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Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 14; Issue: 1-2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13572330801921117

1743-9337

Petr Kopecký, Maria Spirova,

Populism, Right-Wing Movements

Abstract This article charts the development of parliamentary opposition in post-communist Eastern Europe in the context of the changing nature of executive–legislative relations. We first review the existing literature on opposition in post-communist Europe. The second part of the article presents an analytical framework of different modes of executive–legislative interactions. Empirical analysis then demonstrates the practical relevance of these modes in post-communist political systems and their consequences for the position of the parliamentary opposition. We draw our empirical material from three countries of the region: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. We demonstrate that political parties have become the principal source of parliamentary opposition in these countries. However, we also highlight the crucial link between party stability and the ability of the opposition to influence the policy-making process. Notes 1. J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), and M. Waller, The End of the Communist Power Monopoly (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993). 2. J.M. Colomer, ‘Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Democracy, 6 (1995), pp.74–85; J. Elster (ed.), Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996); E. Matynia, ‘Furnishing Democracy at the End of the Century: The Polish Round Table and Others’, European Politics and Societies, 15 (2001), pp.454–71; A.P. Melone, ‘Bulgaria's National Round-Table Talks and the Politics of Accommodation’, International Political Science Review 15 (July 1994), pp.245–68. 3. See, for example, S. Baker and P. Jehlicka (eds.), ‘Dilemmas of Transition: The Environment, Democracy and Economic Reform in ECE’, Environmental Politics (special issue), 7 (1998); S. Crowley and D. Ost (eds.), Workers After Workers' States: Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); S. LaFont, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Women in the Post-Communist States’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34 (2001), pp.203–20. 4. M.M. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 5. For an alternative view see P. Kopecký and C. Mudde (eds.), Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-communist Europe (London: Routledge, 2003). 6. E. Kalinova and I. Baeva, Bulgarskite Prehodi 1944–1999 [The Bulgarian Transitions 1944–1999] (Sofia: Tilia, 2000), p.188. 7. P.G. Lewis, ‘The Repositioning of Opposition in East-Central Europe’, Government and Opposition, 32 (1997), pp.614–30; A. Stepan, ‘Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory’, Government and Opposition, 32 (1997), pp.656–73; J. Barber, ‘Opposition in Russia’, Government and Opposition, 32 (1997), pp.598–613. 8. L. Helms, ‘Five Ways of Institutionalizing Political Opposition: Lessons from the Advanced Democracies’, Government and Opposition, 39 (2004), pp.22–54. 9. P. Kopecký, ‘Power to the Executive! The Changing Executive–Legislative Relations in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 10 (2004), pp.142–54; T.A. Baylis, ‘Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe’, World Politics, 48 (1996), pp.297–323; T.A. Baylis, ‘Embattled Executives: Prime Ministerial Weakness in East Central Europe’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40 (2007), pp.81–106. 10. P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); P. Norton and D.M. Olson (eds.), Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Parliaments: The Initial Decade, special issue of The Journal of Legislative Studies, 13/1 (2007); D.M. Olson and P. Norton (eds.), The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996); D.M. Olson, ‘Institutionalization of Parliamentary Committees: the Experience of Post-communist Democracies’, Paper presented at the ECPR Congress Workshop #16, Turin, 22–27 March 2002; D.M. Olson and W.E. Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2003), pp.21–43. 11. J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel, Cabinets in Eastern Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2001); P. Harfst, ‘Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties’, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen, 14–19 April 2000. 12. Parties in post-communist systems tend to fall within three general categories: the successors of the old communist parties and their satellites (the socialist BSP in Bulgaria and MSZP in Hungary, and the communist KSCM and Christian democratic KDU-CSL in the Czech Republic), the parties that formed (from) the original opposition movements (the conservative MDF and FIDESZ and the liberal SZDSZ in Hungary, conservative SDS, centrist BZNS and the ethnic MRF in Bulgaria, and liberal/conservative ODS and ODA, and social-democratic CSSD in the Czech Republic) and the new parties that have emerged since then. The new parties are most prominent in Bulgaria where the liberal and populist NDSV dominated politics between 2001 and 2005. The presence of anti-system parties has been rather limited: examples include MIEP in Hungary during 1994–2002 and Ataka in Bulgaria since 2005. For a more detailed discussion of parties in the post-communist world see P.G. Lewis, Political Parties in Post-communist Eastern Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); P.G. Lewis, Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe: The First Decade (London: Frank Cass, 2001); M. Spirova, Political Parties in Post-communist Societies: Formation, Persistence and Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 13. Harfst, ‘Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe’. 