Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Russians in Germany: founding the post‐war missile programme

2004; Routledge; Volume: 56; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1465342042000308893

1465-3427

Asif A. Siddiqi,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes The internal secret German designation for the missile was A4. In nearly all Soviet documents the rocket is known as Fau‐2, a transliteration reflecting the German pronunciation of the letter ‘V’; to eliminate confusion, I refer to the missile as the V‐2 even if original Soviet documents use Fau‐2. For the best work on the German contribution to the Soviet ballistic missile programme see Matthias Uhl, Stalins V‐2: Der Technologietransfer der deutschen Fernlenkwaffentechnik in die UdSSR und der Aufbau der sowjetischen Raketenindustrie 1945 bis 1959 (Bonn, Bernard & Graefe‐Verlag, 2001). See also Boris Konovalov, Taina Sovetskogo raketnogo oruzhiya (Moscow, ZEVS, 1992); Christoph Mick, Forschen für Stalin: Deutsche Fachleute in der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie 1945–1958 (Munich, R. Oldenbourg, 2000). For a sampling of this approach see Igor Afanas'ev, ‘The Legacy of the V‐2: The First Soviet Ballistic missiles’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 11, 4, 1998, pp. 164–174; Mark Harrison, ‘New Postwar Branches (1): Rocketry’, in John Barber & Mark Harrison (eds), The Soviet Defence‐Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 118–149; Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945–1964 (Novato, CA, Presidio, 1993). For typical Russian works with such a perspective see B. E. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi (Moscow, Mashinostroenie, 1994); Yu. N. Koptev (ed.), 50 let vperedi svoego veka (1946–1996gg.) (Moscow, RKA, 1998); Yu. P. Semenov (ed.), Raketno‐Kosmicheskaya Korporatsiya “Energiya” imeni S. P. Koroleva (Korolev, RKK Energiya, 1996). Asif A. Siddiqi, ‘The Rockets’ Red Glare: Technology, Conflict, and Terror in the Soviet Union', Technology and Culture, 44, 3, 2003, pp. 470–501. For the best histories of the Katyusha launch system see A. N. Vasil'ev & V. P. Mikhailov, Raketnye puskovye ustanovki v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow, Nauka, 1991); P. A. Degtyarev & P. P. Popov, ‘Katyushi’ na pole boya (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1991). In August 1939, after a discussion on the merits of long‐range (50 kilometres and higher) liquid propellant projectiles, the technical council of the People's Commissariat of Munitions recommended developing them but the effort was suspended in 1941; ‘Postanovlenie Tekhnicheskogo soveta narkomata boepripasov sssr’, 23 August 1939, ARAN, r. 4, op. 14, d. 180, ll. 24–25. For a summary of liquid propellant rocket engine work at NII‐3 in the late 1930s and early 1940s see RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1182, ll. 44–45. According to the Yalta agreements in February 1945 the Soviet Union asked for 50% of $22 billion. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, DC, GPO, 1955). John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparation: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990); Matthias Judt & Burghard Ciesla (eds), Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945 (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996). For overall figures see GARF, f. 5446, op. 52, d. 2, ll. 45–116. See also I. V. Bystrova, Voenno‐promyshlennyi kompleks sssr v gody kholodnoi voiny (Moscow, IRI RAN, 2000), p. 30. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press, 1995), p. 169. D. A. Sobolev, Nemetskii sled v istorii sovetskoi aviatsii: ob uchastii nemetskikh spetsialistov v razvitii aviastroeniya v sssr (Moscow, Aviantik, 1996), p. 58. ‘Postanovlenie. Ob osobom komitete pri GOKO’, 25 February 1945, RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d.373, ll. 48–51. Other members were N. A. Bulganin, A. V. Khrulev, F. I. Vakhitov and N. A. Voznesensky. For a participant description of the fieldwork of the committee see K. I. Koval', ‘Zapiski upolnomochennogo GKO na territorii germanii’, Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, 1994, 3, pp. 124–147. The GOKO decree (no. 7563ss) on the permanent commissions was issued on 21 February 1945. Personnel assignments for the heads of these commissions were approved by 40 separate GOKO decrees (nos. 7646–7685) issued on 5 March 1945. These commissions, assigned to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts and the 1st Ukrainian front, were headed by P. M. Zernov, P. S. Kuchumov, G. I. Ivanovsky and M. Z. Saburov respectively; RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 376, ll. 84–88. See for example the cover letter and decree about moving equipment from a German factory in Mecklenburg that refers to information from a plenipotentiary of the GOKO and the request to have it moved by Chief Trophy Directorate under Vakhitov, ‘O vyvoze oborudovaniya s zavoda po proizvodstvu korpusov snaryadov v gor. Fyurtenberge/Meklenburg, Germaniya/’, 24 May 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1221, ll. 5–6. