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Give War a ChanceRevisited – The Price to Pay: The Military and Terrorism in Peru

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14702436.2011.630178

1743-9698

W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto,

War, Ethics, and Justification

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs 78/. 4 (July/Aug. 1999) pp. 36–44. Luttwak’s main argument was that international intervention in domestic conflicts (either via mediation or via peacekeeping or peace enforcing forces) was unnecessary and undesirable. I have taken some of Luttwak’s ‘side’ arguments for this analysis. 2 Luttwak (note 1) p.36. 3 There has been a plethora of writing trying to define what is terrorism. Brian M. Jenkins tackled the problems of definition head on by stating that ‘[…] what terrorism is seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; if a party can successfully attach the label of terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. The difficulty of defining terrorism has led to the cliché that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fight er, implying that there can be no objective definition of terrorism, no universal standards of conduct in peace or war.’ Brian M. Jenkins,. ‘Statements about Terrorism.’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, International Terrorism. Vol. 463 (Sept. 1982) p. 12. Regarding Shining Path and the MRTA, while Peruvian analysts normally label them as ‘terrorists,’ other analyses also use more neutral terms like ‘insurgents’ or ‘guerrilla’ in their discourse. The author accepts that he may be demonstrating a bias by labeling MRTA and Shining Path as terrorists and not entering into a deep theoretical debate about why they are being labeled so and not anything else – as Jenkins argues ‘terrorists recognize no neutral territory, no noncombatants, no bystanders.’ (p.12). The acts of these movements, particularly Sendero, certainly fall within this category and the author sees this as a defining factor in how they are labeled/profiled. Other discussions regarding a definition of terrorism can be found in: Martha Crenshaw,. ‘The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21stt Century’, Political Psychology. 21/. 2 (June 2000) pp.405–20. Also see Elisabeth Symeonidou-Kastanidou, ‘Defining Terrorism.’ European Journal of Law and Criminal Justice12/1 (2004) pp.14–35. Also see C.A.J. Coady, ‘Terrorism, Morality and Supreme Emergency’, Ethics 114 (July 2004) pp.772–89. Also see Grob-Fitzgibbon. ‘What is Terrorism? Redefining a Phenomenon in Time of War’, Peace & Change. 30/. 2 (April 2005) pp.231–46. Also see: Donald Black, ‘The Geometry of Terrorism’, e Journal of conflict Resolution49/ 1 (Feb. 2005). pp.3–42. Also, in an interview with the author, a retired Peruvian Army colonel argued that ‘the MRTA and Sendero were terrorists, they imposed terror in the small towns they went to that did not have army or police protection. They used apagones [electrical blackouts], coches bomba [car bombs][…] they were never a guerrilla, the free areas they controlled were under an umbrella of terror.’ Phone interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.) 10 Sept., 2009. 4 There was a bizarre event about Guzman being offered free passage abroad in 1982 as it was believed that he had anemia, but nothing came out of this. Also in the mid-1980s the MRTA offered a ceasefire when Alan Garcia came to power but this was quickly forgotten as well. 5 This is not to say that both the MRTA and Sendero followed their respective ideologies without some Peruvian influence. Both groups (in addition to political movements) declared themselves followers of the Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui and the original Peruvian Communist Party. Regarding Guzman and Mariategui, Starn argues ‘big gaps divide the two socialists, and expose the painful blindness of Guzman to the stark yet labyrinth pathways of Peruvian history. The most obvious contrast revolves around Guzman’s pronounced disinterest in Peru’s indigenous roots [while] Mariategui was fascinated by the great civilizations of the Andean past.’ (p. 413) Mauceri labeled the MRTA as a ‘classic Castro-ite group.’ Philip Mauceri,. ‘Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru, Journal of Interamerican Studies in World Affairs33/ 4 (Winter 1991). p84. 6 During the 1950s–1960s, before General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s Agrarian Revolution, arable land was generally in the power of a group of families, usually white, who behaved themselves in the manner of feudal lords. There have been at least fourf good analyses regarding the creation of Shining Path (and to a lesser extent the MRTA). See: Orin Starn,. ‘Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History’, Journal of Latin American Studies 27/ 2 (May 1995). pp. 399–421. Starn explains that ‘the bulks were high school and university students from Ayacucho’s shantytowns and countryside. In this respect, and despite claims of radical upheaval, the new party’s internal organization replicated the colonial stratification of regional society: a privileged elite of white professionals commanded a mass of brown-skinned youth of humble origin.’ (p.403). Nevertheless, Sendero’s dismissal of racial issues, at least in ideological terms, was viewed as a reason to support it. Also see a good more theoretical/scientific analysis in: Edward Muller, Henry Dietez, and Steven Finkel,. ‘Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru’, American Political Science Review 85/ 4 (Dec. 1991). pp.1261–82. Also see James Ron, ‘Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation.’ Journal of Peace Research38/ 5 (Sept. 2001). pp. 569– 92. Also see Cynthia McClintock, ‘Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso’, World Politics37/. 1 (Oct. 1984). pp.48–84. 7 A bank robbery in May 1982 in Lima. A brief but good background of MRTA’s history can be found in: Carlos Ivan Degregori,. ‘El Capitulo que Falta.’ Desco/Revista Quehacer, No. 105 (Jan./Feb. 1997). 8 See the report by Perú’s Truth Commission for details. ‘2.7 Los Molinos: Derrota del MRTA en la Region Central’, available at (visited 7 Sept. 2009). Also see: ‘2.37 Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en el distrito de los Molinos (1989)’, available at (visited 7 Sept. 2009). 9 Polay Campos was first detained in 1989 in Huancayo, but later escaped (along with 47 other terrorists), in 1990 from the Castro Castro prison in Lima. 10 Rincon was detained on Nov.r 1995 along with Lori Berenson, an American citizen who was originally sentenced to life in prison (then reduced to 20 years) for being a MRTA aide in their plans to storm the Peruvian Congress that year. 11 Cynthia McClintock,. ‘The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a “Least Likely” Case: Peru’, Comparative Politics21/ 2 (Jan. 1989) p.130. 12 Susan C Bourgue,. and Kay B. Warren, ‘Democracy without Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru’, Latin American Research Review 24/ 1 (1989) p.17. 13 A good history of the movement can be found in Gustavo Gorriti, Sendero: Historia de la Guerra Milenaria en el Peru (Lima: Planeta Peru 2008) 426 pages. 14 Ronald Osborn, , ‘On the Path of Perpetual Revolution: From Marx’s Millenarianism to Sendero Luminoso.’ Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8/1 (March 2007).p.123. 15 William Yaworsky, ‘Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Perú: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations’,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 32/ 4 (Aug. 2009) p.657. See Yaworsky’s analysis of one example of US aid to Perú’s military in its fight with Sendero. Starn (note 6) argues, as a reason why Sendero did not develop as much domestic support as it may have wished to have, that ‘a lack of understanding of Andean villagers was a major obstacle to the struggle of Shining Path for lasting support in the south-central highlands. According to Guzman’s line of thought, ‘[…] the villagers should be glad to raise animals and crops only for themselves as part of the Maoist strategy of starving the cities. However the black-and-white simplicity of the“semi-feudalism” model ignored the division of large estates under the agrarian reform of 1969, and the conversion of the Peruvian Andes into a crazy quilt of small and medium size farmers [as well as] the role of markets in mountain life.’ (p.415). 16 Phone interview with Peruvian Army Colonel (ret.) 9 Sept. 2009. A good analysis of the organization of Shining Path can be found in: Max G. Manwaring, ‘Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Small Wars, Vol. 541 (Sept. 1995). pp.157–166. 17 A good general analysis can be found in Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton, ‘Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy’, Third World Quarterly12/ 2 (April 1990) pp.21–35. 18 Bruce H. Kay, ‘Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of “King Coca” and Shining Path’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs41/ 3 (Fall 1999) p.103. 19 Phone Interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.) 10 Sept. 2009. In addition, Polay Campos, MRTA’s leader, was the son of an APRA leader, the political party that came to power in 1985 via Alan Garcia Perez. Hence, Sendero would have regarded as the MRTA as less of a potential ally and more an enemy, as its leader had ties to the party in power during the late 1980s, the height of the war. 20 Upon gaining power, Guzman would rename Peru as ‘The New Democracy Republic.’ Phone interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.) 10 Sept. 2009. Speeches and statements made by Guzman are easy to find. A good compilation of his ideology can be found in his book: Abimael Guzman Reinoso,. De Puno y Letra. (Lima, Peru: Manoalzada 2009). 320pp. 21 Montesinos met several times with Guzman as well as with Iparraguirre. According to him, the total time of their meetings extends between 2,000 and 3,000 hours. Several videos of these interrogations and chats have been transmitted by the Peruvian media. Some of the tactics used by Montesinos have been controversial. According to reports, Montesinos made Guzman listen to a variety of songs that made him (apparently) question Sendero’s goals, actions and possibility of success. The validity of the claim that Montesinos’ meetings and psychological tactics like listening to specific songs can work to change the mind of someone like Guzman is certainly arguable and beyond the scope of this article. The term ‘brainwashed’ is used in the broad sense of the word. Articles that discuss these meetings include: ‘Montesinos encubrio a Fujimori’, La Republica (Peru). 1 July 2008. Available at < www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20080701/pasadas/15/13233 > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). Also see: ‘Montesinos, Abimael y Elena Iparraguirre escucharon ‘a mi manera.’’ Periodismo en Linea. 30 June 2008. Available at < http://www.periodismoenlinea.org/200806301483/Ultima-Hora/Montesinos-Abimael-y-Elena-Iparraguirre-escucharon-a-mi-manera.html > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). Also see: ‘Montesinos y Abimael ven Frank Sinatra en video.’ El Comercio (Perú), 1 July 2008. Available at < www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/html/2008-06-30/montesinos-y-abimael-ven-frank-sinatra-video.html > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). Also see Edmundo Cruz,. ‘El Cartero de Abimael toco 6 veces la puerta de Palacio’, La Republica (Peru), 13 Sept. 2009. Available at < www.larepublica.pe/politica/13/09/2009/el-cartero-de-abimael-toco-6-veces-la-puerta-de-palacio-0 > (visited 13 Sept. 2009). 22 Perú: Sendero Luminoso resiste’, BBC.com Mundo,. 25 June 2003. Available at < http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_3018000/3018584.stm > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). 23 A brief profile of some of Sendero’s current leaders can be found in: ‘Conozca a los camaradas de Sendero ‘Jose’ ,‘Alipio’, y a los clanes de la droga en la selva de Vizcatan’, El Comercio (Perú), 23 Dec. 2008. Available at < www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/html/2008-12-23/conozca-camaradas-Sendero-jose-alipio-y-clanes-droga-selva-vizcatan.html > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). 24 Se elevan a 3 los fallecidos en el Vrae.’ La Republica (Peru). 3 Sept. 2009. Available online < http://www.larepublica.pe/politica/03/09/2009/se-elevan-tres-los-fallecidos-en-el-vrae > (accessed 4 Sept. 2009). The senderistas took the guns from the downed helicopter and then blew it up with explosives, following a similar modus operandi used in an Oct. 1999 attack. ‘Terroristas desvalijaron arms de helicoptero y lo dinamitaron.’ La Republica (Perú). 4 Sept. 2009. Available online < www.larepublica.pe/politica/04/09/2009/terroristas-desvalijaron-armas-de-helicoptero-y-lo-dinamitaron-0 > (accessed 4 Sept. 2009). 25 Degregori (note 7).’ 26 Meaning sensationalist newspapers sold at cheap prices that take a strong bias about ongoing local events and whether they be politically or celebrity related. Examples include ‘El Men,’ ‘El Chino,’ ‘Ojo,’ ‘Aja.’ 27 See ‘Peru: Sendero Luminoso es un “conglomerado empresaria” segun experto’, InfoLatam, 15April 2009. Available at < www.infolatam.com/entrada/peru_sendero_luminoso_es_un_conglomerado-13381.html > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see: ‘Humala reitera que Sendero no es un peligro pese al ultimo ataque,’ El Comercio (Peru). 5 Aug. 2009. Available at < http://elcomercio.pe/noticia/323601/humala-reitera-que-sendero-luminoso-no-representa-peligro-pais-pese-al-ultimo-ataque > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see: ‘Alan Garcia: Sendero Luminoso no es una amenaza para la democracia.’ Rpp.com.pe (Peru). 6 Aug. 2009). Available at < http://www.rpp.com.pe/2009-08-06-alan-garcia-sendero-luminoso-no-es-una-amenaza-para-la-democracia-noticia_199551.html > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see Carlos Basombrio, ‘Sendero Luminoso sigue siendo una amenaza por cinco razones’, Semanaeconomica.com. 6 Aug. 2009. Available at < www.semanaeconomica.com/users/21-carlos-basombrio/blogs/42861-sendero-luminoso-sigue-siendo-una-amenaza-por-cinco-razones > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). 28 See ‘El Ejercito Peruano advierte sobre apoyo de las FARC a Sendero Luminoso’, AFP, 19 April 2009. Available at < www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jKeCibQFmltpfEmddOfF_HAW6sRg > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see ‘’Si no hacemos algo tendremos una FARC’ advierte Otto Guibovich’, El Comercio (Peru). 19 April 2009. Available at < http://elcomercio.pe/noticia/275304/si-no-hacemos%3Cbr%20/%3E-algo-tendremos-unas-farc-advierte-comandante-general-ejercito > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see ‘’ Los cartels Mexicanos no realizan acciones armadas directas en Peru’, afirma experto.’ El Comercio (Peru), 28 Nov. 2008. Available at < http://elcomercio.pe/ediciononline/HTML/2008-11-28/los-carteles-mexicanos-no-realizan-acciones-armadas-directas-peru-afirma-experto.html > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). 29 Information gathered by the IDMC can be found in (visited 13 Dec. 2009). Also see: Gavin David White, ‘Displacement, decentralization and reparation in post-conflict Peru.’ Protracted Displacement, pp. 44-6. Available at < www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=4&ved=0CBcQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Frepository.forcedmigration.org%2Fpdf%2F%3Fpid%3Dfmo%3A5091&ei=N54lS4zuBIGaMLmUlPQJ&usg=AFQjCNF7PDsW7NAYPSgjQ_dPtg2Q_71w6Q&sig2=sjJfNYxrdUDpGfVSQT7G1w > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). 30 Julio Gamero,. ‘Crecimiento y pobreza: una comparacion regional’, La Republica (Peru) 6 Aug. 2009. Available at < http://www.larepublica.pe/actualidad-economica-julio-gamero/06/08/2009/crecimiento-y-pobreza-una-comparacion-regional > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). According to official figures, national poverty went down 5.2 per cent between 2006 and 2007 alone. See ‘Pobreza en el Peru disminuyo en 5.2% durante 2007, informa INEI’, Andina, 26 May 2008. Available at < www.andina.com.pe/Espanol/Noticia.aspx?id=MSoVyVrEFhA= > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). This is not to say that common Peruvians have felt the effects of the statistically researched analysis and may still find themselves living as if they were in poverty in spite of arguable higher wages. 