On Messenian and Laconian Helots in the Fifth Century B.C.
1978; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 40; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1540-6563.1978.tb01218.x
ISSN1540-6563
Autores Tópico(s)Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1. Thucydides 4. 80. As explained below at note 12, I prefer this restricted translation of ta polla.2. Plato Laws 776c–777c.3. Aristotle Politics 1269a.4. Thucydides 4. 80. Plutarch Lycurgus 28 reports that the Spartans randomly murdered helots at night and during the day singled out the strongest helot workers for liquidation. Plutarch further notes that to avoid incurring impiety by this act the ephors formally declared war on the helots each year. Myron of Priene states that the Spartans humiliated the helots by forcing them to wear a distinctive cap and jacket and by beating them yearly and murdered any who displayed vigor inappropriate to a slave, in F. Jacoby, Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Leiden, 1920‐) 106 F 2 (hereafter cited as FGrH).5. Plutarch Lycurgus 28.6. As early as the First Messenian War, if we are to believe Polyaenus 1. 17 and Pausanias 4. 16. 6, helots fought alongside the Spartiates. Herodotus (6. 80–81; 7. 229; 8. 25; 9. 10) reports that they took part in the campaigns of King Cleomenes and in the expeditions to Thermopylae and Plataea. The helots originally participated either as attendants to the Spartiate hoplites or as light armed troops. See Johannes Kromayer and Georg Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (Munich, 1926), 39–40, and W. K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practices (Berkeley, 1971), part 1, 49–51.7. H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933), 16, 43, 45, has catalogued the use of helots as hoplites. In the 390s the number of hoplite neodamodeis reached five thousand, according to K. J. Beloch, “Griechische Aufgebote II,”Klio 6 (1906): 34–78 at 70. While the exact political and economic status of these neodamodeis is not clear, it is generally agreed that they were in some sense “freed.” See Victor Ehrenberg, “Neodamodeis,” in Real‐Encyclopäsdie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll (Stuttgart 1893‐), 16: 2396–401 (hereafter cited as PW), and F. R. Willetts, “Neodamodeis,”Classical Philology 49 (1954): 27–32.8. Kromayer and Veith, Heerwesen, 41, surveys evidence for helot rowers. H. W. Parke, “The Development of the Second Spartan Empire,”Journal of Hellenic Studies 50 (1930): 37–79 at 54 (hereafter cited as JHS), analyzes the evidence for their use as harmosts.9. Xenophon Hellenica 6. 5. 23–29. Diodorus 15. 65. 5 says that only one thousand helots were freed and actually took part in the fighting. Plutarch's generalizing comment (Agesilaus 32. 7) that the Spartans were discouraged because of large numbers of desertions at this time does not outweigh the specific information of Xenophon, who was a contemporary of the event.10. F. Gschnitzer, Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum (Munich, 1958), 174, points out that the Spartans were unique in their regular use of noncitizen troops. Most of the other states which did use hoplites from dependent territories did so because they considered these people to be citizens and therefore fulfilling a citizen's duty. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 45, has noted that because of their helot soldiers, the Spartans unlike most other city‐states in the fourth century did not rely upon mercenary hoplites.11. Typical are G. B. Grundy, “The Policy of Sparta,”JHS 32 (1912): 261–69; Victor Martin, La vie internationale dans la Grèce des Cités (Paris, 1940), 203–4; Humphrey Michell, Sparta (Cambridge, 1952), 82–83; and more recently, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, 1927), 89–94, 291–92; Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, 1969), 26–27; Arnold Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History (London, 1969), 185–86. While most scholars see the helot problem as a negative, retarding influence on Spartan foreign policy, I. Hahn, “Aspekte der spartanischen Aussenpolitik im V. Jh.,”Acta Antiqua 17 (1969): 285–96, has argued that the danger of revolt drove the Spartans toward an active, interventionist policy designed to shield the helots from outside agitation.12. Thucydides 4. 