Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents
1982; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 25; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/467006
ISSN1537-5285
Autores Tópico(s)Occupational Health and Safety Research
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessInsurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault AccidentsElisabeth M. LandesElisabeth M. LandesPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 25, Number 1Apr., 1982 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467006 Views: 22Total views on this site Citations: 68Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1982 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Benjamin van Rooij, Megan Brownlee Does Tort Deter? 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