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The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy

2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 28; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01402380500060528

1743-9655

Spyros Economides,

Contemporary and Historical Greek Studies

Abstract The Europeanisation of national foreign policy through EU membership is a widely accepted process. How and why this process takes place is more debatable. In the context of Greek foreign policy, the process of Europeanisation has been long and tortuous, and has been primarily driven from within. EU membership has had a Europeanising influence on Greek foreign policy through adaptation to practices, norms and behaviour, and Greek policy-makers have undergone a degree of socialisation. But, for the most part, the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy has taken the form of the projection of national interests and policy preferences onto the European level in a variety of ways and at a variety of times since Greek accession in 1981. This article suggests that the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy has taken the form of Westernisation, modernisation, normalisation, rehabilitation, denationalisation and multilateralisation, to suit particular needs at particular times. Notes For the best recent work, which traces the broad concepts and sets the framework for general discussions on Europeanisation, see Featherstone and Radaelli (2003 Featherstone Kevin Radaelli Claudio, M eds 2003 The Politics of Europeanization Oxford: Oxford University Press [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), especially the introduction. Many of these issues were best treated in Couloumbis and Iatrides (1980 Couloumbis Theodore A Iatrides John, O eds 1980 Greek–American Relations: A Critical Review New York: Pella [Google Scholar]). For detail on the organisational changes made to the structure and functioning of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs see Kavakas (2000 Kavakas Dimitrios 2000 Greece in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press 144 61 [Google Scholar]: 145–47). These are significant changes on the organisational level but were not always significant in effect, especially under Foreign Minister George Papandreou, diminished in importance by the appointment of dozens of special advisers attached to his cabinet. Even though this reorganisation did not take place until 1998. This was a 'grand coalition' government whose slogan, and political mission, was 'catharsis' – the cleansing of the Greek body politic – following the unrest caused by the Koskotas scandals during this Papandreou premiership. The link in the interplay between foreign and domestic policy was provided by the Foreign Minister of the New Democracy government, Andonis Samaras. He saw in the reappearance of the 'Macedonian question' an opportunity to assert himself as the unrivalled future leader of his party. By commandeering foreign policy he set a nationalist agenda which would do untold damage to Greek interests, even if it did not work to his own political advantage. For a typical example of the international, and especially British, reaction to the Greek handling of the Macedonian issue see Malcolm (1992 Malcolm Noel 1992 The New Bully of the Balkans The Spectator 15 August 1992 [Google Scholar]). For a good account of Greek foreign policy and the Macedonian Question, in the context of the EU's external relations, see Tziampiris (2000 Tziampiris Aristotle 2000 Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question Aldershot: Ashgate [Google Scholar]). The governments of Mitsotakis and Papandreou had to simultaneously deal with a misconceived popular sentiment and the exigencies of regional foreign policy. Mediation with Serbia on the behalf of the EU – and other international actors – such as during the attempts to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to sign up to the Vance–Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia were met not with acclaim but with catcalls of derision; branding Greece an unreconstructed ally of Milosevic's Serbia rather than a well-intentioned conduit for international diplomacy playing to its regional influence. The boldest and most provocative of these arguments was put forward by Samuel Huntington, who portrayed Greece as not a member of the Western civilisation but inhabiting an eastern world based on Orthodoxy. See Huntington (1997 Huntington Samuel, P 1997 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York: Touchstone [Google Scholar]: 126, 162–63, 283–84). It is relevant to note that Simitis and the three other high-ranking PASOK members who formed the so-called Gang of Four, which in effect signalled the end of the Andreas Papandreou era, were commonly referred to as modernisers in public debate and by the media. It was a key feature of their move to take control of the party and government. This maverick tag was not aided by the public pronouncements of George Papandreou's predecessor as Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos. On numerous occasions he made highly inflammatory and derogatory remarks about a number of other states including Turkey and Germany. Of the former he said that it was 'dragging bloody boots across the carpets of Europe' in relation to the treatment of the Kurdish question. Of the latter he referred to it as 'a giant with a child's brain' in the context of its Balkan foreign policy. Other instances are the policy of the Greek government over the Kosovo crisis in 1999, a generally more constructive Balkan policy both in politico-economic terms as well as through participation in policing and peacekeeping missions in the region (and beyond), and the style and substance of the Greek Presidency of the European Council in the first semester of 2003. This proactive, conciliatory policy matched the personalities and political characteristics of the main foreign policy decision-makers, Simitis and Papandreou. The former was not prone to the populist rhetorical flourishes of his predecessor, nor was he one to embrace the grand gesture, often cocking a snook at allies and partners alike, as Papandreou had done on numerous occasions. His pragmatic, low-key approach to foreign policy was much in line with the role of the moderniser which he had adopted domestically as he embarked on a series of domestic reforms. Papandreou, while playing on the family name and political heritage, which provided him tremendous popularity at home and publicity abroad, was the most presentable of PASOK's foreign policy team. He too formed part of the party's modernising tendency and he relied extensively, and successfully, on his charisma, international contacts and fluent 'Westernness' in pursuit of diplomatic goals. While there was an outpouring of goodwill and mutual assistance as a result of the earthquakes, it has been argued that the causal link between 'disaster or earthquake diplomacy' and the Greek–Turkish rapprochement must not be overstated. The process of rapprochement predated the disasters and the diplomacy which ensued may have helped the process along but was not necessarily the instigating factor. See Ker-Lindsay (2000 Ker-Lindsay, James. 2000. Greek–Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of "Disaster Diplomacy"?. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14:1: 215–32. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). These claims were widespread and were mainly fuelled by a combination of a long-standing anti-Americanism, extremists and anarchists, the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greece and a mass media, which viewed the conflict through rose-tinted lenses. It was the method of NATO intervention as well as the unstated objectives of the American led operation, which brought these tendencies to the fore. This policy also bolstered the idea of Westernisation, a key element in long-term Europeanisation. For details of the two most important meetings, the General Affairs Council of 28 January 2003, and the extraordinary summit in February see, Pagoulatos and Vlavoukos (2004 Pagoulatos George Vlavoukos Spyros 2004 [The Last Greek Presidency: Greece in European Integration and the Four Greek Presidencies of the EU] Athens: Papazisi [Google Scholar]: 123–28).