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Politics, Pride, and Precedent: The United States and Canada in the Northwest Passage

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 40; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00908320902864813

1521-0642

Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel,

Polar Research and Ecology

Abstract The issue of the status of the Northwest Passage has ebbed and flowed in U.S.-Canada relations for decades, but the effect of global warming in the Arctic has moved this issue from the largely academic and legalistic realms to the forefront of bilateral (and international) relations. Intimately linked to Canadian nationalism, U.S. adherence to the doctrine of freedom of the seas, and to politics in both nations, the opposing positions held by the two states can no longer afford to be implacably held. Rather, it is time to put pride and politics aside and return to the “special relationship” between Canada and the United States in order to effect meaningful and mutually beneficial continental security. Keywords: ArcticCanadainternational straitsNorthwest Passage The research and information for this article was completed as of January 28, 2009, with the transfer of power from U.S. President George W. Bush to President Barack Obama, and the submission of a budget by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper after the prorogued parliament of December 4, 2008 returned on January 26, 2009. Both nations, mired in one of the worst economic recessions in decades, are confronting economic problems with stimulus packages, and any focus on the Arctic in the near future is likely to be more policy and rhetoric than funding for projects. Notes 1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, speech in Chautauqua, NY, 14 August 1936, Department of State, Press Releases, cited in Stanley Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1959), 3. 2. Franklin Delano Roosevelt as quoted in Robert M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: Two Years of War 1939–1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 307. 3. Mackenzie King, as quoted ibid. 4. J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? (Toronto: Harper Canada, 2004), 38. 5. Jeff Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants: The Changing Context of Canadian Defence Policy,” Canadian Military Journal 4 (2003): 20. 6. R. J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in The Arctic Frontier, ed. R. St. J. Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 256. 7. Interview with R. Gordon Robertson, former Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary of the Cabinet, Ottawa, 13 January 1992. 8. C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 339. 9. Canada Treaty Series, 1940, No. 14. 10. H. L. Keenleyside, “The Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940–1945,” International Journal 16, no. 1 (1960–61): 55. 11. J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, Ltd., 1991), 141. 12. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 96, 26 April 1941. 13. J. L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: Civil Service Mandarins 1935–1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92. 14. John Holmes, “Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Nationalism in Canada, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Canada, 1966), 209. 15. Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 54. See also Granatstein and Hillmer, supra note 11, 153–157. 16. Interview with Graham Rowley, Arctic expert, Ottawa, 21 October 1991. 17. Department of External Affairs reports include a 1942 report entitled, “American Imperialism and Canada,” in John Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian External Affairs, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1980). The Americans were also quoted as answering the phone with “army of occupation.” National Archives of Canada (NAC), MG30, B97 (Trevor Lloyd Papers), G. M. Hearle, from J. D. Ketchum to Lloyd, quoting a 15 June 1943 “letter received from one of our weekly correspondents” concerning U.S. personnel in Edmonton, 24 June 1943. And yet, not all Canadian government officials were critical of the Americans, nor were all Americans unappreciative of Canadian sensitivities. On-the-ground positive relations existed between the U.S. and Canadian militaries and between the U.S. military and Canadian civilians. See Lester Pearson, “Minister in the United States to First Secretary, Washington, March 21, 1944,” in Hilliker, 11:2:1407; NAC, RG 36/7, Vol. 3, file 1, part 2a, “[Major-General W. W.] Foster to Secretary, Cabinet War Committee, 31 July 1944”; and interview with Morris Zaslow, Canadian Historian, Ottawa, 18 October 1991. 18. Interview with Jack Pickersgill, Assistant Private Secretary to Prime Minister MacKenzie King, Ottawa, 23 October 1991. 19. Ibid. 20. NAC, RG 25 89-90/029 Box 34, file 52-C(s), part 1, Report 5. 