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Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09608780903339178

1469-3526

Melissa Merritt,

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1References to Kant's works, with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, refer to the volume and page of the German Academy of Sciences edition (Gesammelte Schriften, Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften edition, later the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902–)). References to the Critique of Pure Reason follow the pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. Translations are my own (unless noted otherwise), but I have consulted the commonly used English translations. 2Kant distinguishes three aspects of the higher cognitive faculty: understanding, judgement and reason (A130/B169). Since the higher cognitive faculty as such is said to be spontaneous, I will not be concerned with the details of its further tripartite division. However, for reasons that should become clear, my account will focus on the power of judgement. 3A remark from Kant's lectures on metaphysics makes this explicit: 'The intellectual cognitive faculty rests on spontaneity, or the faculty of determining oneself, for it is independent of sensation' (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29: 881). 4References to Sellars' article refer to paragraph number rather than page number. 5 Science and Metaphysics, Chapter VII (175). Sellars opens the chapter with this remark about an employment of practical reason aimed at epistemic value. Straightaway, however, he notes that he shall not explore the content of the relevant norms (§3, 176). His aim is mostly to consider practical reason above the point of its divide into specifically epistemic ends, on the one hand, or specifically moral ends, on the other. Sellars does this by considering what he refers to as 'categorically reasonable intentions': i.e. intentions that are not relative to any other intention (e.g. in a means–end relationship) that a subject may already have. He considers the species of derived categorically reasonable intentions, before moving on to the crucial species of intrinsic categorically reasonable intentions. In the moral case, this refers to the categorical imperative. Sellars' opening remarks suggest that there could be an intrinsically categorically reasonable intention of an epistemic sort, though again he does not specify what the content of that intention would be (perhaps: I shall seek a system of knowledge). At any rate, the concluding chapter of Science and Metaphysics suggests that the functionalist response to Sellars might miss the overall spirit of his endeavour, at least in so far as it overlooks Sellars' preoccupation with these normative themes. My own work here takes up the issue of Kant's interest in an exercise of practical reason aimed at epistemic value, to which Sellars here points; I am, however, more closely focused on exegesis than Sellars. 6See, for example, Patricia Kitcher (especially 266, n21). Kitcher maintains that the only conception of spontaneity that Kant can coherently invoke is the 'relative spontaneity' that Sellars attributes to the 'automaton spirituale' (253 n5; see also 122). Cf. Andrew Brook, a functionalist commentator who takes more notice of Sellars' suggestions regarding the practical import of spontaneity (13, 288, and passim). 7Henry Allison notes that Sellars 'take[s] the conception of spontaneity seriously' (183 n.1), even as he sees Sellars as the natural father of subsequent functionalist interpretations of Kant (92). See also Pippin (especially 52). 8Or, as Allison says in another paper: '[J]ust as we can act only under the idea of freedom, so we can think only under the idea of spontaneity' (103). 9Pippin's Idealism as Modernism is anchored in his response to the functionalist interpretation of Kant's appeal to the spontaneity of the mind. For Pippin, 'the modern enterprise' is linked to 'an essentially practical goal' with robust political implications. Kant gestures towards such a goal in his essay on enlightenment; in Pippin's words, it is the cultivation of the 'free self-determination, agency, and spontaneity' of society at large – a goal developed further through the Hegelian idea of 'a necessarily collective agency' (8). The source of it all, Pippin recognizes, is Kant's account of the spontaneity of the mind – and most especially its normative significance. Hence Pippin begins with an attack on the functionalist interpretation of Patricia Kitcher, as it fails to give due acknowledgement of that normativity. Naturally, Pippin also underscores the Hegelian criticism regarding the ultimate incoherence of the Kantian division between the receptivity and the spontaneity of the mind. In Pippin's view, Kant's dualism compromises his capacity to appreciate fully the crucial normativity of spontaneity (11). It lies outside of the scope of this paper to adjudicate this classic Hegelian criticism, since it cannot even be brought into view without a close and sustained reading of the Transcendental Deduction also on the table – and that is not my project here. 10See Jäsche Logic§95 (9: 139) and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Preface (4: 467–8). 11In fact, Kant singles out mathematical cognition as the one sort of rational cognition that does not run the risk of dogmatism. This is because mathematics is cognition from the construction of concepts, whereas other modes of rational cognition are merely knowledge from concepts (aus Begriffen, A837/B865). This means that, in the case of mathematics, there is no real distinction to be drawn between mathematics as 'rational cognition' and mathematics as 'historical cognition' (A837/B865). Therefore, mathematics does not tend to produce slavish novices. The Euclidean being considered here is truly beyond the pale – a scarcely intelligible figure. 