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 26, 179. The Soviet scientific commissions mirrored the American and British Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS and BIOS) teams which included armed services engineers, physicists, mathematicians, chemists and other specialised experts to evaluate the worth of German industry; John Gimbel, ‘Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 14, 3, 1990, pp. 343–366; John Farquharson, ‘Governed or Exploited? The British Acquisitions of German Technology, 1945–48’, Journal of Contemporary History, 32, 1997, pp. 23–42. RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 6313, ll. 5–6. The members of this team included G. N. Abramovich (Deputy Director, NII‐1), R.S. Ambartsumanyan (Deputy Director, VIAM), K.N. Surzhin (Deputy Director, TsAGI), V. V. Vladimirov (Deputy Director, TsIAM) and D. Zosim (Deputy Director, LII) and two professors from TsAGI, A. K. Martynov and K. A. Ushakov. A junior member of the team was B. E. Chertok, the future luminary of the Soviet space programme who recounted his experiences with the team in his famous memoirs; Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, pp. 40–70. Konstantin Kosminkov & Nikolai Valuev, ‘Nemetskoe vliyanie’, Mir aviatsii, 1997, 1, pp. 23–32. Petrov's team arrived at their first target, the Aviation Research Institute (Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt, DVL) at Adlershof, on 11 May 1945. The Abramovich team separated from the main Petrov group on 1 May 1945 and headed towards Peenemünde, arriving a few days later. Remarkably, Petrov had not heard from them as late as 15 May. The ‘new’ team under Isaev traveled along the following route: Peenemünde to Wasdorf near Berlin (location of BMW company facilities) to Berlin to Nordhausen. Besides A. M. Isaev, the team included V. F. Berglezov, A. I. Cheshkov, A. S. Kosyatov, A. V. Pallo, A. S. Raetsky, I. I. Raikov, A. M. Smirnov, A. A. Tolstov and L. I. Volkov; see A. L. Loktev, Nedavno eto bylo sekretom (Moscow, Put', 2001), pp. 78–79; Yu. A. Mozhorin (ed.), Dorogi v kosmos: II (Moscow, MAI, 1992), pp. 42–43. The Soviet authorities appear to have had no knowledge of Peenemünde before early 1945. A summary report on the German V‐1 and V‐2 rocket programme prepared in late 1944 makes no mention of the base; see ‘Spravka k voprosu ob organizatsii nauchno‐issledovatel’skoi raboty po reaktivnym boepripasam v Narkomate boepripasov', RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 42–40. Shakhurin to Malenkov, 8 June 1945, APRF, f. 3, op. 47, d. 182, ll. 70–72, reproduced in V. I. Ivkin, ‘Raketnoe nasledstvo fashistskoi germanii’, Voenno‐istoricheskii zhurnal, 1997, 3, pp. 31–41. Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 211, 264. Foreign forced labourers ran Nordwerk, while labour at Mittelwerk was split half‐and‐half between concentration camp prisoners and German civilians. The Germans (about 10,000) were employed by industrial contractors such as AEG, Siemens, Rheinmetall‐Borsig, Dinamit‐AG, Krupp and Telefunken. For Dora see Yves Béon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1997). Because of delays, the Allies agreed to postpone the date, at first, to 21 June and then, finally, to late July 1945. The transfer of the German Peenemünde team was carried under Project Paperclip, a project to bring German scientists and engineers to the US and at the same time deny their expertise to any other country, including the other Allies; Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York, Atheneum, 1971); Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston, Little, Brown, 1987); Gimbel, ‘Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War’. For Project Overcast see Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, pp. 37–42. Koval', ‘Zapiski upolnomochennogo GKO na territorii germanii’. K. I. Koval', ‘Rabota