Artigo Revisado por pares

Apostles of Americanization? J. Walter Thompson Company Ltd, Advertising and Anglo-American Relations 1945–67

2008; Routledge; Volume: 22; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13619460802439374

ISSN

1743-7997

Autores

Sean Nixon,

Tópico(s)

American History and Culture

Resumo

Abstract The paper explores how the concern with the apparent ‘Americanization’ of British commerce and culture played out within the world of London advertising in the post-war period. In doing so, it engages with, and partly challenges, a pervasive line of argument within economic and cultural history that has emphasized the influence of American commercial power over Europe's economies in the immediate post-war decades. Historians of this period, like contemporary commentators before them, have tended to privilege the dominance of what Victoria de Grazia has recently termed America's irresistible ‘Market Empire’ in their exploration of trans-Atlantic relations. In this paper, I take the case of JWT London, a US-owned multinational advertising agency, and its relationship with its parent company in order to revise claims about US commercial domination. JWT is an instructive case because it was a classic example of an international advertising agency in the era of high American commercial expansion. Yet the organization of its London office and the relations between London and New York reveal a picture of business practices that complicates assumptions about American commercial domination. JWT London was not the bold apostle of the American vision of its parent company, but rather it sought to soften and not aggressively assert the corporate identity and commercial ethos of its American parent. In this regard, JWT London, like other US companies before it and since, worked to shed its Americanness and go native. To insist on this process of indigenization is not to deny the authority of US models of commercial life in this period. Rather it is to suggest that even within a US-owned company like J. Walter Thompson, American commercial influences took particular forms in Britain and that the American domination over Europe was neither monolithic nor homogeneous nor irresistible. Keywords: AmericanizationAdvertisingCommercial NationalismCommercial SyncretismIndigenization Acknowledgements I am grateful to Mike Roper, Peter Gurney, Clark Eric Hultquist, and Stefan Schwarzkopf for their comments and assistance. The research on which this paper draws was supported by a Travel Grant from the Hartmann Centre for the Study of Advertising and Marketing, Duke University and by a Research Promotion Fund award from the University of Essex. I am also grateful to the staff at The History of Advertising Trust, especially Margaret Rose. Notes [1] Tom Sutton letter to Norman Strouse, 16 December 1960, Edward G. Wilson Papers box 8, J. Walter Thompson Company Archives, John W. Hartman Centre for Sales, Advertising and Marketing History, Duke University (hereafter, JWT). [2] Tom Sutton memo to Hinks, Mitchell-Innes and Curling, 20/10/63, J. Walter Thompson Company Archives, History of Advertising Trust (hereafter JWT/HAT). Pearson and Turner discuss the Ford account, Pearson and Turner, 1962:21. [3] The Anglo-Dutch consumer goods manufacturer, Unilever was a strong exponent of this philosophy. See CitationJones, ‘Control, Performance, and Knowledge Transfers’. [4] Zeitlin and Herrigel, Americanizatoin and Its Limits. [5] US investment in Britain had climbed to 6BN dollars by 1967 and through the 1960s Britain became the most important destination for US capital outside Canada. Between 1958–63, 1000 US companies set up operations or formed subsidiaries in Britain (Pells, ‘Not Like Us’, Citation190). [6] See CitationWilliams book, The American invasion, together with CitationHoggart's The Uses of Literacy, as two classic examples. Dennis Potter produced two polemical accounts of social change in the 1950s Britain that also invoked the spectre of growing American cultural influence. See , The Changing Forest and The Glittering Coffin. The debate on the introduction of commercial television was also strong shaped by concerns about the ‘Americanization’ of Britain. See, Wilson, 1961; CitationGurney, ‘The Battle for the Consumer’, 970–5; CitationBlack, The Political Culture, Chapters 4 & 5. The apotheosis of concerns in broadcasting about US influence was the Pilkington report, of which Hoggart was a key author. For his response to the debate provoked by Pilkington, see Hoggart, 1970. [7] De Grazia devotes a long chapter to JWT's expansion into Europe in the early twentieth century, though she tellingly has little to say about the London office, focusing more on JWT's experiences in Germany and France. See De Grazia, Irresistable Empire, Citation26–283. [8] CitationFox, The Mirrormakers, 173. [9] JWT Offices, 1951–60, n.d., Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT. [10] JWT Offices, 