Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian – Chechen Conflict
2005; Routledge; Volume: 57; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09668130500051833
ISSN1465-3427
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 'Printsipy opredeleniya osnov vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Chechenskoi Respublikoi', signed 31 August 1999, published in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 September 1996, p. 1. (Unless otherwise indicated, all Russian-language newspapers and periodicals cited here are published in Moscow.) The two sides signed a formal peace treaty in May 1997. There is a vast literature in several languages dealing with the 1994 – 96 war. Among the best accounts in English are Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York, New York University Press, 1998); Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars:Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 11 – 45; John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gail Lapidus, 'Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya', International Security, 23, 3, Summer 1998, pp. 5 – 49; and Tracey C. German, Russia's Chechen War (New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003). A large number of memoirs by Russian political leaders and military commanders who were involved in the first war have appeared over the past decade, and a small number of memoirs by Chechen officials who took part in the war — most notably Zelimhan Yandarbiev, Chechnya: Bitva za svobodu, 2 vols. (L'viv, Svoboda narodov, 1996) — have also been published. The Russian government sought to conduct a census in Chechnya in 2002 but outside observers found the results extremely unreliable. In mid-October 2002 the then prime minister of the pro-Russian Chechen government, Stanislav Il'yasov, announced that the census revealed a population of 1,088,816 in Chechnya, a much higher total than is generally accepted. Leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia, including the Memorial Human Rights Centre, have estimated that the current population of Chechnya is actually no more than 700,000. This figure tallies well with estimates by Médecins Sans Frontières (500,000), the Danish Refugee Council (675,000) and the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal (650,000). It is also in accord with data compiled by the Validata opinion and marketing research firm (700,000), which was commissioned to do 11 republic-wide surveys in Chechnya (including a recalculation of the population) in February – December 2003. Aleksandr Cherkasov of Memorial has argued that deliberate falsification of the census results, by either the Russian government or the local Chechen government (or both), accounts for the large discrepancy between the official results and the estimated data. Similarly, the head of the Validata population count reported in July 2003 that he 'had not met a single Chechen who actually spoke to an official census-taker last year. Obviously, what happened is that local authorities filled in the census forms themselves and embellished the totals', quoted from Anatolii Kostyukov, 'U chechentsev est' mnenie: Nachalis' pervye sotsiologicheskie zamery nastroenii v respublike', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 July 2003, p. 1. For a fuller discussion of the population issue, see Norwegian Refugee Council, Global IDP Database, Protecting Internally Displaced Persons in the OSCE Area: A Neglected Commitment (Geneva and Oslo, Global IDP Project, October 2003), pp. 24 – 27. Aleksandr Raskin, 'Okruzhenie neulovimykh: Ob''yavivshiesya v Dagestane boeviki razbrelis' v raznye storony', Vremya novostei, 18 December 2003, p. 1. For a sobering overview of the effects of the war on everyday life in Chechnya see Médecins Sans Frontières, The Trauma of Ongoing War in Chechnya: Quantitative Assessment of Living Conditions and Psychosocial and General Health Status among the War-Displaced in Chechnya and Ingushetia (Amsterdam, MSF, August 2004). For a chilling account of the establishment and operation of these camps, see the recently declassified portions of a top secret US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, `Intelligence Information Report [deleted]/Swift Knight — Usama Ben Laden's Current and Historical Activities', October 1998, released October 