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‘What Is, Is More than It Is’: Adorno and Heidegger on the Priority of Possibility

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 19; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09672559.2011.539357

1466-4542

Iain Macdonald,

Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 For orientation in contemporary aspects of the debate, see Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek (eds) Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). The first attempt at a systematic treatment of the question was of course Hermann Mörchen, Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung (Stuttgart: Klett‐Cotta, 1981 Mörchen Hermann. 1981. Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung, Stuttgart: Klett‐Cotta. [Google Scholar]). (See too the prior study, Hermann Mörchen, Macht und Herrschaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno (Stuttgart: Klett‐Cotta,1980 Mörchen Hermann. 1980. Macht und Herrschaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno, Stuttgart: Klett‐Cotta. [Google Scholar]).) The best (sadly, also very brief) attempt to date to do justice to the stakes of the debate is certainly Dieter Thomä, ‘Verhältnis zur Ontologie. Adornos Denken des Unbegrifflichen’, in Theodor W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, ed. Axel Honneth and Christoph Menke (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006 Thomä, Dieter. 2006. “‘Verhältnis zur Ontologie. Adornos Denken des Unbegrifflichen’”. In Theodor W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, Edited by: Honneth, Axel and Menke, Christoph. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. [Google Scholar]). Nota bene: unattributed translations are my own. I have also taken the liberty of making minor modifications, where necessary, to existing translations. 2 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie (2 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973 Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity, Edited by: Tarnowski, Knut and Will, Frederic. London/Evanston: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Northwestern University Press. [Google Scholar]), Vol. 1, p. 160. 3 ‘I have read nothing by him. Hermann Mörchen once tried to talk me into reading him. I never did’ (Richard Wisser, ‘Das Fernseh‐Interview’, in Günther Neske (ed.) Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1977 Wisser, Richard. 1977. “‘Das Fernseh‐Interview’”. In Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, Edited by: Neske, Günther. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske. [Google Scholar]), pp. 283–4). 4 Ibid., p. 283. 5 Ibid., p. 284. Adorno saw very early on that this distinction between philosophy and sociology was at the root of his disagreement with Heidegger. See Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, in The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor, trans. Benjamin Snow (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 Adorno, Theodor W. 2000. “‘The Actuality of Philosophy’”. In The Adorno Reader, Edited by: O’Connor, Brian and Snow, Benjamin. Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]), p. 35; Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (20 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997 Adorno, Theodor W. 1997. Gesammelte Schriften, Edited by: Tiedemann, Rolf. 20 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. [Google Scholar]), Vol. 1, p. 340. The Gesammelte Schriften are hereafter referred to by the abbreviation GS. 6 Wisser, ‘Das Fernseh‐Interview’, p. 284. 7 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999 Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, Edited by: Emad, Parvis and Maly, Kenneth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Google Scholar]), §139, p. 183; Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Friedrich‐Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975 Heidegger, Martin. 1975– . Gesamtausgabe, Edited by: von Herrmann, Friedrich‐Wilhelm. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. [Google Scholar]– ), Vol. 65, p. 260. The Gesamtausgabe is hereafter referred to by the abbreviation GA. 8 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, pp. 24–39; Adorno, GS, 1:325–44. 9 Thomä, ‘Verhältnis zur Ontologie: Adornos Denken des Unbegrifflichen’, p. 46. 10 Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. D. Ross, The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984 Aristotle. 1984. “Metaphysics”. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Edited by: Barnes, Jonathan and Ross, W. D. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]), □q 8, 1049b4ff. 11 ‘Wollte man das Unmögliche doch versuchen und das Wesen des Seyns mit Hilfe der »metaphysischen« »Modalitäten« fassen, dann möchte man sagen: Die Verweigerung (die Wesung des Seyns) ist die höchste Wirklichkeit des höchsten Möglichen als des Möglichen und damit die erste Notwendigkeit, doch abgerechnet die Herkunft der »Modalitäten« aus der ούσία’ (Heidegger, Contributions, §127, p. 172; Heidegger, GA, 65:244. The definition is given twice, in fact, in very similar forms; see too Heidegger, Contributions, §169, p. 207; Heidegger, GA, 65:294.) 12 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960 Husserl, Edmund. 1960. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Edited by: Cairns, Dorion. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), §19, p. 45; Edmund Husserl, Husserliana (The Hague, Dordrecht, and New York: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic Publishers, and Springer Verlag, 1950 Husserl, Edmund. 