ANTINEOCLASSICAL MANAGEMENT MOTIVATION IN A NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMY: A MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE
1982; Wiley; Volume: 35; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00164.x
ISSN1467-6435
Autores Tópico(s)Economic theories and models
ResumoKyklosVolume 35, Issue 2 p. 223-243 ANTINEOCLASSICAL MANAGEMENT MOTIVATION IN A NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMY: A MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE Hiroyuki Odagiri, Hiroyuki Odagiri Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of Tsukuba, Sakura, Ibaraki 305, Japan. - I am grateful to Professors M. Usui and F. Niwa for expositionary advices.Search for more papers by this author Hiroyuki Odagiri, Hiroyuki Odagiri Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of Tsukuba, Sakura, Ibaraki 305, Japan. - I am grateful to Professors M. Usui and F. Niwa for expositionary advices.Search for more papers by this author First published: May 1982 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00164.xCitations: 12 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References 1 Traditionally, two explanations have been offered for Japan's faster economic growth. One attributes it to her high saving rate. However, theoretically, why a higher saving rate results in faster economic growth is not self-evident unless how it raises the natural rate of growth is explained. Empirically, moreover, it is impossible to attribute Japan's fast growth entirely to its saving behavior. The other explanation of Japan's growth is based on the so-called catch-up theory to the effect that in the 1950s Japan was not yet a rich country and thereby could take advantage of the technology and knowhow of advanced countries such as the United States. According to the study by Robin Marris yet to be published, however, even if the catch-up effect is eliminated Japan is still a fast-growing country. Also the fact that Japan maintained relatively fast economic growth after 1973 by which time she had apparently caught up clearly illustrates the limitation of the catch-up theory. 2 See Odagiri [1981, Chapter 5], for the detail. An essential condition for this result is that the firms engage themselves in research and development activity to attain Harrod-neutral cost-saving technical progress. 3 U. S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income. 4 Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, Establishment Census. 5 Foreign markets are no exception. Entry into American and European markets by Japanese firms has been in fact fast despite substantial cultural obstacles. 6 Odagiri [1975] gives empirical supports to this hypothesis. 7 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December 15, 1979. The figure does not include the affiliates. 8 See Abegglen [1973, pp. 31– 32]. 9 For instance, Nihon Keizai Skinbun, July 12, 1980, reports that the newest plant of Nissan Motor Co. that produces Datsun cars now uses industrial robots to do 96 percent of the welding process. Those welders whose jobs were, say, robbed by the robots are not unhappy, however. They are still with the company for other jobs such as pressing. In fact, it is reported that the workers and the union are happy with the introduction of the robots because most of the transferred workers found their new jobs preferable to welding. It is further reported that similar moves are found in other Japanese automobile makers such as Toyota but little in General Motors. 10 See footnote 7 above. 11 Zenkoku Torihikisho, Kabushiki Bunpu Jokyo Chosa, as reported in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 17, 1981. 12 The ratio of long-term and short-term debts to total assets was 81 percent for Japanese manufacturing corporations in 1978 according to the Bank of Japan, Financial Statements of Principal Enterprises. However, this figure is overvalued because the assets are evaluated at acquisition-cost basis. Kuroda and Oritani [1979] estimate that if the assets are evaluated at current value for both Japanese and American corporations, and if the use of off-balance-sheet finance by U. S. corporations, such as finance through subsidiary leasing and finance companies and investment on lease than purchase, is taken into account, the ratio hardly differs between Japanese and American corporations. References 13 Abegglen, James C. : Management and Worker: The Japanese Solution, Tokyo : Sophia University, in cooperation with Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1973. 14 Caves, Richard E. and Uekusa, Masu: Industrial Organization in Japan, Washington , D. C. : The Brookings Institution 1976. 15 Denison, Edward F. and Chung, William K. : How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast: The Sources of Postwar Expansion, Washington , D. C : The Brookings Institution 1976. 16 Doeringer, Peter B. and Piore, Michael J. : Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, Lexington , Massachusetts : Heath Lexington Books 1971. 17 Fair Trade Commission in Japan: Ryutsu Mondai to Dokkinho [Distribution Problems and the Antitrust Law]. In Japanese. Tokyo : Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance 1981. 18 Galbraith, John Kenneth: The New Industrial State, Boston : Houghton Mifflin 1967. 19 George, Kenneth D. and Ward, T. S. : The Structure of Industry in the EEC, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1975. 20 Iida, Tsuneo: Nihon-teki Chikarazuyosa no Saihakken [Rediscovering Strength in Japanese Style]. In Japanese. Tokyo : Nihon Keizai Shinbun Sha 1979. 21 Koike, Kazuo: Shokuba no Rodo Kumiai to Sanka [Trade Unions and Participation in Factories: Japan-U. S. Comparison of Industrial Relations]. In Japanese. Tokyo : Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha 1977. 22 Koike, Kazuo: ‘ Nishi Doitsu ni okeru Shokuba no Roshi Kankei' [Industrial Relations in West German Factories], in Japanese, Mikio Sumiya (Ed.), Roshi Kankei no Kokusai Hikaku, Tokyo : Tokyo University Press 1978, pp. 61– 90. 23 Kuehn, Douglas: Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm, London : Macmillan 1975. 24 Kuroda, Iwao and Oritani, Yoshiharu: ‘ Waga Kuni no “Kinyu-kozo no Tokucho” no Saikento’ [‘Peculiar Financial Structure’ of Japan Reconsidered], in Japanese, Kinyu Kenkyu Shiryo (The Bank of Japan), Vol. 2 (1979), April, pp. 1– 24. 25 Larner, Robert J. : ‘Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations, 1929 and 1963’, American Economic Review, Vol. 56 (1966), September, pp. 777– 787. 26 Manne, Henry G. : ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73 (1965), April, pp. 110– 120. 27 Marris, Robin: The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism, London : Macmillan 1964. 28 Marris, Robin and Mueller, Dennis C. : ‘The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 18 (1980), March, pp. 32– 63. 29 Mito, Tadashi: ‘Keiei Shisutemu no Henbo’ [The Changing Managerial System], in Japanese, Yuichiro Noguchi and Kazunari Abe, (Eds.), Gendai Dai Kigyo Ron, Tokyo : Yuhikaku 1972, pp. 68– 78. 30 Nishiyama, Tadanori: Gendai Kigyo no Shihai Kozo [The Structure of Control in Modern Corporations]. In Japanese. Tokyo : Yuhikaku 1975. 31 Odagiri, Hiroyuki: ‘Kigyo Shudan no Riron' [A Theory of the Grouping of Firms], in Japanese, Economic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1975), August, pp. 144– 154. 32 Odagiri, Hiroyuki: The Theory of Growth in a Corporate Economy: Management Preference, Research and Development, and Economic Growth, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1981. 33 Scherer, Frederick M. : Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chicago : Rand McNally 1970. 34 Vogl, Frank: German Business after the Economic Miracle, London : Macmillan 1973. Citing Literature Volume35, Issue2May 1982Pages 223-243 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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