v germanii po zadaniyu GKO’, Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, 1995, 2, pp. 101–114. The US side completed its withdrawal from Thuringia and Saxony in accordance with the Yalta agreements by 3–4 July 1945; see Serov to Beriya, 9 July 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 395, ll. 28–31. A reconnaissance team from the 47th Guard Army of the Soviet occupation forces were the first to arrive at Nordhausen. See Zhukov, Telegin & Malinin, ‘Operativnaya direktiva komanduyushchego sovetskikh okkupatsionnykh voisk v germanii …’, 29 June 1945, TsAMO, f. 345, op. 5487, d. 335, ll. 198–201, reproduced in V. A. Zolotarev (ed.), Russkii arkhiv: velikaya otechestvennaya: bitva za Berlin, vol. 15 (4–5) (Moscow, Terra, 1995), pp. 430–431. Testimony of A. V. Pallo in Mozhorin (ed.), Dorogi v kosmos: II, p. 44. By late July 1945 the Soviet forces had only two models of the V‐2 in their possession, a very damaged crashed vehicle that was deposited at NII‐1 in Moscow and a second one found by the Abramovich team at Peenemünde, handed over to the artillery team under Maj.‐Gen. A. I. Sokolov; see ‘Dvigateli reaktivnykh artilleriiskikh snaryadov imeyushchiesya v NII‐1’, July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, 1. 235. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, pp. 104–109. Abramovich to Shakhurin, 31 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, ll. 23–28. The Abramovich team was joined by a second group of NII‐1 engineers (after the Isaev group) including L. S. Dushkin, A. A. Gukhman, G. F. Knorre and N. G. Chernyshev, who arrived in Germany in late July 1945. Dushkin was one of the most experienced liquid propellant rocket engineers in the Soviet Union at the time. The two top NKAP officials in Germany in June/July 1945 were N. P. Kuznetsov and Maj.‐Gen. P. Ya. Zalessky, who reported directly to NKAP Commissar Shakhurin. Abramovich's reports to Shakhurin were made independently of those submitted by Kuznetsov and Zalessky. For a participant view of the work of this commission see G. Tyulin, ‘Semerka’, Krasnaya zvezda, 1 April 1989. At the time, Maj.‐Gen. A. I. Sokolov was the Chief of the Directorate of Armaments of the Guards Mortar Units (GMCh). Other members of the commission included Lt.‐Col. G. A. Tyulin (the senior aide to the chief of the scientific‐technical department of the Main Directorate of Armaments of the GMCh), V. P. Barmin, E. Ya. Boguslavsky, M. S. Ryazansky and Yu. A. Pobedonostsev. In early 1944 Gaidukov had tabled a proposal to develop a long‐range ballistic missile using the reaction propulsion expertise of the (then) newly formed NII‐1 institute. He proposed setting up a design bureau in the Commissariat of Munitions to manage the programme. In effect he suggested merging the two technological trends of aviation and artillery. Malenkov rejected this proposal. See Gaidukov to Malenkov, 13 March 1944, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1182, ll. 1–2. G. V. Dyadin, D. N. Filippovykh & V. I. Ivkim, Pamyatnye starty (Moscow, TsIPK, 2001), pp. 44–45. N. S. Simonov, Voenno‐promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950‐e gody: tempy ekonomicheskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiya proizvodstva i upravlenie (Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1996), pp. 166–167. For Vannikov's memoirs on his wartime experiences see V. P. Nasonov (ed.), B. L. Vannikov: memuary, vospominaniya, stat'i (Moscow, TsNIIatominform, 1997). ‘Spravka k voprosu ob organizatsii nauchno‐issledovatel’skoi raboty po reaktivnym boepripasam v Narkomate boepripasov', undated, probably late 1944, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 42–40. GOKO decree no. 8101s issued on 12 April 1945 and NKB decree no. 136s issued on 17 April 1945 formally established the Tenth Main Administration of the People's Commissariat of Munitions whose task was to dismantle equipment from German industrial facilities. See for example the series of cover letters and decrees in May/June 1945 from Vannikov to Malenkov relating to artillery factories in Germany in RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1221, ll. 5–6, 68–70, 71–73, 77–79, 178–181. Vannikov, Shakhurin and Nosenko to Malenkov, 13 March 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1255, ll. 158–159. ‘GOKO Postanovlenie’, 19 April 1945, RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 402, 1. 