The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered
1985; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 93; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/261306
ISSN1537-534X
Autores Tópico(s)Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessCommentsThe Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner ReconsideredFranklin M. FisherFranklin M. Fisher Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 93, Number 2Apr., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261306 Views: 20Total views on this site Citations: 37Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Jun Yeong Lee Price Competition with Cheap Talk (Proposal), SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2019).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423707 Sung-Hoon Park, Myunghoon Lee Potential Monopolies, Consumer Movement, and Welfare Costs, KUKJE KYUNGJE YONGU 20, no.11 (Mar 2014): 27–50.https://doi.org/10.17298/kky.2014.20.1.002Maximilian Römhild, Niklas Lampenius A Model for Incentive Regulation Utilizing the RRC-Rule with a Hierarchical Incentive Mechanism, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930791Edmund H. 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