Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

India's response to the 1971 East Pakistan crisis: hidden and open reasons for intervention

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14623528.2015.991207

1469-9494

Sonia Cordera,

South Asian Studies and Conflicts

AbstractBased on recently declassified materials from the Indian government archives and on the private papers of the principal secretary to the Indian prime minister, this article investigates how India formulated its response to the 1971 East Pakistan genocidal crisis that culminated with the third Indo-Pakistani war. India's victory changed the balance of power in South Asia: Bangladesh emerged as a new independent state, while Pakistan was significantly reduced. The 1971 war is cited in the international literature as one of the first cases of humanitarian intervention in world history. The Indian official position, recently reinforced by a new major publication, highlights the 'humanitarian' character of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, depicting a reluctant India compelled to intervene by international inactivity towards the atrocity. This article contests this interpretation and argues that humanitarian considerations were only one side of the picture. Clear political interests drove the actions of New Delhi, which autonomously formulated a specific strategy aimed at making capital out of the dramatic humanitarian crisis. In advancing this argument, this article contributes to the complex debate about humanitarian intervention by observing that the inability of the UN system to intervene is bound to open the way to two possible outcomes: one is the continuation of the genocidal massacres; the other is the unauthorized humanitarian armed intervention by a regional power, which is likely to act according to its own interests. The specific case under review demonstrates that unauthorized armed intervention cannot per se always be branded as deplorable, since in certain cases such a scenario is better than no intervention at all. AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank the editors, referees and Michelguglielmo Torri for their helpful comments and advice.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes on contributorSonia Cordera received her master's degree in international politics from SOAS, University of London, in 2011, and her PhD in the history of international relations from the University of Florence in April 2013. She worked as research associate at the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai), Italy, from 2011 to December 2013.Notes1 For the definition of genocide in international law, see Article II of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. There is debate among scholars on the issue of whether the brutal repression perpetuated by the Pakistani army against the East Pakistan autonomy movement can actually be broadly defined as genocide; if Moses agrees, Bose rather suggests 'crimes against humanity'. According to Bose, this formula suits better because it can include all the violence committed by the Pakistani army, not only that against Bengali Hindus, and also the violence committed by the Bengali nationalists, which can also be defined as genocidal when targeted against the non-Bengalis (i.e. West Pakistanis and Biharis). Sharing Moses' approach, this article adopts the term 'genocide' to refer to the repression conducted by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. See A. Dirk Moses, 'The United Nations, humanitarianism and human rights: war crimes/genocide trials for Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971–1974′, in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman (ed.), Human rights in the twentieth century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 258–280; and Sarmila Bose, 'The question of genocide and the quest for justice in the 1971 war', Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2011, pp. 393–419.2 See, for example, Simon Chesterman, Just war or just peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 71–74; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 2.3 Srinath Raghavan, 1971: a global history of the creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2013).4 The Indian official position has also been indirectly supported by other works that, by focusing on the inaction of the United Nations towards the East Pakistan crisis, tend to portray an India only led by humanitarian considerations, for example Moses, 'The United Nations, humanitarianism and human rights'.5 Gary J. Bass, The blood telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a forgotten genocide (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), p. xvii.6 Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: the history of the world's largest democracy (London: Pan Macmillan, 2011), p. 453. See also, for example, Idean Salehyan, 'The externalities of civil strife: refugees as a source of international conflict', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008, pp. 792–793.7 See Raghavan, 1971, p. 11.8 See Bass, The blood telegram, ch. 9; and Guha, India after Gandhi, pp. 455–456.9 In 1974, India became the sixth state in the world to demonstrate the possession of nuclear technology, finally replying to the first Chinese nuclear blast of 1964, and in 1975 India also resolved the question of Sikkim in its favour, ending its aspirations of independence. See Sonia Cordera, 'India foreign policy during Indira Gandhi's