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Acknowledging economic realities. The CMEA policy change vis-à-vis the European Community, 1970–3

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13507486.2014.893997

1469-8293

Suvi Kansikas,

Communism, Protests, Social Movements

AbstractIn the early 1970s, the economic consequences of European Community (EC) policies forced the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to devise its trade policy vis-à-vis the outside world. With the implementation of its Common Commercial Policy, the EC was about to change the rules and conduct of its foreign trade. The East–West trade boom that took off in the 1960s had created significant commercial links, and substantial dependencies, across the Iron Curtain. The smaller members of the CMEA began to advocate an opening up towards the EC due to their fears of worsening trade prospects caused by the new EC policies. After reconsideration of its allies' commercial needs, the Soviet leadership was pressured to change its mind in favour of a common approach vis-à-vis the EC. This article follows the debate within the CMEA Executive Committee on the socialist countries' dependency on the Western market and on the advisability of opening up to the global market. It relies on official CMEA documents as well as Soviet and German Democratic Republic (GDR) policy-making documents. This article analyses the process of socialist integration in connection with the simultaneous developments taking place in their Western European counterparts, and thereby fills a gap in the historiography of Europe in the Cold War.Keywords:: CMEAEECCommon Commercial PolicyEast–West trade Notes 1. The EC postponed the implementation of its Common Commercial Policy vis-à-vis the socialist bloc twice: in 1969 and 1972. For further detail, see CitationRomano, “Untying Cold War Knots,” 11–12. 2.CitationMureşan, “Romania's Integration in COMECON,” 44–45. 3.CitationDragomir, “Romania's Participation.” 4. E.g. Berend describes the CMEA as the “weapon of Soviet domination.” CitationBerend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993, 82. 5. E.g., CitationJarząbek, “Die Volksrepublik Polen,” on Polish–Soviet discussions within the Warsaw Pact, and CitationKansikas, “Room to Manoeuvre,” for Soviet discussions with its European allies within the CMEA. 6. The access to Soviet foreign-policy documentation is still quite restricted. The author has relied on materials concerning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) in Moscow as well as policy advice sent to decision-makers by the Soviet Academy think tank, IEMSS (Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System) held in the Archive of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ARAN), Moscow. 7. This article uses materials relating to the Soviet and GDR permanent representations to the CMEA, which consist of internal correspondence and policy-making documents as well as official CMEA documents. The Soviet documents are held in the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) in Moscow; the GDR documents in the Federal Republic of Germany's Federal Archive (SAPMO) in Berlin. 8. Much of the literature on the CMEA describes its efforts at economic integration. See for instance: Citationvan Brabant, Socialist economic integration; CitationKaser, Comecon; CitationMarer, “Prospects for Integration.” 9. Both Randall Stone and David Stone have used CMEA archival materials, but they analyse the CMEA as if it were isolated from the international economy. CitationStone, “CMEA's International Investment Bank;” CitationStone, Satellites and Commissars. Lee Metcalf has noted the effect of Western and EC influence on the CMEA's reform efforts at the beginning of the 1960s. She does not use CMEA primary sources or address the new integration phase in the early 1970s: CitationMetcalf, The Council. The EC–CMEA relations were studied from the Western/EC perspective already during the Cold War by authors such as CitationCutler, “Harmonizing EEC-CMEA Relations,” or CitationGrzybowski, “The Council.” Most recent studies on the Soviet views on the EC neglect to include an analysis of intra-CMEA relations: CitationMueller, “Recognition in Return for Détente?”; CitationRey, “La retour à l'Europe?” The situation for the EC side is improving as new archival-based literature on EC relations with and policy-making towards the CMEA and its members is emerging. See for instance CitationYamamoto, “Détente or Integration?” and Romano, “Untying Cold War Knots.”10.CitationRomano, From Détente in Europe.11.CitationZubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente.”12. This was also the case during the CSCE process: on Soviet efforts at closing ranks see CitationRey, “The USSR and the Helsinki Process;” CitationSavranskaya, “Unintended Consequences;” CitationJarząbek, Hope and Reality.13. SAPMO, DY 30/3445, Information über die 38. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des RGW (Moskau, 23.-27.1.1969). Weiss to SED Politburo, Berlin, 11.3.1969.14. Ibid.15. Ibid.16. Dragomir, “Romania's Participation.”17.CitationRomano, “EPC Main Task,” 123–6.18. SAPMO, DY 30/3455, Information über die 50. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des Rates für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (Moskau, 15.-18.12.1970). Weiss to SED Politburo, Berlin. No date given.19. The CMEA began a new phase of integration in 1969 with negotiations of the Comprehensive Programme, which was adopted at the summer of 1971. For more details, see for instance, Citationvan Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration.20. As early as 1968, Prime Minister Jenö Fock had stated that Hungary was willing to negotiate with the institutions of the EC if it was needed to safeguard the economic interests of the country. HR (Hungarian Unit), Hungary's New Economic Mechanism: Problems and Progress. Part II: Foreign Trade. 