102. The NKB order on the design bureau's creation was issued on 27 April 1945; RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1636, ll. 36–39. Vannikov to Malenkov, 11 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1256, l. 187. The GOKO decree no. 8823ss, issued on 31 May 1945, was titled ‘On Carrying Out Work on Detecting and Removing Factory and Laboratory Equipment, Blueprints and Experimental Models of German Reactive Projectiles’. Vannikov to Malenkov, 6 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1221, l. 52. The eventual site finalised by 22 June was around the old Factory No. 182 belonging to the Commissariat of Ship Building Industry in southern Makhach‐Kala in Dagestan; see Vannikov, Nosenko, Borisov, Goremykin to GOKO, 22 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1221, l. 136. See also the associated draft GOKO decree on l. 137. The letter and draft decree were prepared in updated form on 26 June; see ll. 154–155. The members were A. I. Shakhurin (NKAP), P. V. Dement'ev (NKAP), N. N. Voronov (NKO), N. D. Yakovlev (NKO), L. M. Gaidukov (NKO), P. N. Goremykin (NKB), D. F. Ustinov (NKV), G. G. Kabanov (NKEP), I. G. Zubovich (NKEP), M. G. Pervukhin (NKKhP), I. I. Nosenko (NKSP), V. P. Terent'ev (NKSP), P. I. Parshin (NKMV), Sloev (NKMV), A. K. Repin (VVS) and A. I. Berg (SR). Vannikov to Shakhurin, 23 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, ll. 149–152. For an earlier version of the draft see RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1221, ll. 231–233. In the revised proposal Vannikov suggested the following locations for the design bureaux: GTsKB No. 1 (branch of Factory No. 568), No. 2 (at Factory No. 67) and No. 3 (at Factory No. 70). For traditional concentration of Soviet R&D see Arthur J. Alexander, ‘Decision‐Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement’, Adelphi Paper, 147–148, Winter 1978–79, p. 23. Gaidukov to Malenkov, 26 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1259, ll. 275–276. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy: 1939–1956 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994); Von Hardesty, ‘Made in the U.S.S.R.’, Air & Space, February/March 2001, pp. 68–79. ‘Protokol zasedaniya komissii po reaktivnoi tekhnike ot 25.VII‐45g.’, 25 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, 11. 29–34. Berg to Shakhurin, 26 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, ll. 167–173. ‘Materialy k dokladu komissii po izucheniyu i osvoeniyu nemetskoi reaktivnoi tekhniki’, 4 August 1945, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 1146, ll. 41a–29. The document was formally issued the following day. ‘Skhema organizatsii rabot po izucheniyu i osvoeniyu nemetskoi reaktivnoi tekhniki’, July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, l. 21; ‘Klassifikatsiya reaktivnoi tekhniki’, July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, l. 22. ‘O meropriyatiyakh po izucheniyu i osvoeniyu nemetskoi reaktivnoi tekhniki’, August 1945, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 1146, ll. 28–22. The same can also be found in RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, ll. 14–20. The principal NKAP organisations mentioned in the decree were NII‐1 (Bibikov), TsAGI (Shishkin), TsIAM (Polikovsky), VIAM (Tumanov), LII (Chesalov) and Plants No. 26 (Klimov), 16 (Kolosov), 115 (Yakovlev), 155 (Mikoyan), 381 (Lavochkin) and 51 (Chelomei). The principal NKB organisations would be the new NII‐3 institute to oversee the whole long‐range missile project, a new firing range in Dagestan, the old GTsKB‐1 design bureau for solid propellant reactive projectiles, the new GTsKB‐2 for long‐range liquid propellant reactive projectiles (including the V‐2) and a new design bureau at Peenemünde for long‐range reactive projectiles. Gaidukov to Malenkov, 26 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1259, ll. 275–276. Beriya et al. to Stalin, 17 April 1946, APRF, f. 3, op. 47, d. 179, l. 29. The new commission appears to have been an expanded version of a smaller commission formed by GOKO decree no. 9475ss issued on 8 July 1945 that included L. M. Gaidukov (GAU), P. N. Goremykin (NKB), Ya. L. Bibikov (NKAP), I. G. Zubovich (NKEP) and Uger (unknown affiliation); see RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, l. 34. Shakhurin's deputy commissar V. P. Kuznetsov reported in mid‐July 1945 that Mittelwerk contained 1,900 metal‐cutting lathes, 70 presses, 39 items of mounting equipment, eight electric welding machines, 80 other pieces of equipment and 75 V‐2 engines in various states