80. This is the translation of Kagan, Outbreak, 26–27, which is essentially the same as that of Grundy, “Policy,” 266, and Benjamin Jowett, Thucydides, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1881), 1: 299. As indicated above at note 1, I prefer a more restricted meaning of ta polla: “Security was the overriding consideration that determined the greater part of Lacedaemonian policy toward the helots.” This is the translation of Toynbee, Some Problems, 202. A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1945–70), 3: 547–48, and Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydide, 6 vols. (Paris, 1967), 3: 56, also accept this reading, which is more true to the Greek word order than the total generalization of the other translation.13. Our sources for the krupteia are late and contradictory. Plato Laws 633b seems to refer to an institution which trained young Spartans to face hardships and to develop self‐discipline. On the other hand, Plutarch Lycurgus 28, in an account based largely on Aristotle, speaks of a secret police which terrorized the helots. This variance together with the silence of Herodotus and Thucydides regarding the krupteia suggests caution. Although it seems clear that Plutarch was familiar with the Aristotelian Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, see Philip A. Stadter, Plutarch's Historical Methods (Harvard, 1965), 130–32, one must keep in mind the questionable reliability of the politeiai. On the problem of the sources and reliability of the politeiai in general and those of Sparta in particular, see Eugen Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity (Stockholm, 1965), 181–87. In spite of these problems, many scholars follow Plutarch in attributing the worst acts of terrorism to the krupteia. See for example, Detlef Lotze, Metaxu Eleuthern kai Douln (Berlin, 1959), 45; H. Jeanmaire, “La Cryptie Lacedemonienne,”Revue des Etudes Grecque 26 (1913): 121–50; A. H. M. Jones, Sparta (Oxford, 1967), 10; Georg Busolt and Heinrich Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde (Munich, 1926), 669–70. The paucity of information regarding the krupteia has also allowed modern views of its function to vary widely. Thus, Jeanmaire, “La Cryptie,” sees it deriving from a puberty initiation rite. Finley, “Sparta,” in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne (Paris, 1968), 143–60 at 147, and Jones, Sparta, 10, emphasize its police function, while scholars such as J. Oehler, “Krupteia,”PW 11: 2031–32, and Michell, Sparta, 164, note its role in military training.14. Thucydides 4. 80; Guy Dickins, “The Growth of Spartan Policy,”JHS 32 (1912): 142; Busolt and Swoboda, Staatskunde, 668.15. George Devereaux, “La psychoanalyse et l'histoire. Une application à l'histoire de Sparte,”Annales 20 (1965): 425–41.16. Thus, Martin, La vie internationale, 62, notes the Messenians’ memory of their freedom but in general thinks of a monolithic class of helots, e.g., 62, 203–4. Similiarly Devereaux, “La psychoanalyse,” 26, mentions the national identity of the Messenians but drops this distinction in his subsequent discussion. Jones, Sparta, 10, and Michell, Sparta, 83–84, have commented that the Laconian helots must have behaved differently than the Messenians, but neither has followed this up with a systematic survey of the evidence. Although Y. Garlan, War in the Ancient World (New York, 1975), 79–80, has studied the military use of helots, she has failed to distinguish between the two groups.17. On the problem of the origin and status of the helots, see the excellent discussions of Toynbee, Some Problems, 195–203, and M. I. Finley, “Between Slavery and Freedom,”Comparative Studies in Society and History 6 (1963): 233–49 at 240–41. Since the essential features of their condition seem clear enough, it seems unnecessary to enter the “serf‐slave” debate.18. On the nature and chronology of this war, see the succinct discussion of W. den Boer, “Political Propaganda in Greek Chronology,”Historia 5 (1956): 162–77 at 166–67. Toynbee, Some Problems, 186, n.2, notes the possibility of another Messenian revolt c. 600 b.c. If such a revolt did indeed