2004, through a Freedom of Information Act request. See also Valerii Tishkov, Obshchestvo v vooruzhenom konflikte: Etnografiya chechenskoi voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 2001), pp. 297 – 303. Important aspects of these incursions are still murky, and some analysts in both Russia and the West have argued that the raids were deliberately provoked by the Russian authorities. See for example Charles W. Blandy, Dagestan: The Storm Part I — The 'Invasion' of Avaristan (Sandhurst, UK, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2000); and Charles W. Blandy, Dagestan: The Storm Part 2 — The Federal Assault on the 'Kadar Complex' (Sandhurst, UK, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000). The evidence is suggestive but not conclusive. For an illuminating assessment of this issue see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 75 – 80. From the time these incidents occurred, they have been the subject of immense speculation in the West and in the Russian media. A good deal of troubling evidence has emerged about the possible culpability of the Russian security forces (presumably to create a pretext for a new war), but the case is not ironclad. For a summary of the main points of speculation, see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 80 – 85. In hindsight it might appear that the Russian government had a lot to gain by starting a new war, but in the late summer of 1999 the possibility of suffering another fiasco (as in 1994 – 1996) must have weighed on the minds of policy makers. Outcomes that seem clear-cut in retrospect are often far more uncertain and ambiguous when the events are still happening. For detailed analyses of the military operations and defensive arrangements needed to gain and preserve control of major urban areas in Chechnya, see Captain Aleksei Plisov, 'Oborona goroda: Kogda kazhdyi dom – krepost', a ulitsa – bastion', Armeiskii sbornik, 2001,11, (November), pp. 31 – 36; and Colonel N. I. Kostyaev & Lieutenant-Colonel I. T. Yaroshenko, 'Boi v gorode: Osobennosti organisatsii upravleniya', Voennaya mysl', 2000, 5, (September – October), pp. 23 – 25. Cited in Igor' Rotar', 'Pobeda ne stol' ochevidna: Ostalos' neyasno, gde nakhodyatsya sotni zalozhnikov i desyatki liderov boevikov', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 March 2000, p. 1. On the rationale for the transfer of control, see the comments of FSB director Nikolai Patrushev and MVD chief Boris Gryzlov in Vladimir Vasil'ev, 'FSB sdaet, MVD prinimaet', Trud, 30 July 2003, p. 1; and Aleksandr Raskin & Viktor Paukov, 'Kontr-admiral militsii', Vremya novostei, 30 July 2003, p. 1. Lieutenant-General Evgenii Abrashin, 'Teraktov v Ingushetii i Beslane mozhno bylo ne dopustit", Izvestiya, 24 September 2004, pp. 1, 3. On the closing of the Satsita camp, see Aleksandr Yurskii & Luisa Andieva, ' "Pereezhat' bylo strashno", Zakryt poslednii palatochnyi lager' chechenskikh bezhentsev v Ingushetii', Gazeta, 9 June 2004, pp. 1 – 2; Vladimir Gavrilov, 'Bezhentsy domoi', Trud, 10 June 2004, p. 2; and 'Palatochnykh gorodkov v Ingushetii bol'she net', Parlamentskaya gazeta, 9 June 2004, p. 1. On the earlier forced closings of Chechen refugee camps see Human Rights Watch, Into Harm's Way: Forced Return of Displaced People to Chechnya (New York, Human Rights Watch, January 2003); Human Rights Watch, Spreading Despair: Russian Abuses in Ingushetia (New York, HRW, September 2003); and Peter Baker, 'Forgotten Refugees Are Living "Like Bugs": Chechens Feel They Are Being Squeezed out of Nearby Region', The Washington Post, 19 October 2003, p. A18. These abuses have been documented by many outside governmental and non-governmental organisations, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the US State Department (in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices), Human Rights Watch, and the Human Rights Center 'Memorial'. See for example Human Rights Watch, The "Dirty War" in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and Summary Executions (New York, HRW, March 2001); Human Rights Watch, Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya (New York, HRW, February 2002); US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe: A Decade of Membership in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 2002, p. 49; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Situation