31 Individuals who transport coca or cocaine to laboratories or shipping points are known as mochileros (literally people carrying backpacks). 32 Jorge Loayza, ‘Sendero utilize reclamos de estudiantes en universidades’, La Republica (Peru). 20 Sept. 2009. Available at < www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20090920/8/node/219430/todos/15 > (visited 13 Dec. 2009). 33 Alfredo Palacios Dongo,. ‘Comision de la Verdad ‘inflo’ cifras de victimas’, Planteamientos. 31 May 2009. Available at < www.planteamientosPerú.com/2009/05/comision-de-la-verdad-inflo-cifras-de.html > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). The article explains how, even though the Commission has only managed to identify 18,397 victims, the final amount was ‘inflated’ to close to 70,000. The Commission hired an American, Patrick Ball, to make calculus and estimations, making several assumptions on unaccounted and/or unknown victims, that gave the final amount. The final amount, 69,280 has a 95 per cent confidence, with the limits ranging from 61,007 to 77,552. 34 Despite control of the zone and well-known relations with the ronderos, the military has denied all responsibility. 35 After the end of the Los Molinos section in the Truth Commission’s final report, one of the conclusions is hardly objective and very conducive: ‘it has been demonstrated […] that the army extra-judicially murders and disappears innocent peasants, in its desperation to solve the internal armed conflict’. Perú’s Truth Commission for details. ‘2.7 Los Molinos: Derrota del MRTA en la Region Central’ Available: < www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20V/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20violencia%20(continuacion)/2.%20HISTORIAS%20REPRESENTATIVAS%20DE%20LA%20VIOLENCIA/2.7%20MOLINOS%20DERROTA%20DEL%20MRTA.pdf>. > (visited 7 Sept. 2009) A book supporting the military’s case, explaining exaggerations by the Truth Commission is: Pablo E. Moran Reyna (Peruvian Army Colonel, ret.), Complot contra los militares / Falsedades de la C.V.R. (Lima, Peru: Empresa Editorial Don Agustin 2006) 242pp. 36 Carlos Ivan Degregori and Carlos Rivera Paz,. ‘Perú 1980–1993: Fuerzas Armadas, Subversion y Democracia.’ IEP – Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Documento de Trabajo No. 53. (1993).p. 10. Also see Mauceri (note 5) p.90. Belaunde used his authority under Article 231 of the 1979 Constitution to put parts of Ayacucho under emergency rule and sent in the military. 37 Areas where the MRTA or Sendero operated were also known as zona roja (red zone). 38 The Political-Military Commands continued throughout the Garcia government. When Alan Garcia came to power, ‘he made the worst of decisions, giving more political responsibilities to the military and at the same time reducing its prerogatives.’ Degregori (note 7) p.11. 39 Ibid.p.12. 40 Presidente regional de Ayacucho pide bombardear el VRAE, La Republica (Peru). 4 Sept. 2009. Available online < www.larepublica.pe/regionales/04/09/2009/presidente-regional-de-ayacucho-pide-bombardear-el-vrae > (accessed 4 Sept. 2009). 41 Velásquez: Derrota del narcoterrorismo se hará usando mecanismos democrático’, La Republica (Peru) 4 Sept. 2009. Available online < www.larepublica.pe/politica/04/09/2009/velasquez-derrota-del-narcoterrorismo-se-hara-usando-mecanismos-democratico > (accessed 4 Sept. 2009). 42 ‘Polemica por propuesta de Giampetri.’ La Republica (Peru). 5 Sept. 2009. Available online < www.larepublica.pe/politica/05/09/2009/polemica-por-propuesta-de-giampietri-0 > (accessed Sept. 6, 2009). For a good, though brief, discussion of civil-military relations in Perú and other security factors, see:, William Aviles, ‘Despite Insurgency: Reducing Military Prerogatives in Colombia and Perú’, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 1 (Spring 2009)p.51 of. pp. 57–85. 