1950– . Husserliana, The Hague, Dordrecht, and New York: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic Publishers, and Springer Verlag. [Google Scholar]– ), Vol. 1, p. 82. The Husserliana are hereafter referred to by the abbreviation HUA. 13 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §19, p. 45; Husserl, HUA, 1:82. 14 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §19, p. 44; Husserl, HUA, 1:81–2. 15 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962 Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time, Edited by: Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [Google Scholar]), H41. 16 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §19, p. 45; Husserl, HUA, 1:82. 17 Heidegger says this of Hegel, but it applies to Husserl and to the Idealist tradition more generally. See Heidegger, GA, 68:10–12, 37–8. 18 Heidegger, GA, 68:47. 19 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §19, p. 45; Husserl, HUA, 1:82. 20 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §19, pp. 45–6; Husserl, HUA, 1:83. 21 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §20, p. 46; Husserl, HUA, 1:84. 22 Canny readers of Husserl will notice that I have limited myself to ‘internal’ horizons, leaving aside the concept of ‘external’ horizon that is sketched in Ideas I and developed in The Crisis of European Sciences. But the concept of external horizon – as the ‘field of things’ and ultimately the world‐horizon – does nothing to mitigate a Heidegger‐inspired critique. As Husserl himself says: the world‐horizon ‘exhibits itself to me in every case through a nucleus of “original presence” (this designates the continuously subjective character of what is directly perceived as such) as well as through its internal and external horizon‐validities’ (Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970 Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Edited by: Carr, David. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. [Google Scholar]), §47, pp. 162–3; Husserl, HUA, 6:165–6). The emphasis on the ‘nucleus’ of ‘original presence’ always given ‘subjectively’ shows that it is again the ego and intentionality that are fundamental in the experience of the external horizon. See also Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982 Husserl, Edmund. 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, Edited by: Kersten, F. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), §27, p. 52; Husserl, HUA, 3.1:57. 23 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 104; Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967 Derrida, Jacques. 1967. La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. [Google Scholar]), p. 117. 24 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter, revised edn (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982 Heidegger, Martin. 1982. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, , revised edn, Edited by: Hofstadter, Albert. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 308; Heidegger, GA, 24:438. 25 Heidegger, Contributions, §127, p. 172; Heidegger, GA, 65:244. 26 Heidegger, Contributions, §169, p. 335; Heidegger, GA, 65:475. My italics. 27 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London/Evanston: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Northwestern University Press, 1973 Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity, Edited by: Tarnowski, Knut and Will, Frederic. London/Evanston: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Northwestern University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 27; Adorno, GS, 6:431. 28 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973 Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity, Edited by: Tarnowski, Knut and Will, Frederic. London/Evanston: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Northwestern University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 84; Adorno, GS, 6:92. Ashton mistakenly substitutes mundus sensibilis for Adorno’s mundus intelligibilis, which of course renders the sentence incomprehensible. 29 Heidegger, Being and Time, §§35–7, H167–75. 30 Adorno, Jargon, pp. 11–2; Adorno, GS, 6:420–1. 31 There are, of course, notorious exceptions concerning Heidegger’s political involvement. Nevertheless, for present purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of Adorno’s objections to Heidegger are philosophical, not political. 32 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 207; Adorno, GS, 6:207. 33 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 205; Adorno, GS, 6:205. 34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 205; Adorno, GS, 6:205. 35 Theodor W. Adorno, Ontologie und Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002 Adorno, Theodor W. 2002. Ontologie und Dialektik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. [Google Scholar]), p. 33. 36 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 31; Adorno, GS, 1:334. 37 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 31; Adorno, GS, 1:335. 38 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 33; Adorno, GS, 1:337. 39 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 38; Adorno, GS, 1:343. 40 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 37; Adorno, GS, 1:342. 41 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 37; Adorno, GS, 1:342. 42 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot‐Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 Adorno, Theodor W. 1997. Aesthetic Theory, Edited by: Hullot‐Kentor, Robert. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 3; Adorno, GS, 7:12. 43 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Notes on Philosophical Thinking’, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998 Adorno, Theodor W. 1998. “‘Notes on Philosophical Thinking’”. In Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, Edited by: Pickford, Henry W. New York: Columbia University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 132; Adorno, GS, 10.2:604. 44 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 313; Adorno, GS, 6:308. 45 ‘[Utopie], das Bewußtsein der Möglichkeit, haftet am Konkreten als dem Unentstellten. Es ist das Mögliche, nie das unmittelbar Wirkliche, das der Utopie den Platz versperrt; inmitten des Bestehenden erscheint es darum als abstrakt. Die unauslöschliche Farbe kommt aus dem Nichtseienden. Ihm dient Denken, ein Stück Dasein, das, wie immer negativ, ans Nichtseiende heranreicht’ (Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 56–7; Adorno, GS, 6:66). 46 Rainer Traub and Harald Wieser (eds) Gespräche mit Ernst Bloch (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975 Traub, Rainer and Wieser, Harald, eds. 1975. Gespräche mit Ernst Bloch, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. [Google Scholar]), p. 61. 47 Heidegger, Being and Time, H38. 48 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 308; Heidegger, GA, 24:438. 49 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006 Heidegger, Martin. 2006. Mindfulness, Edited by: Emad, Parvis and Kalary, Thomas. London: Continuum. [Google Scholar]), p. 165; Heidegger, GA, 66:187. 50 Heidegger, Mindfulness, p. 167; Heidegger, GA, 66:189. 51 Suffice it to point the reader to two particularly relevant treatments of this theme. See Charlotte Witt, ‘The Priority of Actuality in Aristotle’, in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M. L. Gill (eds) Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 Witt, Charlotte. 1994. “‘The Priority of Actuality in Aristotle’”. In Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Edited by: Scaltsas, T., Charles, D. and Gill, M. L. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). See too Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time’, in Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle’s Theory of Modality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973 Hintikka, Jaakko. 1973. “‘Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time’”. In Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle’s Theory of Modality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Google Scholar]). 52 The ‘Letter on Humanism’ was written in 1946 and first published in 1947 alongside ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’, then again in a separate edition in 1949. It was subsequently included in Pathmarks (Wegmarken) in 1967. In a marginal note to the 1949 edition, Heidegger writes: ‘What is said here was not first thought up when this letter was written but is based on the course of a path that was begun in 1936, in the “moment” of an attempt to say the truth of being in a simple manner. The letter continues to speak in the language of metaphysics, and does so knowingly. The other language remains in the background’ (Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, in Pathmarks, ed. Will McNeill, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 Heidegger, Martin. 1998. “‘Letter on Humanism’”. In Pathmarks, Edited by: McNeill, Will and Capuzzi, Frank A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 239. Heidegger, GA, 9:313). 53 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 242; Heidegger, GA, 9:317/149. 54 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 242; Heidegger, GA, 9:317/149. 55 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 243; Heidegger, GA, 9:318/150. 56 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 243; Heidegger, GA, 9:318–19/150. 57 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 271; Heidegger, GA, 9:357/188. 58 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 241–2; Heidegger, GA, 9:316/148. 59 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 242–3; Heidegger, GA, 9:316–17/148. 60 Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, p. 37; Adorno, GS, 1:342–3. 61 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 108; Adorno, GS, 6:114. See the discussion of this passage in Thomä, ‘Verhältnis zur Ontologie. Adornos Denken des Unbegrifflichen’. 62 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 8–10; Adorno, GS, 6:20–1. 63 Traub and Wieser (eds) Gespräche mit Ernst Bloch, p. 61. See also Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 313; Adorno, GS, 6:308. 64 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 161; Adorno, GS, 6:164. 65 This ontology may in some ways recall the Kantian view regarding appearances and the thing‐in‐itself. But Adorno strenuously resists the temptation to relate the ‘more’ to the thing‐in‐itself. For although the thing‐in‐itself marks ‘a blind spot in thinking’, it remains ‘arcane and indeterminate’ and an explanatory ‘deus ex machina’ (Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 254; Adorno, GS, 6:251). 66 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Resignation’, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998 Adorno, Theodor W. 1998. “‘Notes on Philosophical Thinking’”. In Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, Edited by: Pickford, Henry W. New York: Columbia University Press. [Google Scholar]), p. 293; Adorno, GS, 10.2:798.