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Belgium: Towards the Breakdown of a Nation-State in the Heart of Europe?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13537110903358689

1557-2986

Lieven De Winter, Pierre Baudewyns,

Political Systems and Governance

Abstract Due to reversal of the center-periphery cleavage between Flemish and Francophones by the 1960s, the Belgian unitary state was transformed gradually into a fully fledged federal state. In spite of this empowerment of the regions and communities, the aftermath of the June 2007 general elections showed that Belgium was moving into a crucial, and maybe final, phase of its community conflict. Conflicts over socioeconomic autonomy have replaced the original language issues, essentially opposing on the one hand the Francophones in Wallonia and Brussels unanimously defending the institutional status quo of the current federal state, and on the other hand most Flemish political elites calling for radical autonomy, and some even for independence. In the near future, undoubtedly more policy competences will be devolved, but this "lighter but fitter Belgium" outcome may not satisfy Flemish elites. Lieven De Winter is Senior Professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain, where he is director of the Centre de Politique Comparée and codirector of the Pôle Interuniversitaire sur l'Opinion publique et la Politique (PIOP). He is editor or coeditor of Non-state wide Parties in Europe (Barcelona: ICPS, 1995), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (Routledge, 1998), Autonomist Parties in Europe (ICPS, 2006), Elections: le reflux? Comportements et attitudes lors des élections en Belgique (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2007), and The Politics of Belgium (London: Routledge 2009). He is author of numerous journal articles and book chapters on political parties, legislatures and cabinets, public opinion, and Belgian politics. Pierre Baudewyns is Research Assistant at the Pôle Interuniversitaire sur l'Opinion publique et la Politique (PIOP) at the Université catholique de Louvain. He has published several articles on elections and political behavior in Belgium. He is working on survey methodology and public opinion within the Belgian regions. Notes 1. As it has been put, "Belgium can legitimately claim to be the most thorough example of consociational democracy, the type of democracy that is most suitable for deeply divided societies"; see Arend Lijphart (ed.), Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of Berkeley, 1981), p. 1. Lijphart also heralds Belgium, with Switzerland, as the best real-world approximation of the ideal type of a consensus democracy; see Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). 2. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan Schakel, "Patterns of Regional Authority," Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 18, Nos. 2–3 (2008), pp. 167–81. 3. Frans Schrijver, Regionalism after Regionalisation: Spain, France and the United Kingdom (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 4. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (eds.), The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism (London: Sage, 1982); André-Paul Frognier, "Application du modèle de Lipset et Rokkan à la Belgique," Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007), pp. 303–24; Vincent De Coorebyter, "Clivages et partis en Belgique," Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 2000 (2008), pp. 7–95. 5. Liesbet Hooghe, "Nationalist Movements and Social Factors: A Theoretical Perspective," in John Coakley (ed.), The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements (London: Sage, 1992). 6. Lieven De Winter, "Conclusion: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Office and Policy Success of Ethnoregionalist Parties," in Lieven De Winter and H. Türsan (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 204–47. 7. Certainly, one can apply a different periodization. Many authors writing entire volumes about the community conflict use more phases. Yet all consider the linguistic laws of 1962–63 and the federal constitution of 1993 as milestones in the Belgian community conflict; see Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (eds.), Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780–1995 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen, Political History of Belgium from 1830 onwards (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000); Xavier Mabille, Histoire politique de la Belgique, facteurs et acteurs de changement (Bruxelles: CRISP, 2001); Lode Wils, Histoire des nations belges: Belgique, Flandre, Wallonie: quinze siècles de passé commun (Bruxelles: Éditions Labor, 2005); Jos Bouveroux and Luc Huyse, Het onvoltooide Land (Leuven, Belgium: Van Halewyck, 2009). 8. The various dialects spoken in Flanders were standardized under the label Nederlands in 1844 by adopting the standard of the Dutch language used in the Netherlands. After the First World War, a small territory with a German-speaking population was added. This community now counts about 70,000 German speakers, less than 1% of the Belgian population. 