1951–1960, n.d., Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT; International Organization, July 1953, Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT. The London company's board of directors included two Americans, one of whom was the Chairman, Rae Smith. [11] An internal report from 1963 shed light on the social make-up of Berkeley Square. This revealed that 44 per cent of its staff (excluding the Directors of the company) hailed from AB social backgrounds, with 50 per cent from C1 families. As the report commented, ‘in terms of social grade the staff profile is wildly atypical [of consumers as a whole] and it is difficult to imagine any other type of organization that could combine such a high proportion of ABC1 employees’. It also noted that the ‘age profile is heavily biased towards the youngest age groups with two-thirds aged under 35 years compared with one-third of the general population’. Another JWT London publication produced for new staff in 1967 emphasized the educational calibre of the London office stating that ‘of the 900 men and women who work [here], 118 are graduates. A list of their degrees reads like a University prospectus’. The London office's film club, established in 1966 by the creative department, revealed the eclectic and culturally ambitious tastes of its members. It screened a mixture of French New Wave (including Jules et Jim and 400 Blows), together with some popular Hollywood and older classics (like the Marx Brothers and W. C. Fields). Office Panel, 1963, JWT/HAT; 40 Berkeley Square, JWT London, 1967, JWT/HAT; Memo, Creative Department, 17/8/66, JWT/HAT. [12] CitationYeo, Reflections on An Agency, 6. [13] Organization—London office, 27 May 1959, Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT; Letter from Andrew Sinclair to Ed Wilson, 1/6/61, Edward Wilson Papers, JWT. [14] In the first 11 months of his tenure in 1954, for example, he crossed the Atlantic eight times. [15] Established in 1931, The International Department also helped to plan and execute advertising campaigns in international media and provide local offices with art work and materials for campaigns, as well as distributing JWT research, marketing methods and ways of working and training for personnel in international offices. [16] On the T-square, see West 1987. The T-square questions are the precursor of the ‘creative brief’ that became a standard part of advertising development in Britain by the 1980s. See Nixon, 1996, 107. [17] CitationRayfield, Fifty at Forty, 19; The T-square method of developing advertising was not the only mechanism through which JWT New York sought to standardize and regulate advertising practices across its international operations. In 1942, the company introduced a system of Review Boards in its New York office and these were subsequently extended to overseas offices. The Review Boards consisted of senior staff in the agency and represented a way, as the 1956 Review Board Procedure document put it, of furnishing ‘the maximum amount of company experience […] that can be brought to bear on the basic planning of each account’. In practice, this meant ensuring that the account team responsible for particular client campaigns had followed the procedures codified in the T-square and thus had developed a sound marketing proposition before expensive production was undertaken (ibid). In addition, the board sought to give a certain consistency and ‘house style’ to JWT's advertising. If, on occasions, internal memos revealed that JWT's leading figures worried that this might produce ‘safe, dull advertising’, they reassured themselves that this would be offset by the general ‘maintenance of creative standards’ across the agency. [18] So widely used by American agencies was this style of persuasion that Victoria de Grazia has suggested that it came to carry connotations of Americanness when transposed to Europe by JWT and other American agencies in the interwar years. CitationDe Grazia, Irresistable Empire, 237–8. [19] CitationDe Grazia, Irresistable Empire, 237–8 [20] The American cosmetics company Cheeseborough-Ponds had popularised the use of testimonials in consumer advertising in 1914, and in 1924 JWT New York ran the first in a long-running series of testimonial adverts featuring ‘society ladies’ testifying to how Ponds' cold creams helped them to keep their beauty. The testimonial as a promotional form had its roots in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century American protestant culture. As Jackson Lears has suggestively argued, testimonials represented a secular appropriation of the narrative of the conversion experience. Rather than confessing their relief from suffering caused by sin, advertising testimonials documented the relief from more profane sources of distress offered by consumer goods (CitationLears, Fables of Abundance, 143). [21] A good example of this was the advertising produced for the malted drink manufacturer, Horlicks. The Horlicks' account was one of Berkeley Square's