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On the utility of security fences along international borders

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14751798.2013.842707

1475-1801

Susan M. Jellissen, Fred M. Gottheil,

Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

AbstractStates confronting cross-border intrusions of terrorism, illegal immigration, and/or drug trafficking weigh the costs of such intrusions against the costs of imposing barriers to prevent or curb the intrusions. In such situations, the degree of national security afforded a state depends, in large measure, upon the degree of border openness the state chooses. Depending upon the intensity and frequency of the intrusions – expressed in terms of opportunity-cost functions – a state might have little choice but to pursue a border policy of zero openness. It is this relationship of border openness to national security that explains why many states choose to construct security fences. In the 49 cases of security fences examined, many – among them Israel vis-à-vis the West Bank, India vis-à-vis Pakistan, Turkey vis-à-vis Greece in Cyprus – the construction of security fences becomes more complicated by their placement on lands whose sovereignties are disputed.Keywords: terrorismcounter-terrorismsecurity fencesbordersIndiaIsrael Notes1. Edward Cannery Lathem, ed., The Poetry of Robert Frost: The Collected Poems, Complete and Unabridged, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1969), 33.2. A seminal article on this idea is David Baldwin's ‘The Costs of Power’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 15, no. 2 (1971): 145–155.3. See Joshua Haskett, ‘Hadrian's Wall: Romanization on Rome's Northern Frontier’ (thesis, master of arts in history, Boise State University, December 2009).4. Consider that over 80% of Canada's exports and imports are to and from the USA. Americans represent over 70% of all tourists visiting Canada annually. Convenient border crossing of goods and people from the USA to Canada is considered as an important instrument to Canada's economic well-being. The dismantling of all border restrictions among members of the European Union was the single most important economic outcome of the European Union itself.5. See Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor, ‘Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate’, American Political Science Review 102, no. 3 (2008): 279–301. A Hebrew University 2009 public opinion poll showed that 60% of Israelis are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Harry S Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, 2009.6. See ‘Using Probabilistic Terrorist Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis’, Rand Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, p. xiii, May, 2007. See also Bruno Frey, Simon Luechinger, and Alois Stutzer, ‘Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism’, CESifo Working Article Series No. 1341 (November 2004); Henry Willis, ‘Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk’, Risk Analysis 27, no. 3 (2007): 597–606; Joanathan D. Farley, ‘Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 6 (2003): 399–411; and Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, and Beverly Porter, ‘Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism’, NBER Working Article (December 2003).7. Land mines represent an inexpensive but highly lethal alterative to the security fence. The table below, drawn from the United Nations Children's’ Fund, lists the most heavily mined states. TableDownload CSVDisplay Table Other countries with high concentrations of land mines include Angola, Kuwait, Somalia, and Mozambique. The United Nations Global Issues reports that 78 states are land mine contaminated. Each year 15,000–20,000 people are killed – most of them are children, women and the elderly – and countless more severely maimed. Approximately 80% of the casualties are civilian. https://www.un.org/en/globalissues/demining.8. Note that at zero degrees of border openness, the d degrees of national security obtained are still less than 100%. That is to say, a state might enhance its degree of national security by imposing more stringent restrictions at its border – even sealing its border completely – but it cannot completely eliminate the risk of border intrusion.9. Consider the data before and after the Israeli decision to erect its security fence. In the six years 1995–2000, the average annual number of suicide bombing attacks was 3.6 causing 22.5 annual fatalities. In the three years following, from 2001 to 2003, average annual number of attacks increased to 40.3 and fatalities to 149. The