14. A. King, ‘Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1976), p.11. 15. R.B. Andeweg, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and Coexisting Patterns’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 (1992), pp.161–82; T. Saalfeld, ‘The West German Bundestag after 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in “Party Democracy”’, in P. Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp.68–89. 16. R.B. Andeweg and L. Nijzink, ‘Beyond the Two Body Image: Relations between Ministers and MPs’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1995), pp.152–78. 17. King, ‘Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations’. 18. See Andeweg and Nijzink, ‘Beyond the Two Body Image’. 19. D.M. Olson, ‘The New Parliaments of New Democracies: The Experience of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic’, in A. Agh (ed.), The Emergence of East Central European Parliaments: The First Steps (Budapest: Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994), p.45. 20. Spirova, Political Parties in Post-communist Societies; J. Toole, ‘Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe’, Party Politics, 6 (2000), pp.441–63. 21. Andeweg, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations in the Netherlands’, p.163. 22. In all three countries, presidents act as heads of state with quite circumscribed constitutional powers, including powers to nominate the prime minister, dissolve parliament, suspend veto on legislation, some legislative initiatives, and certain powers in foreign relations. The indirectly elected Hungarian parliament has retained a relatively unimportant role in Hungarian politics, while the directly elected Bulgarian one and the indirectly elected Czech parliament have attempted to go beyond their formal powers and on several occasions this has proved crucial for the making and breaking of governments. This happened twice with President Zhelev in Bulgaria (1992 and 1997) and once with President Havel in the Czech Republic (1997). However, these were the only occasions when an incumbent government was not able to maintain cohesion. Therefore, while we leave presidents out of our empirical analysis, the experience with presidential influence in the political process in all three countries clearly underscores the point we make later about the link between the stability of government parties and the de facto power of the parliamentary opposition. 23. King, ‘Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations’; Andeweg, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations in the Netherlands’. 24. Kalinova and Baeva, Bulgarskite Prehodi, p.177. 25. G. Ilonszki and S. Kurtan, ‘Hungary’, European Journal of Political Research, 28 (1995), pp.359–68. 26. EJPS, 32 (1999). 27. Following the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, many ministerial posts were eventually given to MPs from the then dissolving Federal Assembly because this is where parties normally nominated their heavyweights. See Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, pp.104–5. 28. The governments of the 1990s are usually considered to have been single-party majority governments. However, at least three of them – the Berov government in 1992, Videnov in 1995 and Kostov in 1997 – were either supported by more than one parliamentary party (Berov), or the ‘majority’ party itself was an alliance of several parties. The Videnov cabinet included members of two smaller parties that had been part of the BSP electoral alliance and the Kostov cabinet included ministers from three individual parties that had made up the ODS alliance. However, no coalition agreements were signed. And, at least in the case of the Berov cabinet, this facilitated the downfall of the cabinet. 29. G. Ilonszki and S. Kurtan, ‘Hungary’, European Journal of Political Research, 28 (1995), p.364. 30. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, p.109. 31. Andeweg, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations in the Netherlands’, p.167. 32. K. Montgomery, ‘Electoral Effects on Party Behavior and Development’, Party Politics, 5 (1999) pp.507–23. 33. Percentages calculated using data (p.50) in G. Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate: A Final Verdict? The Hungarian Parliament, 1990–2002’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 13/1 (2007), pp.38–58. 34. Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, pp.38–58. 35. L. Linek and P. Rakušanová, ‘Why Czech Parliamentary Party Groups Vote Less Unitedly: The Role of Frequent Voting and Bog Majorities in Passing Bills’, Czech Sociological Review, 41 (2005), pp.401–23. 36. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, pp.100–101. 37. L. Linek and Z. Mansfeldová, ‘The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 13/1 (2007), pp.12–37. 38. G. Karasimenov, ‘The Legislature in Post-Communist Bulgaria’, in Olson and Norton (eds.), The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, p.57. 39. G. Karasimenov, ‘Bulgaria: Parliamentary Committees – Institutionalization and Effectiveness’, in Olson and Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, pp.93–117. 