21. In an attempt to mitigate tensions, the United States made an effort to put joint projects under civilian auspices as much as possible. U.S. National Archives (USNA), RG 27 Records of the Weather Bureau Formally Classified Subject Files, 1042-1963, Box 7 Army-Greenland file: “Annual Ottawa Meeting 1953–54,” J. Glenn Dyer, chief, Arctic Operations Project to D. M. Little, assistant chief of Weather Bureau, 22 December 1953. 22. Robert Huebert, political science professor and director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, has noted that the U.S. commitment to Arctic security actually delayed Canada's attention and commitment to the North—its people, issues, and administration. “Had Canada been responsible for more of its Arctic security and had the Americans been more aggressive, Canadian leaders would have had to pay more attention to the Arctic and been forced to develop the instruments and policies needed to properly protect Canadian interests. Instead Canada was able to free ride on the Americans’ willingness to act.” Robert Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Security: Preparing for a Changing Future,” Behind the Headlines: Canada's Arctic Interests and Responsibilities 65, no. 4 (2008): 16. Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 3, argued that prior to World War II Canada was able to provide a minimum of expense for northern defense but that after the war, as the North's importance was realized, Canadians had to find a way to retain “maximum security with minimal loss of sovereignty.” 23. Directorate of History (DHist), file: Northern Cruise Planning Discussion, 17 February 1948. 24. See Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, “Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946–1949,” The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord 9, no. 2 (1999): 23–29. 25. Captain O. C. S. Robertson, quoted in T. A. Irvine, The Ice Was All Between (Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959), 18. 26. DHist, Pullen Diary, 7 September 1957. 27. Interview with Pickersgill, supra note 18. 28. Michael Byers, referenced in Graham Fraser, “Canada's Control over the Arctic Is Tentative at Best,” Embassy, 23 August 2006, available at www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=2006/23/fraser. 29. Alan Bailey, “Breaking Through the Ice,” Petroleum News, 25 November 2007, available at www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/230239803.shtml. 30. In 1958, the USS Nautilus traveled under the polar ice cap and North Pole from the Bering Strait to the Denmark Strait. The USS Skate transited under the ice and surfaced at the North Pole in both 1958 and 1959. In 1960, the USS Seadragon became the first nuclear-powered submarine to transit the Northwest Passage. A Canadian observer, former Labrador captain, at the time commodore, O. C. S. Robertson was aboard. Two years later, the USS Skate made the same transit in the other direction. 31. Fred Fowlow, “Managing Security and Sovereignty in Canadian Territorial Waters,” Starshell 7, no. 40 (2007): 15. 32. The Sector Principle is a claim to an area that falls between an Eastern and Western meridian, and extends northward to the North Pole. A pie-shape area has been promoted by Canada and the USSR/Russia, although the principle is not recognized by other nations for Arctic claims (the Sector Principle is used in Antarctica). Canada's initial use of the Sector Principle dates back to 1904, when it was used on a Department of Interior map. The area delineated was 140° W to 60° W, although at that time and for decades to follow, Canada's claim within the sector was to the land, not the water. Elliot-Meisel, supra note 15, at 16. See also Erik Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian Perspectives (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); and John O’Brien, International Law (London: Cavendish Ltd., 2001), 222. 33. Alicia Zoretto, “Canadian Sovereignty at the Northwest Passage,” ICE Case Studies 185 (May 2006), available at www.american.edu/ted/ice/northwest-passage.htm. See also Michael Byers and Susanne Lalonde, “Who Controls the Arctic?” discussion paper at Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law and Diplomacy Conference (June 2006, Ottawa), 8. 34. Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) Archives, E346/82 Vol. 4, file: “Personal Record of S.S. Manhattan, 1969, “A.H.G. Storrs, Letter of Instruction to Captain T.C. Pullen, 11 July 1969.” 35. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 15 May 1969, Vol. 8, 8720. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., at 8721. 38. HBC Archives, E 346/2/2B, Memorandum for the Cabinet, “Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” 20 March 1969, 7. 39. Ibid., at 11. 40. Ibid. Both the memorandum and Trudeau's statements imply that the government saw this as acknowledgment of Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage. 41. Ibid. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian Department of Transport did, however, consult prior to the voyage. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., at 12. 