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The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War

2012; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592318.2012.632853

1743-9558

Niccolò Petrelli,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

Abstract In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war. Keywords: Second Lebanon Warspecial operations forcesIsraeli strategy Notes 1. Anglim Anglim, Simon. 2007. Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-terrorism?. Contemporary Security Policy, 28(1): 28–41. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], 'Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads', 36. 2. Van Creveld Van Creveld, Martin. 1998. Tsahal: Histoire Critique de la force Israelienne de Defense, Monaco: Editions du Rocher. 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