What Else Justification Could Be 1
2010; Wiley; Volume: 44; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.x
ISSN1468-0068
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoNoûsVolume 44, Issue 1 p. 10-31 What Else Justification Could Be† Martin Smith, Martin Smith University of GlasgowSearch for more papers by this author Martin Smith, Martin Smith University of GlasgowSearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 February 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.xCitations: 97Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Adler, J. 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