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The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No-First-Use Nuclear Policy

2008; Routledge; Volume: 27; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01495930801944701

1521-0448

Baohui Zhang,

Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies

Abstract This article examines whether China may modify its no-first-use nuclear policy in the future. It suggests that due to the ascendance of Taiwan as the central security challenge for China and its inability to use conventional deterrence to prevent American military intervention in the Taiwan Strait, there are increasing Chinese discussions on the role of nuclear deterrence in this context. This article suggests that for political and strategic reasons China is unlikely to formally renounce the no-first-use policy. However, this does not rule out the possibility of China threatening first use of nuclear weapons when a real crisis in the strait makes American military intervention inevitable or imminent. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that some of China's nuclear experts are promoting a flexible approach to the no-first-use Policy. Thus, the article suggests the U.S. must prepare for the contingency of Chinese nuclear deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and examine how this scenario may impact American security strategies in the Pacific. The author wishes to thank Peter Baehr and Brian Bridges for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. For more details about this comment by General Zhu, see “Zhongguo zhu chenghu shaojiang: jiang yong hewu kang mei” (Chinese Major General Zhu Chenghu: China Will Use Nuclear Weapons Against the U.S.), Xingtao Daily, July 16, 2005. 2. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 2. 3. Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds., China's Nuclear Future (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study (Washington, DC, 2006); Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., China's Nuclear Force Modernization (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006); The Federation of American Scientists and The Natural Resources Defense Council, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC, 2006). 4. This exhibition in Beijing was staged to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the PLA on August 1, 2007. The exhibition presented multiple pictures and a scale model of the DF-31. The new 094 SSBN was identified by a researcher from the Federation of American Scientists in July 2007 through Google's Quickbirds satellite. 5. For this ONI report, see Agence France-Press, “Navy: China Bolsters Ballistic Missile Subs,” at http://www.defensenews.com/story/php?F=2594646&C=america. 6. See China News Agency, “Hu Jintao bu runxu renhe ren yi renhe fangshi jiang Taiwan fenge chuqu” (Hu Jintao: Will Not Allow Anyone Using Whatever Means to Separate Taiwan from China), at http://news.sin.com.cn/2007-09-06/121313831744.shtml. Hu has made this warning in his bilateral talks with Australian Prime Minister John Howard. 7. For studies in English of China's nuclear doctrines, see Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), pp. 30–35; Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21 st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Alastair Iain Johnston, “China's New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter1995/96), pp. 5–42. 8. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, p. 13. For a Chinese view on the necessity of NFU doctrine in the early of Chinese nuclear deterrence, see Shi Wei, “Zhongguo he zhanlue tanxi” (An Exploration of China's Nuclear Doctrines), Junshi wenzhai, January 2007, pp. 12–15. 9. Congressional Research Service, ibid. 10. He Li, “The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 49, no. 2 (March/April, 2002), pp. 33–43. 11. For more discussion of evolution of China's war doctrines, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People's Liberation Army: 1978–1999,” in James C. Mulvernon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp. 87–118. 12. Ibid. 13. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 6–7. 14. Ibid., p. 268 15. Ibid. 16. For a comprehensive analysis in English of the RMA, see Michael G. Vickers and Robert C. Martinage, The Revolution in War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004). The most systematic study on RMA by the Chinese military came from a multivolume book project called Shijie xin junshi biange (The World's Military Transformation) (Beijing: The PLA Press, 2004), which was organized by the PLA Military Science Academy and the National Defense University and included twelve books on various aspects of military transformation. The editor-in-chief of the series was General Zhang Li, the PLA Deputy Chief of Staff. 17. See Wang Baochun, Shiji xin junshi biange sin lun (New Perspectives on the World's Military Transformations) (Beijing: The PLA Press, 2005), p. 458. 18. See Xu Hezhen, Zuozhan fangshi di geming xing bianhua (Revolutionary Changes in Military Combat) (Beijing: The PLA Press, 2004), p. 103. 19. Lewis and Xue, p. 271. 20. Rand Corporation, Chinese Response to U.S. Military Transformation and Implication for the Department of Defense (Santa Monica, 2006), p. 1. 21. Ibid., p. 3. 22. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China's New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 19. 23. Zhu Mingquan, Wu Chunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending: Zhongmei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China-U.S. Nuclear Relationship) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2005). 24. Zhu Mingquan, Zhongmei he guanxi, (China-U.S. Nuclear Relationship), in ibid, p. 212. 25. Ibid., p. 215. 26. “Zhongguo he weishe zhanlue” “Nuclear Deterrence of China,” in Junshi guancha (Military Observer), November 2004, p. 25. 27. Ibid., p. 26. 28. “Zhongguo he cuihui nengli yu weishe zhanlue” “China's Nuclear Capability and Nuclear Deterrence”, Wuqi ku (Defense International News), January 2005, p. 122. 29. Ibid., p. 125. 30. “Zhongguo he qianting yu he zhanlue tiaozheng” “Chinese Nuclear Submarines and Adjustment of Nuclear Doctrines”, Junshi wenzhai (Military Digest), June 2005, p. 14. 31. “Zhongguo he zhanlue jixu tiaozheng” “China Urgently Needs A Change in Its Nuclear Strategy”, Junshi wenzhai (Military Digest), October 2004, p. 26. 32. Huang Dong, “Zhongguo he zhanlue bixu yu shi gongjin” “China Must Update Its Nuclear Doctrine with the Change of Time”, Junshi wenzai (Military Digest), December 2005, p. 23. 33. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, pp. 13–14. 34. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, p. 12. 35. Paul Dodge, “China's Naval Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: The Risks of International and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 24, no. 5 (December 2005): 416. 36. Yi Xiang, “Zhonguo hangkong bing ruhe tupe zhou si duen hewei” “How Can China's Air Power Break the Siege by Aegis”, Jianchuan zhishi (Naval & Merchant Ships), October 2007, p. 19. 37. Dai Xue. “yige kongjun shangxiao di guofang yousi lu, di er shi qi zhongdui ruqin, meiguo yinxing kongyun yu dangdai zhanzheng shiyang geming” “China Faces the Greatest Strategic Challenge Since the Nuclear Era, An Fir Force Colonel's Concern for National Security: The Invasion by the 27 th Air Squadron and Revolution in Warfare by the American Stealth Air Force”, Guoji zhanwang (International Outlook), July 2006, p. 20. This article, which depicted a very gloomy picture for the future of Chinese air power, triggered massive responses in China. The magazine, which has close ties to the military, thus organized a symposium on the impact of F-22 on China's security in a later issue. 38. See David A. Fulghum, ‘Raptor Scores in Alaskan Exercise,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 7, 2006 retrieved from http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw010807p1.xml 39. Robert L. Paarlberg, “Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 1 (2004), pp. 122–151. 40. Brad Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds., China's Nuclear Future (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), p. 177. 41. For a Chinese prediction on continued conventional gap with the United States, Zhou Jianming, Meiguo di guofang zhuanxing jiqi dui zhongguo di yingxiang (U.S. Military Transformation and Its Impact on China) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2006). 42. For a representative U.S. study of China's potential strategies to offset American conventional advantages, see the Rand Corporation, Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006). 43. “Zhongguo tiaozheng he zhanlue fangzhen” “China Adjusts its Nuclear Doctrine”, Kanwa Defense Review, December 2005, p. 30. 44. For more information on China's strategic nuclear weapons, see Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China. 45. Ibid, p. 28. 46. See “Zhongguo jin yibu xianshi dandao daodang weishe liliang” “China Displays Ballistic Missile Deterrence”, Kanwa Defense Review, September 2007, p. 25. For the UPI report, see Andrei Chang, “Analysis: China Shows Off New Military Hardware,” August 3, 2007, at http://www.upiasiaonline.com/security/200708/03/analysis_china_shows_off_new_military_hardware/. 47. Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “China's Nuclear Agenda,” The New York Times, September 7, 2001. 48. Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, Meiguo daodang fangyu jihua toushi (An Analysis of U.S. Missile Defense) (Beijing: Zhongguo minhang chubanshe, 2001), p. 256. Both authors are PLA officers teaching at the National Defense University. 49. See Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006, p. 2. 50. Christopher McConnaughy, “China's Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?” in Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., China's Nuclear Force Modernization (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006), p. 43. 51. Huang Qiang, “Haiwai cong weixing zhaopian tuice zhongguo xinxing he qianting” “Overseas Predictions about China's Latest Nuclear Submarine”, Binggong keji, September 2007, p. 29. 52. David S. Yost, “France's Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operational Implementation,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlise Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 203. 53. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006), p. 8. 54. Ibid. 55. Rand Corporation, Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense, p. 112. 56. Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 4: 631–32. 57. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Nuclear Deterrence In Retrospect,” in Richard Ned Lebow, Coercision, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 195. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, p. 13. 61. The Federation of American Scientists and The Natural Resources Defense Council, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, p. 5. 62. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 63. Zheng Bijian, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5 (September–October 2005). 64. Zhu Mingquan, pp. 212–13. 65. For this Chinese concern, see “Meiguo taikong wuqi hua yu zhongguo keneng fanying” “U.S. Militarization of Space and Possible Chinese Responses”, Binggong keji (Ordnance Technologies), January 2007, pp. 7–9. 66. For example, an U.S. organization called the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense recommends deployment of 1000 spaced based interceptors by 2010. A report by the group can be found at http://missilethreat.com/reports/iwg.html. 67. For Chinese discussions of the issue, see Tang Xiaofeng, Zhongri liang guo hui kai zhang ma? (Will China and Japan Fight Another War?) (Hong Kong: Huixun chubanshe, 2005); “Shendu toushi zhong ri haiyang quanyi zhizheng”(An In-depth Analysis of Sino-Japanese Rivalry), Xiandai jiangchuan (Modern Ships), February 2006. 68. Peng Guanlian, “Shijie he anquan taishi chuzai linjie dian” “World's Nuclear Security Approaching The Threshold,” Xiandai guojie guanxi, January 2007, p. 15. 69. Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21 st Century,” China Security, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), p. 12–13. 70. Zhu Mingquan, ‘Zhongmei he guanxi,’“China-U.S. Nuclear Relationship”, p. 216. 71. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, p. 12. 72. Paul Dodge, “China's Naval Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 415. 73. Ibid., p. 416. 74. Ibid., p. 415. 75. Andrei Chang, “Analysis: China Shows Off New Military Hardware,” note 48. 76. See “Jiefangyun zhuanjia: zhongguo junshi touming neng jinggao shiyie qiangquan” “PLA Expert: China's Military Transparency Can Warn Powerful Countries in the World,” Huanqiou shibao, September 12, 2007. 77. Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” National Interests, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 2000/01): 17–29. 78. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Introduction,” in Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., China's Nuclear Force Modernization (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006), p. 5. 79. Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, An Analysis of U.S. Missile Defense, note 46, pp. 248–51.