second government (1971–1977): the rise of a regional power' (PhD thesis, University of Florence, 2013).10 See the United Nations statements on the norm, available at: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.11 Apart from those already cited see, for example, Sarmila Bose, Dead reckoning: memories of the 1971 war (New Delhi: Hachette India, 2011); Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Liberation and beyond: Indo-Bangladesh relations (New Delhi: Kornark Publishers, 1999); Hasan Zaheer, The separation of East Pakistan: the rise and realization of Bengali Muslim nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994); Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Onkar Marwah, 'India's military intervention in East Pakistan, 1971–1972', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1979, pp. 549–580; Robert Victor Jackson, South Asian crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). On the American approach to the issue, see Kalyani Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: politics and beyond (New Delhi: MacMillan, 2010); Roedad Khan, The American papers: secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh documents, 1965–1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Dennis Kux, India and the United States: estranged democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, DC: National Defence University, 1993), pp. 289–307.12 It is important to note that the prime minister's secretariat documents have not been declassified by the Indian government yet, and that P. N. Haksar's private papers are the only documents among those of the restricted circle of the prime minister's advisers that are available to scholars now. It is worth noting that the Haksar papers finally enable access to important government documents. In fact, Haksar was the principal secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 1967 to 1973, and was described as the 'main centre of power and authority' of the Indian government due to the important role he played in influencing the prime minister's decisions. See V. A. Pai Panandiker and Ajay K. Mehra, The Indian cabinet: a study in governance (New Delhi: Kornak Publishers, 1996), p. 227. The disclosure of other private papers and the further declassification of government documents are clearly desirable for a greater advance in the historical reconstruction of the events of 1971. Similarly, it would also be beneficial if Pakistan were to begin efforts in the same direction.13 As already noted, for example, neither Guha nor Bass reported that India approached the Soviet Union to resume the negotiations for a treaty on 7–8 June 1971.14 For more information about the domestic situation in Pakistan and the causes of the 1971 crisis, see Sonia Cordera, 'The long-term effects of decolonization of British India: the 1971 secession of Bangladesh and its international consequences', in Thierry Di Costanzo and Guillaume Ducoeur (eds.), Decolonization and the struggle for national liberation in India (1909–1971): historical, political, economic, religious and architectural aspects (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 213–227; Sisson and Rose, War and secession, pp. 8–34; Zaheer, The separation of East Pakistan.15 Ayesha Jalal, The state of martial rule: the origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 298–313.16 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: a modern history (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 206.17 Harry W. Blair, 'Sheikh Mujib and deja vu in East Bengal: the tragedies of March 25', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 52, 25 December 1971, pp. 2555–2562.18 Zaheer, The separation of East Pakistan, p. 495. The Indian government had been advised by one of its Research Analysis Wing (RAW) operators in Dacca. The secret service was largely used by New Delhi to deal with the East Pakistani secessionist forces. See 'RAW report dated 3 July 1971' and 'RAW report dated 13 April 1971' (both focusing on the situation in East Pakistan), in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227; and 'Letter from P. N. Haksar to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dated 3 February 1972', which summarizes the role played by the Sashastra Seema Bal (Armed Border Force) and the RAW during the East Pakistan crisis, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 220, in Nehru Museum and Memorial Library [hereafter NMML] Archives, New Delhi. See also Asoka Raina, Inside RAW: the story of India's secret service (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), pp. 53–54.19 'Report from RAW transmitted by R. N. Kao, additional secretary, to prime minister dated 13 April 1971', p. 1, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML.20 For a selection of eyewitness accounts and newspaper reports, see Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 2 Vols. (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972), 1: pp. 280–445. The majority of Pakistani army officers indulged in various forms of violence against the Hindu minority with the clear aim of uprooting them from East Pakistan. A telegram sent by the American Embassy in Islamabad to Washington in early August 1971 indicates that at that time (finally) the 'persecution of Hindus appears to have ceased' due to the 'drastic decrease in the number of Hindus available to persecute'. See 'Telegram sent by American Embassy to the Department of State dated 2 August 1971', in Khan, The American