most celebrated and longest running campaigns. The business had been acquired in 1934 and was one of a number of significant British accounts that helped the London office to establish itself in the interwar period. Horlicks was also typical of the kind of grocery advertising that dominated JWT London's business well into the post-war period. [22] The Pan American Airways account was the classic example. JWT New York worked closely with Pan Am's Long Island head office in running the worldwide advertising for the carrier. JWT London was sent proofs and layouts by the New York office that required minimal revision. In other cases, dollars were changed to pounds or small differences between US and British phrasing were made (like substitute ‘oil and cowboy country’ for ‘oil and cattle country’ JWT/HAT Pan American Airways, 18/5/62. [23] For example, Denis Lanagan, later to become the Chairman of JWT London, spent a year in New York working on the ‘Stripe’ toothpaste account in 1959. Tom Rayfield, one of London's best copywriters, spent a year in the US in 1966. And there were many other examples. J. Walter Thompson Company News, 10/8/53; 7/10/66; Round the Square, June 1956; September 1960; Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT. [24] The International Operations of J. Walter Thompson Co. Ltd, Analysis of an expanding venture with policy recommendations, 15 December 1945:9. [25] Letter from Edward G. Wilson to Six US admen in foreign offices, 31 March 1965, Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT. [26] Letter to Douglas Saunders from Sam Meek, 2 November 1959, Sam Meek papers, JWT. [27] Between 1957–9, JWT London helped to train staff in the Paris office, CitationHultquist, ‘Americans in Paris’, 494. [28] India was the next biggest with 544 staff, though the majority of its 25 international offices had under 100 staff. International Offices, January 1962, Edward G. Wilson Papers, JWT. [29] 83 per cent of JWT London's clients had been built up independently, with only 17 per cent of its turnover coming from clients shared with the New York office. Tom Sutton letter to Norman Strouse, 16 Dec 1960, Edward G. Wilson Papers box 8, JWT. [30] The International Operations of J. Walter Thompson Co. Ltd, Analysis of an expanding venture with policy recommendations, 15 December 1945:15. [31] The International Operations of J. Walter Thompson Co. Ltd, Analysis of an expanding venture with policy recommendations, 15 December 1945:15 [32] CitationHebdige, ‘Towards a Cartography of Taste 1935–62’; CitationLe Mahieu, A Culture of Democracy. [33] CitationHoggart, The Uses of Literacy. See also, CitationGurney, ‘The Battle for the Consumer’, 970–5; CitationBlack, The Political Culture, Chapters 4 & 5; Mort, Citation2000. [34] CitationHebdige, ‘Towards a Cartography of Taste 1935–62’, 54. [35] See, inter alia, ‘You British have nothing to fear from US invasion’, Advertiser's Weekly, 13/5/60:82. CitationWilliams book, The American Invasion, published in 1962 focused on the intrusion of American commercial methods and merchandising in his diatribe against the worst effects of American Civilization on Britain. See, 21–2 on US advertising agencies. For general developments in British advertising through the 1950s and the 60s, see CitationNixon, ‘In Pursuit of the Professional Ideal’. [36] CitationPearson and Turner, The Persuasion Industry, 95; CitationSampson, Anatomy of Britain, 362. [37] Advertising Review, Vol 1, no 1:1. [38] Advertising Review, Vol 1, no 1:8. [39] Advertising Review, Vol 1, no 1:54–5. [40] CitationIPA, Institute Information, 1956, Vol. 3, no.9:6. [41] ‘British Advertising is big American business’, Advertiser's Weekly (hereafter, AW), 23/2/62:20; see also ‘Brunning makes attack on American influence, research like a religious sect’, AW, 11/3/60:1. [42] CitationPearson and Turner, The Persuasion Industry, 146. [43] CitationPearson and Turner, The Persuasion Industry, 146. [44] CitationPearson and Turner, The Persuasion Industry, 147. [45] ‘The New Challenge’, AW, 6/11/59:16; ‘You British have nothing to fear from US invasion’, AW, 13/5/60:82; ‘New Style Anglo-American tie-up’, AW, 15/7/60:5; ‘Second Wave’, AW, 17/7/64:24; ‘The Creative Revolution’, AW, 8/4/66:32; ‘Why Madison Avenue Moved In’, Times, 26/6/69:25. [46] The top British agencies by billings were London Press Exchange (LPE), Colman Prentis Varley (CPV) and S. H Benson. On US ownership, see CitationWest, ‘Multinational Competition’, 475; CitationSampson, Anatomy of Britain, 632. [47] CitationMattelart, Advertising International; CitationJones and Bostock, ‘US Multinationals’. These developments were also part of a large-scale quantitative expansion of the UK advertising industry by the 1960s. [48] CitationFox, The Mirrormakers, 173. [49] CitationFox, The Mirrormakers, 173 [50] See JWT's corporate adverts in Printer's Ink, 1 February 1957; Advertising Age, April & June 1958. [51] CitationNevett, Advertising in Britain, 