12In science, there is a continuum from the most slavish imitator to the most original and creative minds; but 'genius' (and by this Kant means exclusively artistic genius) is something altogether different, and this has to do with the fact that the insight of the greatest artists is something that cannot be taught. The work of a Newton can be taught – i.e. it can be made clear how one proceeds from 'the first elements of geometry up to his great and profound discoveries' (5: 309). The work of a Homer cannot – at least in the sense that it cannot be explained 'how his ideas, rich in fantasy and yet also in thought arise and come together in his head, since he himself does not know and thus also cannot teach it to anyone else' (5: 309). Kant's way of putting genius beyond the pale in this way may leave him with rather little to say, really, about originality in the arts – but that is another matter that cannot be entered into here. 13Locke is vivid on this point: 'In the Sciences, every one has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreads; which however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock, who gathers them. Such borrowed Wealth, like Fairy-money, though it were Gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes to use' (I.iv.23, 101). 14 Metaphysics of Morals (6: 385–7, 391–2, and 444–6) and Groundwork (4: 422–3). 15Duties of virtue are conceived under the general rubric of the duty to make oneself 'worthy of the humanity' that dwells in one (Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 387 and 392). Moral virtue overcomes 'natural inclinations [Naturneigungen]' (6: 394). Neigung, in Kant's usage, consistently refers to sensuous inclinations; this contrasts his use of Hang, which refers more broadly, and neutrally, to dispositions. Enlightenment, for instance, is a Hang– toward the active, rather than passive, use of one's reason – not a Neigung (8: 41). 16 It is so comfortable to be a minor. If I have a book that has understanding for me, a spiritual adviser [Seelsorger] who has conscience for me, a doctor who decides upon a regiment for me, and so on, then I need not trouble myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay; others will gladly undertake the irksome business for me. (8: 35) 17On Kant's conception of virtue, and especially concerning this point, I have been helped by Engstrom, 'The Inner Freedom of Virtue' (292–3). 18I point here to a remark from earlier in the Critique of Judgment (5: 197n.), and very similar remarks are made in the first Critique as well. 19In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that the three maxims together characterize the thinking of 'broad minded' individual, who 'can set himself apart from the subjective, private conditions of judgment, between which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects upon his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of another)' (5: 295). 20Likewise, enlightenment admits of degree. This, at any rate, would follow from the point that I have argued here: namely that enlightenment is a virtue. Virtue is an ideal that finds no perfect realization (see, for example, 6: 409); it follows, for Kant, that virtue admits of degree. In a similar vein, O'Neill stresses that enlightenment 'is a process', not an all-or-nothing affair (37). 21For a more detailed account of the public use of reason, see O'Neill, who stresses that the three maxims of common human understanding are maxims of communication, and sees the categorical imperative as something that 'both emerges from and disciplines human communication' (47); see also Deligiorgi (§II, 148–55). 22In the Critique of Judgment, Kant remarks that superstition – prejudice 'in sensu eminenti'– leads to 'blindness' and 'even demands it as an obligation [Obliegenheit]' (5: 294). In the Jäsche Logic, Kant remarks of 'old and rooted prejudices' that they are 'difficult to battle, because they justify themselves and are at the same time their own judges' (9: 81). 23It is possible that a negative version of this claim would be sufficient: i.e. that objective grounds cannot be in principle incommunicable. At any rate, Kant's account of objective grounds of judging is based on his presentation of the 'principles of the pure understanding'. My concern in this paper is not aimed directly at that fundamental epistemology, but rather, at the practical framework of Kant's account of sound understanding, or judgement. 24In contrast to custom and inclination, imitation would seem to involve deliberate activity. This may explain why Kant holds that prejudices of imitation are especially hard to uproot: they do a better job of mimicking genuine thought. In the Jäsche Logic, Kant suggests as much by remarking that prejudices of imitation are 'inclination toward passive use of reason, or toward the mechanism of reason rather than toward its spontaneity under laws' (9: 76). I thank Bridget Clarke for helping me to appreciate this point. 25In the Critique of Judgment, Kant notes that we are less prone to reflective failure in matters of gustatory taste: we almost never presume that our taking things to be a certain way is anything other than idiosyncratic, even though there may in fact be widespread agreement (5: 214). 