papers, pp. 624–631. On this see also Bass, The blood telegram, pp. 79–84. Not surprisingly, the AL leaders formulated accusations of 'genocide' against the Pakistani military junta. These claims were soon supported by international newspaper articles and diplomatic reports from Dacca. See, for example, the editorial 'Genocide in East Pakistan' in the Saturday Review (New York), 22 May 1971, pp. 20–21; and Anthony Mascarenahs' article 'Genocide' in the Sunday Times, 13 June 1971, pp. 12–14. It is noteworthy that after the launch of Operation Searchlight, violence was also committed by Bengalis. See Bose, Dead reckoning and 'The question of genocide'.21 The conventional Bangladeshi literature argues that three million people were killed and 200,000 women raped, while the Pakistan version recognized only 26,000 killings and no more than one hundred rape cases. See Government of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman Commission report (Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 33, available at: http://www.pppusa.org/Acrobat/Hamoodur%20Rahman%20Commission%20Report.pdf.22 Eighty per cent of the entire number of refugees who escaped to India were of the Hindu religion.23 Michelguglielmo Torri, Storia dell'India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007); and S. J. Burki, Pakistan: fifty years of nationhood (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).24 India accounts for seventy per cent of the South Asian population and land; before 1971 its GDP was five times larger than Pakistan's, and historically it had always been much more industrialized than Pakistan. Statistics from the World Bank, 2011, available at: http://data.worldbank.org. See also Surjit Mansingh, India's search for power: Indira Gandhi's foreign policy, 1966–1982 (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 271; and Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, 'Political economy of national security', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, Nos. 44/45, 2 November 2002, pp. 4545–4549.25 For a detailed analysis of the Kashmir question, see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).26 Sumit Ganguly, India as an emerging power (London: Psychology Press, 2003).27 Robert J. McMahon, 'United States Cold War strategy in South Asia: making a military commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954', Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1988, pp. 812–840.28 John W. Garver, Protracted contest (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 187–215.29 The conspiracy's name came from a city in the Indian state of Tripura where the accused had supposedly met Indian army officers. The fact that representatives of the Indian government had met Mujib-ur Rahman since 1962 in different secret locations in India is not a mystery. See 'Agartala conspiracy case was not false', Bangladesh News, 23 February 2011, available at: http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2011/02/23/agartala-conspiracy-case-was-not-false; or 'Textbook "incorrectly" describes Agartala Case: Shawkat', The Daily Star, 12 June 2010, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=142345. What remains unclear is whether during the 1960s India's government was really acting with the goal to promote the division of Pakistan or whether it was just keeping alive relations with East Pakistani political exponents.30 Although the road was declared open only in 1971, truck passage had been possible since 1969.31 The two hijackers landed the plane in Lahore, and after the evacuation of crew and passengers they blew it up. The fact that Pakistan granted the hijackers political asylum and allowed them to address public meetings against India triggered New Delhi's reaction. Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 136. The ban largely complicated military movements of the Pakistani army from West to East Pakistan in 1971 and during the different phases of the East Pakistani crisis.32 There were numerous Indian and international press reports at that time on the violence committed by the Pakistani army. Moreover, Indian intelligence agents were in East Pakistan from before the repression, as mentioned earlier (see note 18). For a selection of Indian and world press reports, see Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: pp. 345–445.33 'Letter from P. N. Haksar to Acharya dated 7 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 165, NMML Archives.34 See, for example, Times of India, 8 April 1971; Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 149; and Bass, The blood telegram, p. 89.35 See Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 149.36 See, for example, 'Pakistan: two-nation theory again', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 13, 27 March 1971, p. 690.37 Jayaprakash Narayan, popularly known as J. P., was an Indian independence activist and a respected Gandhian leader, while K. Subramanyam was the director of the authoritative Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), an institute funded by the Indian Ministry of Defence.38 The Hindustan Times, 17 March 1971.39 Cited by Kemal A. Faruki, 'India's role in the East Pakistan crisis: legal aspects', Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1971, p. 28.40 See the speech by the Indian prime minister at the Lok Sabha on 27 March 1971 in Indira Nehru Gandhi, India and Bangla Desh: selected speeches and statements, March to December, 1971 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), p. 