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Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887

1989; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 32; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/467168

1537-5285

Thomas W. Gilligan, William Marshall, Barry R. Weingast,

Electoral Systems and Political Participation

Previous articleNext article No AccessRegulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall, and Barry R. WeingastThomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall, and Barry R. WeingastPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 32, Number 1Apr., 1989 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467168 Views: 35Total views on this site Citations: 77Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1989 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Beatriz Benítez-Aurioles Historia del sueño dorado de los economistas: desde la configuración de la síntesis neoclásica hasta nuestros días, Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought 9, no.22 (Dec 2022): 069–080.https://doi.org/10.5209/ijhe.82489Thomas W. 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