in Chechnya: Briefing Paper to the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (New York, HRW, April 2003); Rachel Denber, ' "Glad to be Deceived": The International Community and Chechnya', in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict (New York, HRW, 2004), pp. 121 – 139; Human Rights Center `Memorial', Chechnya 2004 god: Pokhishcheniya i ischeznoveniya lyudei (Moscow, Memorial, February 2005); Human Rights Center 'Memorial', Deceptive Justice: Situation on the Investigation of Crimes against Civilians Committed by Members of the Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic during Military Operations, 1999 – 2003 (Moscow, Memorial, May 2003); and 'Russia', in US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 (Washington, DC, Department of State, February 2004) Most of the sources adduced in the previous note also discuss the Chechen guerrillas' violations of human rights. Il'ya Maksakov, 'Ubiistvennaya statistika', Izvestiya, 19 February 2003, p. 1. See also Dmitrii Simakin, 'Smert' v rodnom tylu: Za tri "mirnykh" goda Rossiya poteryala nemnogim men'she soldat, chem za 9 let afganskoi voiny', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 February 2003, p. 1. Quoted from Vladimir Mukhin, 'Moskva uvelichivaet voiskuyu gruppirovku v Chechne: Pod shumok teraktov Genshtab podtyagivaet v myatezhnuyu respubliku poslednie rezervy', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 2003, p. 1. The latest official data, tabulated in 'Sravnitel'nyi analiz pomesyachnykh poter' v Chechne voennosluzhashchikh Minoborony, MVD, mestnoi militsii i naseleniya (na osnove ofitsial'noi informatsii)', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 5, 13 February 2004, p. 8, suggest that only around 50 – 60 Russian soldiers were being killed each month in early 2000, but these figures omitted entire categories, producing figures for total deaths that are roughly half of what they should be. Estimates by the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committees and other non-governmental organisations suggest a real figure of 100 – 150 a month for 2003 and the first half of 2004. See for example Vladimir Mukhin, 'Generaly raskroyut spiski: Minoborony priznalo neobkhodimost' publikatsii imen vsekh voennosluzhashchikh, pogibshikh v Chechne', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 November 2003, p. 4; and David Filipov, 'Russia's Unyielding Struggle: Attacks by Chechens Show Vulnerability', The Boston Sunday Globe, 10 August 2003, p. A4. A senior officer in the Russian military intelligence (GRU) spetsnaz forces, who is staunchly supportive of the campaign in Chechnya, estimated in late December 2003 that roughly 20% of the soldiers in his unit were being killed each year — an astonishingly high proportion if accurate; See the interview conducted by Vadim Udmantsev, ' "Mne nravitsya moya rabota": Spetsnaz GRU vypolnyaet v Chechne polovinu vsekh boevykh zadach', VPK — Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er, No. 16, 24 – 30 December 2003, p. 5. Vladimir Mukhin, 'Lukavye tsifry Chechni: Ni voisk, ni boevikov ne stanovitsya men'she', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 29, 6 August 2004, p. 2. See for example Ol'ga Allenova, 'Chechenskii OMON pochti v karmane: U Akhmata Kadyrova', Kommersant, 22 May 2003, p. 5. Denis Kozlov, 'Mir bez mira, voina bez pravil: Real'naya Chechnya ne pokhozha na to, chto my vidim po televizoru', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 43, 5 December 2003, pp. 1, 5; and 'Chechenskie boeviki pytayutsya izmenit' taktiku i geografiyu terroristicheskoi deyatel'nosti', Agentstvo Voennykh Novostei, 1 April 2003. This point also was raised by many of the Russian MVD and Defence Ministry officials I interviewed in Moscow in December 2003 and June 2004. 'Za posobnichestvo boevikam zaderzhany militsionery', Severnaya Ossetia (Vladikavkaz), 21 August 2004, p. 1. Comments of Mikhail Lapotnikov, chief of the investigative bureau in the office of the procurator-general for the North Caucasus, cited in Vlad Trifonov, 'Ingushskie militsionery byly posobnikami Shamilya Basaeva', Kommersant, 24 September 2004, p. 5. Paul Quinn-Judge, 'No Way Out?', Time, 13 October 2003, p. 15. Among many similar accounts is Vadim Rechkalov, `Ideologiya Basaeva: Pochemu spetssluzhby ne mogut poimat' Shamilya Basaeva', Izvestiya, 14 December 2004, pp. 1 – 2 Even in 1999 most Chechens were dismayed when Basaev launched incursions into Dagestan that provoked new Russian attacks against Chechnya; see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 68 – 69. Quoted in Captain Mikhail Sevast'yanov, 'Obustroistvo voisk v Chechne — eto nadolgo i vser'ez', Krasnaya zvezda, 2 November 1999, p. 1. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who until March 2004 was Putin's chief spokesman on Chechnya, explained the president's policy as follows: 'Some Western politicians have been remarkably persistent in trying to discuss "alternative" means of resolving the Chechen problem. Yet all of these proposals, upon closer inspection, boil down to the same thing — negotiations with terrorists. That path, needless to say, is a dead end'. Yastrzhembsky went on to argue that 'certain forces in the West are not actually interested in regulating the situation in Chechnya' and 'are instead seeking to dissipate the positive political and psychological achievements' of Kadyrov's government. Cited in Andrei Pilipchuk, 'Stereotip "chernoi dyry" ', Krasnaya zvezda, 23 April 2003, p. 2. This point is stressed in Lieutenant-General Gennadii Kotenko, Major-General Ivan Vorob'ev & Colonel Valerii Kiselev, 'Kogda front povsyudu", Armeiskii sbornik, 2003, 12 (December), pp. 37 – 41. See also Ivan Safranchuk, 'Chechnya: Russia's Experience of Asymmetrical Warfare', in John Andreas Olsen (ed)., Asymmetric Warfare (Oslo, Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2002), pp. 371 – 388. Ivan Egorov, Anton Ivanitsky & Anton Bil'zho, 'Chechnya v Irake i Afganistane: Taktika, razrabotannaya boevikami i terroristami v Chechne, s uspekhom primenyaetsya ikh sobrat'yami v Irake i Afganistane', Gazeta, 29 August 2003, pp. 1 – 2. The taking of hundreds of hostages for political purposes (as in Moscow in October 2002 and Beslan in September 2004) should be distinguished from the small-scale kidnappings that occur in Chechnya on a daily basis, usually for ransom. Kidnappings have been perpetrated by all sides in the conflict — the Chechen rebels, the pro-Russian Chechen government and the Russian army and MVD — as well as by criminal gangs in the North Caucasus. It is often difficult to pinpoint the identity and motivations of the culprits. The Russian MVD reported in April 2004 that a total of 1,808 people had been kidnapped in the North Caucasus in the previous few years, including 1,699 who were seized in Chechnya. Some 605 of the 1,699 were abducted in 2003 alone. See Vladimir Yanchenkov, 'Bez vesti propavshie: Lyudei voroval nachal'nik ugolovnogo rozyska', Trud, 15 April 2004, p. 3; see also Pavel Chernikov, 'Rossiya v tsifrakh', Kommersant-vlast', 19 April 2004, p. 12. The MVD figures, though exceedingly high, are less than half the number estimated by the Human Rights Center Memorial on the basis of reports from their field representatives. Russian press coverage of suicide bombings must be used with great caution. Part of the problem is the inherent uncertainty and confusion surrounding such events in the initial days after they occur; in addition, some Russian journalists have been wont to latch onto rumours and speculation without attempting to cross-check them. When discussing these events below I have relied only on accounts that have stood up over time. The precise name for the OGV varies in official publications, and it seems to have changed slightly over time. Occasionally it is referred to as the Unified Grouping of Federal Forces in the North Caucasus, and in a few cases the Russian word 'sil' rather than 'voisk' is used for what in English is rendered as 'forces'. When 'sil' is used, the acronym for the grouping is given as OGFS rather than OGV (and some sources even give both versions, adding to the confusion). For background on the rationale for forming a unified grouping of forces, see Colonel-General M. I. Karatuev, 'Osobennosti deistvii Ob'edinennoi gruppirovki federal'nykh sil v kontrterroristicheskoi operatsii', Voennaya mysl', 2000, 3 (May – June), pp. 64 – 69; Colonel-General L. S. Zolotov, 'Kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya v Dagestane i Chechne: Osnovnye itogi i vyvody', Voennaya mysl', 2000, 3 (May-June), pp. 77 – 84; and 'Kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya na Severnom Kavkaze: Osnovnye uroki i vyvody – Kruglyi stol', Voennaya mysl', 2000, 4 (July – August), pp. 5 – 24. See the lengthy interviews with Baranov in Aleksandr Oliinik, ' "Basaev seichas v Chechne" ', Russkii kur'er, 26 September 2003, p. 2; Andrei Fefelov, 'Chechnya trevogi nashei', Zavtra, 9 January 2004, pp. 1, 3; and 'Iz pervykh ruk: Po instruktsiyam "Al'Kaidy" ', Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er, 14 January 2004, p. 3. 