of preparedness. He also noted that all technical documentation had gone from the factory, apparently taken by the Americans; see Shakhurin to Malenkov, 18 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 6313, ll. 1–2; Dmitriev, Tsvetkov and Zalessky to Shakhurin, 31 July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 6313, l. 120. GOKO decree no. 9716 issued on 3 August 1945; see RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 6313, l. 156; RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 423, l. 147. A. A. Vekser, Raketa dal'nego deistviya Fau‐2 (po trofeinym materialam) (Moscow, Gosizoboronprom/NKAP, 1945). The monograph is stored in RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 90–57. The records of visitors to Stalin's office in 1945 do not indicate any personal meetings with Vannikov or Gaidukov, the two men most likely to lobby on behalf of long‐range missiles. Commissar Shakhurin met Stalin seven times in 1945 but, except for the first two times, all the meetings were on Soviet aviation. The first two meetings, in March and April 1945, took place before the missions into Germany. A. V. Korotkov, A. D. Chernev & A. A. Chernobaev, ‘Alfavitnyi ukazatel’ posetitelei kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1998, 4, pp. 40, 50. Gaidukov never met Stalin in 1945; Korotkov, Chernev & Chernobaev, ‘Alfavitnyi ukazatel’', p. 50. For accounts of this alleged meeting see Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, pp. 138–139. Roughly the same narrative is recounted in Yaroslav Golovanov, Korolev: Fakty i mify (Moscow, Nauka, 1994), pp. 361–362. Filippovykh recounts a meeting between Stalin and the Shakhurin commission in July 1945 but provides no evidence; Dyadin, Filippovykh & Ivkin, Pamyatnye starty, p. 64. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, p. 101. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 129; Mark Kramer, ‘Research Note: Documenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 266–271. The complete decree is reproduced in V. I. Ivkin, ‘Posle Khirosimy i Nagasaki: s chego nachinalsya yadernyi paritet’, Voenno‐istoricheskii zhurnal, 1995, 4, pp. 65–67. Vannikov tried to embrace civilian production; in January 1946 several agricultural factories from other commissariats were attached to NKB, which now became the Commissariat (and soon the Ministry) of Agricultural Machine Building so as to indicate its mostly civilian profile. Through the first half of 1946, however, the ministry was unable to handle the transition due to gross mismanagement; see V. S. Lel'chuk & M. A. Molodtsygin, ‘Poslevoennaya konversiya’, in V. S. Lel'chuk & E. I. Pivovar (eds), SSSR i kholodnaya voina (Moscow, Mosgorarkhiv, 1995), pp. 99–141. Direct work on the design bureau's 23 thematic projects began only in July 1945, one month after the arrival of the first missile documentation from Germany. According to the organisation's own accounting, it finished 47% of its assigned work, which included 15 design projects, by the end of 1945; see ‘Otchetnyi doklad o rabote za 1945 god po osnovnoi deyatel’nosti gosudarstvennogo tsentral'nogo konstruktorskogo byuro no. 1/GTsKB‐1', January 1946, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1636, ll. 36–37; Vannikov to Malenkov, 12 June 1945, RGAE, f. 7516, op. 1, d. 1256, 1. 136. The focus of work at GTsKB‐1 in 1945 was studying, reproducing and testing all German solid propellant missiles, including the Rheinbote; see ‘Spravka o rabotakh po reaktivnoi tekhnike na predpriyatiyakh NKB’, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 119–118. RGAE, f. 8495, op. 1, d. 1218, ll. 155–156. For the cover letter see Kirpichnikov, Vannikov et al. to Beriya, 22 November 1945, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 39–38. The Soviet government issued the jet aviation R&D plan on 17 April 1946; ‘K otchetu osobomu komitetu ob opytnykh rabotakh i osvoeniyu novoi tekhniki’, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 6683, ll. 13–14. ‘Ob organizatsii v Narkomate boepripasov nauchno‐issledovatel’skoi raboty po reaktivnoi tekhnike', RGAE, f. 4372, op. 94, d. 314, ll. 37–33. The decree stipulated the transfer of two research centres (personnel and equipment) from NKAP to the new GSNII‐70: the NII‐1 institute's Branch No. 1 based in Vladykino (headed by Yu. A. Pobedonostsev) and the OKB‐SD design bureau based in Khimki (headed by V. P. Glushko and including a group led by S. P. Korolev). Glushko offered his services as a leading engineer in