Artigo Revisado por pares

The firm rules: Multinational corporations, policy space and neoliberalism

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 28; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436590701507594

ISSN

1360-2241

Autores

Paul Alexander Haslam,

Tópico(s)

Labor Movements and Unions

Resumo

Abstract Abstract This paper examines the constraints on state policy autonomy engendered by globalisation. It evaluates the three major competing hypotheses on the decline in the state's inability to bargain with multinational corporations for the purpose of promoting economic development in light of two case studies of state – firm bargaining. The case studies are drawn from the mining sectors in Argentina and Chile in the late 1990s. Notes The doctoral research from which this article was drawn was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Organization of American States, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship programme and Queen's University. I would like to thank Catherine Conaghan for her comments on earlier versions of this paper. 1 T Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974; and R Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises, New York: Basic Books, 1971. 2 JM Stopford & S Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; and S Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p 96. 3 H Feigenbaum, J Henig & C Hamnett, Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p 6; HE Schamis, Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Latin America and Europe, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002, p 6; N Spulber, Redefining the State: Privatization and Welfare Reforms in Industrial and Transnational Economies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p 75; and SK Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, p 257. 4 P Beamish, Multinational Joint Ventures in Developing Countries, Routledge: London, 1988, pp 30 – 38; T Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp 18 – 124; J Dunning, Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy, Wokingham: Addison-Wesley, 1993, p 553; G Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp 151 – 153; R Grosse, Multinationals in Latin America, London: Routledge, 1989, p 46; and S Kobrin, 'Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries, International Organization, 41 (4), 1987, p 613. 5 C Kennedy, Jr, 'Relations between transnational corporations and government of host countries: a look to the future', Transnational Corporations, 1 (1), 1992, pp 68 – 69; M Minor, 'The demise of expropriation as an instrument of ldc policy, 1980 – 1992', Journal of International Business Studies, 25 (1), 1994, p 179; E Safarian, 'Host country policies towards inward foreign direct investment in the 1950s and 1990s', Transnational Corporations, 8 (2), 1999, p 93; and L Wells, Jr, 'God and fair competition: does the foreign direct investor face still other risks in emerging markets?', in TH Moran (ed), Managing International Political Risk, Malden, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1998, pp 15 – 43. 6 unctad, World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development, Geneva: United Nations, 2000, p 6. 7 R Yin, 'The case study crisis: some answers', Administrative Science Quarterly, 26 (1), 1981, p 61. 8 See G King, R. Keohane & S Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; and A Lijphart, 'Comparative politics and the comparative method', American Political Science Review, 65 (3), 1971, p 683. 9 J Dunning, 'Governments and multinational enterprises: from confrontation to cooperation?', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20 (2), 1991, pp 225 – 244; and Y Luo, 'Toward a cooperative view of mnc – host government relations: building blocks and performance indicators', Journal of International Business Studies, 32 (3), 2001, pp 402 – 403. 10 Stopford & Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms, pp 24 – 25. 11 T Moran, 'How does fdi affect host country development? Using industry case studies to make reliable generalizations', in T Moran, E Graham & M Bloomström (eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and Center for Global Development, 2005, p 286. 12 Safarian, 'Host country policies', p 108. 13 Ibid, p 106. 14 P Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State, London: Sage Publications, 1990, p 230. 15 R Ramamurti, 'The obsolescing "bargaining model"? mnc – host developing country relations revisited', Journal of International Business Studies, 32 (1), 2001, pp 29 – 31, 34. 