26Locke, Essay I.iv.23–5 (and especially §25) (100–3). In reply to Locke, Leibniz grants that philosophers often 'maintain their prejudices under the name of innate principles', but suggests that Locke may be too quick to grab the mantle of enlightenment for empiricism (74–5). 27The fact that Kant complains about Locke and Leibniz in one breath (A271/B327) suggests, at least, that Kant is thinking of their debate as presented in the New Essays. Although my remark here about the general upshot of the Amphiboly is meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive, it should not be controversial to suggest that Kant takes critical philosophy to meet – or at least acknowledge – the demands of enlightenment in a way that no prior philosophical system managed to do. 28I shall not, by any means, be offering a full account of the polemic against Leibniz in the Amphiboly; my concern here is solely to clarify the terms 'reflection' and 'transcendental reflection'. 29This is a point that Allison overlooks in his account of spontaneity. Allison correctly notes that cognition is not a matter of simply 'being in the appropriate cognitive state', but rather requires 'conceptual recognition or taking reasons as reasons' (64) – this he sees as 'essentially connected with the spontaneity of the understanding' (102). The problem comes in Allison's account of the matter: if the understanding is to take its reasons as reasons and, therefore, as justifying its beliefs, it must connect them with these beliefs in a unitary consciousness in a judgment in accordance with some rule or principle of synthesis, which functions as an 'inference ticket'.(102) In this account, one would be grasping reasons as reasons in the darkest 'private' sphere as long as that sphere was marked out by a coherent inferential scheme: one can determine what may count as a reason for what without thinking for oneself in the way that Kant celebrates in his account of enlightenment. Even the young Wolffian, our stock character representing imitative thinking, still takes reasons as reasons – by Allison's lights – when he engages in his Wolffian catechism. 30This point is made clearly at the outset of the second section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (4: 407), and figures throughout the many works of Kant's moral philosophy (see, e.g., Critique of Practical Reason 5: 28–30; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6: 21–2, 31, 41). 31See, for example, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (4: 397ff.). 32This point about the impossibility of silencing the Delphic command can be appreciated also from another angle, through Kant's account of conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals (6: 401, 430 and 437ff.). 33For example, for Locke, and the empiricist tradition stemming from him, 'reflection' refers an introspective awareness of the mind's own 'Operations'; this self-awareness of the mind is modelled sense perception, and accordingly dubbed 'internal Sense' (Essay II.i.4; 105). 34Smit suggests that the Critique engages in transcendental reflection – although he does not go so far as to claim that transcendental reflection is the method. Smit aims to set up a parallel between pure general logic and critical philosophy: they are in the business of making explicit the fundamental principles of thought and cognition, respectively. Each of these enterprises engages in a different mode of reflection: the one in logical reflection, the other in transcendental reflection (210, 216). The task of critical philosophy is to make explicit the 'reflective cognition'– a certain self-understanding of the spontaneous mind – that makes cognition of objects possible in the first place (208). While I do not take issue with this last point as an overarching interpretation of the task of critical philosophy, more careful handling of the notion of transcendental reflection is required. 35Westphal also distinguishes a further species of reflection ('epistemic reflection') in which we draw upon counterfactual reasoning to determine 'just what our most basic cognitive capacities are' (17). The principal difference between this and transcendental reflection, on Westphal's account, seems to be that it draws on counterfactual reasoning. 36A further problem is that Westphal includes too much under the heading of 'transcendental reflection', leaving the term without any distinct meaning. See, for example, his claim that transcendental reflection determines the origins of key cognitive representations in sensibility, understanding, or reason, and the a priori roles and relations of these representations in cognitive judgment, and thus their contributions to the possibility and validity of knowledge, especially of synthetic knowledge a priori. (17) While this may characterize the work of the Critique, it does not helpfully shed light on just what transcendental reflection is, or what it means to suppose that transcendental reflection is the method of the work. 37There is also, of course, the judgment of reflection, which is the topic of the Critique of Judgment: the judgement of reflection admits of 'aesthetic' and 'logical' species – i.e. the judgement of taste, and the teleological judgement. However, reflection as Kant discusses it in the texts that we have been looking at so far is pointedly distinguished from judgement. Therefore, we should not conflate 'reflection' and 'the judgment of reflection'. An account of the relation between reflection and the judgment of reflection lies outside of the scope of this paper. 