Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict
2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 14; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09636410591001474
ISSN1556-1852
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoBuilding on recent scholarship on reputation in international politics, this article argues that, because reputation for resolve cannot form in international conflicts due to anarchy, politicians' persistent belief in the value of reputation for resolve is merely a cult of reputation. After outlining the logic of the cult and an operational code derived from it, this article examines the pattern of influence that the cult has exerted on state behavior in conflicts. It then explores the possible cause of the cult. Finally, it proposes that integrating structural and psychological factors may be a productive enterprise for understanding state behavior, and that further work along this line may lead to interesting findings. Shiping Tang is associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue. Acknowledgments For discussion and comments, the author would like to thank Andrew Batson, Thomas Christensen, Keith Clemenger, James Fearon, Avery Goldstein, Peter Gries, Richard Herrmann, Richard Ned Lebow, Jonathan Mercer, Robert Powell, Robert Ross, Matthew Rudolph, and two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks are due to Daryl Press for sending the author part of his unpublished book manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies. Notes Shiping Tang is associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue. 1This article deals exclusively with the role of reputation for resolve in international conflicts. For the important distinction between "reputation for resolve" and "reputation for power," see Paul Huth, "Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (fall 1997): 75–78. For the role of reputation (for commitment or compliance) in international cooperation, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 125–126; Robert Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World(London: Routledge, 2002), 95–96, 125–126; and Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review 94, no 4 (December 2000): 819–35. 2When politicians (and sometimes theorists, too) talk about "reputation" and "credibility," they frequently use the two terms interchangeably—with each other and with "honor," "resolve," and "prestige." In reality, reputation (for resolve) is only one of the three components of credibility (more on this point later). Throughout this article, I use the terms "reputation" and "credibility" distinctively unless they are embedded in original quotations. 3Schelling's two classics laid down much of the foundation: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Also see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Westport: Greenwood, 1961). The literature of deterrence theory is enormous; for excellent reviews, see Paul Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 25–48; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence Theory: Theory and Evidence," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 183–207; and Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289–324. 4Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 36. 5Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 186–187. 6Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 10. 7Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence,ed. Steven Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63. 8Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 228. 9Major works include Robert McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (fall 1991): 455–71; James Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interest," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236–69; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence and American Foreign Policy in the Third Word (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis," paper presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/CMS/files/PressDaryl.pdf; and Daryl G. Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility? Evidence from the "Appeasement Crises, 1938–39," manuscript. Huth also tested whether a state's past behavior has any effect on crisis bargaining, but his result was a bit ambiguous. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), chap. 6. 10Works in this category include those of MacMahon and Hopf cited above. 11Works in this category include those of Fearon, Mercer, and Press cited above. 12Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origin of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58–107. See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 13Mercer, Reputation and International Politics. 14McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 455. 15Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15, 27. 16Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15. See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 42. 17Snyder and Diesing made a similar point: "'resolve' and 'credibility' are close to being the opposites of the same coin." Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 50n11. See also George Kent, The Effects of Threats, Mershon Center Pamphlet Series (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 84–86. 18 The American Heritage Dictionary (New York: Dell, 1983), 586. For a similar definition, see New Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language (Danbury: Lexicon, 1992), 846. 19Making credibility a truly relational concept essentially means that whether a state can gain a certain kind of credibility depends mostly, if not entirely, on whether observers confer that kind of credibility on it. A state can desire a certain kind of credibility and try to influence the formation of that credibility, but ultimately it cannot control the outcome of that process. Put differently, cultivating certain kinds of credibility through certain behaviors may or may not work. 20For instance, China's threat to intervene in the Korean War was deemed incredible by General Douglas MacArthur because he did not believe that China had the capability to fight a meaningful war against his troops. On the other hand, the U.S. threat that it would fight to the end was largely dismissed by North Vietnam because the Vietnamese did not believe the U.S. had much interest in Vietnam. For a similar but less developed argument, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15. 21Mercer's distinction between "specific" and "general" reputation has a similar logic but is closer to Morgan's distinction between "immediate" and "general" deterrence and to Snyder and Diesing's distinction between "background or long-term" and "immediate" images. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 37–39; Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), chap. 2; and Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 291. I also distinguish between bargaining and behavioral reputation for power. 22Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 16, 42, 59–60. 23Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 48–49. For similar views, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 116–25; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 185; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 400; and Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313–35. 24The author thanks Thomas Christensen for this point. Needless to say, politicians' resolve often depends on their assessment of relative capability, and assessing is not easy under most circumstances. For a general discussion of the problem of assessment, see Shiping Tang, "A Systemic Theory of Security Environment," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–34. 25As Jervis noted, "states have often cared about specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for the conclusion they felt others would draw from the way they dealt with them." Jervis, Logic of Images, 7. For a similar argument, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 39. 26This article focuses on reputation among opponents only. Although fear of losing reputation among allies also weighs heavily among decisionmakers, reputation between two adversaries matters far more than between two allies. For a similar argument, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 4. 27This is consistent with "prospect theory"—that one is willing to pay a heavier price to defend what one already possesses. For a review, see Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87–112. For a classic statement that reputation is something worth fighting for, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 124. 28Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 208. 29Others may prefer to label this belief in the fungibility of reputation as a belief that commitments are interdependent or as "past action theory." See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 55–59; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 36–42; Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 32–34; and Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility?" Mercer, Huth, and Press all point out that there is a broader and a narrower version of this belief. *Although the possibility that politicians may simply "use" the cult to sell their policies and justify their actions cannot be completely ruled out, their rhetoric in private (and to a lesser degree, their rhetoric in closed meetings), when they do not have much need to sell and justify, suggests otherwise. Moreover, they often took costly actions (such as the actual use of force) following their cult rhetoric, and they continued to defend the logic of the cult even after backing down in crisis (see below). For a discussion of the believability of rhetoric in private and in closed meetings, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 13n16. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue. **Theoretically, after backing down, politicians can also deny that there will be any loss of credibility by denouncing the cult and its logic. This act, however, is rarely observed. Politicians' refusal to denounce the cult after retreat has two possible explanations. First, politicians may actually believe in the cult. Second, they may have no intention of repudiating the cult because doing so would undercut their ability to justify future actions; thus it is better to deny that anything was lost. Although this second explanation cannot be completely ruled out, the first explanation seems far more plausible in light of politicians' often vehement denial that they backed down even when their denial is plainly untenable: politicians' refusal to denounce the cult actually underscores their firm belief in the cult. ***This is the "entrapment" phenomenon in alliance politics. See Snyder, "Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." The notion of "abandonment" and "entrapment" first appeared in Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 30Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 190–222. 31Most existing literatures focus on type I behavior and rhetoric. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility"; and McMahon, "Credibility and World Power." Some of the most illustrative examples of type II rhetoric came from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev after the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis. For instance, after backing down from his ultimatum on Berlin, Khrushchev nonetheless declared that he won: "It was a great victory for us, and it was without firing a single shot"(type II-a, discussed below). See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 510. After the Cuban missile debacle, Khrushchev again contended, "We feel that the aggressor came out the loser. He made preparations to attack Cuba but we stopped him and forced him to recognize before world public opinion that he won't do it at the current stage. We view this as a great victory" (type II-a). See letter from Khrushchev to Castro, 30 October 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader,ed. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1992), 243. Khrushchev also put his retreat from Cuba on the high ground: "In order to save the world, we must retreat" (type II-b, discussed below). Quoted in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), 282. 32For the relationship between repeated games and the concern for reputation and credibility, see Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 128–35. On rivalry, see Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 147–71; Paul F. Diehl, ed., Enduring Rivalries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); and John A. Vasquez, "Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 531–58. 33That is, this rivalry should be an easy test for the cult. For detailed elaboration, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 15–18. *Hopf, Peripheral Visions; and Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility." Most important, Press also largely discredited the quintessential case supporting the logic of the cult: Hitler's famous quote before the invasion of Poland ("Our enemies are little worms, I saw them in Munich"). Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility?" For an earlier discussion of the Munich case, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 217–19. 35Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 18–22. One may also add that the Soviet Union had previously backed down from the 1946 Iran-Turkey crisis, the 1946–47 Turkey-Greece crisis, and the 1948–49 Berlin blockade. 