Davidson on Value and Objectivity
2007; Wiley; Volume: 61; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01102.x
ISSN1746-8361
Autores Tópico(s)Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
ResumoDialecticaVolume 61, Issue 2 p. 203-217 Davidson on Value and Objectivity Hallvard Lillehammer, Hallvard Lillehammer Faculty of Philosophy, King's College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1ST UK; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Hallvard Lillehammer, Hallvard Lillehammer Faculty of Philosophy, King's College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1ST UK; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 03 August 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01102.xCitations: 3Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract In a series of articles, Donald Davidson has argued that the objectivity of value is entailed by the objectivity of propositional attitude ascriptions. In this paper I explore the scope and limits of Davidson's argument with particular reference to his claim that there would be convergence among the values of enlightened agents who fully understood one another. I argue that Davidson's argument supports the convergence claim only if that claim is restricted to a limited range of comparatively basic values. I show that this restriction of the convergence claim is in tension with Davidson's contention that value judgements are objective in much the same way factual judgements are. References Anscombe, E. 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Blackburn, S. 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 2004, Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gallie, W. B. 19556, 'Essentially Contestable Concepts', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, pp. 167– 198. Hume, D. 1993, Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurley, P. 2002, 'A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-Desire Theory', The Journal of Ethics 6, pp. 1– 20. Hurley, S. 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, D. 1984, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. Lewis, D. 1989, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 63, pp. 113– 137. Lewis, D. 1996, 'Desire as Belief II', Mind 105, pp. 303– 314. Mackie, J. L. 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Mellor, D. H. 2005, ' What Does Subjective Decision Theory Tell Us?' in: H. Lillehammer and D. H. Mellor, eds, Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137– 148. Myers, R. H. 2004, 'Finding Value in Davidson', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, 107– 136. Pettit, P. 2002, Rules, Reasons, and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. 1999, Engaging Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scanlon, T. M. 1998, What We Owe Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Citing Literature Volume61, Issue2June 2007Pages 203-217 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Referência(s)