44. Thomas Pullen, “S.S. Manhattan's Northwest Passage Voyage–Observations by Canada's Representative,” speech, Empire Club of Canada, 12 February 1970, available at www.empireclubfoundation.com/details.asp?SpeechID=1476&FT=yes. See also A. H. G. Storrs and T. C. Pullen, “S.S. Manhattan in Arctic Waters,” Canadian Geographic 80, no. 5 (1970): 166–181. 45. T. C. Pullen, “What Price Canadian Sovereignty?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (September 1987): 71. 46. Pullen later wryly noted that the U.S. ship's inability to make the entire voyage served as a catalyst for the U.S. government's commitment to build new replacement ships, of the new Polar class, while Canada's icebreaker fleet merely aged. T. C. Pullen, “In the Wake of the Manhattan,” Canadian Shipping and Marine Engineering (1970): 15. 47. The John A. Macdonald thus became the first Canadian Coast Guard ship to transit the Northwest Passage. 48. Pullen, “Manhattan's Voyage: Observations,” supra note 44. The necessary synergy of ship and icebreaker remains relevant to the present. Huge, ice-strengthened ships may serve as their own icebreakers, but icebreaking success cannot be guaranteed. Thus, icebreakers will continue to be used in conjunction with ice-strengthened freighters. Ultimately, as the weather and climate will bear, the intent is to conquer the icy waters and establish viable shipping routes. Paul Koring, “Russians Hope to Show Potential of ‘Arctic bridge,’” Globe and Mail, 22 July 2008, available at globeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080722.ARCTICSHIPPING22/TPStory/?query=arctic. 49. Joe Osiphat, “S.S. Manhattan and the Northwest Passage,” available at sunshiporg.homestead.com/manhattan.html. 50. There is another popular, but incorrect, belief that the Manhattan sailed back through the Northwest Passage in 1970. As noted, it actually returned in the same season, and the 1970 voyage was, in fact, into the waters of the eastern Arctic. 51. HBC Archives, E346/1/14, T. C. Pullen, “Report on the Arctic Tanker Test (S.S. Manhattan) August–November, 1969,” 10. Despite the successful transit, oil pipelines were ultimately favored for a variety of reasons. Pipelines remain an option even today. For example, see the Mackenzie gas pipeline project. Norvall Scott, “NWT Defends Arctic Gas as Green Benefit,” Globe and Mail, 24 June 2008, available at secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20080624/RARCTIC24. 52. Pullen, “Wake of the Manhattan,” supra note 46, at 13–16. Pullen specifically and repeatedly called for a Polar 8 icebreaker, which could transit year-round in the high Arctic. A Polar 8 icebreaker would be able “to maintain headway at 3 knots through hard level ice eight feet … thick.” T. C. Pullen, “Why We Need the Polar 8,” Canadian Geographic 107, no. 2 (1987): 84. 53. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), Statutes of Canada 1969–1970, chap. 47. 54. “Canadian Prime Minister's Remarks of the Proposed Legislation,” quoted in David Larsen, “United States Interests in the Arctic Region,” Ocean Development and International Law 21 (1990): 178. (Italics in original.) 55. Ivan Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Canadian Way (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 283. Harriet Critchley, “Canadian Naval Responsibilities in the Arctic,” in RCN in Transition: 1910–1985, ed. W. A. B. Douglas (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 283, referred to the Canadian position as constituting “functional jurisdiction,” as opposed to “sovereign jurisdiction.” 56. For example, Professor Maxwell Cohen criticized Canada for refusing to permit review of AWPPA by the International Court of Justice and, among other criticisms, called the legislation a result of “neo-nationalism.” Maxwell Cohen, “The Arctic and National Interest,” International Journal 26, no. 1 (1970–71): 77. 57. In international law, “historic waters” is not specifically defined and, when claimed by a state, is rarely accepted by the international community. To successfully claim historic title, the claimant state not only must demonstrate a history of using the water and its exclusive control of the water, but it must also get the acknowledgment or acquiescence of its claim by other states. If all these criteria are met, the water has the same status as internal waters and the right of innocent passage does not exist. Donat Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 251. 58. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Reports 116. 59. Technically, as of April 2006, the Canadian military calls the Northwest Passage “Canadian Internal Waters,” although the use of the term “Northwest Passage” does not seem to have diminished whatsoever. In fact, after the announcement, a Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that “he was ‘not aware’ of the change,” and Professor Michael Byers declared that “[i]t has no real significance apart from (showing) the seriousness of [Canada's] position.” Nathan VanderKlippe, “Northwest Passage Gets Political Name Change,” CanWest News Service, 9 April 2006, available at www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id6d4815ac-4fdb-4cf3-a8a6-4225a8bd08df&k=73925. 60. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4. 61. 516 U.N.T.S. 397. 62. 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 63. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 60, at 28. 64. Ibid., at 29. 65. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 58. 66. Interview with Robertson, supra note 7. Robertson entered the Department of External Affairs in 1941 and served in numerous government posts until 1975, including commissioner of the Northwest Territories, chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND), and clerk of the Privy Council and cabinet secretary. 67. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 58. 68. Donat Pharand, “The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit,” Ocean Development and International Law 38 (2007): 23. 69. LOS Convention, supra note 62. Article 234 closely resembles, but does not completely duplicate, Canada's AWPPA. Pharand, supra note 57, at 237, contended that Article 234 now constitutes customary law and validates Canada's AWPPA. The LOS Convention does not expressly address the issue of international straits. 70. For example, in the Strait of Hormuz (between Iran and Oman) and the Strait of Malacca (between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore). 71. Arctic Cooperation Agreement, Canada Treaty Series, 1988, No. 29. 72. Joe Clark, House of Commons, Debates, 10 September 1985, 5:6463. 73. Ibid. 74. LOS Convention, supra note 62, art. 38(1). 75. See Donald Rothwell, “The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute,” Cornell International Law Journal 26 (1993): 360; and Byers and Lalonde, “Who Controls the Northwest Passage?” supra note 33, at 23–26. 76. National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, June 1987), 23. 77. Ibid., at 43. 78. Ibid., at 45. 79. The nuclear-powered submarines were never built, but Canada did buy four used diesel-electric submarines from the British in the 1990s. The diesel-electric submarines cannot operate under the ice and thus are not suited for Arctic patrols. The underwater sensors are again under discussion, after being cut from the budget in 1992. The price tag at that time was C$100 million. Fowlow, supra note 31, at 15. Some of the other proposals and projects have been addressed by subsequent governments, most importantly by the Harper government, but there is little to show for it more than 20 years later. 80. Arctic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 71. 81. For a comprehensive analysis of the agreement, see Christopher Kirkey, “Smoothing Troubled Waters: The 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Co-operation Agreement,” International Journal 50 (1995): 401–426. Further discussion and specific aspects of the agreement are found in Larsen, supra note 54, at 167–191; and Miro Cernetig, “Arctic Guard,” Globe and Mail, 7 August 1991, A3. According to Kirkey, the agreement is an example of “integrative bargaining,” in which both parties compromise and obtain some of their desired aims. And yet, the agreement is not without interesting and potentially contentious interpretation. When the agreement was signed, Brian Mulroney's chief of staff, Derek Burney, stated that the agreement was “implicit recognition” of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Burney is quoted in Kirkey, at 419. And, Mulroney himself argued that it was “fully consistent with the requirements of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.” “Statement by Assistant to the President for Press Relations Fitzwater on the Canada-United States Agreement on the Arctic, January 11, 1988,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book 1 [January 1–July 1, 1988] (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 25. And yet, President George W. Bush's ambassador of the United States to Canada, David Wilkins, wrote to the assistant deputy minister, North America in 2006, stating that icebreakers need only: “Seek Canada's consent when U.S. icebreakers intend to conduct maritime scientific research as they transit the Northwest Passage … [and absent such research] would not be required to seek Canadian consent before transiting the Northwest Passage.” “Ambassador of the United States of America to Mr. Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, North America, 27 October 2006.” available at www.state.gov/s/1/2006/98302.htm. (My thanks to Ted McDorman for directing me to this memorandum.) It remains to be seen how the Barack Obama administration will interpret the agreement, although the Wilkins view also existed during the William J. Clinton administration. U.S. Department of Defense, “UNCLOS Dept. of Defense Position Summary’94,” July 1994, available at www.prosea.org/articles-news/unesco/UNCLOS_Dept_of_Defense_Position_Summary_94.html. 82. Interview with R. A. J. Phillips, former civil servant and former Chief of the Arctic Division, Cantley, Quebec, 22 October 1991. 83. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, art. 15.1(c), available at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/pdf/nunav_e.pdf. As Nunavut's premier, the Honorable Paul Okalik noted, however, while “[t]he historic activities of Inuit are the essence of the sovereignty claims,” the record continues to be full of unfulfilled promises and falls short of the necessary programs and projects needed in the North. Paul Okalik, “Arctic Priorities: A Northern Perspective,” Behind the Headlines: Canada's Arctic Interests and Responsibilities 65, no. 4 (2008): 4, 7. 84. Regarding the Arctic Council, see its Web site at www.arctic-council.org. 85. “Teaching and Learning About Nunavut,” available at www.canadainfolink.ca/nunavut.htm. 86. Norman Hillmer, “A Border People,” Canada World View 24 (2005), available at www.international.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue24/01-title-en.asp. 87. Like the other six Arctic nations (Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia), the United States and Canada have clear and indisputable responsibilities to their citizens in the Arctic. Although another paper, it must be noted here that increased human activity in the North will only compound the threats that global warming pose to these northerners, their communities, and their livelihood. Arguably, there are potential benefits of longer fishing seasons, increased economic activity, lower heating costs due to a shorter and less severe winter, and fewer cold weather–related injuries. But, there is no denying potentially new hardships: the loss of ice cover for annual hunts, the decrease in the polar bear population and other sources of food for the native communities, the spread of new diseases introduced by increased human activity in the North (both from permanent settlers and tourists), potential ecological and environmental disasters from oil spills or shipping accidents, and so forth. Add to this the negative effects on the North's infrastructure, which was built on now-melting permafrost, and a shorter ice road season, and the governments find themselves faced with a huge cost to rectify these situations. These issues must be addressed, neither the peoples nor the environment of the North can afford to have reactive policies implemented only in response to disastrous developments. In Canada, two studies noting the negative effects of global warming on the northern communities have been largely ignored. A “quiet release [of] a major Health Canada report … [on] the harmful impact of climate change on the health of Canadians, particularly the young, elderly and aboriginals” follows the delayed 2007 Natural Resources Canada report, “From Impacts to Adaptation.” The 2007 report noted the impact of global warming on “each region” of Canada, and has received little attention. Bill Curry, “Health Report to Get ‘Low Profile’ Release,” Globe and Mail, 23 July 2008, available at www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080723/BNStory/National/?cid=al_gam_nletter_newsUP. See also Bill McKibben, “Think Again: Climate Change,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2009) available at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4585&print=1. 88. National Research Council, Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs (2007),” 8, available at www.nap.edu/catalog/11753.html. See also Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 63–77. 89. Ibid., at 5. 90. Philip Ewing, “USCG Steps Up Bid to Rescue Icebreaker Funding,” Defense News, 24 March 2008, available at www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3442703&c=SEA&s=TOP. 91. The Healy is longer and heavier than the Polar Sea and Polar Star. See www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcHealy/. 92. National Research Council, “An Assessment,” supra note 88, at 13. See also McKibben, supra note 87. 93. National Research Council, “An Assessment,” supra note 88, at 14. 94. Ibid., at 8. See also Admiral Thad Allen, commandant U.S.C.G., referenced in Andrew Revkin, “U.S. Pushes to Expand Arctic Icebreaker Fleet,” International Herald Tribune, 17 August 2008, available at www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15371352. Certainly, ice unpredictability is the operative word with regard to global warming and the North. For example, in summer 2006, there was a “complete absence of icebergs” off the coast of Newfoundland, whereas 2008 was “a banner season for icebergs.” Keith Nicol, “Iceberg Alley: Warm Welcome for a Cold Tourist Attraction,” Globe and Mail, 12 July 2008 available at www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story.LAC.20080712.ICEBERGS12/TPStory/Focus/Atlantic/. 95. Andrew Revkin, “U.S. Pushes to Expand Arctic Icebreaker Fleet,” International Herald Tribune, 17 August 2008, available at www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15371352. 96. Randy Boswell, “U.S. Shifts Arctic Foreign Policy,” CanWest News Service, 9 August 2008, available at www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=1d6374e1-0a0c-483e-915a-e7151f7774a9. 97. National Research Council, “An Assessment,” supra note 88, at 8. 