43 ‘[… M]any officers and most conscripts understandably dreaded being drafted into Ayacucho and other hotspots (such a posting was frequently received as a punishment or, in the case of officers, following defeat in disputes over promotion or some other bureaucratic wrangle) […] given the lack of provisions and in many cases surrounded by a hostile or suspicious civilian population, the sense of demoralization felt by sections of the armed forces was comprehensible [when they were stationed in isolated parts of the Andes and Amazon.’ Lewis Taylor,. ‘Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996’, Bulletin of Latin American Research 17/1 (Jan. 1998).pp.46–7. 44 An interview with an allegedly former member of the Rodrigo Franco group can be found in: ‘Testimonio de ex agente del commando Rodrigo Franco inculpa a Mantilla’, AgenciaPeru.com, 19 May 2002. Available at < http://agenciaperu.com/investigacion/2002/may/franco.htm > (visited on 13 Dec. 2009). 45 Osborn (note 14)p. 120.Before the advent of MRTA and Sendero, there were mass civilian movements sponsored by political groups like APRA and the Partido Comunista Peruano. 46 Coordination of South American governments, namely in the Andes and Southern Cone, to share intelligence regarding leftist organizations and individuals labeled as security threats. 47 Peru and Chile almost went to war in 1975. In 1981, Peru and Ecuador had a short-lived border dispute. 48 ‘While informers in the pay of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) had from 1977 onwards detected (albeit in confused fashion) that a guerrilla campaign was being planned in Ayacucho, the information was given a low priority by their superiors, who were more concerned with tracking the activities of the mainstream left organizations directing the large-scale general strikes and trade union mobilizations at the time. Also, the military high command, devoting their energies into overseeing the transition back to an elected government, paid little attention to what was erroneously considered to be simply more hot air about ‘la lucha armada’ [‘the armed struggle’] commonplace in student circles. Compounding this equivocation, once in office, President Belaunde and his ministers assumed the PCP-SL rebellion represented a re-run of the 1960s foco-style guerrilla movement.’ Taylor (note 43) in Peru, pp.35–58. See Gorriti (note 13) p.68 for a brief analysis of how Sendero studied the uprisings of the 1960s before their own uprising. Also see Gorriti (note 13) pp.88–101 for a good analysis about what type of intelligence the Peruvian military had about Sendero prior to the beginning of the war and what was done about it. 49 ‘Sendero’s ‘war of guerrillas’ differed sharply from the standard foco strategy used by Peruvian guerrillas during the 1960s. In this period, Sendero guerrillas, following Mao’s dictum that revolutionary fighters should be indistinguishable from the local population, were organized into cells rather than openly military forces […] Peruvian strategy treated Sendero as a foco army [..] As a consequence, Peru’s military found itself unable to deal Sendero the “final blow” it had anticipated […]’ Mauceri (note 5) pp.92–3. 50 Ibid.p.89. 51 Paramilitary security groups were part of Peruvian culture, just like in many places, to protect small communities from thieves, if police protection was lacking. The Peruvian military began actively using rondas by 1982 and continued to use them in spite of the Uchurracay incident. 52 ‘’Sombra’ lucho 20 anos contra Sendero y lo abandonaron,’ La Republica (Peru). 17 Oct. 2009. Available at < www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20081017/pasadas/15/167622 > (visited 14 Dec. 2009). 53 Mauceri (note 5)p.102. 54 Ibid. 55 Osborn(note 14)p.127 56 A good analysis of conscription in Peru can be found in Eduardo Gonzalez-Cueva,. ‘Conscription and Violence in Peru.’, Latin American Perspectives 27/ 3 (May 2000). pp. 88–102. Also see: ‘Uno de los soldados muertos en ataque terrorista era menor de edad’, El Comercio (Peru), 15 April 2009. Available at < http://elcomercio.pe/noticia/273377/uno-soldados-asesinados-emboscada-terrorista-sanabamba-era-menor-edad > (13 Dec. 2009). 