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Gibbard's expressivism: An interdisciplinary critical analysis

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 22; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09515080903153626

1465-394X

Christine Clavien,

Emotions and Moral Behavior

Abstract This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality. I begin by introducing Gibbard's theory before testing some key assumptions underlying his system against recent empirical data and theories. The results cast doubt on some crucial aspects of Gibbard's philosophical theory, namely his reduction of morality to anger and guilt, and his theory of "normative governance." Gibbard's particular version of expressivism may be undermined by these doubts. Keywords: AngerEmotionExpressivismGibbardGuiltMetaethicsMoral EmotionMotivationNormative GovernanceSentimentalism Acknowledgements Acknowledgements are due to two blind referees, Peter Goldie, Julien Deonna, Chloë FitzGerald, Ivo Wallimann and Willem-Jan Zwanenburg for correction, advice, and comments on previous versions of this paper. Notes Notes [1] To some extent, Gibbard has revised his anti-realist position in a recent book entitled Thinking How to Live (2003). However, since this book does not address the two main targets of this paper (namely Gibbard's choice of moral emotions and his notion of normative governance) I will scarcely refer to it in this paper. [2] Following Gibbard, in this paper I will focus the discussion on a psychological account; this means that nothing will be said about the way morality can be justified. [3] This conception of rationality is not unchallenged. For further discussion on this theme, see Carson (1992 Carson, T. 1992. Gibbard's conceptual scheme for moral philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52/4: 953–956. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Gibbard (1992 Gibbard, A. 1992. Reply to Blackburn, Carson, Hill, and Railton. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 969–980. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), pp. 974–975. [4] Note that Gibbard often uses the words 'feelings' and 'emotion' interchangeably. [5] Gibbard sometimes makes use of the term 'resentment' instead of anger, although he prefers the latter (Gibbard, 1990 Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings; A theory of normative judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 42). [6] Although I do not address this question in my paper, it is worth referring briefly to an argument made by Shaun Nichols (2004 Nichols, S. 2004. Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 83–96) that calls into question the particular way in which Gibbard integrates rationality and emotions into his account of moral judgments. As Nichols points out, "if moral judgments are judgments of the appropriateness of guilt, then an individual cannot have the capacity to make moral judgments unless she also has the capacity to make judgments about the appropriateness of guilt" (2004, p. 89). However, empirical evidence on young children shows precisely such dissociation: young children are able to distinguish moral violations from conventional violations although they are incapable of assessing the appropriateness of guilt (Harris, 1989 Harris, P. 1989. Children and emotion: The development of psychological understanding, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987 Turiel, E, Killen, M and Helwig, C. 1987. "Morality: Its structure, functions, and vagaries". In The emergence of morality in young children, Edited by: Kagan, J and Lamb, S. 155–243. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar]). In response, Gibbard might however simply acknowledge that children do not have fulfilled moral capacities as long as they are not able to think that a moral emotion is warranted; they would only show a kind of proto-morality. [7] Note that when Gibbard uses the term 'feeling', he seems to think of this particular aspect of emotion. He also explicitly expresses the idea that "in general, a feeling tends to be elicited by certain circumstances, and it tends toward actions of certain kinds" (1990, p. 256). [8] "We can speak of systems in an organism that do various things, and something is a biological function of that system if the system's doing that thing constitutes an adaptation—if the system is adapted to doing that thing" (Gibbard, 1990 Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings; A theory of normative judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 63). [9] "As I am glossing morality, there seem to be cultures that get along without it" (Gibbard, 1990 Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings; A theory of normative judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 294; see also p. 150) [10] A "counterpart" emotion to anger is to be understood as an emotion that is elicited in reaction to the actual or potential anger of another person against oneself. [11] Note that there might be a response to this argument. As Blackburn points out, an emotivist can perfectly well express an attitude in response to somebody else's attitude. Moreover, he can also "express a conviction that if one attitude is to