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The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity

2011; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09555803.2011.579495

1469-932X

Kazuhiko Tōgō,

Arctic and Russian Policy Studies

Abstract Abstract This article examines Japan's relations with the Soviet Union/Russian Federation during the sixteen-year period between Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 and Putin's completion of his first year as president in the spring of 2001. It identifies five lost windows of opportunity for solving the Northern Territories dispute between these two nations, which might have significantly improved the bilateral relationship. At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986–1988, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989 saw structural rigidity on the part of Japanese policy-makers hampering the faster development of the relationship. The third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992 was the consequence of a failure in policy choices on the Japanese side and of policy-makers not fulfilling their responsibility. At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997–1998, the Japanese side learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at the forefront of Japanese and Russian negotiators' mind. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast and effectively in 2000–2001, and then were suddenly crushed because of domestic issues in Japan. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in negotiating with the Russians, but the negotiators were unable to overcome domestic constraint. Keywords: JapanRussiaterritorial negotiationsNorthern TerritoryKurile Acknowledgments My deep thanks go to Dr L. O. Black, Professor W. J. Boot, Dr. J. Ferguson, Professor C. S. Goto-Jones, Professor W. R. van Gulik, Professor G. Hook, Professor R. Kersten, Professor G. Rozman and Professor J. J. A. Stockwin, for their support, encouragement and valuable comments in formulating, reading and evaluating this paper. Professor Paul Midford, Associate Editor at Japan Forum, and two anonymous readers also gave important suggestions, which I really appreciated. Notes 1. For further analyses, see Hasegawa (2008 Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. 2008. "Russia and historical memory in East Asia". In East Asia's haunted present: historical memories and the resurgence of nationalism, Edited by: Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi and Togo, Kazuhiko. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. [Google Scholar], pp. 220–236) and Togo (2008a Wada, Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai, Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. [Google Scholar], pp. 176–181, 2008b, pp. 53–62). 2. Nishimura's statement is also referred to in the Joint Compendium on the History of the Japan-Russia Territorial Issue (Japanese and Russian Foreign Ministry 1992 Japanese and Russian Foreign Ministry. 1992. The joint compendium on the history of the Japan-Russia territorial issue [Google Scholar], p. 3). Kimie Hara quoted in her dissertation a booklet issued in November 1946 in English by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, specifying that the Kurile Islands include Kunashiri and Etorofu, but Habomai and Shikotan constitute a different entity (Hara 1998 Hara, Kimie. 1998. Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar], pp. 24–30). 3. The five principles were: to support reform in the Soviet Union; to expand substantially cooperation with the Russian Federation; to cooperate in accepting the Soviet Union in the Asia Pacific region; to cooperate in accepting the Soviet Union into the IMF and World Bank; and to resolve the territorial problem based on the principle of law and justice (Togo 2007 Tōgō, Kazuhiko. 2008b. Nichi-Ro kankei o saikōchiku suru tame ni. Sekai, 783: 53–62. [Google Scholar], p. 159). 4. The Cabinet yearly opinion poll shows that in October 1991, 25.4 per cent of the Japanese had positive or somewhat positive views on Russia and 69.5 per cent had negative or somewhat negative views on Russia. The following October 1992, positive or somewhat positive views had declined to 15.2 per cent and negative or somewhat negative views risen to 79.6 per cent (Naikakufu Seifu Kōhōshitsu 1991 Naikakufu Seifu Kōhōshitsu. 1992. Gaikō ni kansuru yoron chōsa [online] Available from: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h04/H04-10-04-10.html [Accessed 29 October 2010] [Google Scholar], 1992 Panov, Alexander. 1992. Fushin kara shinrai e, Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai. [Google Scholar]). 5. In the area of defense security, it should be noted that, as early as 1996, the Minister of State for Defense's visit to Moscow in April and a Maritime Self Defense Force escort vessel's port visit to Vladivostok in July had made a breakthrough in the dormant relations (Togo 2007 Tōgō, Kazuhiko. 2008b. Nichi-Ro kankei o saikōchiku suru tame ni. Sekai, 783: 53–62. [Google Scholar], p. 192). 6. Foreign Minister Keizō Obuchi conveyed this policy decision to President Yeltsin on 23 February in Moscow (Asahi Shinbun, 24 February 1998). 7. See major Japanese newspapers dated 20 April 1998. All have their lead article reporting that Hashimoto made a proposal, the gist of which was to draw a territorial demarcation line north to Etorofu. 8. Asahi Shinbun, 5 January 2005, carried this critically important news.