98. As previously noted with the Manhattan, large ships can at times operate as their own icebreaker. Thus, it is arguable that eventually more and more “icebreaking needs” may be delivered by the tankers themselves. These “double-acting tankers” (DAT) move forward through open water and thin ice and, after turning 180 degrees, use their stern to break heavy ice. Lloyd's Register, “Lloyd's Register-Classed Double-Acting Tanker Wins ‘Ship of the Year’ Award,” 23 June 2003, available at www.lr.org./News+and+Events/News+Archive/2003. But, until such time as these ships are the rule rather than the exception, the need for icebreakers will remain. 99. For example, see Clive Archer and David Scrivener, eds., Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986); Lt. Commander Nathaniel French Jr., Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security (New York: Praeger, 1990); Aldo Chircop and Susan Rolston, eds., Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Are Canadian and U.S. Interests Contradictory or Complementary? (Halifax: International Insights Society, 1987); E. J. Dosman, ed., The Arctic in Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976); Katharine Dunkley, The International Legal Status of the Northwest Passage (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987); Franklyn Griffiths, ed., Politics of the Northwest Passage (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1987); John Honderich, Arctic Imperative (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1987); Macdonald, supra note 6; Donat Pharand and Leonard Legault, Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); Oran Young, Arctic Politics (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992). 100. The Arctic ice cover is not only receding, it is thinning, and predictions are that the melting will accelerate as open water absorbs more of the sun's rays (whereas ice reflects the sun's rays). This is called the ice-albedo feedback loop. Richard Kerr, “A Warmer Arctic Means Change for All,” Science 297 (30 August 2002): 1490, 1492. See also McKibben, supra note 87. 101. Susanne Lalonde, “Arctic Waters: Cooperation or Conflict?” Behind the Headlines: Canada's Arctic Interests and Responsibilities 65, no. 4 (2008): 10 nn., the changing Arctic “has completely changed the nature of the problem. This is no longer simply a bilateral issue, if it ever was.” 102. In October 2002, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee predicted it could occur by 2017 while Canada's chief of ice forecasting for the Canadian Ice Service, John Falkingham, expects that not even summer shipping will be ice free until later in the twenty-first century. Peter Tyson, “Future of the Passage.” PBS, Nova, February 2006, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/arctic/passage.html. See also Franklyn Griffiths, “The Shipping News,” International Journal 58, no. 2 (2003): 257–272; and Rob Huebert, “The Shipping News, Part II,” International Journal 58, no. 3 (2003): 295–308. In 2006, a “U.S. Navy report predicted that within 10 years the passage would be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels for one month a year,” referenced in Rebecca Dube, “As Ice Melts, Debate Over Northwest Passage Heats,” USA Today, 4 April 2006, available at www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006–04-03-nwpassage-debate_x.htm. For different time frames for ice-free transits and the timeline for severe problems caused by climate change, see Trausti Valsson in Time, 1 October 2007, 34; Byers and Lalonde, “Who Controls the Northwest Passage?” supra note 33, at 4, nn. 14–17; Roger Gibbins, “Global Warming Issue Hotter than Ever: Climate Change on Canadians’ Agenda, and They Expect Politicians to Respond,” Hamilton Spectator, 14 January 2007, available at www.cwf.ca/V2/cnt/commentaries_200801140843.php?print=yes,; “North Pole Is an ‘Island’ as Northwest and Northeast Passages Open,” Yale Environment 360, 3 September 2008, available at e360.yale.edu/content/digest.msp?id=1422; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), available at www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; NATO's “Influence on Climate Change on the Changing Arctic and SubArctic Conditions,” available at modb.oce.ulg.ac.be/backup/colloquium/NATO-RussiaARW/2008termsofreference.html; McKibben, supra note 87. 103. The Canadian Ice Service's senior ice forecaster, Luc Desjardins, believes that the record ice loss over the past couple of years will continue to make the Northwest Passage “fully navigable” in summer. Referenced in Randy Boswell, “Arctic Meltdown Could Set New Record,” CanWest News Service, 10 August 2008, available at www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=5707df3f-8804–46db-9d71-ff7018935667. 104. Lawson Brigham, chairman of Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, quoted in Andrew Revkin, “U.S. Pushes to Expand Arctic Icebreaker Fleet,” International Herald Tribune, 17 August 2008, available at www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15371352. 105. Bob Weber, “Northwest Passage Sees Spike in Seafarers,” Globe and Mail, 12 August 2008, available at www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080812.