occur, it merely strengthened the Messenian national identity already evidenced by the first revolt.19. On this see Carl A. Roebuck, “A History of Messenia from 369–146 b.c., (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1941), 27–28.20. K. M. T. Chrimes, Ancient Sparta (New York, 1952), 296–304, has suggested that in portions of northern and western Messenia there existed a special class of helots who were more free than the others and not totally dominated by the Spartans. It was from this group, she concludes, that the Spartans recruited their helot soldiers. I agree with Lotze, Metaxu, 46, who points out that such a group of de facto free, armed helots would have been incredibly dangerous to the Spartans. Besides, as Franz Kiechle, Messenische Studien (Kallmunz, Germany, 1959), 61–62, has observed, the absence of a special designation for the Messenian helots indicates that they were in essentially the same condition as those in Laconia.21. Plato Laws 692d, 698e. These are our only definite references to this revolt. Strabo's reference (8. 362) to a fourth Messenian war is late and vague. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Strasbourg‐Berlin, 1912–27), 1: 2, 272–73, suggests that the Spartan expulsion of Mesenians from Cephallenia and Naupactus (Diodorus 14. 34) is more likely to be Strabo's fourth war.22. So den Boer, “Political Propaganda,” 168–69, who suggests that Plato's version arose out of the need to counter new, pro‐Messenian propaganda, which followed the refounding of Messenia in 370. Acceptance of this version was facilitated by the easy confusion of Leotychidas II, who lived in the 490s, with Leotychidas I, who was associated with the great Messenian revolt of the seventh century. For the problems which dictate cautious use of Plato's historical information, see Tigerstedt, Legend, 252–54, and above all Chester G. Starr, “The Credibility of Early Spartan History,”Historia 14 (1965): 257–62 at 259–60.23. If one accepts the “Rhianos Hypothesis,” then the revolt and settlement of Messenian refugees at Zancle, which Pausanias (4. 23) places in the seventh century, can be associated with a war in the 490s. For the history and criticism of this hypothesis—that the events from Rhianos which Pausanias placed in the seventh century actually belong in this fifth‐century context—see H. T. Wade‐Gery, “The ‘Rhianos Hypothesis’,” in Ancient Society and Institutions (Oxford, 1966), 289–302. On the general nature of the Messenian tradition and the place of Rhianos in it, see Lionel Pearson, “The Pseudo‐History of Messenia and Its Authors,”Historia II (1962): 387–426. For the coins, see E.S.G. Robinson, “Rhegion, Zankle‐Messana and the Samians,”JHS 66 (1946): 13–20. For the monuments, see L. H. Jeffrey, “Comments on Some Archaic Greek Inscriptions,”JHS 59 (1949): 25–38 at 27–30, and Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969), no. 22. On the basis of this evidence, W. P. Wallace, “Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia,”JHS 74 (1954): 32–35, has made the most rigorous argument for the reality of a revolt in the 490s. Others who accept this revolt include W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (New York, 1969). 91–92: George Huxley, Early Sparta (Cambridge, Mass, 1962), 89; Kiechle, Messenische Studien, 106–30; Dickins, “Growth,” 31.24. Pausanias 4. 23. 4–10.25. Jeffrey, “Comments,” 27–30.26. Herodotus 9. 10; 28–29.27. On the use of helots as light‐armed troops in general and at Plataea in particular, see Kromayer and Veith, Heerwesen, 40, and Pritchett, Greek Military Practices, Part 1, 49–51.28. W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1912), 2: 364, note Herodotus's explicitness and accept his figures. Others consider his figures too high: Beloch, “Griechische Aufgebote II,” 51; Michell, Sparta, 79. On the value of Herodotus as a source for the Persian Wars in general, see Chester G. Starr, “Why Did the Greeks Defeat the Persians?”Parola del Passato 17 (1962): 321–32, and Arthur Ferrill, “Herodotus and the Strategy and Tactics of the Invasion of Xerxes,”American Historical Review 72 (1966): 102–15.29. As has been assumed by Busolt and Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, 668, n, 4, and Dickens, “Growth,” 33.30. Among the scholars who emphasize the helot factor in the episode of Pausanias are Pavel Oliva, Sparta and Her Social Problems (Prague, 1971), 150–52; Dickins, “Growth,” 23, 33; Grundy, “Policy,” 267.31. Thucydides 1. 