40. Karasimenov, ‘Bulgaria: Parliamentary Committees’, p.101. 41. Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, pp.47–8. 42. G. Ilonszki, ‘A Functional Clarification of Parliamentary Committees in Hungary, 1990–98’, in Olson and Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, pp.21–43. 43. Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.49. 44. Linek and Mansfeldova, ‘The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004’, p.24. However, the 2006 parliament created 17 committees. 45. Z. Mansfeldová, J. Syllová, P. Rakušanová and P. Kolář, ‘Committees of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic’, in Olson and Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, pp.69–89. 46. Mansfeldová et al., ‘Committees of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic’, p.89. 47. Ilonzki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.52; data for 2002–6 provided by the Information Centre of the Hungarian Parliament. 48. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, p.132. 49. Linek and Mansfeldova, ‘The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004’, p.33. 50. Figures calculated by the authors with data from Bulgarian Parliament Legislation Database, available at www.parliament.bg/?page = app&lng = bg&aid = 4. 51. Ilonzki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.51. 52. Linek and Mansfeldová, ‘The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004’, p.33. Data refer only to the period 2002–4. 53. Bulgarian Constitution, Art. 31. 54. Figures calculated from Bulgarian Parliament Archives: 39th Parliament, available at www.parliament.bg/?page = archive&lng = bg 55. Karasimenov, ‘Bulgaria: Parliamentary Committees’. 56. Ilonzki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.53. 57. Ilonzki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.53; figures for 2002–6 calculated by the authors with data from the Information Centre of the Hungarian Parliament. 58. Figures from www.psp.cz. 59. J.W. Schiemann, ‘Hungary: The Emergence of Chancellor Democracy’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 10 (2004), pp.128–41; Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, pp.96–144, Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, pp.38–58. 60. Schiemann, ‘Hungary: The Emergence of Chancellor Democracy’, pp.128–41; Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, pp.96–144; Ilonszki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, pp.38–58. 61. Hungarian Constitution, Art. 39/A. 62. G. Schöpflin, ‘Hungary: Country without Consequences’, OpenDemocracy, 22 Sept. 2006, http://193.41.101.59/debates/article.jsp?id = 3&debateId = 33&articleId = 3926. 63. G. Ilonszki and S. Kurtan, ‘Hungary’, European Journal of Political Research, 44 (2005), p.1033. 64. Bulgarian Constitution, Art. 89. 65. Rates calculated by the authors with data from Kapital Weekly Archives. 66. Czech Constitution, Art. 72. 67. G. Ilonszki and S. Kurtan, ‘Hungary’, European Journal of Political Research, 38 (2000), p.407. 68. ‘Hungary’, The World of Parliaments Quarterly Review, Issue 9 (2003), available at www.ipu.org/news-e/9-7.htm. 69. Figures calculated by the authors with data from Bulgarian Parliament Archives: 39th Parliament, available at www.parliament.bg/?page = archive&lng = bg. 70. Figures calculated by the authors with data provided by the Information Centre of the Hungarian Parliament. 71. Karasimenov, ‘Bulgaria: Parliamentary Committees’. 72. Rates for the 2001 and 2005 Parliament calculated by the authors with data from Bulgarian Parliament Archives: 39th Parliament and Bulgarian Parliament: 40th Parliament, available at www.parliament.bg/?page = ns&lng = bg. 73. Ilonzki, ‘From Minimal to Subordinate’, p.47. 74. Figures calculated by the authors on the basis of information from www.psp.cz. 75. Pirinski had been born in the USA and became a naturalised Bulgarian citizen. 76. V. Ganev, ‘The Bulgarian Constitutional Court 1991–1997: A Success Story in Context’, Europe-Asia Studies, 4 (2003), p.602. 77. See P. Kopecký, ‘Czech Republic: Entrenching Proportional Representation’, in J.M. Colomer (ed.), Handbook of Electoral System Choice (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), pp.347–58. 78. ‘Constitutional Watch’, East European Constitutional Review, 9 (2000). 79. The situation in Hungary is more favourable to the opposition. Since referenda backed by citizens are not only allowed but also binding irrespective of how parliament feels on the issue, the opposition can use this road to initiate national referenda. However, on several occasions the majority has successfully challenged the legality of opposition-backed referenda, thereby preventing them (East European Constitutional Review Constitutional Watch, 7/1, 1998.) 80. Balkan Assist, Pryakata Demokraciya: Pregled na Istoiyatata i Praktikite [Direct Democracy: Review of its History and Practice] (Sofia: Balkan Assist, 2005). 81. B. Koranyi, ‘Hungary's top court backs opposition referendum’, www.reuters.com/article/health-SP/idUSL0581268220070605. 82. For a treatment of some of these cases see P. Norton and D.M. Olson (eds.), ‘Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Parliaments: The Initial Decade’, special issue of the Journal of Legislative Studies 13/1 (2007). Additional informationNotes on contributorsPetr Kopecký Petr Kopecký is a Senior Research Fellow Maria Spirova Maria Spirova is a post-doctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science, University of Leiden, The Netherlands.