36For a detailed discussion, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 7–10. 37Ibid., 46, 57 (emphasis in original). 38Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexities in Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 170–71. Press made a similar point in "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 58. Indeed, during the entire cold war, there might have been two cases about which one may reasonably argue that the United States might have underestimated the Soviets' resolve: (1) during the Berlin crisis in 1958, when Eisenhower told congressional leaders that he could take a tough stand because the Soviets had bluffed before (cited in Jervis, Systemic Effects, 170); and (2) during the 1973 Middle East crisis, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger assured China that Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev's ultimatum to intervene was a bluff (see William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow [New York: New Press, 1998], 157). These two cases, however, were not clear-cut, because in both cases U.S. decisionmakers' rhetoric could be explained by the powerful need to assure allies—domestic allies and China, respectively. Indeed, Kissinger's assurance was contradicted by his own actions. He was unimpressed by White House chief of staff Alexander Haig's conviction that the Soviets were bluffing, stating, "I did not see it as a bluff (but it made no difference)," and he acted according to the worst-case scenario anyway by ordering a worldwide military alert (Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval[Boston: Little, Brown, 1982], 585). This article's argument is also supported by the fact that Kissinger presented two contradictory versions of the story. In his memoir, he wrote that the worst scenario was more likely (that is, that the Soviets meant business), yet while talking to the Chinese ambassador, Zhen Huang, he assured China that the Soviets were bluffing (thus Burr's interpretation of Kissinger's comments was too simplistic). Truman, in a different setting, put the need to assure more explicitly: "If, however, the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully, it would add to our success in Iran, Berlin, and Greece (Turkey) a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the Communists. And each success, we suggested to our allies, was likely to add to the caution of the Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol 2: Years of Trial and Hope(Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 339 (emphasis added). Of course, Truman was perhaps also trying to seize the opportunity for mobilizing the nation. On this point, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Domestic Mobilization and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 39Hopf, Peripheral Visions, 37–40, 45–46, 62–69, 118–23, 129–30. Khrushchev might have been the only leader that did from time to time underestimate his opponents' resolve when initiating a crisis (as in Berlin and Cuba). Khrushchev's belief that the Soviet Union's nuclear threat played a crucial role in forcing the United Kingdom and France to back down during the Suez crisis might have led him to bluff again in Berlin. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 190–94. Kennedy's Bay of Pigs and Vienna debacles might have caused Khrushchev to underestimate the former's resolve in Berlin. See "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961," Cold War International History Project(CWIHP) Bulletin, no. 3 (fall 1993): 58–60. Even Khrushchev, however, consistently acted cautiously during crisis bargaining and rarely underestimated U.S. credibility when it truly mattered. 40Mercer, Reputation and International Politics. 41A Google search using the phrase "doubt our resolve," performed on 11 April 2000, found more than eighty hits, mostly for warning opponents and assuring allies. By 15 June 2004, the number of hits on this phrase had reached 444 (perhaps largely because of September 11). Snyder and Diesing found that politicians resorted to making threats that engaged prestige, honor, and future bargaining reputation in all the cases they examined. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 199. The cult is not restricted to Western decisionmakers. For instance, during the 1999 Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan, both Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Indian army chief General V. P. Malik labeled the conflict as "a challenge to our nation's resolve" and a test for India's "political and military will" Vajpayee quoted in Financial Express (New Delhi), 29 June 1999, available at http://www.expressindia.com/fe/daily/19990629/fec29033.html; Malik quoted in India Today, 7 June 1999, 24. Not surprisingly, after Pakistan was forced to back down again, many Indians still feared that Pakistan might be more resolute than India if there were another round. Swapan Dasgupta, "India Can't Endure Pain," India Today (New Delhi), 14 August 2000, available at http://www.india-today.com/itoday/20000813/swapan.shtml. 42Hopf, Peripheral Visions. For a succinct treatment of the role of credibility in the conduct of postwar American diplomacy, see McMahon, "Credibility and World Power." 43"President Reagan's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Central America," New York Times, 28 April 1983. 44Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95. For a recent discussion of reputation in alliance politics, see Gregory D. Miller, "Hypothesis on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past," Security Studies 12, no. 3 (spring 2003): 45–85. 45Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise to Beijing during the 1958 Crisis," CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6–7 (winter 1995–96): 219, 226–27. For a Chinese perspective on this, see Dai Chaowu, "Dier ci taiwan haixia weiji he zhongsu guanxi," (The second Taiwan Strait crisis and Sino-Soviet relations), Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first century) (Hong Kong), no. 64 (April 2001): 29–41. 46Schelling, Arms and Influence, 43. 47Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 370. Also see Jervis, Logic of Images, 82–83. 48Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War,trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1952), 75 (emphasis added). 49 Zhang Guo Ce (Compiled stories of the warring period), trans. and ed. He Jiangzhan (Changsha: Yue-lu Publishing House, 1992), 112/551, 120/558. 50Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 23–26 and chap. 10. Another factor related to our discussion here is the personal prestige of high-level decisionmakers. 51Abraham Rabinovich, "Despite Ragtag Pullout from Lebanon, Israel Is No Paper Tiger," International Herald Tribune, 30 May 2000; and McGeorge Bundy, quoted in Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vintage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 126. 