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Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life 2004–2009

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 38; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09637494.2010.499281

1465-3974

Nikolay Mitrokhin,

Soviet and Russian History

Abstract In setting the scene for my consideration of the role of Orthodoxy in the political life of Ukraine from 2004 to 2009 I briefly outline the complex history of Ukraine and the correspondingly complex evolution of its religious structure. I identify the triple intellectual discourse which is still lively in all Ukrainian political and cultural circles today, which consists in choosing one of three answers to the question 'what is Ukraine?': part of Austria–Hungary (or, more widely, multiethnic Europe); part of Russia; or a state in its own right, seeking its 'special path'. I then consider the various ways in which Ukraine may be divided into regions and sub-regions and how these accompany political preferences: in the 2000s Ukrainians have been divided into two camps, along the border between the old Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (for Viktor Yuschenko, an independent state and integration into Europe) and the Muscovite Tsardom plus the Crimean Khanate (for Viktor Yanukovych, the communists and a de facto restoration of the USSR). There is also general difference between the west and the east of the country in the areas of religiosity, frequency of church attendance and parish membership: in the western regions these are at Central European levels (or even somewhat higher), while in the eastern regions they are some four times lower. I then move on to look at the political self-positioning of the various churches. I identify three different tendencies within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) alone. I argue that nominal adherence to an institution means much less in Ukraine than it does in Russia, and an individual's personal qualities much more. I then illustrate my various arguments with a close look at the role of the Orthodox churches in the 2004 presidential election campaigns and in the 'Orange Revolution' and its aftermath. I argue that the UOC-MP proved unable to provide Yanukovych with enough support in 2004, while all the other major religious organisations managed to cooperate successfully to back Yuschenko, and that since the fall of Yanukovych's 'anti-orange' government in 2007 the UOC-MP has started slowly drifting towards greater autonomy with less regard for Moscow-based church politics, and towards a greater readiness to negotiate with its rival Orthodox churches. My conclusion is that the regional and confessional complexity of Ukraine obliges the authorities to take all political and religious interests into consideration. Notes 1 The Diocese of Mukachevo was historically placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Vatican, and this remains the case today. 2 The most recent example of this was the activity of Galician autonomists in artistic and political circles in L'viv in the early 2000s. This involved not only celebrating the birthday of the Emperor Franz Josef in 2002 and erecting a statue to him in the courtyard of the art gallery but devising a Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian language and using it for some of the contents of the leading intellectual publications of the city (and hence of the local region): the newspaper Postup and the journal Ï . Today within the UGCC the leading faction is 'Ukrainocentric', based on the Studite monastic order; this faction aims to exploit the Orthodox heritage more and several leading members of it are calling for a radical distancing from the Vatican, but there are also the 'Westernisers' (the Basilian monastic order and various provincial dioceses) whom the Studites consider to be 'conduits for the politics of Rome' and 'Latinisers'. 3 On 1 January 2009 fewer than 50 per cent of registered religious organisations were Orthodox (not including Old Believers) in the following regions: Crimea; the city of Sevastopol'; and Donets'k, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivs'k, L'viv and Ternopil'oblasti (estimate by the author on the basis of statistics from the State Committee on Nationalities and Religions (Derzhavnyi, Citation2009)). We should note that in 2004 more regions fell into this category (eight out of 27). 4 Critics might point out that we should base our calculations not on the number of registered organisations but on the percentage of respondents to opinion polls on religious affiliation. If we did that then certainly most of Ukraine except Galicia would appear as 'Orthodox', but then the question arises as to whether this response means actually practising the faith or being active in religious organisations. This latter is the key factor in the potential mobilisation of a religious community and lies at the root of the concept of a 'dominant' religion. 