9. The distribution of the Dutch- and French-speaking populations has always been a contested issue. Linguistic censuses have been held since 1842, but their methodology was questionable. After the First World War these censuses were used to determine the language regime of the communes along the linguistic border, especially in and around Brussels; Reginald de Schryver, Bruno de Wever, Gaston Durnez, Lieve Gevers, Pieter van Hees, and Machteld de Metsenaere (eds.), Nieuwe Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse Beweging (Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo, 1998). Given the politicization of "language counting," no more census data on the language use of Belgians have been published since 1954, when the final results of the 1947 census appeared. 10. It had already played the role of administrative center in the past when Belgian provinces were part of different empires. 11. In addition, there were religious differences between Flanders and Wallonia, with a very Catholic Flanders, and a Wallonia and Brussels more disposed towards anticlericalism. 12. This peripheral position of Flanders fits Rokkan and Urwin's definition (Politics of Territorial Identity, 1982, p. 5) of the center and the periphery well. They define the center as the "privileged location within a territory where key military/administrative, economic and cultural resource-holders most frequently meet; with established arenas for deliberations, negotiations and decision-making; where people convene for ritual ceremonies of affirmation of identity; with monuments that symbolize this identity; with the largest proportion of the economically active population engaged in the processing and communication of information and instructions over long distances. Centers, then, are both locations providing services and nodes in a communication network." On the other side, a periphery is defined as "dependent, controlling at best only its own resources and more exposed to fluctuations in long-distance markets; [it] is isolated from all other regions except the central one; and contributes little to the total flow of communication within the territory, with a marginal culture that is fragmented and parochial, yet not fully dominant across the politically defined territory" (ibid). Also, in Rokkan's terms, the initial territorial structure is clearly monocephalic, with political power and economic and cultural resources all highly concentrated in a well-defined and clearly prevailing geographical area. Initially, the Flemish periphery did not possess any political, economic, and cultural resources. Hence, Flanders in the nineteenth century was more peripheral than the industrial regions of, for instance, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland, or Wales. 13. Lode Wils, Van de Belgische naar de Vlaamse natie. Een geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging (Leuven, Belgium: Acco, 2009). 14. The name of the party referred to the war front where many Flemish soldiers had given their lives for their country while serving under officers who did not speak or understand their language. On the other hand, some Flemish nationalists had collaborated with the German occupiers, trying to achieve nationalist objectives that had been refused before the war, such as the conversion of the State University of Ghent into a Dutch-speaking one. 15. Consequently, the VNV captured most political and administrative positions in the occupied state. It also recruited Flemish volunteers to fight bolshevism with the German army and fully adopted national socialist ideology. 16. Luc Huyse and Steven Dhondt, Onverwerkt Verleden. Collaboratie en Repressie in België 1942–1952 (Leuven, Belgium: Kritak, 1991). 17. A new Flemish nationalist party, the Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie (Christian Flemish Peoples Union), was founded in 1954, but before 1965 it managed to capture only one or two seats. 18. Even though Dutch was recognized as an official language by the end of the century, it was not used in higher education in Flanders until 1930. 19. The "linguistic laws" of 1963 constituted the final step in this process. The process of assimilation to French was even reversed as the elites in Flanders gradually became Dutch speaking. 20. Wilfried Dewachter, Van oppositie tot elite. Over macht, visie en leiding (Leuven, Belgium: Acco, 2003). 21. Between 1945 and 1965, no reapportionment of seats according to voting population had occurred. 22. Michel Quévit, Les causes du déclin Wallon (Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1998). 23. Paul Delforge, Philipe Destatte, and Micheline Libon (eds.), Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon (Charleroi, Belgium: Institut Destrée, 2000). 24. In 1999, the effective number of parties reached its peak at 9.1; Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont, "Belgium: Party System(s) on the Eve of Disintegration?", in David Broughton and Marc Donovan (eds.), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1999), pp. 183–206. 25. De Winter and Dumont, "Belgium," pp. 183–206. 26. Lieven De Winter, "In Memoriam the Volksunie 1954–2001: Death by Overdose of Success," in Lieven De Winter, Marga Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Peter Lynch (eds.), Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage, vol. 2 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciènces Politiques i Socials, 2006), pp. 11–45. 