'Ukaz o dopolnitel'nykh merakh po bor'be s terrorizmom na territorii Severokavkazskogo regiona Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Ukaz No. 715, 30 June 2003, published in Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 31, 4 August 2003, part II, item 2889. For useful background on the various reorganisations of Russian 'counterterrorist' operations, see V. V. Ustinov, 'Gosudarstvennaya antiterroristicheskaya strategiya: Obshchaya kontseptsiya i pravovye aspekty', Gosudarstvo i pravo, 2003, 3 (March), pp. 5 – 18. Until December 2003, when the then commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Valerii Baranov, was promoted from Colonel-General to Army-General, the district had been headed by a three-star general; see 'Tretii general armii', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 44, 19 December 2003, p. 3. Boldyrev's successor, Aleksandr Baranov, who was appointed by Putin in July 2004, is also a four-star general. Interview transcribed in Andrei Pilipchuk, 'General-polkovnik Vladimir Boldyrev: My — lyudi derzhavnye, i Otechestvo sumeem zashchitit", Krasnaya zvezda, 16 October 2003, p. 1. Ibid. Interview with Boldyrev in Sergei Konovalov, 'Kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya: Voennye i militsiya podelili Chechnyu na zony otvetstvennosti', Kommersant, 19 January 2004, p. 6. Ibid. On the FSB's continued autonomy, see Ivan Safronov, `Komanduyushchemu voiskami v Chechne podchinili vsekh, krome FSB', Kommersant, 21 December 2004, p. 4. The current status of the GRU in the chain of command is unclear. Until June 2004, when the Russian parliament at Putin's behest adopted a law on the restructuring of the Defence Ministry, the GRU had been an integral component of the Soviet and Russian General Staff since 1949. (Soviet military intelligence was subordinated to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Committee from September 1947 to January 1949, a move inspired by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.) The law adopted in mid-2004 implies, but does not specifically say, that the GRU will report directly to the defence minister rather than to the General Staff. During subsequent parliamentary hearings, high-ranking General Staff officers denied that the downgrading of the General Staff would eliminate its control of the GRU, but some Russian legislators and officials have argued otherwise. See Dmitrii Litovkin, 'Genshtab pereshel ot oborony k napadeniyu v Dume', Izvestiya, 30 June 2004, p. 3. For a detailed, though only partial, listing of the vast number of units under the OGV and their areas of deployment, see Mariya Bondarenko et al., 'Basaevskii proryv: Krovavyi pokhod boevikov na Ingushetiyu povtoril tssenarii reida na Budennovsk devyatiletnei davnosti', Nezavisimaya gazeta , 23 June 2004, p. 3. Yurii Demidov, 'Strategiya i taktika nuzhdayutsya v izmeneniyakh', Shchit i mech', No. 4, 22 January 2004, pp. 3 – 5. This was all the more evident during the first year of the war; see for example Michael R. Gordon, 'Chechen Ambush Deaths Laid to Russian Military Confusion', The New York Times, 3 April 2000, p. A9. Colonel Gennadii Zhilin, 'Opyt boevogo primeneniya voisk na Severnom Kavkaze: "Rabochie loshadki" lokal'nykh voin', Chast' 2 ('Baikal', 'Terek', 'Koz'ma Minin' i drugie — bronepoezda v vooruzhenom konflikte v Chechenskoi Respublike'), Soldat Otechestva, No. 47, 16 June 2004, p. 5. Ibid. Interviews with Russian MVD officials, Moscow, December 2003 and June 2004. Cited in Vladimir Ivanov & Vladimir Mukhin, 'Takie raznye voiny s terrorizmom', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 45, 26 December 2003, p. 2. Comments of committee chairman Viktor Ilyukhin and committee member Gennadii Gudkov, cited in Igor' Plugatarev, 'Ukhod nachal'nika Genshtaba Kvashnina predopredelen: Kreml' gotovitsya nazvat' osnovnogo vinovnika za sluchivsheesya v Ingushetii', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 24, 2 July 2004, pp. 1 – 2. See the vivid accounts in Yurii Shchekochikhin, Zabytaya Chechnya: Stranitsy iz voennykh bloknotov (Moscow, KRPA-Olimp, 2003). The problem of dedovshchina is by no means limited to units in Chechnya; it is pervasive in the Russian armed forces. See the valuable 88-page study by Human Rights Watch, The Wrongs of Passage: Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of New Recruits in the Russian Armed Forces (New York, HRW, October 2004). Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Na grani razlozheniya: Bez radikal'nykh mer po ukrepleniyu voinskoi distsipliny Vooruzhenye Sily RF riskuyut prevratit'sya v neupravlyaemoe skopishche vooruzhenykh lyudei', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 37, 5 October 2001, p. 8. Interview with Russian Ground Forces captain who had returned from Chechnya in the autumn of 2003, Moscow, December 2003. See for example the interview with Colonel Yurii Radionov, head of the Federal Border Guards detachment in the Argun region of Chechnya, transcribed by Aleksei Peslis & Ruslan Pasynkov, 'Glavnyi vrag na granitse — sindrom privykaniya k obstanovke', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 31, 20 August 2004, p. 1. Interview with Tikhomirov in Aleksandr Babakin, 'Voiska pravoporyadka: Glavkom Vnutrennykh voisk MVD RF general armii Vyacheslav Tikhomirov predlagaet ne speshit' s peredachei otvetsvennosti chechenskoi militsii', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 14, 16 April 2004, p. 1. Vadim Solov'ev, 'Severnyi Kavkaz: Retsidiv 22 iyunya 1941 goda: Glava Minoborony RF priznal, chto podgotovka Vooruzhenykh sil nakhoditsya ne na dolzhnom urovne', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 24, 25 June 2004, p. 1. Cited in Anna Politkovskaya, Vtoraya chechenskaya (Moscow, Zakharov, 2002), p. 37. Interview with Russian Ground Forces captain who had commanded both kontraktniki and conscripts in Chechnya, Moscow, June 2004. The importance of these delays is evident in recent surveys of kontraktniki which show that, for an overwhelming majority, earning money is the only factor that prompted them to enlist; see for example L. V. Peven', 'Voennaya sotsiologiya: Osobennosti perekhoda k professional'noi forme organisatsii Vooruzhenykh sil', Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 2003, 12, p. 64. Yuliya Mikhailina, 'Tyazhba: Uznat' sekret prezidenta — Skol'ko platit' omonovtsam za boi v Chechne', Gazeta, 1 September 2004, p. 3; and Ol'ga Allenova, 'Chernye stranitsy: Bukhgalteriya terrora', Kommersant-Den'gi, No. 43, 1 November 2004, p. 22. Dmitri V. Trenin & Aleksei V. Malashenko, Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 140. Interview with Russian MVD captain who returned in May 2004 from duty in Chechnya, Moscow, June 2004. 'General-polkovnik Vladimir Boldyrev: "Voiska okruga zanimayutsya svoim delom" ', Voennyi vestnik yuga Rossii (Rostov-na-Donu), No. 46, 10 November 2003, p. 3. Lieutenant-General Gennadii Kotenko, Major-General Ivan Vorob'ev & Colonel Valerii Kiselev, 'Taktika — netraditsionnaya, rezul'tat — optimal'nyi', Armeiskii sbornik, 2003, 7 (July), pp. 32 – 33. See the interview in Udmantsev, ' "Mne nravitsya moya rabota" ', p. 5. See also Vladimir Mukhin, `V Chechne voyuyut glavnym obrazom spetspodrazdeleniya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 November 2004, p. 9. For a first-hand survey of these phenomena, see Thomas Goltz, Chechnya Diary: A War Correspondent's Story of Surviving the War in Chechnya (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2003). Anastasiya Samotorova, 'Ekonomika antiterrora: Skol'ko eshche nuzhno deneg silovikam, chtoby strana spala spokoino', Novye izvestiya, 6 September 2004, p. 7. See also Peter Baker & Susan B. Glasser, 'Russian Plane Bombers Exploited Corrupt System', The Washington Post, 18 September 2004, pp. A1, A11; and the lengthy interview with Mikhail Aftamonov, the police officer accused of letting two Chechen suicide bombers through a security checkpoint at Moscow's Domodedovo airport in August 2004, in Komsomol'skaya pravda, 7 February 2005, p. 6. Quinn-Judge, 'No Way Out?', p. 15. For very similar comments by another Western journalist who has provided first-rate coverage of Chechnya, see David Filipov, 'Russia's Unyielding Struggle: Attacks by Chechens Show Vulnerability', The Boston Sunday Globe, 10 August 2003, p. A4. See also Goltz, Chechnya Diary. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, 'Front za liniei tyla', Profil', No. 21, 2 June 2003, pp. 24 – 27. Colonel Gennadii Zhilin, 'Opyt boevogo primeneniya voisk na Severnom Kavkaze: "Rabochie loshadki" lokal'nykh voin', Chast' 3 ('" Tachanki" rossiiskoi pekhoty'), Soldat Otechestva, No. 47, 16 June 2004, p. 5. Zhilin, 'Opyt boevogo primeneniya voisk na Severnom Kavkaze', Part 2, p. 4. Quoted from a set of 'instructions on the waging of combat operations' (instruktsii po vedeniyu boevykh deistvii) issued by the Chechen guerrilla commander Hattab in 2002. The document was captured that year by Russian forces after Hattab was killed. Excerpts are reproduced in Zhilin, 'Opyt boevogo primeneniya voisk na Severnom Kavkaze', Part 3, p. 5. See also Kotenko, Vorob'ev, & Kiselev, 'Taktika — netraditsionnaya, rezul'tat — optimal'nyi', pp. 32 – 33. Vladimir Mukhin, 'Chechnya kak obshchevoiskovoi poligon', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 42, 28 November 2003, p. 2. Prior to Kormil'tsev's decision the regulations were unchanged from the Soviet era. Kotenko, Vorob'ev & Kiselev, 'Kogda front povsyudu', p. 39. Interview with Russian Defence Ministry and MVD officials, Moscow, December 2003 and June 2004. Interview with General Abramov conducted by Captain Dmitrii Chartorizhsky, 'General Vladimir Abramov: "Vykhodnykh zdes' ne byvaet" ', Suvorovskii natisk (Khabarovsk), 15 April 2003, p. 4. See the comments of Major Dmitrii Zaitsev in 'Kruglyi stol: Boevaya podgotovka', Armeiskii sbornik, 2000, 6 (June), p. 13. For a partial listing and brief description of successful ambushes and attacks as of mid-2002, see 'Reidy chechenskikh boevikov', Kommersant, 17 August 2002, p. 3. Igor' Plugatarev, 'Fiasko spetssluzhb v Dagestane', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 44 19 December 2003, p. 1; and Vladimir Barinov, 'Po sledu: "Oni deistvuyut, kak dikie zveri" ', Gazeta, 19 December 2003, p. 2. Abrashin, 'Teraktov v Ingushetii i Beslane mozhno bylo ne dopustit", pp. 1, 3. Quoted in Sergei Ptichkin, 'Spetsnaz v Nazran' ne doletel', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 24 June 2004, p. 2. See for example Demidov, 'Strategiya i taktika nuzhdayutsya v izmeneniyakh', pp. 3 – 5; and Major-General I. N. Vorob'ev, 'Taktika boevykh grupp', Voennaya mysl', 2001, 1 (January – February), pp. 26 – 33. Vadim Rechkalov, " 'Budut lokal'nye stychki s zhertvami do 100 chelovek, a voiny ne budet": Bandformirovaniya Severnogo Kavkaza osvaivayut novuyu taktiku', Izvestiya, 2 August 2004, p. 1. Comments of General Nizhalovsky in 'Kruglyi stol: Boevaya podgotovka', Armeiskii sbornik, 2000, 6 (June), p. 11. Pilipchuk, 'General-polkovnik Vladimir Boldyrev', p. 1. Interview with Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, in Vladimir Georgiev, ' "Likvidatsiya baz za rubezhom — strategicheskaya oshibka": U Rossii net chetkoi geopoliticheskoi doktriny', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 December 2001, p. 10. For perceptive essays on the dismal state of the Russian military as of 2004, see Aleksandr Gol'ts, Odinnadtsat' poteryannykh let (Moscow, Zakharov, 2004). 'Brakovannaya tekhnika podryvaet natsional'nuyu bezopasnost': Rossiiskii oboronno-promyshlennyi kompleks rezko snizil kachestvo produktsii', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 29, 6 August 2004, p. 5. Interview with Radionov in Peslis & Pasynkov, 'Glavnyi vrag na granitse', p. 1. Aleksandr Babakin, 'Desant poluchaet novoe vooruzhenie: Osnashchenie elitnykh voisk zavisit ot ekonomiki nashei strany', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 30, 13 August 2004, p. 4. Comments of General Nizhalovsky in 'Kruglyi stol: Boevaya podgotovka', p. 13. See for example Evgenii Smyshlyaev, 'Vertolety nad Chechnei: Sistemu ekspluatatsii tekhniki reformirovat' v khode konflikta', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 38, 13 – 19 October 2000, p. 6. Interview with Ground Forces colonel, Moscow, June 2004. Quoted in Konstantin Rashchepkin, '76-y VDD: Desant v Chechnyu', Krasnaya zvezda, 6 February 2004, p. 1. Several months later, Semenyuta was much more cautious; see the interview with him in Konstantin Rashchepkin, ' "My tam, gde zhdut pobedu" ', Krasnaya zvezda, 4
Referência(s)