5 Statistics produced by the government's Committee for Religious Affairs in Ukraine for 1 January 2004 show more registered Protestant than Orthodox religious communities in one region, Donets'k oblast', while in two others – the city of Kiev and Kharkiv oblast'– Protestants had more communities if unregistered ones known to the Committee were included. In five regions (Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Kirovohrad, Luhans'k and Chernivtsi oblasti) the number of Protestant communities was 75 per cent or more of the number of Orthodox communities, and in eight (Dnipropetrovs'k, Kiev, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Kherson and Cherkasy oblasti and Crimea) it was 50 per cent or more (Relihiini, Citation2004). These statistics clearly show the presence of Protestantism throughout the south-east and its concentration in major industrial cities. The high number of Protestants in the far west of the country is explained by the presence of significant ethnic minorities (mostly Hungarians and Germans). 6 In some major cities (Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k, Donets'k) there were some partially compensatory factors: tourism; musical societies and clubs of other kinds; a small hippy movement (active from the 1970s). In the election campaigns of the 2000s the intelligentsia in the south-east tended either to support the 'orange' side or not to take part at all. 7 For more on this see Mitrokhin (Citation2004b). We might note that in Russia the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church take quite a sceptical and suspicious view of the scout movement, because of the way it organises itself and because it is seen to be using 'propaganda'. 8 All statistics in this section on the number of parishes as of 1 January 2009 are taken from Statistika (Citation2009). The figures for 2004 come from Relihiini (Citation2004). 9 For example: the Union of Free Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (Soyuz svobodnykh tserkvei khristian yevangel'skoi very) (111 registered and 69 unregistered); the Ukrainian Centre of the United Church of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (Ukrainsky tsentr ob"yedinennoi tserkvi khristian very yevangel'skoi) (26 registered and 117 unregistered); the Ukrainian Christian Evangelical Church (Ukrainskaya khristianskaya yevangel'skaya tserkov') (162); the Church of Christ (Tserkov' Khrista) (110); the Church of the Full Gospel (Tserkov' polnogo yevangeliya) claims 601 registered and 15 unregistered organisations. 10 There were also 580 unregistered Protestant communities in 2009, according to estimates by the government's Committee on Nationalities and Religions. There were considerably fewer unregistered Orthodox communities, both absolutely and proportionally: 143. (Estimates by the author on the basis of Statistika (Citation2009).) 11 Of the total number of registered and unregistered Muslim communities in Ukraine, 346 and 613 respectively are in Crimea. 12 This discourse has now abated, as a result of several factors: the absence for a decade now of any real evidence of conflicts between Greek Catholics and Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox in the region; a general shift in the attitude of the leadership of the UOC-MP towards dialogue with other churches in Ukraine; the death in April 2005 of Pope John Paul II, whom the Moscow Patriarchate saw as responsible for the activities of the 'Uniates' in 1990; the death in December 2008 of Patriarch Aleksi, for whom the loss of the western Ukrainian dioceses was the birth trauma of his period as patriarch; and the accession of the new patriarch, Kirill, for whom this event is not traumatic in the same way and who is in any case more sympathetic towards Catholicism than Aleksi was. 13 This theme comes up very frequently in proposals and statements by Ukrainian political figures and is a permanent backdrop to church–state relations in Ukraine. (See for example: Kuchma (Citation2000) ('"My great dream is to have one single Ukrainian Orthodox Church", says the president'); Litvin (Citation2009) (Litvin is the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament; he was a member of the 'Orange Coalition' from 2004 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010 an ally of Yanukovych; he is quoted as being convinced that 'a single canonical Orthodox church would be a blessing for Ukraine', inasmuch it would play 'a significant consolidating spiritual role'); Timoshenko (Citation2009); Yushchenko (Citation2010).) Yanukovych himself has adopted an ambiguous position on the subject (see for example Yanukovich, Citation2004a, 2009). 14 The average percentage of parishes belonging to the UOC-KP as compared to those belonging to the UOC-MP in the Dnipro region and in the south of the country is about 20, except in Kiev oblast', where it is about 50, and in Kharkiv oblast' and Crimea, where it is insignificant. Supporters of the UOC-MP frequently claim that many if not most of the parishes claimed by UOC-KP are fictional, having been registered only with the support of the local authorities. The same claim could justifiably be made, however, about many of the parishes of the UOC-MP itself. 15 A church of this name existed in the 1920s, was restored by the Nazis in the early 1940s and later continued to function among the Ukrainian diaspora abroad. 16 The visit did not achieve the desired results and Patriarch Bartholomaios did not assume the responsibility of officially recognising the UOC-KP, although equally he did not condemn its existence. 17 As an example we might cite the 'educational' (antisectarian) 'Dialog' centre which operates in Zaporizhzhia with the support of the local bishop but extends its activities to other parts of Ukraine. 