177. [52] Advertiser's Weekly 20 November 1947:360–1; December 4, 1947:463–8. [53] CitationRayfield, Fifty at Forty, 12. [54] Saunder Hinks to New York, 5 July 1945, JWT/HAT. [55] ‘Notes on negotiations that have so far taken place between JWT London and JWT New York’, August 1945, JWT/HAT. [56] ‘Notes on negotiations that have so far taken place between JWT London and JWT New York’, August 1945, JWT/HAT [57] ‘Pan American World Airways Incorporated Purchase of de Havilland Comets, proposed advertising in Britain’, JWT London, October 1952, JWT/HAT. [58] Letter to D. Dougherty from J.R Keith, 14 December 1953, JWT/HAT. [59] Letter from Sam Meek to Sandy Mitchell-Innes, 23 September 1957, JWT/HAT. [60] Guidance of this sort from New York revealed important continuities between the pre-war and post-war practices followed within the company as a whole in developing overseas business. It echoed, in particular, the tone of a publication produced by JWT London for potential American clients. This had emphasised, not obscured, the company's American-ness. As a 1937 publication put it: JWT Co Ltd offers a complete American-type advertising and marketing service. […] A number of its staff, in key positions, are Americans, and nearly every important executive has had American experience or training. Through constant interchange of personnel with its parent company in America, it is always in touch with the latest developments in American advertising and marketing methods. [61] One symbol of this was Douglas Saunder's appointment to the top position in the IPA, the British advertising industry's corporate body. He served as President in 1958. [62] CitationYeo, Reflections on An Agency, 28 & 29. JWT/HAT. Not dated but written around the time of the takeover of JWT by WPP in 1989. Annabel's open two doors away from JWT London's office at 44, Berkeley Square in 1963. It was named after Birley's then wife, Lady Annabel Goldsmith. Robin Douglas Home was the membership secretary of the Playboy Club in 1966, see Times, 23/4/66:11; Times, 3/3/58:14. [63] His father was the younger brother of Lord Hume, the Tory Prime Minister. His uncle William was a minor playwright. His younger brother, Charles, became editor of the Times in 1982. [64] Letter from Derrick Cawston to Tom Sutton, 14/4/64, JWT/HAT. [65] Letter from Edward Booth-Clibborn to Dermot Wilson, 9/8/63; Letter from Edward Booth-Clibborn to Violet Skeates, 9/7/63; Letter from Edward Booth-Clibborn to Chris Higham, 29/9/64; Letter from Edward Booth-Clibborn to J. Bullmore, 11/11/64; Letter from Don Michel to Edward Booth-Clibborn, 18/12/64. [66] JWT London also approached Liz Smith, fashion editor of the Observer colour supplement, as fashion adviser for JWT. See Letter from Terri Hamaton to Norman Philip, 25/10/68, JWT/HAT. [67] Times, 16/10/68:12. [68] Recorded in letter from Dermot Wilson to the Creative Department, 28/4/64, JWT/HAT. [69] Recorded in letter from Dermot Wilson to the Creative Department, 28/4/64, JWT/HAT [70] Letter from Dermot Wilson to the Creative Department, 28/4/64, JWT/HAT. [71] London's growing self-assurance was further evidenced by its bold move to revise the T-square. Under the direction of Stephen King, a leading researcher at JWT London, the office proposed that Sam Meek's original formula be redesigned and renamed the T-plan. As West has argued, what was significant about this shift to the T-plan was that it moved the development of advertising away from its reliance on a rather mechanical use of market research towards an approach that sought to identify the desired response that was sought in the consumer and to develop advertising that stimulated this. As the company itself put it, the aim was to ‘establish what the target group of consumers should notice in the brand, should believe about it and feel towards it’ (JWT London, history p12). [72] See Pearson and Turner, 1960: 71–80. [73] See the extensive correspondence from viewers of the Oxo adverts in ‘Oxo Correspondence’, 1965 file', JWT/HAT box 203. The investment of many of these viewers in the ‘Katie’ adverts was evident in the number who wrote to complain that Katie had not washed her hands after coming home with the shopping and then handling the Oxo cubes. As Mrs L. King of Woodingdeam, Sussex, noted, ‘Katie is a very well groomed girl and she has a lovely home, but her cooking hygiene is not good’, 6/11/65, JWT/HAT box 203. [74] CitationWinship, ‘Culture of Restraint’, 16. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSean Nixon Sean Nixon is senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Essex and author of Hard Looks, Masculinities, Spectatorship & Contemporary Consumption (UCL Press, 1996) and Advertising Cultures, Gender, Commerce, Creativity (Sage, 2003). He is currently working on a project on advertising and social change in post-war Britain provisionally titled, ‘Entrepreneurs of Affluence, Advertising, Consumption and Social Change, 1955–68’.

Referência(s)
Altmetric
PlumX