11.41 The Times of India, 31 March 1971.42 Gandhi, India and Bangla Desh, p. 12.43 See, for example, the prime minister's official speech on 27 March, the 29 March resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Congress, and the tenth Lok Sabha resolution of 31 March. Gandhi, India and Bangladesh, pp. 9–12; and Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: pp. 669–672.44 'Text of the resolution moved by the prime minister of India in the Parliament on March 31, 1971', in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: p. 672. It is interesting to note that the term 'genocide' was absent in the first draft of the resolution, and that it was only inserted in the second and the final drafts. See 'Draft resolution for the Working Committee of the All India Congress Committee', dated 29 March; and 'Resolution by the Lok Sabha on the situation in East Pakistan now called Bangla Desh (II Draft)', dated 30 March 1971, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 164, NMML Archives. Emphasis added.45 James P. Sterba, 'India charges genocide', New York Times, 17 April 1971. Emphasis added.46 Zaheer, The separation of East Pakistan, p. 275.47 Jackson, South Asian crisis, p. 44.48 The small circle of Indira Gandhi's advisers was composed of some bureaucratic functionaries, such as P. N. Haksar, V. W. Swaminathan (cabinet secretary), K. B. Lal (defence secretary), I. G. Patel (economy secretary) and T. N. Kaul (foreign secretary). Moreover, in dealing with the Pakistan crisis in 1971, Indira Gandhi relied largely on a number of other secretaries of the Prime Minister's Secretariat (PMS), such as D. P. Dhar (head of the Policy Planning Committee at the Ministry of External Affairs), G. Ramachandra, M. Malhotra, Sharada Prasad and B. N. Tandon, who later achieved important posts in the Indian administrative service. For more information on Indian foreign policy decision-making processes during Indira Gandhi's term, see Sumit Ganguly, 'The prime minister and foreign and defence policies', in James Manor and B. D. Dua (eds.), Nehru to the nineties: the changing office of prime minister in India (London: Hurst, 1994), pp. 138–160.49 D. K. Palit, Lightning campaign: Indo-Pakistan war, 1971 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1972), pp. 41–44.50 Separatism was rampant over South Asia, also of course including India, as Haksar's mention of Kashmir highlights. 'Note entitled "Some points for the meeting with the leaders of the opposition parties on the situation of East Pakistan" from Haksar to prime minister dated 26 March 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 164, NMML Archives.51 'Letter from P. N. Haksar to Indira Gandhi dated 1 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.52 'Letter from Director General BSF, K. F. Rustomji, to Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. S. H. F. J. Manekshaw dated 23 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 258, NMML Archives. The direct assumption of responsibility by the Indian military forces over the training camps had a clear impact on the ground and did not remain only on paper. As an RAW note highlights, for example, it was the Indian army that distributed payments to the Bengali forces. This fact even raised some resentment among them, as they felt they were on India's payroll, and among some Bengali ex-Pakistani army officers, who were irritated by the control over their behaviour by the Indian army. See 'RAW record dated 3 July 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.53 According to the Indian Minister of Labour and Rehabilitation, 119,566 Pakistani refugees had entered India by 17 April, while only later did their number significantly increase, reaching 8.25 million by the end of August 1971. See Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: p. 446.54 'Letter from D. P. Dhar to Haksar dated 4 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227; and 'Letter from D. P. Dhar to Haksar dated 18 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 220, NMML Archives.55 The Government of Pakistan proposed some other explanations to justify such an exodus, for example the famine that hit East Pakistan after the civil war, and India's deliberate encouragement of the Hindu outflow. On this point, see, for example, Faruki, 'India's role in the East Pakistan crisis', p. 29. However, these two theses lack credibility: first, the Hindu minority was not the poorest section of East Pakistan, which could have explained their escape; and second, even if India was supporting the East Pakistani guerrilla forces, it was contrary to such a consistent outflow of people to its territory.56 The official statistics of the Indian government were for 18.5 million rupees as daily maintenance costs. See Partha N. Mukherji, 'The great migration of 1971: II reception', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 10, 9 March 1974, pp. 399–408; in total 3,600 million rupees were provided for the maintenance of the refugees. See Government of India, 'Economic survey 1971/1972' (Ministry of Finance, 1972), Major Economic Developments, p. 9, available at: http://indiabudget.nic.in/es1971-72/1%20Major%20Economic%20Developments.pdf.57 It has been calculated by the World Health Organization that around 5,800 people had died from cholera by September 1971 ('Cholera in India is fatal to 5,805 Bengali refugees', New York Times, 30 September 1971).58 In West Bengal the extremist groups of the East Pakistani political