Churchill at the Summit: SACLANT and the Tone of Anglo-American Relations in January 1952
2010; Routledge; Volume: 32; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/07075332.2010.489751
ISSN1949-6540
Autores Tópico(s)Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Work on Churchill is voluminous but probably the best account to date of his interest in personal diplomacy is K. Larres, Churchill's Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy (New Haven, 2002). 2 For work on summitry see D. Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century (London, 2007); K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration (London, 1994); C. Fairbanks, The Allure of Summits (Washington, 1988); D. Dunn (ed.), Diplomacy at the Highest Level (London, 1996). 3 A. P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London, 1995), 90–100; S. Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil (Basingstoke, 2003). 4 In addition to our own work there is a considerable literature on Anglo-American relations, including J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship. Anglo-American relations form the Cold War to Iraq, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, 2006); C. Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A political history of Anglo-American relations since 1945 (New York, 1992); J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–84: The Special Relationship (London, 1984); D. Dimbleby and D. Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988); W.R. Louis and H. Bull (eds), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); K. Burk, Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America (London, 2007). 5 State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, Pentagon, 21 November 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter FRUS), 985–9. 6 Sir Roger Makins, a Deputy Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office, thought that the rearmament programme, exacerbated by the outbreak of the Korean War, would make the Anglo-American ‘partnership still more difficult to manage … The maintenance of our economic independence is vital to a healthy Anglo-American relationship.’ Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden fulsomely agreed with such sentiments, telling the Cabinet in January 1952 that ‘he had returned from North America with a renewed conviction of our need to do everything possible to re-establish our economic and financial independence.’ Makins, ‘Impressions of America’, 25 May 1951, B[ritish] N[ational] A[rchives] Kew, London, FO371/90931; BNA, CAB 128/24, CC(52)4, 17 January 1952. For an account of how Britain's decline all came to something of a head in the 1960s in Anglo-American relations see A. P. Dobson, ‘The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961–67’, Review of International Studies, xvi (1990), 239–58. 7 House of Commons Debates, 484, 632, 15 Feb. 1951; for more details of these problems see A. P. Dobson, ‘Informally Special? The Churchill-Truman Talks of January 1952 and the State of Anglo-American Relations’, Review of International Studies, xxiii (1997), 27–47, and Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil, particularly chapter 4. 8 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965, (London, 1966), diary entry 15 October 1951, 47; BNA, FO 371/90938, FO to Washington Embassy, personal Churchill to Truman, 30 Dec. 1951. 9 BNA, FO 371/90838, paper Makins, ‘Objectives in the Washington Talks’, 29 Nov. 1951; FRUS, 1952–54, vi, part one, Gifford to State Dept., 28 Dec. 1951, 720–3; John Colville, The Fringes of Power (London, 1985), 632–3. 10 Churchill cited in Simon Rofe, ‘Lord Lothian, 1939–40’, in Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John W. Young (eds), The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939–77 (Basingstoke, 2009), 14–32, at p. 24. 11 This is a somewhat different picture of Churchill and his attitude towards the Americans at the 1952 summit from that portrayed by at least one Churchill scholar. J. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57 (London, 1995), 253–6. Charmley has Churchill as an inveterate appeaser of the US to no effect in terms of pay-off for Britain: ‘As usual, Churchill was making unnecessary concessions [offering to increase copper production] to try to secure American support which would not be forthcoming.’ Rather unbelievably Charmley also claims: ‘One of the Prime Minister's main concerns during his time in Washington had been to secure American agreement to appoint a British admiral to command NATO's naval forces.’ At no point did Churchill argue for this. 12 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Ministry of Defence to B.J.S.M. Washington, 21 Dec. 1951. 13 BNA, DEFE 4/40, British Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes, meeting 43, ‘Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic’, 7 March 1951. 14 While the SACLANT issue has received very little attention hitherto, there are a number of more general accounts of the summit. These include Dobson, ‘Informally Special?’, 24–47; D. Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department (London, 1970), 594–606; D. Carlton, Anthony Eden. A Biography, (London, 1981), 302–12; A. Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conservative Government, 1951–55 (London Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), 388–90; M. Gilbert, ‘Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair’ 1945–65, viii (London, 1988), 672–95; P. Boyle, ‘The “Special Relationship” with Washington’, in John Young (ed), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951–1955 (Leicester, 1988), 29–54. 15 Colville, of the British Private Office, characterized American preparation for the conference thus: ‘The White House and the State Department clutched their life-belts and prepared to repel boarders.’ J. Colville, Footprints in Time (London, 1976), 233. FRUS 1951, iv, Policy Planning Staff, ‘Outline for discussion at JCS Meeting November 21 1951’, 20 Nov. 1951, 980–5; Ibid., record State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting held at the Pentagon 21 Nov. 1951, 985–89; [United States] N[ational] A[rchives], RG 59, box 2769, memo. R. B. Knight to Matthews, ‘Conversations between President Truman and Mr Churchill - U.S. objectives’, 10 Dec. 1951. 16 Truman Library, Acheson Papers, box 67, memos of conversation 1952, Acheson to Pearson via Woodward, 23 January 1952; BNA FO371/97593, Strang to Eden, 4 Jan. 1952; and D. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 595. 17 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 594. 18 BNA FO371/90937, Truman to Churchill, 28 Dec. 1951. 19 British officials deemed Churchill's Congressional address ‘very much of a personal triumph’. BNA, FO 371/97588, Washington Embassy to FO, ‘Survey of American regional press comment on Mr Churchill's address to Congress’, 1 Feb. 1952. 20 As Brien McMahon, Chairman of the US Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, put it, ‘Mr Churchill says publicly that he is not coming over here to seek American funds. This is, of course, nonsense - he has no choice but to solicit more money, and we have little choice except to give it to him.’ FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (McMahon) to President, 5 Dec. 1951, 695–8. In similar vein Berkeley Gage reported that the ‘Chicago Tribune is … trying to show that whatever proposals Mr. Churchill makes, his ulterior motive is to get as much good American money as possible poured down the ‘rathole.’ BNA, FO371/97592, Berkeley Gage, British Consulate General Chicago to Embassy Washington, 28 Dec. 1951. 21 BNA, FO 371/97593, Franks to Eden, 27 Jan. 1952. 22 BNA, PREM 8 1363, Memo for PM 24 Feb. 1951. 23 Truman Library, PSF box 115, folder: General File Churchill, Winston 1951–53, Fechteler to Truman 2 Jan. 1952. 24 BNA, ADM205/85 First Sea Lord Chief of Naval Staff to various CI Chiefs, 24 Jan. 1952 25 According to an interesting, but also rather puzzling observation by Colville, Churchill's Private Secretary: ‘There was an embarrassing incident at the first White House meeting. The President and the Prime Minister sat facing each other, flanked by their respective Chiefs of Staff, and one of the main topics for discussion was naval command of N.A.T.O. forces, to which we laid claim since the Americans were in command on land. It fell to the First Sea Lord, the diminutive but intelligent Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, to present our case. He went red in the face, large drops of perspiration appeared on his brow and he was too overawed to do more than stutter a few disjointed words. The C.I.G.S., General [sic Field Marshall] Slim, stepped into the breach and presented the naval case coolly and calmly. It was a magnificent tour de force by the representative of another service and it was evident that the Americans were as impressed as we were. They agreed to the British proposal.’ Regarding this, first of all the British were not laying claim to naval command of NATO Atlantic forces, but more puzzling than this straightforward error is to locate when this incident happened. It may indeed have been in the first plenary session on Monday 7 January, but if it were then there appears to be no official record of it: also US concessions were actually made the day before the first plenary. According to the record of both sides, the first formal discussion of SACLANT was in the second not the first plenary session, but there is no record of interventions at that meeting by either McGrigor or Slim. Furthermore the record only indicates that Colville was present at the third plenary when it appears that SACLANT was not discussed. It was discussed at a restricted meeting before the fourth plenary and while there is no attendance list for this meeting it is unlikely that Colville attended and again the record gives no indication of interventions by McGrigor or Slim. Colville, The Fringes of Power, 291. 26 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 27 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 28 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 29 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 30 Quoted from S. M. Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning 1948–1954 (Annapolis, 1995), 133, citing source: Eisenhower to Fechteler, 17 Jan. 1952, Eisenhower Papers, 12: 883–85. Much of this section on the pre-summit talks on SACLANT is drawn from Maloney's work, but also see J. J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO 1949–80 (London, 1991), 18 and passim. 31 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 32 BNA, ADM205/85 First Sea Lord Chief of Naval Staff to various CI Chiefs, 24 Jan. 1952. 33 FRUS 1952–5, vi, part 1, 859–61, Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower, 24 Jan. 1952). 34 Moran Diaries, 7 Jan. 1952, Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran – The Struggle for Survival 1940–1965 (Boston), 1966, 379. 35 Moran Diaries, 380. R. Lewin in Slim: the Standardbearer (London, 1976), 278, records that Churchill at one point said: ‘You have urged me to do this fake without any explanation to public or Parliament.’ 36 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 766–73, United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, Jan. 7, 1952, 5–7pm. 37 In the event it turned out that Churchill's fears were justified. On 11 February McGrigor wrote: ‘We have recently received SACLANT's proposal for his staff which exceeds anything we can imagine during our worst nightmare.’ ‘I think he has gone quite mad.’ BNA, ADM 205/85, McGrigor to Andrewes, 11 Feb. 1952. 38 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 766–73, United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, Jan. 7, 1952, 5–7pm. 39 Ibid., also at Truman Library PSF box 115, General File Churchill, folder: General File Churchill, Winston meeting with President Truman January 1952 folder (1), 7 Jan. Meeting, Cabinet Room. 40 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 859–61, Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower), 24 Jan. 1952. 