Artigo Revisado por pares

A DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC INTUITIONISM

1984; Wiley; Volume: 15; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1467-9973.1984.tb00655.x

ISSN

1467-9973

Autores

Paul K. Moser,

Tópico(s)

Psychological and Educational Research Studies

Resumo

MetaphilosophyVolume 15, Issue 3-4 p. 196-209 A DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC INTUITIONISM PAUL K. MOSER, PAUL K. MOSER LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 6525 NORTH SHERIDAN ROAD CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60626 USASearch for more papers by this author PAUL K. MOSER, PAUL K. MOSER LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 6525 NORTH SHERIDAN ROAD CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60626 USASearch for more papers by this author First published: July 1984 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1984.tb00655.xCitations: 9AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Alston, William P. (1983), “What's Wrong With Immediate Knowledge?”, Synthese 55, pp. 73–95. Alston, William P. (1976), “Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access”, American Philosophical Quarterly 13, pp. 257–72. Annis, David B. (1982), “Epistemology Naturalized”, Metaphilosophy 13, pp. 201–8. Annis, David B. (1978), “A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, pp. 213–19. Armstrong, David M. (1973), Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Bonjour, Laurence (1980), “ Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Studies in Epistemology, pp. 53–74. Edited by Peter French et al. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press. Bonjour, Laurence (1978), “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, pp. 1–13. Bonjour, Laurence (1976), “The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies 30, pp. 281–312. Cornman, James (1980), Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. Dordrecht : D. Reidel. Ducasse, C.J. (1968), “ Objectivity, Objective Reference, and Perception”, in Ducasse, Truth, Knowledge, and Causation, pp. 90–131. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul. Firth, Roderick (1978), “ Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?”, in Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, pp. 215–29. Edited by A.I. Goldman, and, J. Kim. Dordrecht : D. Reidel. Goldman, Alvin I. (1979), “ What is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, pp. 1–24. Edited by G.S. Pappas. Dordrecht : D. Reidel. Lehrer, Keith (1974), Knowledge. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Mostofsky, David I. (1970), “ The Semantics of Attention”, in Attention: Contemporary Theory and Analysis, pp. 9–24. Edited by D. Mostofsky. New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts. Post, John F. (1980), “Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 38, pp. 31–52. Swain, Marshall (1981), Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca : Cornell University Press. Citing Literature Volume15, Issue3-4July 1984Pages 196-209 ReferencesRelatedInformation

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