 141, 142, 155, 183, 184; Mary‐Louise Melia, “The Quartz Crystal Program,” and “Monograph, Project B‐15,” interlinked mss. based on Office of the Chief Signal Officer staff studies, Box 12, The Signal Corps Collection (USAMHI), 1st ms., 1; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 176; Armored Force Study, 85; House, 121; David L. Woods, A History of Tactical Communication Techniques (Orlando, Fla.: Orlando Division, Martin Company, Martin–Marietta Corporation, 1965), 237. 21. Terrett, 144, 184. 22. Terrett, 141, 142, 144–46, 158, 180, 183, 184; Thompson, Test, 233; Raines, 230; Broom, Siena Paper. 23. Cameron, 383; House, 121; Terrett, 156, 158, 159; Thompson, Test, 71, 233; Thompson, Outcome, 21, 638; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 182. 24. Terrett, 141, 146, 147, 180, 181, 245; Melia, 1st ms., 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13; “Monograph, Project B‐15,” 2nd ms., 4; “Annual Report, War Department, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1942: Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War 1942 (Draft)” (USAMHI), 213, 214, 224; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 176; Thompson, Test, 72, 160, 233; Raines, 274; Woods, 237. 25. Terrett, 147, 155, 180, 181; Thompson, Test, 160, 162, 233; Melia, 1st ms., 1, 7, 8, 10, 11; “Monograph, Project B‐15,” 2nd. Ms., 4; Theresa Kraus, “U. S. Planning to Protect Brazil” (paper delivered at the Siena College Symposium on World War II [New York], 31 May 1990). 26. Annual Report Draft, 224; Melia, 1st ms., 7; Terrett, 180, 245. 27. Annual Report Draft, 224; Melia, 1st ms., 1, 8, 10, 11, 13; Terrett, 181; Thompson, Test, 160. 28. Terrett, 156, 160, 180, 181, 229, 233; Thompson, Outcome, 21; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 182; Raines, 231, 274, 277; Melia, 1st ms., 8, 10, 11, 13. 29. “Revised Tables of Organization, Armored Force, Jan. 1, 1942, Enclosure # 2 to Report on Armored Force School, Ft Knox, Ky, Lt Col F. E. Stack” (USAMHI), unpaginated; Terrett, 164; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 24, 25, 26; Greenfield, 67; Woods, 232, 237; Armored Force Study, 84, 85; Jarymowycz, 214, 215; Third Army Report, 5, 6, 10, 17, 21, 22; First Army Report, 172–76, 180; Thompson, Test, 363, 364, 373; Thompson, Outcome, 21, 119, 120, 124, 126; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 176, 177, 182; Messenger, 198, 202; House, 8, 105–18, 121, 128; Charles M. Province, Patton's Third Army (New York: Hippocene Books, 1992), 27. 30. Thomas A. Hughes, Over Lord (New York: Free Press, 1995), Chapters 5–10; David R. Mets, Master of Airpower (Novato, Calif.: Presideo Press, 1988), Chapter VIII. 31. Patton also neglected to mention the role played by Russian troops in securing victory. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1968), 424; Thompson, Outcome, 21; Thompson, “The Signal Corps in World War II,” 176.
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