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Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition

1985; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 28; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/467083

1537-5285

William J. Baumöl, Janusz A. Ordover,

Merger and Competition Analysis

Previous articleNext article No AccessUse of Antitrust to Subvert CompetitionWilliam J. Baumol and Janusz A. OrdoverWilliam J. Baumol and Janusz A. OrdoverPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 28, Number 2May, 1985Antitrust and Economic Efficiency Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467083 Views: 40Total views on this site Citations: 68Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Melike Arslan Legal diffusion as protectionism: the case of the U.S. promotion of antitrust laws, Review of International Political Economy 28 (Dec 2022): 1–24.https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2022.2158118DIRK AUER, GEOFFREY A. 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