the missile programme in a letter dated 23 November 1945 to Interdepartmental Commission Chairman L. M. Gaidukov; see V. F. Rakhmanin (ed.), Odnazhdy i navsegda …: dokumenty i lyudi o sozdatele raketnykh dvigatelei i kosmicheskikh sistem akademike Valentine Petroviche Glushko (Moscow, Mashinostroenie, 1998), pp. 195–197. ‘Spravka soglasovaniya proekta postanovleniya SNK SSSR’, 23 November 1945, RGAE. f. 94, d. 314, l. 28. The seed of the plot against Shakhurin dated to August 1945 when Stalin's son Vasilii wrote a letter to his father claiming that the aviation industry had delivered defective aircraft (like the Yak‐9) to the Red Air Force during the war, killing many pilots. The investigation took a darker turn when Abakumov used the circumstances in a plot to discredit Marshal Zhukov, whom Abakumov intensely disliked. After his arrest, Air Force Marshal Novikov provided ‘incriminating’ evidence against Zhukov under torture, which led to the Marshal's disgrace and exile; see I. N. Kosenko, ‘Taina “aviatsionnogo dela” ’, Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, 1994, 6, pp. 57–62; I. V. Bystrova, ‘Razvitie voenno‐promyshlennogo kompleksa’, in Lel'chuk & Pivovar (eds), SSSR i kholodnaya voina, p. 165. For a summary of the Commissariat of Armament's production activities during the war see RGAE, f. 4372, op. 77, d. 255, l. 108; Simonov, Voenno‐promyshlennyi kompleks sssr, pp. 158–162. The GOKO issued a decree on 10 June 1945 on the production of fire control radars, optical systems to control anti‐aircraft fire and synchronisation drives for ground anti‐aircraft artillery. Most of the major factories for these systems were under Ustinov's Commissariat of Armaments, which created a special subdivision, the Fourth Main Directorate, on 14 May 1945; see RGAE, f. 8157, op. 1, introductory essay. RGAE, f. 7572, 15 March 1946, op. 2, d. 1127, l. 32; Zhukov and Ryabikov to Zhukov, 1 January 1946, RGAE, f. 8157, op. 1, d. 1089, ll. 1–2. Ustinov to Shakhurin, July 1945, RGAE, f. 8044, op. 1, d. 1318, ll. 159–160. RGAE, f. 397, op. 1, d. 5, l. 3; Semenov (ed.), Raketno‐kosmicheskaya korporatsiya ‘Energiya’, p. 21; Loktev, Nedavno eto bylo sekretom, pp. 22–32, 41, 48. The director of the factory during the war was A. D. Kalistratov. Ustinov issued warnings to several of his factory directors for their inability to produce civilian equipment; see Simonov, Voenno‐promyshlennyi kompleks sssr, pp. 114, 118–119. RGAE, f. 8157, op. 1, d. 1001, ll. 179–181. The plan was issued on 30 March 1946; Semenov (ed.), Raketno‐kosmicheskaya korporatsiya ‘Energiya’, p. 22. Chertok also makes this point; see Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, pp. 139–140. Dyadin, Filippovykh & Ivkin, Pamyatnye starty, p. 71. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, p. 141. Beriya et al. to Stalin, 17 April 1946, APRF, f. 3, op. 47, d. 179, ll. 28–31; reproduced in Ivkin, ‘Raketnoe nasledstvo fashistskoi germanii’. Ibid. Korotkov, Chernev & Chernobaev, ‘Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina’, p. 123. M. F. Rebrov, ‘Chelovek iz epitsentr’, Krasnaya zvezda, 29 August 1997. Mikhail Pervov, Zenitnoe raketnoe oruzhie protivovozdushnoi oborony strany (Moscow, Aviarus‐XXI, 2001), p. 32. G. N. Pashkov, 1946, ‘Spravka o raznoglasiikh po reaktivnoi tekhnike po proektu osobogo razdela piatiletnogo plana’, RGAE, f.4372, op. 94, d. The decree was first openly published in two sources: ‘Voprosy reaktivnogo vooruzheniya’, in I. D. Sergeev (ed.), Khronika osnovnykh sobytii istorii raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo naznacheniya (Moscow, TsIPK, 1994), pp. 227–234; and V. I. Ivkin, ‘Kak sozdavalis’ raketnye voiska v sssr', Voenno‐istoricheskii zhurnal, 1995, 1, pp. 53–57. The original is in APRF, f. 93. Soviet industry formed the most important design bureau responsible for the development of liquid propellant rocket engines within the Ministry of Aviation Industry in 1946. In a similar vein, Winner has noted that ‘no idea is more provocative in controversies about technology and society than the notion that technical things have political qualities. At issue is the claim that the machines, structures, and systems of modern material culture can be accurately judged not only for their contributions to efficiency and productivity and their positive and negative environmental side effects, but also for the ways in which they can embody specific forms of power and authority’. Langdon Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 19–39.