Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Italy's foreign policy toward China: missed opportunities and new chances

2008; Routledge; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13545710701816794

1469-9583

Valter Maria Coralluzzo,

Global Political and Social Dynamics

Abstract This essay provides an account of the erratic and troubled history of the relations between Italy and the People's Republic of China since the 1950s. After reaching their highest point in the two years immediately following the Tiananmen events – when Italy, more than any other Western country, worked to break China's international isolation – they have considerably frozen for a long time. The reason has to be found not only in the crisis that, since 1992, has overcome the Italian political system, but even more so in the structural limits of Italy's economic foreign policy and in the lack of a coherent strategy aimed at promoting Italian goods in world markets that provide huge opportunities – opportunities mostly neglected by the political-economic Italian establishment. The Berlusconi government replaced this negligence with fear-mongering behavior and recurring and outspoken protectionist remarks of various centre-right leaders, who feared the potential damage caused by China's increased competitiveness (which represented, in their opinion, an unfair trade practice) to the national industry. Though too recent to say if it will bear fruit, Prodi has made a desperate attempt for Italy to make up lost ground by leading to China what has been emphatically defined ‘the greatest institutional and business mission ever organized by Italy’ just a few months after his comeback to Palazzo Chigi. Keywords: ChinaItalian foreign policyUNembargodumpingprotectionismBerlusconiProdi Notes Calamandrei (Citation1956: 71) wrote that ‘[The Italian government], we must recognize, has so far been the most obedient implementer – really, a reliable A-student – of American policy toward China: Italy has been the most reluctant country, and the slowest, at resuming relations (let's not even say diplomatic relations, an idea that seems far too heroic ever to occur to an Italian statesman, let's just talk about trade relations or even cultural relations). Every other country in Europe, even those committed to membership in NATO, has been freer and more courageous than Italy. The Italian trade delegation, if it ever goes to China, will certainly be the last to go, bringing up the rear behind every other country in Europe.’ Among the domestic supporters of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China were, of course, the socialist and communist opposition parties, out of a sense of ideological solidarity, but also a substantial share of the manufacturing sector, given the strong attraction of an immense nation with whom they could establish profitable trade relations, as well as a great many intellectuals, given the allure of an age-old civilization to which Italy, the homeland of Marco Polo and Matteo Ricci, felt bound by a sort of elective affinity. Particularly worthy of mention were the visits to China of the Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Medici (January 1973) and Arnaldo Forlani (June 1977), the visits to Italy of the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Huang Hua (October 1978) and of the Premier and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Hua Guofeng (November 1979), as well as the trip to China made by Sandro Pertini, President of the Italian Republic, accompanied by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo (September 1980). Most of these sanctions, with the exception of the embargo on arms sales, were revoked by the EC in October 1990, while economic cooperation agreements resumed in January 1992. De Michelis wrote: ‘In the context of the European Community, Italy thus attained a leading position, which attracted the attention of the Chinese. We managed to move Europe past the strategy of closure, which was of no use to us or to them. Indeed, the British, though they were in complete agreement on the substantial issues, were dragging their feet because of Hong Kong; the French were uncertain; the Danes and the Dutch were interested only in human rights issues, and would not give an inch; the Germans were close to our position, but, as Genscher customarily did, they were waiting to see what the Americans wanted’ (De Michelis Citation1995: 209). We should, in any case, second the observations made by Maria Weber that ‘Italian corporations usually undervalue the strategic value of their presence in China, because they think it is too far away’. Moreover, ‘entry into the Asian market is [often] triggered by contingent opportunities and is facilitated by chance acquaintances (trade fairs, conferences). As a result, the entrepreneurial approach is superficial and short-lived: the strategies tend to be reactive and the relations are often based solely on sales. What is lacking, in contrast, are the financial and human resources for establishing long-term strategies and sinking roots onsite, in the territory’ (Weber Citation2005a: 19 – 20). ‘Ignoring Chinese politics in favor of Chinese business certainly made it easier to develop bilateral relations; but it also exposed those relations, as was the case in 1989 – 90, to a substantial element of fragility. Whatever should happen in China, the Italian political world will almost by definition be taken by surprise’ (Dass[ugrave] and Rhi-Sausi Citation1995: 194). For a critical review of the foreign policy of Berlusconi's second administration, see in particular Croci (Citation2005), Brighi (Citation2006b), and Coralluzzo (Citation2006). For a brief reconstruction of the debate that developed in Italy concerning the China question beween supporters of ‘market mechanisms’ and ‘Neo-Colbertists’, see Vitaletti and Fiocca (Citation2003). Italy had in practical terms been previously excluded from that miracle (or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Italy had excluded itself), and was down at fifteenth place in the ranking of countries exporting to China, with a share that had even declined between 1998 and 2004, dropping from 1.64 to 1.16 per cent of total Chinese imports (Cavalera Citation2004a). Member states of the EU continued to be divided on this point, because certain countries, such as Great Britain, who were more sensitive than other European nations to the concerns of the US administration over the security of Taiwan, or the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, who harbored serious reservations concerning the guarantees provided by China that it would respect human rights, had grave misgivings about the advisability of proceeding quickly to abolish the embargo, even though France and Germany had already come out in favor of doing so. The nine product categories were: sweaters, men's trousers, socks and stockings, brassieres, undershirts, women's overcoats, t-shirts, linen fabrics and yarns and threads. The disagreement came to an end on 10 June 2005 with an agreement between the European Commission and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Tade, Bo Xilai. According to that agreement, the government of Beijing agreed to restrict until the end of 2007 Chinese exports of the nine categories of textile products under investigation within specific levels of growth (between 8 and 12.5 per cent annually). For a brief reconstruction of the entire affair, see Weber (Citation2005a: 14 – 18). For a brief review of Berlusconi's most spectacular gaffes and wisecracks, see Coralluzzo (Citation2006: 60 – 2). In this connection, the establishment of the Mandarin Fund was significant. This equity fund was created by the Istituto Bancario San Paolo together with the China Development Bank and the Chinese Import – Export Bank, with the support of the governments of Rome and Beijing.