52Soviet leaders' concern for their prestige regarding Afghanistan was evident from archive materials. See "CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, with Report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev," and "Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador A. M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 June 1978," both available at http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/. 53Fearon argued that politicians' concern for "domestic audience cost" is one important factor driving the escalation spiral. I contend here that the concern for reputation, which is a sort of "international audience cost" among potential opponents and allies, is at least equally critical. The two kinds of "audience cost" differ in that the international audience cost is illusory, whereas the domestic audience cost may be real. For the original discussion of "domestic audience cost" and "lock-in" effect, see James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no 3 (September 1994): 577–92, esp. 579–81. 54As Goertz and Diehl put it, "the likelihood of future conflict conditions behavior." Goertz and Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries," 149. 55Earl Ravenal, "Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection," International Security 6, no. 4 (spring 1982): 28; and Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 186. 56Snyder and Deising noted that this tactic was employed in all of the cases they examined. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 188, 199. 57As Schelling put it, "A potent means of commitment, and sometimes the only means, is the pledge of one's reputation." Schelling, The Strategy of Conflicts, 29. 58Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility." In the real world, one would be hard pressed to find a single case in which a state's opponent takes the state's "reputation of resolve itself as a vital interest." In this regard, Mercer's criticism of deterrence theory was not thorough enough. See Mercer, Reputations and International Politics, 15. 59Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985): 114–15. 60Of course, it is perfectly possible that states simply intend to misrepresent their resolve (that is, they pretend to be more resolute than they actually are) by issuing cult rhetoric-based signals. For a detailed discussion on how misinformation drives states to war, see Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War." 61Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chap. 2. 62Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 109. 63Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 188. 64Whether the "worst-case mentality" is a product of anarchy or only a neorealist (realist) assumption remains an issue of contention. For a brief discussion, see Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realists," International Organization 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 445–50. I thank Bob Powell for bringing this point to my attention. 65Mercer touched on worst-case mentality but did not develop fully its logical implication for reputation. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 10, 72–73. Moreover, Mercer himself sometimes fell back on worst-case thinking to explain empirical observations (as with his discussion of Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg's assessment of Russia and Austria's resolve, at 193). 66This does not mean, however, that a state's bargaining credibility in a particular crisis will remain constant. Indeed, a state's bargaining credibility in its opponent's mind changes as the state takes various costly moves to signal its resolve. 67Mercer adopts a more relaxed definition of "reputation formed." He argues that whenever an observer assigns a dispositional explanation for a state's past behavior, a reputation is formed. In contrast, the definition presented here contends that unless a state's image changes versus its baseline image (of being resolute for adversaries and irresolute for allies), there is no reputation formed. Personal communications with Mercer, April 2004. 68Jervis, Logic of Images, 8. 69This point lies at the heart of the "costly signaling" theory in crisis bargaining. See James D. Morrow, "Capability, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (November 1989): 941–72; James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interest: Typing Hands versus Sinking Cost," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 150. 70For an incisive criticism of such arguments in U.S. deterrence policy during the cold war, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989): 174–225. 71See, for instance, Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–1991," International Security 17, no. 2 (fall 1992): 175; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Correspondence: Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy," International Security 26, no. 2 (fall 2000): 162–63. 72For a similar point, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 219–21. 73Jervis, Logic of Images, 18, 20–21. 74Poker is a game under anarchy because there is no central authority among the players. In contrast, the metaphors that Schelling uses—bank robbing and a father's demanding that his son improve his grades, or else—are not. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 37, 85. 75Schelling, Arms and Influence, 93. 76Indeed, states that backed down last time were more likely to be the ones that issued the initial threat of force in the next crisis. Russell J. Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 379–419. 77Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 189. 78Henry Kissinger was quoted saying that "the United States must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power." See Tom Braden, "Why Are We Looking for Problems?" Washington Post, 14 April 1975. 79In this sense, Snyder and Diesing do not miss the target entirely by attributing the origin of the cult to the anarchy-derived worst-case mentality. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 188. 80Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 119 (emphasis added). 81Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 188, 297–310. The quotation is from 188. 82For a good historical account, see Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 83Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, JR., A Thousand Days(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 258. 84"Clinton's Words on Somalia: 'The Responsibility of American Leadership,"' New York Times, 8 October 1993, A15. Of course, one can argue that Kennedy was trying to save his own face while Clinton was trying to justify his action. 85Snyde
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