128–35.32. Herodotus 5. 32; 8. 3. Aristotle Politics 1307a. Since the events lie almost a decade beyond the climax of Herodotus's Histories, the argument from silence here is very weak. Still, Herodotus treats Pausanias in some detail, so that one might reasonably expect some reference to the helot conspiracy. Aristotle in his discussion of factions refers to Pausanias as an example of a great man who stirred up factions in an order to increase his own power. At Politics 1301b, Aristotle may refer to Pausanias's desire to overthrow the ephorate. So Paul Poralla, Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen (Breslau, 1913; reprint ed., Rome, 1966), 103. As Oliva, Sparta, 150, notes, however, the reference actually is to King Pausanias, not the regent. In neither case does Aristotle mention the helots.33. The paradigmatic nature of Thucydides’ treatment of Pausanias and Themistocles has been noted especially by Haruo Konishi, “Thucydides’ Method in the Episodes of Pausanias and Themistocles,”American Journal of Philology 91 (1970): 52–69, and also by John Finley, Thucydides (Ann Arbor, 1963), 139; E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides, 3d ed. (Hildesheim, Germany, 1960), 158. Although H. D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge, 1961), does not treat Pausanias specifically, he shows Thucydides’ general tendency to present individuals as types. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, Commentary, 3: 481, 658, note Thucydides’ overinsistence on the helot danger. On the Laconian‐Messenian distinction in Thucydides, see below at notes 44, 54, 56, 57.34. Thucydides I. 132.35. It is true that the extreme charges of medism are suspect. See the discussion of Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2: 155 ff. Charles W. Fornara, “Some Aspects of the Career of Pausanias of Sparta,”Historia 15 (1966): 257–61, at 266, has demonstrated the ephors’ concern over the alienation of allies which resulted from Pausanias's high‐handedness.36. As Josef Wolski, “Pausanias et la problème de la politique spartiate,” Eos 47 (1954): 75–94.37. As Hans Schaefer, “Pausanias,” PW 18: 2275, and Oliva, Sparta, 151–52.38. A. French, “The Spartan Earthquake,”Greece and Rome 2 (1955): 108–18, is typical. See also, Michell, Sparta, 32–33; Oliva, Sparta, 153–54; Forrest, History, 101–2.39. Diodorus 11. 63–64; 84; Plutarch Cimon 16; Pausanias I. 29; 4. 24.40. Herodotus 9. 35; 64. While these conflicts are somewhat vague chronologically, their Messenian character is clear.41. Lysistrata 1141–44.42. [Xenophon] Constitution of the Athenians 3. 11. The Old Oligarch recalls that even though the Athenians had sided with the Spartans against the Messenians, they were attacked by the Spartans shortly thereafter. Hartvig Frisch, The Constitution of the Athenians: A Philological‐Historical Analysis (Copenhagen, 1942), 334–35, interprets these remarks as referring to the revolt of 465 and to the conflict at Tanagra in 457.43. Xenophon Hellenica 6. 5. 33.44. Thucydides 1. 101–3. Thucydides begins his account by speaking simply of helots, but he drifts into the Messenian terminology which his contemporaries used. While his description of the peace settlement with the rebels, for example, refers only to Messenians, it appears that Thucydides felt uneasy about this Messenian terminology. So Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, Commentary, 1: 298. Thucydides attempted to explain that the rebels were called Messenians because most of them were of Messenian descent. Now he is saying either that most of the rebels were Messenians and only a few were Laconian, or that most of the Laconian rebels were descendants of Messenians who had been settled in Laconia. In either case the number of Laconian rebels would be small.45. Thucydides 1. 101 reports that two perioecic towns, Thuria and Aithaia, took part in the revolt. Thuria clearly was a Messenian town, but the location of Aithaia is obscure. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, Commentary, I: 298, and Toynbee, Some Problems, 190, 347, think that it was close to Thuria. Mattias Valmin, Études topographiques sur la Messénie ancienne (Lund, 1930), 62–63, thinks that Aithaia should be identified with the Messenian town of Antheia.46. Roebuck, “History,” 27–28. See also below at note 55.47. I.G. I2 37. This fragmentary inscription from a relief refers to Messenia or the Messenians. Benjamin Merritt, “Greek Inscriptions,”Hesperia 13 (1944): 210–66, at 224–29, dates this inscription to the mid‐century on the basis of letter forms and considers it to be part of a treaty between the Naupactians and the Athenians. This seems reasonable, though the context really is not clear.48. While Diodorus's vivid account (11. 63) of twenty thousand casualties is of doubtful value, this was a catastrophic quake. See W. Capelle, “Erdbeben in Altertum,”Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum 21 (1908): 603–33 at 605–6. Ludwig Ziehen, “Das spartanische Bevölkerungsproblem,”Hermes 68 (1933): 218–37, suggests that the greatest losses were among women rather than men. Still, there must have been significant losses among the homoioi.49. Although the exact scope and length of this war are not entirely clear, it was a considerable challenge to the Spartans. On the dates of the conflict see B. D. Merritt et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists, 4 vols. (Princeton, 1939–53), 3: 162–68, and H. Bengston, ed., Die Verträge der griechisch‐römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr. (Munich, 1962), 41.50. Thucydides 3. 41.51. Thucydides (4. 41: 5. 14, 35, 56) does refer to some desertions from Laconia, and later in the war the Athenian base on the coast opposite Cythera attracted some helots (Thucydides 7. 26; Xenophon Hellenica 1. 2. 18). The effect on Laconian helots was not great, however, and certainly less than Thucydides’ narrative suggests.52. Louis A. Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (Leiden, 1972), especially at 122 ff., has emphasized this aspect of ancient warfare.53. Thucydides 7. 27.54. Thucydides 4. 26.55. For this monument and the inscription, see Gisela M. A. Richter, The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks, 4th ed. (New Haven, 1970), 186–88. Although the inscription does not specifically mention Sphacteria, on the basis of style and Pausanias's description (5. 26. 1) Richter concludes that the Sphacteria incident is the most likely subject of the commemoration.56. Thucydides 4. 80. This explanation has been accepted recently by Donald Kagan, The Archidamian War (Itchaca, 1974), 288.57. Thucydides 5. 34, 67.58. Thucydides 5. 14, 23.59. As Grundy, “The Population and Policy of Sparta in the Fifth Century,”JHS 28 (1908): 77–96 at 94–95, and Jones, Sparta, 11, 52.60. Kagan, Archidamian War, 333–35, notes all of these factors.61. Thucydides 5. 23.62. The Athenians did not remove these Messenians until later in the same year, and then only briefly. They returned in 419 and remained until 409. Thucydides 5. 23, 56.63. Bengston, Verträge, 121, has noted the unusual lack of reciprocity regarding this provision.64. Jones, Sparta, 52, has argued for the general nature of this provision. Support for this view cannot be found in the treaty which the Spartans made with the Tegeans c.550. This treaty merely required the Tegeans to disallow pro‐Messenian, anti‐Spartan activity in their territory. See Bengston, Verträge, 11. Nor does the fact of Athenian, Plataean, and Aeginetan aid to the Spartans in 465 indicate that such aid was required of allies. The Plataeans stressed the extraordinary nature of their service (Thucydides 3. 54), while the Spartans remembered the Aeginetans simply as “benefactors” (Thucydides 2. 27). The Athenian aid is easily understood as part of Cimon's philo‐Laconian policy without reference to any treaty obligation. On this see Meiggs, Athenian Imperialism (Oxford, 1972) 41, 88–89.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames T. ChambersThe author is Assistant Professor of History at Texas Christian University. He wishes to thank the University's Research Foundation for financial assistance which supported research for this article.
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