be held then so must the other be held" and so forth (Blackburn, 1993 Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in quasi-realism, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 19). Therefore, moral debate among emotivists is possible. However, it is not my purpose to enter into this debate not least because at the time Gibbard published Wise Choices Apt Feelings, Blackburn had not yet formulated his argument. [12] "I can feel guilt inappropriately: I can feel it without being at fault and without thinking myself at fault" (1990, pp. 148–149). I think Gibbard has a point here. A cognitive and reflexive apprehension of a situation does not always match with the emotions one is used to feel in that type of situation. Such a mismatch could for example easily occur when the subject has recently revised his moral convictions. [13] It is a twist of fate precisely because sentimentalism is usually preferred over rationalism because it has fewer difficulties with the problem of motivation. [14] Concerning this question, philosophers usually speak of the "internalism versus externalism" debate. However, because of the many definitions that have been given to these terms, and consequently the innumerable confusions they have led to, I prefer not make use of them in this article. Moreover, many philosophers would choose to discuss both of the following relations: (i) the relation between 'having a reason to think that something is warranted' and 'thinking that it is warranted' (objective/phenomenological levels); and (ii) the relation between 'thinking that something is warranted' and 'doing it' (phenomenological/practical levels). Since Gibbard's discussion is restricted to the psychological and practical levels, I focus my attention on the second relation. [15] This position is clearly stated in his recent writings (see Gibbard, 2003 Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking how to live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 152–158). [16] In his most recent book, Thinking How to Live, Gibbard explicitly maintains the relevance of normative governance but does not elaborate further on the notion (2003, p. 153). As he says, his new book "treats not the psychology of oughts, but their logic and epistemology" (2003, p. 154). [17] It is difficult to describe precisely what normative governance is without over-interpreting Gibbard's writings. I will venture however a more detailed account of it in the last section. [18] Presumably, emotions such as fear of being repressed after a helping action might undermine the motivational power of normative governance. [19] There are various ways to define positive and negative emotions. In this article, I follow Aaron Ben-Ze'ev: "positive emotions incorporate a positive evaluation, pleasant feelings, and the desire to maintain the situation; negative emotions incorporate a negative evaluation, unpleasant feelings and the desire to change the situation" (2000, p. 72). It follows that I would label compassion or sympathy as a "negative emotion." [20] It should be noted, however, that this analysis leads to the inelegant conclusion that Western countries are better cooperators than the ones that do not display narrow morality. [21] In fact, the story is much more complicated. Cooperation in large groups is not only dependent on the willingness of some to punish defectors, but also on the willingness to punish the non-punishers. And if we are to give an account of the evolution of collective actions in large groups, we need some other selective forces such as group selection, psychological biases or other adaptationist tools. For further details, see Boyd et al. (2003 Boyd, R, Gintis, H, Bowles, S and Richerson, P. 2003. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100: 3531–3535. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), Henrich and Boyd (2001 Henrich, J and Boyd, R. 2001. Why people punish defectors; Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208: 79–89. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and Price, Cosmides, and Tobby (2002 Price, M, Cosmides, L and Tobby, J. 2002. Punitive sentiment as anti-free rider psychological device. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23: 203–231. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). [22] Fehr and Gächter (2002 Fehr, E and Gächter, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415: 137–140. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) organized a 'public good experiment' where 240 students participated. In a public good situation, everyone of a group is free to contribute or not to a public good but once the public good exists, every member of the group can benefit from it, even those who did not contribute to the production of the good. [23] It is worth recalling here that Gibbard clearly distinguishes guilt from shame and argues that the former is more efficient in promoting cooperation and coordination than the latter. However, current state of empirical research does not permit to determine precisely their respective practical contributions. This empirical uncertainty opens the possibility for alternative arguments in favor of shame rather than guilt (Deonna, 2007 Deonna, J. 2007. "Evolution, émotion et morale; Les exemples de la honte et de la culpabilité". In Morale et évolution biologique; Entre déterminisme et liberté, Edited by: Clavien, C and El-Bez, C. 142–164. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes. [Google Scholar]). For this reason, I prefer not to distinguish these emotions in the context of the present analysis. [24] According to the authors, shame is the negative emotion experienced when an agent knows that others are aware that she has behaved in a blameworthy fashion; Gibbard would think of this as guilt (at least in the case of Western cultures). [25] For a similar functional account of the moral relevance of gratitude see Algoe, Haidt, and Gable (2008 Algoe, SA, Haidt, J and Gable, SL. 2008. Beyond reciprocity: Gratitude and relationships in everyday life. Emotion, 8: 425–429. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, and Larson (2001 McCullough, ME, Kilpatrick, SD, Emmons, RA and Larson, DB. 2001. Is gratitude a moral affect?. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 249–266. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). [26] At first glance, it might seem strange to refer to disgust as a moral emotion. Would it not be wiser to speak of 'indignation' instead of 'moral disgust'? It seems not because, in a magnetic resonance imaging experiment, the neuroscientists Moll and colleagues (2005 Moll, J, Oliviera-Souza, R, Tovar Moll, F, Azevedo Ignacio, F, Bramati, IECaparelli-Daquer, EM. 2005. The moral affiliations of disgust: A functional MRI study. The Cognitive Behavioral Neurology, 18(1): 68–78. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) have shown that ordinary disgust and moral disgust activate mainly the same brain regions. It is worth mentioning here that the case of disgust reveals another difficulty, namely the reduction of morality to cooperation and coordination. It is not clear whether disgust has evolved because of its positive effects on cooperation (see Faucher, 2007 Faucher, L. 2007. "Les émotions morales à la lumière de la psychologie évolutionniste: Le dégoÛt et l'évitement de l'inceste". In Morale et évolution biologique; Entre déterminisme et liberté, Edited by: Clavien, C and El-Bez, C. 108–141. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes. [Google Scholar]). [27] For a more technical analysis of affiliative bonding, see Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky (2005 Depue, RA and Morrone-Strupinsky, JV. 2005. A neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding: Implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28: 313–395. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). [28] One of Gibbard's main projects in Wise Choices Apt Feelings is precisely to sharpen the concept of morality (1990, p. 293). [29] Although I will not argue here against this solution, I doubt the plausibility of any attempt to differentiate non-moral emotions from intrinsically moral emotions (see my 2008, chapter 5, section 3). [30] In more contemporary terminology, we would search for a common characteristic of moral emotion's formal objects. [31] The welfare and fundamental needs of people can be understood in a very basic sense: quantity and quality of food, clothes and accommodation, the amount of negative stress people can face during their life or the possibilities they have to achieve their goals. Note that there is a sense in which speaking of the welfare and fundamental needs of people is already normative. However, this normative component must not be overemphasized; it might simply correspond to the necessary conditions for an organism to grow and flourish in its environment (analogously, a sufficient amount of sunshine and a certain quality of earth is necessary for a geranium to grow). [32] It has been shown that, beside deficits in their affective system, psychopaths face impairments in language (abstract semantic categorization tasks), attention and orientation (Kiehl, 2006 Kiehl, K. 2006. A cognitive neuroscience perspective on psychopathy: Evidence for paralimbic system dysfunction. Psychiatry Research, 142: 107–128. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, psychopaths are usually capable of inferential reasoning. This is all we need to give credence to Mameli's analysis. [33] This model allows for the possibility to be motivated to perform actions with predicted outcomes that trigger bad feelings. These cases are possible under the condition that other predicted outcomes of the action cause good feelings capable of outweighing the bad ones (Mameli, 2005 Mameli, M. 2005. "The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality". In Emotion, evolution and rationality, Edited by: Evans, D and Cruse, P. 159–178. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 172). [34] Moreover, this regulating power should be weak enough to allow for cases of weakness of the will. [35] An anonymous reviewer helpfully drew my attention to this fact. [36] For example, a subject could judge that her own anger about a given situation is not reasonable, and then refrain from acting out of this anger. Additional informationNotes on contributorsChristine ClavienChristine Clavien is junior post-doctoral lecturer at the University of Lausanne.