6.11.1969. OSA/Radio Free Europe Background Reports, http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:e8a4ef5b-a8c9-4d7c-84d4-58f372f5ea58 (Accessed 11 December 2013).21. SAPMO, DY 30/3455. All translations by the author, unless otherwise noted.22. SAPMO, DY 30/3457, Information über die 52. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des Rates für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (Moskau, 27.-29.4.1971). Weiss to SED Politburo, Berlin, 6.5.1971.23. Ibid.24. ARAN, f. 1933, o. 1, d. 67, ll. 10–21. Materiali k XXV Sessii SEV. Oleg Bogomolov (IEMSS) to Yuri Firsov (USSR Council of Ministers), 16.7.1971.25. Ibid.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. SAPMO, DC 20/12410, Laslo Papp to CMEA vice-Secretary Angelov-Todorov, 12.10.1971. Appendix: Die Auswirkungen des geplanten Ausbaus der EWG auf den Aussenhandel den Mitgliedsländern der RGW.29. Ibid.30. Ibid.31. SAPMO, DY 30/3459, Information über die 55. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des Rates für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (Moskau 12.-14.10.1971). Weiss to SED Politburo, Berlin 20.10.1971.32. Ibid.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. SAPMO, DY 30/3460, Direktive für das Auftreten des Vertreters der DDR im RGW auf der 56. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des RGW. GDR Council of Ministers to Gerhard Weiss, Berlin, 12.1.1972.36. RGANI, f. 2, o. 3, d. 232, ll. 1–7. Martovskii plenum, Stenograficheskii otchet plenuma. O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii SSSR i vneshnepoliticheskoi deiatel‘nosti KPSS. L.I. Brezhnev, 22.3.1971.37. Kansikas, “Room to Manoeuvre,” 202–3.38. Report to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Council of Ministers on the Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Prague, January 25–26, 1972. www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng = en&id = 18106&navinfo = 14465 (Accessed on 11 December 2013).39. SAPMO, DY 30/3461, Information über die 57. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des RGW (Moskau, 18.-20.4.1972). Weiss to SED Politburo, Berlin, 26.4.1972.40. Ibid., Appendix: Kurzfassung der Ausführungen des Vertreters der UdSSR im Exekutivkomitee, Genossen Lesechko, auf der 57. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des RGW zu Fragen der Beziehungen zwischen RGW und EWG.41. Ibid.42. Ibid., Appendix: Kurzfassungen der offiziellen Standpunkte der VRB, UVR, VRP, SRR und CSSR zu Fragen der Beziehungen zwischen RGW und EWG.43. SAPMO, DC 20/16863, Gerhard Weiss to Erich Honecker, Berlin, 19.5.1972. Appendix: Grundlinie des weiteren Vorgehens der RGW-Länder gegenüber der EWG, 18.5.1972.44. SAPMO, DY 30/13859, M.A. Lesechko (CMEA) to Erich Honecker (SED Politburo), 31.5.1972. Appendix: Überlegungen der VRB, der UVR, der DDR, der MVR, der VRP, der UdSSR und der CSSR zur Frage des Verhältnisses des Rates für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. Ibid., Appendix: Überlegungen der Rumänischen Seite zur Herstellung von Kontakten zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Gemeinsamer Markt).48. Ibid.49. Schaefer Henry, First year of socialist integration. 11.8.1972, OSA/Radio Free Europe Background Reports. http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:f491558d-7707-4e7e-b661-c538852efdac (Accessed 11 December 2013). The report concluded that the political highlight of the Session had been the admission of Cuba.50. ARAN, f. 1933, o. 1, d. 91, ll. 53–67. O pozitsii i taktike stran SEV po otnosheniu k Evropeiskomu Ekonomicheskomu Soobshchestvu. O.T. Bogomolov (IEMSS) to M.A. Lesechko (Soviet permanent CMEA representation), 5.9.1972.51. Ibid.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. ARAN, f. 1933, o. 1, d. 91, ll. 142–156. Ob opredelenii dal'neishei politiki stran-chlenov SEV po otnosheniu k ‘Evropeiskomu Ekonomicheskomy Soobshestvy’. O.T. Bogomolov (IEMSS) to Iu.A. Pekshev (CPSU CC), 17.10.1972.55. Ibid.56. Ibid.57. See Romano, “Untying Cold War Knots.”58.CitationBrežnev, Puheita [Speeches], 206–7.59. RGANI, f. 2, o. 3, d. 292, ll. 7–71. Aprel'skii Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS-a. (1973). O mezhdunarodnom deiatel'nosti TsK KPSS po osushchesvleniu reshenii XXIV s'ezda partii. L.I. Brezhnev.60. Ibid.61. Ibid.62. Ibid.63. The pro-détente factions in the top Soviet hierarchy were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MID) and Foreign Trade (MVT) and institutes of the Academy of Sciences, whereas the CPSU International Department and the KGB were opponents to the easing of tensions and influences coming from the West. Rey, “USSR and the Helsinki Process,” 71–5.64. SAPMO, DC 20/12501, Beschluss zur Information über die XXVII. Tagung des RGW vom 13. Juni 1973. Appendix: Information über die XXVII. Tagung des RGW. GDR Council of Ministers 7.6.1973.65. Romania had for instance in 1972 applied to be included in the EC Generalised Scheme of Preferences – just one step short of establishing official relations. Romano, “Untying Cold War Knots,” 10–11.66. The meeting is referred to in most studies on CMEA–EC relations. See for instance a recent account: Mueller, “Recognition in Return for Détente.” For a CMEA account on the results of the meeting: RGAE, f. 302, o. 2, d. 1160, ll. 15–19. Zapisi besedi sekretaria SEV Faddeeva N.V. s Ispolnitel'nim Sekretarem EEK OON Stanovnikom Ia. 1.4.1974. A. Popov, Moscow, 9.4.1974.Additional informationNotes on contributorsSuvi KansikasSuvi Kansikas received her doctorate at the University of Helsinki in 2012. Her forthcoming book is entitled Socialist Countries Face the European Community. Soviet-bloc Controversies over East-West Trade (Peter Lang). She is a postdoctoral researcher at the Finnish Centre of Excellence on Russian Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki.