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Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Regime Survival after Nazarbayev and Karimov

2014; Routledge; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/19448953.2014.986381

1944-8961

Thomas Ambrosio,

Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

AbstractNursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan have ruled their respective countries since before the Soviet Union dissolved, dominating their political systems and centring power around themselves and their families. However, both are in their 70s and questions of who will succeed them and whether their departure will result in political instability have become increasingly pressing in both societies. Rooted in the literature on authoritarian leadership succession, as well as reviewing the cases of leadership changes in the former Soviet Union to date, this article examines the conditions within these countries which would make smooth transition more or less likely. This has implications for authoritarian leadership succession elsewhere in the region and more broadly. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes [1] Gordon Tullock, Autocracy, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1987, p. 151. [2] Andrew Nathan, 'Authoritarian resilience', Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 2003, pp. 6–17 (p. 7). [3] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, 'State institutions and the survival of dictatorships', Journal of International Affairs, 65(1), 2011, pp. 1–13 (p. 6). [4] Barbara Geddes, 'What do we know about democratization after twenty years?', Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 1999, pp. 115–144 (p. 121). [5] Since none of the former Soviet regimes fit into the third category, this section will only cover the first two. Moreover, leadership succession in military systems has received scant attention. One could surmise that the chances for a successful leadership transition in these systems are mixed at best. While militaries have established rules for promotions in a manner similar to those of single-party systems and may therefore be well positioned to regularize advancement and succession, these systems place the agents of military violence into a central role, which increases their ability to conduct unconstitutional leadership changes. Unconstitutional transitions are far more likely to lead to regime collapse. [6] Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, The Politics of Dictatorship, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2011, pp. 26–31. [7] Donald Share, 'The Franquist regime and the dilemma of succession', The Review of Politics, 48(4), 1986, pp. 549–575. [8] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships, Continuum, New York, 2011, pp. 200–203, 210–211. [9] Lowell Dittmer, 'Leadership change and Chinese political development', The China Quarterly, No. 176, 2003, pp. 903–925; Nathan, op. cit.[10] Benjamin Smith, 'Life of the party', World Politics, 57(3), 2005, pp. 421–451.[11] Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 6.[12] The Soviet leaders between Khrushchev and Gorbachev can be seen as examples of this process. Ryan Kennedy, 'Institutionalization and strength of leaders in authoritarian regimes', paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference in Boston, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 1.[13] Brownlee, op. cit., p. 14.[14] Henry Hale, 'Democracy, autocracy, and revolution in post-Soviet Eurasia', World Politics, 58(1), 2005, pp. 133–165.[15] Stephen Hess, 'Protests, parties, and presidential succession', Problems of Post-Communism, 57(1), January/February 2010, pp. 28–39.[16] Tullock, op. cit., pp. 152–153.[17] Jason Brownlee, 'Hereditary succession in modern autocracies', World Politics, 59(4), 2007, pp. 595–628. Stacher applied Brownlee's argument to Syria in Joshua Stacher, 'Reinterpreting authoritarian power', Middle East Journal, 65(2), 2011, pp. 197–212.[18] Tullock, op. cit., p. 165.[19] Jason Brownlee, 'A new generation of autocracy in Egypt', Brown Journal of World Affairs, 14(1), 2007, pp. 73–85.[20] Michael Hanna, 'The son also rises', World Policy Institute, 26(3), 2009, pp. 103–114.[21] Rodger Govea and John Holm, 'Crisis, violence and political succession in Africa', Third World Quarterly, 19(1), 1998, pp. 129–148.[22] Nikolas Gvosdev, 'No Putinism without Putin', National Interest, 26 September 2011, < http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/no-putinism-without-putin-5935>.[23] Hale, op. cit., pp. 148–149.[24] Slavomir Horak, 'Turkmenistan's succession', Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 10 January 2007, < http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q = node/4377>; Slavomir Horak, 'The elite in post-Soviet and post-Niyazow Turkmenistan', Demokratizatsiya, 20(3), 2012, pp. 371–385.[25] Freedom House, 'Freedom in the world country ratings: 1972–2013', 2012, < http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20and%20Ratings%2C%201973-2013%20%28FINAL%29_0.xls>.[26] Sean Roberts, 'Resolving Kazakhstan's unlikely succession crisis', PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 231, September 2012, p. 1.[27] Isabel Gorst, 'Kazakhstan: succession question looms', Financial Times, 20 July 2010, < http://blogs.ft.com/beyondbrics/2011/07/20/kazakhstan-succession-question-looms/>; 'Unrest in Kazakhstan', The Economist, 31 December 2011, < http://www.economist.com/node/21542223/print>.[28] Farangis Najibullah, 'Who would succeed Kazakh President Nazarbayev', RFE/RL, 22 April 2011, < http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/9502683.html>.[29] 'Kazakhstan's President on succession of power', Tengri News, 5 July 2013, < http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstans-President-on-succession-of-power-20820/>.[30] Sandy Higgs, 'Kazakhstan political reshuffle', Russia Today, 24 September 2012, < http://rt.com/news/kazakhstan-government-reshuffle-masimov-814/>.[31] Anvar Rahmetov, 'Kazakhstan's Presidential elections 2011: Nazarbayev postpones succession', ISPI Analysis, No. 51, May 2011, p. 5.[32] Nicolás de Pedro, 'The Nazarbayev consensus and its limits', CIDOB Notes, 31 May 2011, p. 2.[33] Rahmetov, op. cit., p. 5.[34] Max Bader, 'Hegemonic political parties in post-Soviet Eurasia', Communist & Post-Communist Studies, 44(3), 2011, pp. 189–197 (p. 191).[35] Alex Danilovich, 'Kazakhs, a nation of two identities: politics and revived tradition', Problems of Post-Communism, 57(1), 2010, pp. 51–58 (pp. 55–57).[36] Sebastien Peyrouse, 'The Kazakh neopatrimonial regime', Demokratizatsiya, 20(4), 2012, pp. 345–370.[37] Barbara Junisbai, 'A tale of two Kazakhstans: sources of political cleavage and conflict in the post-Soviet period', Europe–Asia Studies, 62(2), 2010, pp. 235–269 (p. 236).[38] Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and Elite, I. B. Tauris, London, 2005, p. 112.[39] Najibullah, op. cit.[40] Stratfor, 'Kazakhstan: the ruling dynasty's family feud', 4 June 2007, on file with author.[41] Dariga's husband eventually went into exile and made a public break with Nazarbayev, branding him a dictator. Hugh Barnes, 'Kazakhstan's feuding first family', New Statesman, 5 July 2007, < http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2007/07/kazakhstan-aliyev-president>.[42] Joanna Lillis, 'Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev's daughter makes political comeback', EurasiaNet.org, 28 July 2011, < http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64584>.[43] Georgiy Voloshin, 'Post Nazarbayev succession becoming most discussed issue in Kazakhstan', Central Asia–Caucasus Institute Analyst, 3 August 2011, < http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q = node/5605>.[44] Rahmetov, op. cit., p. 4.[45] 'Unrest in Kazakhstan', op. cit.[46] Jason Lewis, 'Money laundering probe puts spotlight on the 15 million sale of the Duke of York's home', The Telegraph (London), 26 May 2012, < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/9291896/Money-laundering-probe-puts-spotlight-on-the-15-million-sale-of-the-Duke-of-Yorks-home.html>.[47] Higgs, op. cit.[48] Michael Moran, 'The sphinx of the steppes', Slate, 23 May 2012, < http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_reckoning/2012/05/23/the_sphinx_of_the_steppes.html>.[49] Fiona Hill and Kevin Jones, 'Fear of democracy or revolution in Uzbekistan', Washington Quarterly, 29(3), 2006, pp. 111–125.[50] Freedom House, op. cit.[51] Martin Spechler, 'Authoritarian politics and economic reform in Uzbekistan', Central Asian Survey, 26(2), 2007, pp. 185–202; Alisher Lkhamov, 'Neopatrimonalism, interest groups and patronage networks', Central Asian Survey, 26(1), 2007, pp. 65–84.[52] Andrew March, 'The use and abuse of history', Central Asian Survey, 21(4), 2002, pp. 371–384 (p. 371).[53] Laura Adams and Assel Rustemova, 'Mass spectacle and styles of governmentality in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan', Europe Asia Studies, 61(7), 2009, pp. 1249–1276.[54] This is an ironic condition in Uzbekistan: while the central authorities are seen as extremely powerful vis-à-vis any other central actor, the Uzbek state is actually quite weak in relation to the subnational actors. Lawrence Markowitz, 'The sub-national roots of authoritarianism', Demokratizatsiya, 20(4), 2012, pp. 387–408.[55] 'Uzbek leader proposes constitutional changes to replace President—text', BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 November 2010.[56] Bruce Pannier, 'What's on the Uzbek President's mind?', RFE/RL, 17 November 2010, < http://www.rferl.org/content/Karimov_Calls_For_Constitutional_Changes/2222588.html>; Alisher Ilkhamov and Catherine Fitzpatrick, 'President Karimov's search for a safe succession', EurasiaNet.org, 22 November 2010, < http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62427>.[57] 'Uzbek MPs change constitution, reduce presidential term', BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 December 2011.[58] Alyssa Meyer, 'Uzbekistan's President Karimov sets his departure date?', Carnegie Endowment, 10 April 2012, < http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/10/uzbekistan-s-president-karimov-sets-his-departure-date/a7ev>.[59] Pannier, op. cit.[60] Rostislav Turovsky, 'Party systems in post-Soviet states', Perspectives on European Politics & Society, 12(2), 2011, pp. 197–213 (p. 208).[61] 'Uzbek President's speech at Joint Session of Legislative Chamber and Senate, Part One', UzDaily (English), 15 November 2010.[62] For example, the vote of no confidence is a recommendation to the president, rather than an automatic removal of the prime minister.[63] The younger daughter, Lola Karimova-Tillyaeva, though also an important figure in Uzbekistan, is not seen as having the same ambitions as her older sister.[64] One article cheekily referred to her as Kim Kardashistan. Sarah Kendzior, 'Kim Kardashistan', The Atlantic, 8 August 2012, < http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/kim-kardashistan-a-violent-dictators-daughter-on-a-quest-for-pop-stardom/260885/>.[65] Catherine Fitzpatrick, 'WikiLeaks: succession or protection plans for Gulnara Karimova?', EurasiaNet.org, 21 March 2011, < http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63120>.[66] Ilkhamov, op. cit., p. 77.[67] Andrew Kramer, 'A brutal feud emerges in Uzbekistan's fractured first family', New York Times, 19 November 2013, < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/world/asia/a-brutal-feud-emerges-in-uzbekistans-fractured-first-family.html?_r = 0>.[68] Andrew Swerdlow, 'Keeping up with the Karimovs', Foreign Policy, 11 November 2013, < http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/14/keeping_up_with_the_karimovs_gulnara_uzbekistan_googoosha>.[69] Joshua Noonan, 'Uzbekistan's looming succession struggle', Silk Road Reporters, 14 August 2014, < http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/08/14/uzbekistans-looming-succession-struggle/>.[70] Eric McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2011, p. 140.[71] Ibid., p. 141.[72] Yury Fedorov, 'Uzbekistan: clans, succession, and stability', Security Index, 18(2), 2012, pp. 39–54 (pp. 44–45).[73] Christopher Schwartz and Bruno De Cordier, 'Life after Taghut', fairobserver.com, 7 January 2012, < http://www.fairobserver.com/article/life-after-taghut>.[74] Aleksandr Naydenov, 'Who will succeed Islam Karimov as Uzbekistan's leader and why Akbar Abdullaev is now the only contender', 20 July 2012, < http://uzbekistanpolitics.blogspot.com/2012/07/who-will-replace-islam-karimov-as.html>.[75] Fedorov, op. cit., p. 51.[76] Luca Anceschi, 'Central Asia: succession planning in dictatorships', opendemocracy.net, 15 March 2012, < http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/luca-anceschi/central-asia-succession-planning-in-dictatorships>.[77] Roberts, op. cit., p. 2.[78] Shaun Walker, 'Who's that boy in the grey suit? It's Kolya Lukashenko—the next dictator of Belarus …', The Independent, 29 June 2012, < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/whos-that-boy-in-the-grey-suit-its-kolya-lukashenko-the-next-dictator-of-belarus-7897089.html#>.[79] Kirill Nourzhanov, 'Presidential elections in Tajikistan', e-International Relations, 23 December 2013, < http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/23/presidential-elections-in-tajikistan-emomali-rahmons-fourth-term-at-the-helm/>.[80] Gregory White, 'After Putin', Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2012, < http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577241392587109400.html>.[81] Billingsley's study of political succession in Arab countries is an exception. He argued that the popular acceptance and legitimization of dynastic rule in both monarchies and hereditary republics is based upon Islamic and Arab tribal culture. Anthony Billingsley, Political Succession in the Arab World, Routledge, New York, 2010.Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas AmbrosioThomas Ambrosio is a Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University. His current research interests include the sources of stability of authoritarian regimes, strategies to counter democratic diffusion, and the international spread of authoritarianism.