Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950?January 1951
1986; Oxford University Press; Volume: 10; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-7709.1986.tb00449.x
ISSN1467-7709
Autores Tópico(s)Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
ResumoAfter the end of the Second World War, Britain's position as a power of only middle rank became apparent. Its retreat from empire in India and from spheres of influence in the Middle East illustrated this weakened role in world politics, as did its dependence on American funds for its economic rehabilitation, and its desire for a strong U.S. military presence in Europe to guarantee security. When North Korea attacked South Korea in June 1950, the British government saw this as a test of the vitality of the new Atlantic alliance and of America's willingness to respond to Communist aggression. Many within the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee agreed that their best course was to support U.S. policy initiatives during the conflict, and, to this end, Britain placed a brigade plus two infantry battalions, together with certain naval forces, at the UN Command's disposal. Fearing to challenge U.S. decisions outright, and because it "might be blamed for subsequent military difficulties,"1 Britain took no sustained action to restrain American troops from crossing the 38th parallel. London also refrained from pressing vigorously for the establishment of a demilitarized zone in northern Korea, which it favored as a way of reassuring the Chinese that U.S.-UN intentions were "peaceful."
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