16 D DeLuca, 'Trade-related investment measures: US efforts to shape a pro-business world legal system', Journal of International Affairs, 48 (1), Summer 1994, pp 257 – 271; and P Haslam, 'BITing back: bilateral investment treaties and the struggle to define an investment regime for the Americas', Policy & Society, 23 (3), 2004, pp 91 – 112. See also R Ramamurti, 'Global regulatory convergence: the case of intellectual property rights', in Robert Grosse (ed), International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 348. 17 unctad, World Investment Report 2003: fdi Policies for Development—National and International Perspectives, Geneva: United Nations, 2003, pp 89, 208 – 218. 18 A Cosby et al, Investment and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements, Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2005, pp 5, 13. 19 M Halward-Driemeier, Do bilateral Investment Treaties Attract fdi? Only a Bit … and They Could Bite, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3121, Washington DC: World Bank, 2003, pp 3, 22 – 23; and unctad, International Investment Agreements: Flexibility for Development, unctad[Pink] Series on issues in international investment agreements, Geneva: United Nations, 2000, p 1. See also Kevin P Gallagher (ed), Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy Space in the wto and ifis, London: Zed Books, 2005. 20 Moran, 'The changing nature of political risk', pp 71 – 73. 21 Ibid, p 73. 22 R Cox, 'Global perestroika', in R Miliband & L Panitch (eds), The Socialist Register 1992, London: Merlin Press, 1992, pp 26 – 43; and P Hirst & G Thompson, Globalization in Question, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp 60 – 69. 23 Panorama Minero (Buenos Aires), February 1998, pp 13 – 72. 24 Interviews, Buenos Aires, 10 and 19 August 1998. 25 Interview, Buenos Aires, 20 August 1998. 26 Panorama Minero, February 1998, pp 23 – 24. 27 Interview, Buenos Aires, 19 August 1998. 28 Cámara Argentina de Empresarios Mineros, 'Las regalías mineras en la provincia de Catamarca', unpublished working paper, Cámara Argentina de Empresarios Mineros, Buenos Aires, February 1998. 29 Interviews, Catamarca, 12 February 1999. 30 Interviews, Buenos Aires, 10 and 19 August 1998. 31 Interviews, Buenos Aires, 10, 14 and 19 August 1998; 9 September 1998. 32 Interview, Buenos Aires, 9 September 1998. 33 L Suárez Samper, 'Una nueva ley para las regalías mineras', La Nación Online, 8 April 1998, at http://www.lanacion.com.ar, accessed 1 August 2002. 34 F Gutiérrez, 'El conflicto por regalías, en un callejón sin salida', La Nación Online, 26 March 2000, at http://www.lanacion.com.ar, accessed 1 August 2002; and A Rebossio, 'Cortocircuito entre Catamara y la firma Minera Alumbrera', La Nación Online, 23 August 2000, at http://www.lanacion.com.ar, accessed 1 August 2002. 35 Minería Chilena, Chilean Mining Compendium 1998, Santiago: Editec Ltda, 1998, p 47. 36 Minería Chilena, October 1997, p 11. 37 Minería Chilena, November 1997, p 74. 38 H Hochschild, 'Sonami forsees a difficult scenario for 1998', in Directorio Minero de Chile 1998, Santiago: PuntoDiez SA, 1998, p 86. 39 Interview, Santiago, 12 November 1998. 40 Interviews, Santiago, 2 and 25 November 1998; 19 January 1999. 41 Interview, Santiago, 24 November 1998. 42 C Vera, 'Impuesto abortado', Qué Pasa, 10 – 16 February 1998, at http://www.quepasa.cl, accessed 1 August 2002; Vera, 'Caida libre', Qué Pasa, 17 – 23 February 1998, at http://www.quepasa.cl, accessed 1 August 2002; and Vera, 'Rechazo a propuesta Villarzú sobre impuestos', Qué Pasa, 4 February 1998, at http://www.quepasa.cl, accessed 1 August 2002. 43 Interviews, Santiago, 18, 24, 25 and 26 November 1998. 44 K Montalbán, 'Sigue el debate: ¿Nuevos impuestos a la minería?', Minería Chilena, December 1997, p 105. 45 T Flores & C Williamson, 'Contribución de la minería a la recaudación fiscal en el mediano plazo', unpublished working paper, Economics Institute, Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, September 1998, pp 15, 17 – 18. 46 Interview, Santiago, 18 January 1999. 47 Interviews, Santiago, 10 and 12 November 1998. 48 Vera, 'Caida libre', Qué Pasa. 49 A recent attempt to adapt the obsolescing bargain model to include broader political concerns can be seen in L Eden, S Lenway & D Schuler, 'From the obsolescing bargain to the political bargaining model', in Grosse, International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century, pp 253 – 271.

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