18 In the eastern regions the Protestants build their own churches or meet in people's flats and do not claim subsidies of the kind which the UOC-MP receives. By contrast in Kiev, for example, where the UOC-KP is strong, the authorities are obliged to divide property being returned to the churches, and subsidies for restoring it, between the two main Orthodox churches, and they also give some to the UAOC. 19 Bishops from eastern Ukraine (particularly Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasti), who comprise a significant proportion of the total episcopate, tend to be significantly more brutal than their colleagues in their Russian nationalist pronouncements. As an example we might consider the activities of former Bishop Diomid (Dzyuban') (see Mitrokhin, Citation2007b). 20 The movement for the return and rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars has been closely linked with 'Ukrainocentric' political forces and the central government and has been the main 'pro-Ukrainian' factor in otherwise 'pro-Russian' Crimea. All actors on the political scene in Crimea have made deliberate and thorough efforts to regulate any conflicts, however, and with some success, although incidents such as the one described do not help the process. 21 This was in 2004. It seems that this number declined substantially after the Orange Revolution. Representatives of the episcopal administration told me in private conversation in Moscow in January 2005 that they were 'having serious problems with retaining parishes' since the UOC-MP had come out with a pro-Moscow stance in the election campaign, that several parishes had already left and that others were considering doing so. 22 Particularly the flag, which is displayed in churches, and that symbol of Ukrainian culture the embroidered cloth which is hung round ikons to prevent them gathering dust. 23 Somewhat less than half the registered parishes of the UOC-KP are in the west of the country, but they are active and really exist. 24 The text of this testament has been published on several internet sites. See for example Zaveshchaniye (Citation2002). 25 In mid-2009 Iliya was living in the residence of the patriarch of Moscow in Peredelkino in the Moscow suburbs, and was thus de facto the leading elder in the church, a position which had been occupied until the arrival of Patriarch Kirill by Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov), who also lived at Peredelkino but who had been inactive for several years. 26 Over the last few centuries the Russian Orthodox Church has had four 'lavras': the Kiev Monastery of the Caves; the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery; the Pochayev Monastery; and the Alexander Nevsky Monastery. A lavra is a widely recognised large male monastery with a large number of holy places and a long history, of national significance, and with its own important educational establishment. The importance of this resolution can be seen from the fact that notable monasteries such as Valaamo, the Solovetsky Monastery, the Pskov Monastery of the Caves and in Ukraine the Dormition Monastery in Odesa do not have the status of lavra. 27 The head of the monastery writes: 'The monastery records will forever enshrine the name of the benefactor who is so dear to our Sviatohirs'k brotherhood, Viktor Yanukovych, who while head of the Donets'k oblast' administration identified funding and actively supported many aspects of our work. It was upon his heart that the Lord laid the task of fulfilling the prophecies of the elders about the regeneration of our monastery. It was his soul which responded to the Divine call, and led by the hand of the Lord, he accepted responsibility for the building and glorification of the monastery' (Arseni, Citation2004). Continuing evidence of support for the ideas and memory of Zosima was provided by the visit of Patriarch Kirill to eastern Ukraine (mainly Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasti ) in 2009. He was warmly received by Yanukovych and the Donets'k clan. 28 Conspicuous by their absence were such Synod members as Metropolitan Nikodim (Rusnak) of Kharkiv, Metropolitan Onufri (Berezovsky) of Chernivtsi and Metropolitan Makari (Svistun) of Vinnytsa. Even the chancellor of the UOC-MP was not there. There were no representatives at all from Podolia; the only representative from the south was the head of the Odesa diocese; and three western oblasti were also unrepresented (Osvyashchena, 2004). We should note, however, that there may be another explanation for the absence of all these hierarchs. Unofficial sources suggest that if Yanukovych won the election the Donets'k group planned to replace the head of the UOC-MP, who was seriously ill, with 'their own' Metropolitan Illarion. A significant number of bishops, including other candidates for the post, as well as their opponents, would not welcome this prospect (see Sleduyushchim, 2020). 29 Here we might contrast the pronouncements of Russian Orthodox clergy within Russia itself. They tend to hold that churches were destroyed in the 1920s and 1930s by unnamed 'enemies of Russia', by people who had 'lost their reason' or been 'blinded'. They hardly ever blame the government itself; on the contrary, they underline the unity of government and church. Repressions and persecutions in the 1960s and 1970s are mentioned only very rarely and then only in stories about the lives of particular individual members of the clergy.