27. Ruth Van Dyck and Jo Buelens, "Regionalist Parties in French-Speaking Belgium: The Rassemblement Wallon and the Front Démocratique des Francophones," in Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan, Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 51–69. 28. Chantal Kesteloot, Au nom de la Wallonie et de Bruxelles français. Les origines du FDF (Bruxelles: Complexe/CEGES, 2004). 29. Note that the Liberals initially split into three parties, including a Brussels Francophone wing that merged with the Walloon wing in 1979. For the specific circumstances of these splits and the evolution of the successor parties of these three party families, see Lieven De Winter, "Socialist Parties in Belgium," in José Maravall (ed.), Socialist Parties in Europe (Barcelona: Institut de Sciencies Politiques i Socials, 1991), pp. 123–56; Lieven De Winter, "Christian Democratic Parties in Belgium," in Mario Caciagli, Lieven De Winter, Alf Mintzel, Joan Culla, and Alain De Brouwer, Christian Democracy in Europe (Barcelona: Institut de Ciènces Politiques i Socials, 1992), pp. 29–54; Lieven De Winter, "Liberal Parties in Belgium: From Freemasons to Free Citizens," in Lieven De Winter (ed.), Liberalism and Liberal Parties in the European Union (Barcelona: Institut de Ciènces Politiques i Socials, 2000), pp. 141–82. 30. Lieven De Winter, Marga Gomez-Reino, and Jo Buelens, "The Extreme-Right Flemish-Nationalist Vlaams Blok," in Lieven De Winter, Marga Gomez, and Peter Lynch (eds.), Autonomist Parties, Vol. II (2006), pp. 47–78. 31. Benoit Rihoux, "Belgium: Greens in a Divided Society," in Dick Richardson and Christopher Rootes (eds.), The Green Challenge: The Development of Green Parties in Europe (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 91–108. 32. Lieven De Winter, Marc Swyngedouw, and Patrick Dumont, "Party System(s) and Electoral Behaviour in Belgium: From Stability to Balkanisation," in Marleen Brans, Lieven De Winter, and Wilfried Swenden (eds.), The Politics of Belgium (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 71–94. 33. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); see Lieven De Winter, "Multi-Level Party Competition and Coordination in Belgium," in Charley Jeffery and Dan Hough (eds.), Devolution and Electoral Politics (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 76–95. 34. Chantal Kesteloot, "The Growth of the Walloon Movement," in Kas Deprez and Louis Vos (eds.), Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780–1995 (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 139–52; Delforge, Destatte, and Libon, Encyclopédie. 35. The royal question arose from the attitude of Leopold III (1934–50) towards the Nazis during the Second World War, when he ordered the country's surrender in 1940 and remained captive throughout the war while a government in exile was formed in London. The question of his return after the war created a major division that brought the country to the brink of civil war. In a 1950 referendum on the issue, the North and the South voted differently, with a majority of Flemings (72%) in favor of the King, but only 42% of Walloons accepting this position. Leopold ultimately abdicated in favor of his son Baudouin. The school pact between the Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals was concluded in 1958 and brought to an end a conflict that had been simmering for 130 years, by providing for a package on the financing of Catholic schools. The culture pact was concluded between the same three traditional parties in 1974 and made large sums of money available to organizations of different pillars, imposing "pluralist" management on all publicly financed or subsidized entities, such as public radio and television, theatres and libraries, universities, school boards, sports organizations, tourism bodies, and museums. For the operation of the consociational model in respect of the Belgian community conflict, see Kris Deschouwer, "And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century," in Brans, De Winter, and Swenden, Politics of Belgium (2009), pp. 33–49; Jos Bouveroux and Luc Huyse, Het onvoltooide Land (Leuven, Belgium: Van Halewyck, 2009). 36. If at least three quarters of the members of a linguistic group introduce a motion to that effect on a specific bill, parliamentary procedure is suspended, and the Council of Ministers makes a judgement on the "alarm-bell" motion within 30 days, inviting the relevant chamber to reconsider in the light of this. In practice, this procedure has been used effectively only once, but it has been used more often as a threat, given the fact that once a conflict has reached this stage, it rings the funeral bells for the federal government too. There is also a procedure to govern cases of "conflict of interest" between federal or substate chambers. 37. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 38. Lieven De Winter and Marc Swyngedouw, "The Scope of EU Government," in Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (eds.), Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 47–73; Lieven De Winter, Marc Swyngedouw, and Bart Goeminne "The Level of Decision Making: The Preferences of the Citizens after Enlargement," in Jacques Thomassen (ed.), The Legitimacy of the European Union after Enlargement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 117–40. 