41 Ibid., Memo by Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle) of a Meeting Between President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, 8 Jan., 1952, 5pm, 793–4 at 794. 42 Moran Diaries, 9 Jan. 1952, 383. 43 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Cabinet Conclusions 14 Jan. 1952. 44 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 843–45, The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Department of State, 14 Jan. 1952. 45 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Discussion at Dinner in Ottawa, 13 Jan. 1952. 46 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 843–5, The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Department of State, 14 Jan. 1952. 47 Truman Library, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo of Conversations 1952, folder: January, Pearson to Acheson, 15 Jan. 1952. 48 BNA, FO371/97592, Communiqué, 9 Jan. 1952: ‘The question of the Atlantic Command is still under discussion.’ 49 The Economist, 12 Jan. 1952, ‘Notes of the Week’ Mr. Churchill in Washington. 50 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 802–6, Memo of Conversation by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) subject Churchill Talks: Ambassador Bonnet, Mr. Juniac, 8 Jan. 1952. 51 BNA, FO371/97592, Communiqué, 7 Jan. 1952 and ‘Record of Meeting Held in the British Embassy Washington’, 10 Jan. 1952. 52 Cmd. 8468, 17 Jan. 1952, Mr. Churchill's Speech to the Congress of the United States of America; BNA, FO371/97588, Washington to Foreign Office, ‘Initial Press and Radio Comment on the Results of the PM's Visit’, 20 Jan. 1952. 53 Cmd. 8468, 1952; House of Commons debates, 495, 198, 30 Jan. 1952. BNA, FO371/97593, Agency Press, 5 March 1952. Interestingly in the mid 1960s, the USA suggested that Britain send a token military force to help in Vietnam: the British response was the same as that of the US in 1952. 54 BNA, CAB 128/24, CC(52)4, 17 Jan. 1952. 55 Moran Diaries, 16 Jan., 391. 56 Truman Library, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo of Conversations 1952, folder: January, Acheson to Pearson via Woodward, 23 Jan. 1952. 57 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Annex: United Kingdom Record of Discussions Between Mr. Churchill and Secretary of Defence, Mr. Lovett, Friday 18 Jan., also present McGrigor, Elliot, William Foster US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Fechteler et al. 58 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 601. 59 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 846–57, US Delegation Minutes of the Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, the White House, 18 January 1952. 60 Ibid. and Acheson to Pearson, 23 Jan. 1952, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo of Conversations 1952, folder: January. The account of the final meeting in Acheson's letter to Pearson does not make clear that Churchill had his own draft and the role of Acheson appears more significant, but otherwise the account is in accord with the official minutes. 61 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 846–57, US Delegation Minutes of the Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, the White House, 18 Jan. 1952. 62 The Economist, 26 Jan. 1952, ‘Britannia Rules Some Waves’. 63 BNA, FO371/97592, Brook and Makins to Strang, 18 Jan. 1952. 64 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 802–6, Memo of Conversation by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) subject Churchill Talks: Ambassador Bonnet, Mr. Juniac, 8 Jan. 1952. 65 Just how much he had deteriorated and how out of touch he was has spawned many debates, but it is interesting to note that Acheson's impression of him at the 1952 summit was that ‘he seemed to be weakening, though still formidable and quite magnificent.’ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 595. Also, when it was suggested that Britain had leverage on the United States because if it did not provide help then Britain might swing away and abandon any attempt to re-arm Germany, which would deliver it into the hands of the Soviets, Churchill's immediate response was that even without Britain and Western Europe, the United States would still be able to rearm Germany and to defeat the Soviets single-handedly if it needed to. It seems he had few illusions at least about the power game, Moran Diaries, 377. 66 Moran Diaries, 26 Jan. 1952, 395. 67 Truman Library, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo of Conversations 1952, folder: January, Pearson to Acheson, 15 Jan. 1952. 68 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 859–61, Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Eisenhower), 24 Jan. 1952. 69 Moran Diaries, 1 Jan. 1952, 377. 70 Moran Diaries, 381. 71 FRUS 1952–54, vi, part 1, 846–57, United States Delegation Minutes of the Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, Jan. 18, 1952, 3pm. 72 Truman Library, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo. of Conversations 1952, folder: January, Pearson to Acheson, 15 Jan. 1952. 73 Moran Diaries, 381. 74 Truman Library, Acheson Papers box 67, Memo of Conversations 1952, folder: January, Pearson to Acheson, 15 Jan. 1952. 75 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Annex: II ‘Atlantic Command’, 60. 76 BNA, CAB 21/3057, Minutes of British and US Chiefs of Staff Meeting 6 Jan. 1952. 77 BNA FO 371/97592, record meeting at British Embassy Washington, 10 Jan. 1952. 78 D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 596. 79 Dobson, ‘Informally Special?’; A. Danchev, Oliver Franks: Founding Father, (Oxford, 1993), 130. 80 W to My Darling, 20 Jan. 1952, Mary Soames (ed) Speaking for Themselves: the Personal Letters of Winston and Clementine Churchill (London, 1998), 563. 81 BNA, FO 371/91610, Churchill to Eden, 8 Nov. 1951.
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