Artigo Revisado por pares

Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 28; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436590601081948

ISSN

1360-2241

Autores

Steven Barracca,

Tópico(s)

International Relations in Latin America

Resumo

Abstract This article compares the failed military coups in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002) with the successful 1999 military putsch in Pakistan in order to identify what factors affect coup outcomes in third-wave democracies. The unity of the armed forces in support of the Pakistani coup, and its division in the two Latin American cases, are critical in explaining the divergent outcomes. In turn, the degree of cohesion within the military in each case was affected by perceptions of domestic support and international reaction to military rule. In Ecuador and Venezuela there was greater public antipathy for military rule and stronger international opposition. This increased the armed forces' perceptions of the costs of governing, fostering divisions within the officer corps that ultimately scuttled the coups. In contrast, the successful coup in Pakistan was largely attributable to the unified military, which was a product of greater domestic and international tolerance of military rule. Notes I wish to thank my graduate assistant, Deepshikha Sigdel, for her assistance with the research. 1 This trend is noted by S Huntington, ‘Reforming civil – military relations’, Journal of Democracy, 6 (4), 1995, p 15; and D Pion-Berlin, ‘Introduction’, in D Pion-Berlin (ed), Civil Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p 2. 2 Huntington, ‘Reforming civil – military relations’, p 14. 3 On the causes of coups, see E Fossum, ‘Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups d'état in Latin America’, Journal of Peace Research, 4 (3), 1967, pp 228 – 251; and E Nordlinger, Soldiers and Politics: Military Coups and Government, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977. 4 JL Gibson, ‘Mass opposition to the Soviet putsch of August 1991: collective action, rational choice, and democratic values in the former Soviet Union’, American Political Science Review, 91 (3), 1997, pp 677 – 684; and D Sutter, ‘Legitimacy and military intervention in a democracy: civilian government as a public good’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 58 (1), 1999, pp 129 – 143. 5 Sutter, ‘Legitimacy and military intervention’, p 131. 6 SE Finkel, EN Muller & K Dieter-Opp, ‘Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political action’, American Political Science Review, 83 (3), 1989, pp 895 – 903. 7 Sutter, ‘Legitimacy and military intervention’, p 139. 8 MI Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp 144 – 155. 9 Gibson ‘Mass opposition to the Soviet putsch’, p 677. 10 WR Thompson, ‘Organizational cohesion and military coup outcomes’, Comparative Political Studies, 34 (8), 1976, pp 255 – 276. 11 S Levitsky & LA Way, ‘International linkage and democratization’, Journal of Democracy, 16 (3), 2005, p 21. 12 DS Boniface, ‘Is there a democratic norm in the America? An analysis of the Organization of American States’, Global Governance, 8 (3), 2002, pp 368 – 381. 13 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on A Rashid, ‘Pakistan's coup: planting the seeds of democracy?’, Current History, 98 (632), 1999, pp 409 – 414; and P Constable, ‘Pakistan's predicament’, Journal of Democracy, 12 (1), 2001, p 15 – 29. 14 JA Lucero, ‘Crisis and contention in Ecuador’, Journal of Democracy, 12 (2), 2001, p 60. 15 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on Lucero, ‘Crisis and contention in Ecuador’; CE Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian political irruption: uprisings, coups, rebellions, and democracy’, Nepantla: Views from the South, 2 (1), pp 173 – 204; and JS Fitch, ‘Post-transition coups: Ecuador 2000’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 33 (1), 2005, pp 39 – 58. 16 Facts and analysis of these background events draw on OG Encarnación, ‘Venezuela's “civil society coup”’, World Policy Journal, 19 (2), 2002, pp 38 – 48. 17 See bbc News, ‘Pakistan awaits military's next move’, bbc Online Network, 13 October 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/473370.stm; and J Burke, ‘Pakistan: marching to the brink’, India Today, 25 October 1999, at http://www.india-today.com/itoday/19991025/cover.html. 18 bbc News, ‘Opposition happy at Sharif's dismissal’, bbc Online Network, 13 October 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/473124.stm. 19 World Values Survey, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 20 Constable, ‘Pakistan's predicament’, p 27. 21 Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian political irruption’, p 185. 22 Ibid, p 181. 23 Encarnación, ‘Venezuela's “civil society coup”’, p 41. 24 For facts and analysis on the Venezuela coup, I rely heavily upon S LaFuente & A Meza, El acertijo de abril: Relato periodístico de la breve caída de Hugo Chávez, Caracas: Debate, 2004. 25 A Shah, ‘Pakistan's “armored” democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 14 (4), 2003, p 37. 26 Rashid, ‘Pakistan's coup’, p 411. 27 Burke, ‘Pakistan’. 28 bbc News, ‘Pakistan's coup: the 17 hour victory’, bbc Online Network, 11 November 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/475195.stm. 29 Lucero, ‘Crisis and contention in Ecuador’, p 65. 30 Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian political irruption’, p 178. 31 Ibid, pp 200 – 201. 32 HA Trinkunas, ‘The crisis in Venezuelan civil – military relations: from Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic’, Latin American Research Review, 37 (1), 2002, pp 68 – 69. 33 bbc News, ‘Clinton urges return to civilian rule’, bbc Online Service, 14 October 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/473507.stm. 34 Constable, ‘Pakistan's predicament’, p 21. 35 Rashid, ‘Pakistan's coup’, p 409. 36 bbc News, ‘Ecuador coup condemned’, bbc Online Service, 22 January 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/614434.stm. 37 Walsh, ‘The Ecuadorian political irruption’, pp 181, 191. 38 erri, ‘Ecuador: vice president to take power after coup, erri Daily Intelligence Report, erri Risk Assessment Services, 23 January 2000, Vol 6 – 023, at http://www.emergency.com/2000/ecuacop.htm. 39 cia, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency, 6 April 2002.

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