construction of the security fence began in 2003.10. In mid-nineteenth century Palestine, capricious intrusions of nomadic Bedouin tribes upon the villages and fields of the Fellahin resulted in considerable crop theft and destruction. On occasion, the frequency and destructiveness of the intrusions were so severe, the victimized Fellahin abandoned their villages and fields. In some cases village desertion was temporary and in other cases permanent. See F. Gottheil, ‘Money and Product Flows in Mid-19th Century Palestine: The Physiocratic Model Applied’, in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, ed. D. Kushner (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).11. For an excellent analysis of territorial claims conflict see Andrew Burghardt, ‘The Basis of Territorial Claims’, Geographical Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 225–245. See also Brian Sumner, ‘Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice’, Duke Law Journal 53 (April, 2004): 1779–1812.12. Nick Megoran, ‘The Critical Geopolitics of the Ubekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute’ (available online, May 2004). See also Vladimir Kolossov, ‘Theoretical Limology: Postmodern Analytic Approaches’, Diogenes 53, no. 2 (2006).13. See Robin Kuckham, Ismail Ahmed, Robert Muggah, and Sarah White, ‘Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of the Issues and Evidence’, Institute of Development Studies Working Article No. 128 (March 2001).14. Michel Foucher, Fronts et Frontières (Paris: Fayard, 1991).15. 2008 Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Counterterrorism Center 2009).16. Justus Weiner and Barry Feinstein emphasize this point in the case of Jordan and Israel: The Armistice Agreement itself specifically dictated in Artice II (2) that it shall in no ‘way prejudice the rights, claims and positions’ of Jordan or Israel in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of the Agreement having been dictated exclusively by military considerations, According to Article VI(9), moreover, Jordan and Israel agreed upon the armistice demarcation lines ‘without prejudice to future territoriasl settlement or boundary lines or to claims of wither Party relating thereto’, The George Washington International Law Review 37 (2005): 401.17. Israel's Six Day War of 1967 and Yom Kipper War of 1973. India's Kargil War of 1999.18. See Jeffery Weiss, ‘India and Pakistan – A Cautionary Tale for Israel and Palestine’, Connecticut Journal of International Law 18: 455–78.19. See Praveen Swami, ‘Failed Threats and Flawed Fences: India's Military Responses to Pakistan's Proxy War’, India Review 3, no. 2 (April 2004). See also Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., ‘Do Fences Make Good Neighbors? An Analysis of Israel's Security Policy Choices’, Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 3 (December 2006): 397–416.20. Phillis Levin, ‘The World; Of Fences and Neighbors’, The New York Times, August 3, 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/08/03/weekinreview/the-world-of-fences-and-neighbors.html.21. Israeli Security Agency; http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/about/Pages/TheISAStatute.aspx. It should be noted as well that the sharp decline in terrorist attacks during 2003–2004 can also be attributed to the increase in Israeli military incursions into the West Bank which targeted terrorist activists.22. http://www.presstv.ir/pop/Print/?id=115137.23. The terrorist threat nonetheless continues. Juma'at-ud-Da'wah leader in Kashmir, Abdul Aziz Alvi stated bluntly that “the problem of Kashmir can only be resolved through Jihad.” July 16, 2010, Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar).24. The World Fact Book, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, June 24, 2010. Egypt had its own terrorist problems with Gaza. Attacks from Gaza into Egypt's border towns forced Egypt to build a subterranean fence – steel barrier 100 feet deep – to prevent Hamas from tunneling under its 12-mile border with Gaza.25. Maj. Gen. Doron Almog, ‘Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 4. no. 12 (December, 2004), www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-12.htm.26. A cross-border raid in 2006 resulted in the capture of Gilad Shalit who was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing in Israel.27. http://www.idf.il/1283-12992-EN/Dover.aspx.28. V. K. Shashikumar, ‘The Subverted Indo-Bangladesh Border’, Indian Defense Review 25, no. 2 (2010), www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-subverted-indo-bangladesh-border-i/.29. Among the most prominent groups are Jama'at ul-Mujahedeen (JMB), Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI), Islam-o-Muslim (IoM), and Hizb-ut Towhid (HuT). They are especially strong in the southwestern border districts of Kushtia, Jessore, and Chuadanga. Their goal is to create a sharia-based Islamic state in Bangladesh.30. See Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003), 63–87.31. For example, the Wayilah tribe in Yemen does not recognize the borders arranged by the Jeddah Treaty claiming that it violates the tribal border agreement honored by the Wayilah and the Yam, long before the Saudi and Yemenite states were created. See Yotam Feldner, ‘The Saudi Separation Fence’, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Pageia&ID=IA16204.32. Ibid., pp. 74, 76, 80.33. Khaled al-Hilaly, ‘Migration Studies With A Yemeni Twist’, Yemen Times, July 16, 2009. The considerable per capita income differential between Saudi Arabia and Yemen explains, in part, the Saudi decision to security fence its border. See World Economic Outlook Database, April, 2010, International Monetary Fund.34. During 2009, Saudi news article Okaz reported that during the last three months of 2009 alone, border police seized rocket-propelled grenades, more than 100 guns, and nearly 100 sticks of dynamite. Saudi officials, it reported, fear that many more weapons may get through. Gulf News, December 24, 2009. See also ‘Truce Under Threat Amid Fears of New War’, Jordan Times, July 11, 2010.35. Ibid.36. ‘Flash Points: UAE-Saudi Border Back in Focus’, Energy Compass, December 4, 2009.37. See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm. See also Big Oil Man from Arabia, Michael Sheldon Cheney, Ballantine Books, 1958.38. Nanuam, Wassana, ‘Southern Strife: Can a “Security Wall” Bring Peace’, Bangkok Post, July 23, 2009.39. The World FactBook, CIA, Washington DC. http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the_world_factbook/fields/2070.html.40. For discussion of Iran's Pakistan fence see India-Defence, January 1, 2007; also ‘Spokesperson Briefing’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, May 28, 2007. For discussion of its Afghanistan fence, see Maseh Zarif, Ahmad Majidyar, ‘Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments’, IranTracker, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, August 21, 2009.41. Nick Megoran, ‘Bad Neighbors, Bad Fences’, Asia Times, March 15, 2000, www.atimes/com/c-asia/BC15Ag01.html.42. Pietra Soddu, ‘Ceuta and Mililla: Security, Human Rights and Frontier Control’, Panorama, 2006. See also http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Melilla.43. Abdeslam Maghraoui, ‘Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague, and the Western Sahara Dispute’, Mediterranean Politics 8, no. 1 (2003): 113–126.44. Neil Jarman, ‘Interface and Security Barrier Mapping Project’, Institute for Conflict Research (May, 2008). See also http://new.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6685355.stm, published May 23, 2007.45. See House of Lords debate on Belfast's Peace Wall, Hansard, HL Deb, November 12, 2007, c243–4. Also, Jonathan Snow, ‘Security Fences Around the World’, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, http://www.defenddemocracy.org.46. See Barry Feinstein and Justus Weiner, op. cit., pp. 328–329.47. See http://www.barentsobserver.com/cppage.4651568-16149.html; http://img0.custompublish/getfile.php/1169053.900.xxpucxvvwy/nilsen.russian.pdf?return=www.barents.no; http://www.baltinfo.ru/stories/Pogranichnye-tropy-nelegalov-107496; http://nazdarru.livejournal.com/58316.html?thread=757964; http://www.chita.ru/news/14475/; http://freepages.misc.rootsweb.ancestry.com~hughwallis/Baltics/Estonia.htm; and http://www.7is7.com/otto/estonia/border.html.48. Dmitry Kozak, head of counterterrorism in Chechnya, visited Israel at the invitation of Major General Giora Eiland, head of Israel's National Security Council (MALAL). The purpose was to consider how Israel's expertise on security might contribute to the creation of a security fence between Stavropol region in the south of Russia from one side and Chechnya and Daghestan in the north Caucasus from the other. Axis Information and Analysis, http://www.axisglobe.com/print_article.asp?article=433.49. A British home office spokesman offers this evidence: ‘Between January and September 2006 there was an 88% fall in the number of clandestine entrants arriving in Kent compared to the same period in 2002', Holly Williams, The Independent, February 26, 2007.50. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico_%E2%80%93_United_States_border. See also Terence P. Jeffery, ‘Administration Will Cut Border Patrol Deployed on U.S.-Mexico Border’, CNSNews.com, September 24, 2009.