forces, such as the communists and the National Awami Party (NAP), considered pro-Beijing by India, began to establish direct links with the Naxalite movement, which was, at that time, a serious challenge to the state power supremacy. Rooted in the deeply inequitable agrarian society of north Bengal, the Naxalite revolutionary movement was indeed petitioning for an effective redistribution of land, and also threatening the interests of the local Congress party. For an in-depth analysis of the Naxalite movement, see, for example, Prakash Singh, The naxalite movement in India (New Delhi: Rupa, 1996).59 See, for example, Romesh Tapar, 'Crisis in the East', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 19, 8 May 1971, p. 946; and Ashok Sanjay Guha, 'Bangla Desh and Indian self-interest', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 20, 15 May 1971, pp. 983–985.60 Interview with the prime minister, India News, 4 May 1971, and also 'Foreign minister's reply to the short duration discussion regarding demand for recognition of Bangla Desh in Rajya Sabha on May 25, 1971', in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: p. 677.61 'Prime minister's statement in Lok Sabha on situation in Bangla Desh, on May 24, 1971', in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: p. 674.62 See the same speech in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, p. 674.63 Sisson and Rose, War and secession, pp. 145 and 184–185. The dispatch of military forces also turned out to be useful to New Delhi for better controlling the political order in West Bengal, and for definitively solving the problem of the Naxalites. On this, see, for example, A. M., 'Calcutta diary', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 8, No. 20, 19 May 1973, p. 889; and Francine R. Frankel, India's political economy, 1947–2004: the gradual revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 457–458. However, the more general gathering of military forces along the Indian border cannot be explained only by the threat of political disorder in West Bengal.64 'Plans have separately been made for organising training on a larger scale. The completion of that programme may take several months.' See 'Top secret note from R. N. Kao, additional secretary, to prime minister, dated 5 May 1971', p. 4, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.65 'Top secret note from R. N. Kao, additional secretary, to prime minister, dated 5 May 1971', p. 4.66 'Situation, report of the Bangladesh Army dated 5 July 1971', p. 4, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.67 Indian leaders considered a Chinese intervention in case of a war against Pakistan as improbable, but they acutely felt the diplomatic necessity to safeguard the country against such a possibility. See 'Letter from D. P. Dhar to T. N. Kaul dated 29 April 1971', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.68 'Record of conversation between foreign minister and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R. on 7 June, 1971', pp. 2–6, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 203, NMML Archives. Emphasis added.69 'Record of conversation between foreign minister and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R., on 7 June, 1971', pp. 6–7.70 The government of the United States continued to back Pakistan, while Great Britain kept a neutral position over the issue. Only on 23 June did Great Britain announce the suspension of its development aid to Pakistan. On the American strategy, see Bass, The blood telegram; for the other states' reactions, see Raghavan, 1971, ch. 7.71 National Herald, 21 June 1971, cited by Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 187.72 The Hindu, 26 June 1971, cited by Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 187.73 Tad Szulc, 'US military goods sent to Pakistan despite ban', New York Times, 22 June 1971.74 It was thanks to the mediation of the Pakistani president Yahya Khan that ambassadorial talks between the United States and China were resumed in 1969 in Warsaw after they had been suspended for the Cultural Revolution. After the talks were again interrupted in 1970, contacts between Beijing and Washington were carried on directly thanks to the direct mediation of the Pakistani military junta. Chen Jian, Mao's China and the cold war (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011), pp. 238–276.75 Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 190.76 'RAW record on Bangladesh dated 3 July 1971', p. 2, and 'Top secret immediate note for the chief in command about the Bangladesh forces, undated', pp. 1–6, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives.77 On 19 July the UN Secretary U Thant sent a memorandum to both the government of India and Pakistan proposing such an option. On the following day he unusually also wrote to the president and members of the Security Council, requiring them to proclaim their position on the issue. See 'The UN secretary general's aid memoire', in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: pp. 657–659.78 Foreign minister's speech made on 2 August, in Government of India, Bangladesh documents, 1: p. 662. A similar position is further documented in 'Letter from foreign minister to Indian Embassy, Washington DC, dated 24 July 1971', in MEA, AMS, WII/104/17/71, National Archives, New Delhi.79 See Moses' analysis in 'The United Nations, humanitarianism, and human rights', p. 268.80 Jackson, South Asian crisis, p. 67. The American and Pakistani governments