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BIBTEX RIS

Optimal Auction Design

1981; Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences; Volume: 6; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1287/moor.6.1.58

ISSN

1526-5471

Autores

Roger B. Myerson,

Tópico(s)

Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Resumo

This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.

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