39. During the 1970s and 1980s, the focus of conflict regarding the linguistic border was the commune of Voeren (Fourons in French), allocated to the Flemish Community in 1963 (Limburg province), but populated by a narrow majority of French speakers (57% in 1947, only 19% in 1930). In fact, the Walloon Socialists were happy to exchange rural, Catholic Voeren for the industrial communes of Comines and Mouscron. The Fourons French speakers regularly violated the monolingual Dutch status of this commune (while enjoying facilities) and wanted to protect their linguistic rights by reattaching their commune to the French-speaking province of Liège. The Voeren question regularly cropped up on the national political agenda, and a few governments fell over the issue. Since the 1990s, the issue has lost momentum. Dutch immigrants—having received local suffrage since the Maastricht Treaty (1992)—toppled the political majority in the local council in favor of the Flemish, thus eliminating the town hall as a legitimate institutional power base for Francophone resistance. 40. Other models include a "federal district" status for Brussels, a merger between the Walloon and Brussels regions, or even a "District of Europe"; see Nicolas Lagasse, "Gouverner Bruxelles. Règles en vigueur et débat," Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 1628–1629 (1999). 41. Belgium has not yet ratified the cadre convention on the protection of national minorities of the Council of Europe. The Flemish still refuse to recognize the Francophones in the Brussels periphery as a national minority. 42. This fear of further assimilation in and around Brussels is reinforced by the extension of local suffrage to EU citizens since 2000, under the Maastricht Treaty, and to non-EU legally established migrants (law of 2004). Since these groups are much more likely to use French than Dutch, this is likely to further reinforce the predominance of the Francophone parties. In several communes, the local council no longer includes any Flemish councillor (and thus neither a Flemish alderman nor a representative in the management of the administratively important Commission Publique d'Assistance Sociale, (CPAS)). 43. One of the recurrent complaints of the Flemish minority is that the doctors and nurses of the public (and particularly private) hospitals and pensioners' homes are not (or not sufficiently) bilingual; Jean-Paul Nassaux, "Les relations communautaires à l'Assemblée réunie de la Commission communautaire commune," Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 1633– 634 (1999). 44. In fact, the requirement of bilingualism for all Brussels civil servants is quite beneficial for the Flemish population, which tends to be more fluent in both national languages. Hence, many "Brussels" jobs are occupied by Flemish workers, who commute daily to Brussels from all over Flanders. 45. Note that redistribution occurs not only between north and south, but in other directions as well. Capron's detailed analyses based on the difference between gross and net income per capita, which constitutes a rough indicator of interregional transfers, showed that (in 2003) the difference for the inhabitants of the Flemish region was 108.1 versus 105.5, for Wallonia 86.2 versus 90.6, and for Brussels 97.5 versus 98.1 (Belgium = 100). However, in pure terms of regional economic performance, that is, in terms of gross regional product, Brussels is far ahead of the other two regions with 200.5, by contrast to 99.0 for Flanders and 71.8 for Wallonia, due to the fact that many Flemish and Walloons gain their income in the Brussels region. Hence, Brussels politicians call for a tax regime that is based less on the current system of income tax (collected at the level of the commune of residence), and more on the commune of employment (where this income is earned). In addition, Capron demonstrates that several Flemish arrondissements (administrative and statistical units) are net receivers, while some Walloon arrondissements are net contributors; see H. Capron, "Croissance et développement spatial inégal des regions," in B. Bayent, H. Capron, and P. Liégeois (eds.), L'espace Wallonie-Bruxelles. Voyage au bout de la Belgique (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2007), pp. 199–225. 46. Alain Destexhe, Alain Eraly, and Eric Gillet, Démocratie ou particratie? 120 propositions pour refonder le système belge (Bruxelles: Editions Labor, la Noria, 2003). 47. At the 2003 general elections, four Flemish parties could hope to claim leadership: the Liberals with 25 MPs, the Socialists with 23, the Christian Democrats with 21, and the Vlaams Blok with 18. The last of these, however, remained "uncoalitionable"—excluded by other parties on ideological grounds as a potential coalition partner. 48. The Liberals changed from Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (Party for Liberty and Progress) into the Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish Liberals and Democrats) in 1992; the Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian Peoples Party) became Christen Democratisch en Vlaams (Christian Democratic and Flemish) in 2001. 49. In addition, the Flemish minister-president Yves Leterme made several insulting comments about Walloon profiteerism and Francophones' intellectual incapacity to learn Dutch. Hence, while he gradually became the most popular politician in Flanders (as shown when he won 800,000 personal votes at the 2007 federal elections), his popularity among Francophones was nil, a serious handicap when he was in the process of forming a federal government. 