38Longuenesse notes that she is offering an account of logical reflection, not transcendental reflection. She is specifically concerned with what she refers to as 'logical comparison'– a term she uses interchangeably with 'logical reflection'–'in the broad sense' (130). The 'narrow' sense of logical reflection, she remarks, is an 'analytic' comparison of concepts that is 'performed in the understanding alone'; the 'broad' sense of logical reflection, which is the topic of her account, is 'a comparison performed in the understanding subject to sensible conditions' (127, n58). If the general trajectory of Longuenesse's interpretation is sound, then it is logical reflection that is at issue in the formation of concepts. Her aim, I take it, is to account for the mode of reflection proper to the origin of the categories (i.e. to explain Kant's view that the categories are not innate, but rather 'originally acquired'). 39This species may then divide into transcendental and non-transcendental subspecies: transcendental reflection for when a-priori metaphysics are at issue, and non-transcendental reflection when a-posteriori claims are at issue. 40Longuenesse suggests predecessors in the Arnauld and Nicole's Port-Royal Logic and Locke's Essay (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 112). 41Kant uses the term Reflexion here, glossing it with Überlegung (9:94); for more evidence that Kant uses the Latinate and German terms interchangeably, see A261/B316. 42I do not mean to suggest that the three maxims exhaust the demands of the practice of judgement, but I do take it that they help us zero in on Kant's idea that reflection is the fundamental demand, or requirement, of the practice of judgement. What I have argued for here should provide a starting point for a more developed account that would examine the distinct realms of theoretical and practical judging: for in both contexts, Kant worries about prejudice and underscores the requirement of reflection. In the context of such an expanded account, the role of regulative ideals of reason would be addressed. Further development would also need to account for the systematic position of the judgment of reflection (which, as I noted above, should not be confused with reflection) and its implications for the central point that reflection is the fundamental demand of the practice of judgement. 43Moreover, it can seem that Kant's invocation of spontaneity threatens the viability of the critical project itself. For what can it mean for a spontaneous reason to engage in the project of self-knowledge (Axi, Bxxxv, A849/B877) that the Critique is supposed to be? If theoretical cognition is limited to objects of possible experience, and a spontaneous reason is not an object of possible experience (A556/B584), then how is the critical project coherent? In reply to this famous 'metacritical' question, Rescher suggests that the reasoning involved in carrying out critical philosophy – i.e. accounting for the spontaneity of the mind – is itself practical (176). Compare Burge, who suggests that such reasoning is itself above the theoretical/practical distinction (250, 258). I do not take myself to be entering into this fray here. 44David Bell's reading of this passage dwells in a different way on its reference to 'a gift of nature'. Perhaps thinking of Kant's conception of 'genius' as an inexplicable force of nature (see Critique of Judgment§§46–7), he draws on this passage to associate spontaneity with a 'blind' following of rules (226). He interprets this to mean that at the core of our cognitive capacities lies an 'ability to enjoy a spontaneous, criterialess, disinterested, presumptively universal, non-cognitive, reflective feeling that certain diverse elements of experience as such belong together' (239) – a capacity revealed in Bell's reading of the judgement of taste. I suppose that for Bell there is hope for those lacking 'mother wit'– namely through the cultivation of taste, as this is then the best practice for judgement. Yet this only refreshes my doubt that spontaneity, in any respect, should be characterized as 'blind'. 45An intriguing reference to 'grafting' comes at the very end of the Critique of Practical Reason's Doctrine of Method, where Kant addresses matters of moral pedagogy. There Kant endorses the 'grafting' of good moral dispositions, as long as the individual in question has developed an adequate propensity toward reflection and the sense of moral humility that goes along with that (5: 161). Kant even grants that one may be brought onto 'the track of the morally good in the first place' by exploiting the attractions of personal advantage or alarm at the prospects of disadvantage or injury; 'but as soon as this machinery, these leading strings have had even some effect, the pure moral motive must be brought to bear on the soul' (5: 152). Moreover, throughout the second Critique's Doctrine of Method, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests that imitation may indeed play an important role in moral pedagogy – as when one is 'instructed through an example of virtue or holiness'– so long as this appeal to the exemplary does not degenerate into 'a mechanism of imitation' (5: 283). Close examination of these passages would belong to a more developed account of reflection than I am able to provide within the scope of this paper. 46 Gängelwagen and Leitbänder, both instruments for teaching a child how to walk, are discussed in Kant's lectures on pedagogy (9: 461, 466). The term Gängelwagen is used both in this passage (A134/B173) and in 'What is Enlightenment?' (8: 35). 47I would like to thank Bridget Clarke, Steve Engstrom, Paul Guyer, Paul Hurley, Peter Thielke, Rachel Zuckert and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks are due to Markos Valaris, for much conversation on the issues of this paper, and for comments on the paper at various stages.