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Deely, Aquinas, and Poinsot: How the intentionality of inner sense transcends the limits of empiricism

2010; De Gruyter; Volume: 2010; Issue: 178 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1515/semi.2010.009

1613-3692

Anthony J. Lisska,

Classical Philosophy and Thought

In Four ages of understanding, John Deely considers (among many things) issues in the philosophy of mind rooted in the Aristotelian tradition. One specific item concerns perceiving the individual as an individual that is not reducible to an empiricist “bundle of sensations.” Deely, in discussing Poinsot on inner sense and perception through an intentio insensata, suggests that most modern and contemporary philosophers neglected Poinsot's insights, a partial exception being Thomas Reid. The present essay offers an explicatio textus of Aquinas's texts shedding light on the role the vis cogitativa with its intentio insensata plays in transcending classical empiricism. Deely's analysis brings to the forefront this philosophical discussion. Nonetheless, Deely's analysis omits discussing how late twentieth century analytic philosophy of mind has ventured nearer this set of epistemological concerns than his book appears to indicate. This essay covers that omission.