Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Defending Differentiated Policies of Multiculturalism

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14608940701406187

1469-9907

Veit Bader,

Migration, Refugees, and Integration

Abstract Affirmative action and multicultural (MC) policies are being challenged by egalitarian liberals, as well as republicans, in theory and politically in recent years. In this article, the author focuses on MC policies, the common core of which is to recognise serious ethno-cultural inequalities under conditions of equal civil and political rights, and find legal and political solutions to address these inequalities. The author argues that egalitarian liberal critics need not reject MC policies as long as such policies are properly conceived and implemented. This, however, requires that their normative justifications and practical implementations be reconsidered. Keywords: MulticulturalismAffirmative Action(Neo-)republicanismPolicy-dilemmas A longer version of this article has been presented at a conference on 'Ideas and Policies for Our Times' in Braga, Portugal, in 2002. A Portuguese version is published in Perez Monteiro, N. & Rosas, J. (Eds.). (2004). Ideas and policies for our times. Lisbon: Mario Soares Foundation. A longer version of this article has been presented at a conference on 'Ideas and Policies for Our Times' in Braga, Portugal, in 2002. A Portuguese version is published in Perez Monteiro, N. & Rosas, J. (Eds.). (2004). Ideas and policies for our times. Lisbon: Mario Soares Foundation. Notes A longer version of this article has been presented at a conference on 'Ideas and Policies for Our Times' in Braga, Portugal, in 2002. A Portuguese version is published in Perez Monteiro, N. & Rosas, J. (Eds.). (2004). Ideas and policies for our times. Lisbon: Mario Soares Foundation. 1. See excellent overviews from a comparative perspective in Çinar (Citation2001); Perchinig (Citation2001). 2. See Bader (Citation1997b, pp. 103ff). In this approach, 'status-hierarchies' are structural inequalities, not to be lumped together with 'cultural inequalities' like in Nancy Fraser's Tanner Lecture or by Kymlicka (Citation2001, pp. 331ff) where a simplistic dichotomy between 'economic hierarchy' and 'status hierarchy' paves the way for a misleading dichotomy of policies of redistribution and of recognition. As a consequence, the specific focus of MC policies on cultural inequalities is lost and the quite traditional mixture of 'culture and identity' is reproduced. In 2003, Fraser tried to develop a three-dimensional analysis by adding 'representation'. 3. This is one of the many flaws of neat distinctions between 'race neutral, class-conscious' policies proposed by Lind (Citation1995, p. 12), Sleeper (Citation1997) and others. 4. See Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (Citation1989), European legislation on linguistic rights of minorities; Packer (Citation2002). 5. See Donders (Citation1999) for developments within the Council of Europe, particularly the Framework Convention 1995 and the aborted Additional Protocol to the ECHR 1996. 6. Jeremy Waldron (Citation2000) rightly criticises the wrong justificatory identity claims in favour of group rights, but like Barry and many others, wrongly thinks that no collective cultural rights are needed. 7. In my own approach, collective prestige is part of the package of essential societal resources (Bader & Benschop, 1989, pp. 133, 141ff) for the social and cultural bases of negative and positive prestige. 8. Valadez (Citation1999, Chapter 3) is too impressed by a 'culture of poverty' approach, overestimating the 'internalization of oppression' and the predominance of ideologies (see Bader & Benschop, 1989, pp. 145–153; Scott, 1988; Berg, Citation2004; Bader, Citation2007b). 9. See Carens' (2000, Chapter 3) for a lucid criticism of Kymlicka's central concept of 'societal culture'. In 2001, 346f Kymlicka focuses exclusively on language and core institutions. 10. See the excellent criticism of incommensurability by Bhashkar (Citation1986); see also Barry (Citation2001, Chapter 7). 11. See Spinner-Halev (Citation2001, p. 86), who has rightly criticised Shachar for not distinguishing clearly enough 'between oppressed and non-oppressed groups', as if the problem of Jewish personal law in Israel would be the same as the situation of Muslim personal law in India. His justice-based approach, however, indiscriminately mixes 'structural' and 'cultural' inequalities. He rightly insists that demands for group autonomy have to be based on reasonable claims of severe injustice, but wrongly gives the impression that marginalisation across-the-board would be required. 12. In some countries, MC policies may have been elite-driven and not hotly contested. This may be partly true for the Netherlands where researchers (like Penninx and Entzinger) and reports by the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) have played a crucial role—together with higher civil servants—in initiating MC policies. These policies have, of course, been opposed by social scientists and politicians, but this criticism by concerned republicans opting for re-universalising citizenship (e.g., Paul Scheffer, following Barry) as well as by right-wing populists (such as Bolkestein and Pim Fortuyn) became more widely shared, dramatised and politically effective after 9/11. However, it is certainly not true for Canada (see Hiebert et al., Citation2003). 13. The democratically honorable indignation against policies by stealth should be tempered by the insight that fairly intelligent, effective and also normatively wise policies are often only achieved by policies of 'subterfuge'. See Héritiér (Citation1999) for the EU, and V. Guiraudon (Citation2000) and Engelen (Citation2003) for immigration and incorporation policies. 14. See also Barry (Citation2001, pp. 317ff). In discussing the question 'What kinds of local variation are consistent with liberal universalism?', Barry rightly makes space for 'customising' laws to conventional norms (see his distinction between First- and Second-Order Impartiality). He mistakes my criticism of 'illegitimate, even stupid, ethnocentrism' as if I would 'condemn any filling out of the liberal "thin moral code" in accordance with local norms' (Barry, Citation2001, p. 288), which I clearly do not (Bader, Citation1997a). We disagree significantly, however, when it comes to the critical scrutiny of these local norms and how to fight illegitimate ethnocentrism. I take Barry to defend Rawlsian content-constraints of public reason, trying to purify public debate, keeping contested cultural claims out, whereas I insist that only through voice, organisation and mobilisation of cultural minorities can we detect such illegitimate ethnocentrism and move forward towards a more neutral and impartial interpretation and application of this moral core (Bader, Citation2007).