approved U Thant's proposals. After India's refusal, they collaborated to allow the UN dispatch at least to East Pakistan. See, for example, Benjamin Welles, 'UN to send team to East Pakistan', New York Times, 1 August 1971.81 For the entire text of the treaty, see Jackson, South Asian crisis, pp. 188–191.82 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis 1971', Doc 148, 'Memorandum from Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council staff to the president's assistant for national security affairs (Kissinger)', 16 September 1971, available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d148; and Sisson and Rose, War and secession, pp. 225–226.83 Interview with Gen. K. M. Shergill, held in New Delhi on 21 December 2011.84 See the speech she made on 29 and 31 October. Indira Nehru Gandhi, India speaks: selected speeches of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on her tour abroad, September-November 1971 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), pp. 40 and 51.85 Speech at Columbia University on 6 November, in Gandhi, India speaks, p. 98.86 Speech in Washington on 4 November, in Gandhi, India speaks, p. 64.87 Interview with Gen. J. F. K. Jacob, held in New Delhi on 6 December 2011; 'Telegram from the American Embassy in Islamabad to Washington, dated 23 November 1971', in Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India, pp. 261–266; and 'Signal G-1104 dated the 21 of November from commander to chief of general staff', in Government of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, p. 95. See also Sydney Schanberg, 'New Delhi sources admit troops entered Pakistan' and 'Big India forces reported going into East Pakistan', New York Times, 8 and 24 November 1971.88 Dixit reported that D. P. Dhar commented on the news of the Pakistani attack saying: 'The fool has done exactly what one had expected'. Dixit, Liberation and beyond, p. 89.89 In reality, the Indian authorities had already decided in early December 1971 to launch an offensive war only in East Pakistan. Logistical hindrances, military constraints and international oppositions, coming also from the Soviet Union and China, then prevented them from later changing their plans. Bass, The blood telegram, p. 280; and Sisson and Rose, War and secession, p. 215.90 For the resolutions, see the UN website at http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto. The marginality of the UN is also demonstrated by the failure of the UN operation in East Pakistan, which had been launched by the UN Secretary General on 15 November 1971. Ordered without any formal supporting resolution released by a UN organ, and 'solely on the base of President Yahya Khan's acceptance', it lasted only a week due to the scarce security conditions created by India and the Mukti Bahini's opposition. Gidon Gottlieb, 'The United Nations and emergency humanitarian assistance in India-Pakistan', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 66, No. 2, April 1972, p. 363.91 For a brief and precise resumé of the war, see Guha, India after Gandhi, pp. 458–461. See also Bass, The blood telegram, ch. 8; and Raghavan, 1971, ch. 10.92 'Letter from Swaran Singh, Indian Foreign Minister, to Sheik Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber, Foreign Minister of the state of Kuwait', in 'Telegram 29811 from Foreign, New Delhi, to India Embassy in Kuwait dated 20 March 1972', p. 2, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 234, NMML Archives. For contemporary commentaries to support this evaluation, see, for example, the case of refugees from Chandpara and Bokchora in Partha N. Mukherji, 'The great migration of 1971: III return', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 11, 16 March 1974, pp. 449–451. This assessment is also confirmed by the fact that the repatriation of the Bengali refugees from India did not later become a bilateral issue between the two countries.93 See, for example, Dixit, Liberation and beyond, chs. 6–9.94 On Indian self-perceptions, see 'Letter by the Joint Secretary of RAW, K. S. Nair, to Cabinet on Pakistan's intentions dated 30 March 1972', in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 231, NMML Archives. Furthermore, American Assistant Secretary Sisco recognized India as the stronger player in South Asia on 12 March 1973 in his intervention at the American Congress (see 'Telegram from Indian Embassy in Washington to New Delhi, dated 13 March 1973', in MEA, AMS, WII/109/1/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi). Similar recognition was also given by the American deputy assistant secretary for Near and Middle East and South Asian affairs, Alfred Atherton (see 'Telegram from Indian Embassy in Washington to New Delhi, dated 28 February 1975', in MEA, PP(JS) WII/4/3/74, National Archives, New Delhi); by the American president and the British prime minister during a bilateral meeting in 1973 (see 'Telegram from Rasgotra to foreign secretary dated 3 February 1973', in MEA, AMS, WII/103/4/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi); and by Warren Christopher, American department secretary (see 'Letter from N. Dayal, Counsellor of Indian Embassy in the United States, to Indrajit Singh, Department Secretary MEA, New Delhi, dated 31 July 1977', in MEA, AMS, WII/104/28/77, National Archives, New Delhi).95 Talbot, Pakistan, p. 238.96 Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Hodder, 2010), p. 86; and Mansingh, India's search for power, p. 51.97 Guha, India after Gandhi, p. 463.