57 By 1994, Sendero’s actions had declined to a trickle, and tourists and business returned even to Ayacucho. President Fujimori used these victories to bolster his election campaign, even as his regime papered over human rights violations by the government under the banner of the fight for democracy. Starn (note 6) p.411. 58 An analysis of Garcia’s first term in office in the 1980s and the APRA Party can be found in: Carol Graham, ‘ Peru’s APRA Party in Power: Impossible Revolution, Relinquished Reform’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32/ 3 (Autumn 1990) pp.75–115. 59 A discussion about left-wing Peruvian political parties throughout the military juntas of 1968–80 and upon the return to democratic rule can be found in: Guillermo Rochabrun Silva,. ‘Crisis, Democracy and the Left in Peru’, Latin American Perspectives. 15/ 3 (Summer 1988) pp.77–96. 60 Gregory D. Schmidt,. ‘Fujimori’s 1990 Upset Victory in Peru’, Comparative Politics 28/ 3 (April, 1996). pp. 321–54. 61 A comparison between Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe and the one carried out by Guatemala President Jorge Serrano in 1993 can be found in Maxwell A. Cameron, ‘Latin American autogolpes: dangerous undertows in the third wave of democratization’, Third World Quarterly19/ 2 (1998) pp.219–39. 62 A good analysis of violence as a political tool can be found in: Jo-Marie Burt,. ‘Quien Habla es Terrorista: The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori’s Peru’, Latin American Research Review41/ 3. (Oct. 2006) pp. 32–62. Also see Gregory D. Schmidt, ‘Delegative Democracy in Peru? Fujimori’s 1995 Landslide and the Prospects for 2000’, Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs 42/ 1 (Spring, 2000) pp.vi–132. 63 Moises Arce,. ‘Political Violence and Presidential Approval in Peru’, The Journal of Politics. Vol. 65/ 2 (May, 2003). pp. 572–583. 64 A reason why Sendero survived and MRTA did not also had to do with the structure of Sendero’s leadership which also included individual cells that could operate without having to be in direct contact with Guzman and the top leaders. In the MRTA’s case, the leadership structure was much simpler, meaning pyramid style, and once Polay Campos and Rincon Rincon were captured, the organization crumbled. 65 In the 1980s they would literally go there, kill the local leaders and steal supplies. 66 ‘Sendero Luminoso resurge en Perú de la mano del narcotrafico’, Terra/AP. 31 May 2008. Available at < www.terra.com.pr/noticias/articulo/html/act1274641.htm > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). 67 For a good discussion about coca and Shining Path, see Kay (note 18)’ pp.97–127. 68 Phone Interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.), 10 Sept. 2009. 69 Phone Interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.), 9 Sept. 2009. 70 Phone Interview with Peruvian Colonel (ret.) 10 Sept. 2009. The truce was offered via a press conference in Aug. 1985. See: ‘Primera conferencia clandestina.’ Centro de Documentacion de los Movimientos Armados (www.cedema.org). Transcript of MRTA press conference given in Aug. 1985. Available at < www.cedema.org/ver.php?id=3432 > (visited 10 Sept. 2009). 71 An anecdotic note can be given of Alan Garcia who, upon gaining power, became the youngest civilian president in Peru’s history at the young age of 36. 72 Luttwak (note 1) pp.38. 73 Perú’s Truth Commission for details. ‘2.7 Los Molinos: Derrota del MRTA en la Region Central’ Available: (visited 7 Sept. 2009) 74 Carlos Reyna Izaguirre,. ‘Shining Path in the 21st Century’.’ NACLA Report on the Americas 30/ 1 (July-Aug. 1996) pp. 37–38. 75 Luttwak (note 1) p.36. 76 There have been some victories like the dissolution of the EPL and M-19, and while the FARC and ELN are currently weak compared to previous years, it is unlikely that an end to the conflict is in sight, in spite of having pro-military leaders like Alvaro Uribe and the current president, Juan Manuel Santos, who was Uribe’s former Minister of Defense. 77 For a good analysis of how Sendero gained and lost territorial control throughout the country and the stages of its guerrilla war, see Robert B. Kent,. ‘Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru’, Geographical Review83/ 4 (Oct. 1993) pp.441–54. 78 McClintock (note 6) pp.71–2.