50. The Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO) at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Pôle Interuniversitaire Opinion publique et Politique (PIOP) at the Université Catholique de Louvain have been conducting postelectoral and longitudinal surveys since 1991 (for methods, data, and publications, see www.ispo.be and www.piop.be); see Pierre Baudewyns, Daniel Bol, Virginie Van Ingelgom, and Caroline Van Wynsberghe, Questions de société et comportement electoral, PIOP Working paper 2008/3; available www.uclouvain.be/261359.html; Marc Swyndegouw, Politieke kwesties en stemgedrag, Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO), Onderzoeksverslag, CeSO/ISPO/2008-9 (2008); available soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/onderzoek/9/pdf/Politieke_kwesties_en_stemgedrag_Swyngedouw.pdf [accessed 16 Nov. 2009]. 51. Lieven De Winter, "La recherche sur les identités ethno-territoriales en Belgique," Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2007), pp. 575–96; Lieven De Winter, "Les identités territoriales: 25 ans d'évolution," in André-Paul Frognier, Lieven De Winter, and Pierre Baudewyns (eds.), Elections: le reflux? Comportements et attitudes lors des élections en Belgique (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2007), pp. 141–56; Marc Swyngedouw and Nathalie Rink, Hoe Vlaams-Belgischgezind zijn de Vlamingen?, Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO), Onderzoeksverslag CeSO/ISPO/2008-6 (2008); available soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/onderzoek/9/pdf/ISPO07vlaanderenbelgie.pdf [accessed 16 Nov. 2009]; André-Paul Frognier, Lieven De Winter and Pierre Baudewyns, Les Wallons et la réforme de l'Etat. Une analyse sur la base de l'enquête post-électorale de 2007, Document de travail du PIOP, 2008; available www.uclouvain.be/209208.html/ [accessed 16 Nov. 2009]. 52. André-Paul Frognier and Lieven De Winter, "Les Belges et le Fédéralisme. Les leçons des enquêtes de 1970 à 2007," in Régis Dandoy, Geoffroy Matagne, and Caroline Van Wynsberghe, Le fédéralisme belge (Bruxelles: Academia Bruylant, forthcoming) 53. For instance, during the campaign for federal elections, no debates are organized between Flemish and Francophone politicians; see Marc Lits, "Media in Belgium: Two Separate Public Opinions," E-book Rethinking Belgium, 2009; available www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-files/ebooks/ebook-3/Lits.pdf [accessed 16 Nov. 2009]. French newspapers are hardly read in the Flemish side of the country and vice versa. The same applies to radio and television news. Topics differ in saliency; see Dave Sinardet, Knut de Swert, and Régis Dandoy, "Les sujets des journaux télévisés Francophones et flamands: une comparaison longitudinale," Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 1864 (2005). Even interview styles differ; see Martina Temmerman and Dave Sinardet, "Political Journalism across the Language Border: Communicative Behaviour in Political Interviews by Dutch- and French-Speaking Journalists with Dutch- and French-Speaking Politicians in Federal Belgium," in Jeroen Darquennes (ed.), Multilingualism and Applied Comparative Linguistics: Vol. 2: Cross-Cultural Communication, Translation Studies and Multilingual Terminology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), pp. 110–38. 54. Lits, Media in Belgium, pp. 43–7. 55. Bernadette Bawin-Legros, Liliane Voyé, Karel Dobbelaere, and Mark Elchardus (eds.), Belge toujours. Fidélité, stabilité, tolérance. Les valeurs des Belges en l'an 2000 (Bruxelles: De Boeck Université, 2001); Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens, and André-Paul Frognier, "Does Belgium (still) Exist? Differences in Political Culture between Flemings and Walloons," in Marleen Brans, Lieven De Winter, and Wilfried Swenden, Politics of Belgium (2009), pp. 50–70; Nicole Voss and Pierre Lebrun, Divergences et Convergences Régionales en Belgique. Les Wallons et les Flamands à l'épreuve des 275 questions de l'European Social Survey (Bruxelles: Academie Royale des Sciences et des Lettres de Belgique, 2006). 56. The employers are more divided, given the fact that a minority of Flemish entrepreneurs have embraced the idea of Flemish independence and support separatist think tanks and even separtist political parties. These entrepreneurs hope that an independent Flanders would be more entrepreneur friendly, with lower taxes and wages, weaker trade unions, and more efficient public services. 57. At the June regional elections of 2009, the parties that defended the independence option (N-VA, Vlaams Belang, and Lijst De Decker) totalled about 35% of Flemish voters (although many of them are not motivated by community issues). 58. This is one of the reasons that the Flemish leadership decided to make Brussels the capital of the Flemish region and community, rather than selecting a provincial capital within Flemish territory. 59. On the other hand, as in many other countries, European integration has also boosted the independence option of Flemish ethnoregionalist parties; Lieven De Winter and Marga Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, "European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties," Party Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2002), pp. 483–503.