Artigo Revisado por pares

The Production of Territory in North Korea: ‘Security First, Economy Next’

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 19; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14650045.2013.847432

ISSN

1557-3028

Autores

Seung‐Ook Lee,

Tópico(s)

Asian Industrial and Economic Development

Resumo

Abstract One of the prevalent stereotypes about North Korea is that it is the world's most isolated country. This view derives from North Korea's ruling ideology – juche – which calls for territorial isolation from external influences. For this reason, any territorial strategy like the introduction of special economic zones is generally regarded as an inevitable economic choice forced upon it. However, I argue that it is not that North Korea has no choice but to open its territory due to economic suffering but that North Korea's own territorial imperative, 'security first, economy next,' determines how it produces territory. To do so it deploys various territorial strategies such as de-bordering, re-bordering, and zoning. In this sense, North Korea's production of territory manifests Jean Gottmann's idea of territory first as shelter for security and next as a springboard for opportunity. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Katherine Bennett, Mat Coleman, Nicolle Etchart, Hyeseon Jeong, Will Jones, Joel Wainwright, and anonymous reviewers for their critical and valuable comments. Notes 1. Though the term 'juche' is untranslatable and inaccessible to the non-Korean, it is generally translated into 'independence', 'self-reliance', 'autonomy', and 'subjective entity'; B. Cumings, 'The Corporate State in North Korea', in H. Koo (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993) p. 214; B. Koh, 'North Korea and its Quest for Autonomy', Public Affairs 38/3 (1965) p. 294. 2. Y. Kwon, 'Dear Leader Plays It Smart', Asia Times, 2 Sep. 2011, available at , accessed 15 April 2013; D. Nanto and E. Chanlett-Avery, 'North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis', Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RN32493 (4 June 2009). 3. H. Wang, The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity (London and New York: Verso 2011) p. 41. 4. B. Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York and London: The New Press 2004) p. 5. 5. J. Gottmann, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia 1973) p. 14. 6. See, for example: J. MacLeavy and J. Harrison, 'New State Spatialities: Perspectives on State, Space, and Scalar Geographies', Antipode 42/5(2010) pp. 1037–1046; S. Reid-Henry, 'The Territorial Trap Fifteen Years On', Geopolitics 15/4 (2010) pp. 752–756. 7. Some geographers cite Gottmann's concept of territory but without substantial discussions on the idea itself; J. Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95/2 (2005) pp. 437–461; S. Elden, 'Land, Terrain, Territory', Progress in Human Geography 34/6 (2010) pp. 799–817; R. Johnston, 'Out of the 'Moribund Backwater': Territory and Territoriality in Political Geography', Political Geography 20/6 (2001) pp. 677–693; A. Murphy, 'Entente Territorial: Sack and Raffestin on Territoriality', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30/1 (2012) pp. 159–172; S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval To Global Assemblages (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006). For instance, Raffestin confesses that "I would not be able to say if I have drawn the idea of territory from him, but it is quite probable that he influenced me"; C. Raffestin, 'Space, Territory, and Territoriality', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30/1 (2012) p. 125. Like this statement, those who refer to Gottmann appreciate his contribution as 'a more historically sensitive treatment of territory'; Murphy (op. cit., p. 161). Yet they just show limited engagement in Gottmann's idea. In particular, his analysis of political economy of the production of territory has not received due attention. Instead, Gottmann is best known for his works in urban geography especially his concept of the megalopolis; J. Gottmann, Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961). Muscara claims that his outstanding achievement in urban geography may have hidden his contributions to political geography; L. Muscara, 'Jean Gottmann's Atlantic 'Transhumance' and the development of his spatial theory', Finisterra 13/65 (1998) p. 160. 8. A host of discussions increasingly contribute to contesting the territorial dimensions of sovereignty (e.g., J. Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95/2 (2005) pp. 437–461; A. Ong, 'Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia', Theory, Culture & Society 17/4 (2000) pp. 55–75). Especially, Agnew's new notion of 'sovereignty regimes' or Ong's 'graduated sovereignty' may shed new light on North Korea's changing territorialisation of sovereignty. Due to limited space, this paper cannot elaborate a detailed discussion. 9. Gottmann, The Significance (note 5) p. x. 10. Ibid., pp. 17–24. 11. J. Gottmann, 'The Evolution of the Concept of Territory', Social Science Information 16/3 (1975) p. 33. 12. J. Gottmann, 'The Basic Problem of Political Geography: The Organization of Space and the Search for Stability', Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 73/6 (1982) p. 346. 13. J. Gottmann, 'Spatial Partitioning and the Politician's Wisdom', International Political Science Review 1/4 (1980) p. 437. 14. Gottmann, The Significance (note 5) p. 7. 15. Ibid., p. 134. 16. Ibid., pp. 155–157; J. Gottmann, Center and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics (Beverly Hills and London: SAGE Publications 1980) p. 224. 17. Gottmann, The Significance (note 5) p. 52. 18. R. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1986) p. 64. 19. Gottmann, The Significance (note 5) p. 154. 20. J. Gottmann, 'Space, Freedom, and Stability', International Political Science Review 5/2 (1984) p. 119 21. G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998); S. Žižek, S, 'How to Begin from the Beginning', New Left Review 57 (2009) pp. 43–55. 22. H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing 1991). 23. Gottmann, 'The Evolution' (note 11) p. 31. 24. Gottmann, The Significance (note 5) p. 123. 25. Ibid., p. 20. 26. This research relies on a mixed methodology of archival analysis and semi-structured interviews with key informants in North Korea, South Korea, and China. For this, I conducted more than a year of fieldwork in Northeast Asia. In China, I took advantage of the vast resources at Jilin University (one of the leading institutions for the study of North Korea). As an advanced research scholar, I interacted with scholars and government officials who engage in China's North Korea policies as well as journalists and businessmen who are well informed about North Korea. Also, I visited North Korea two times, in 2009 and 2011. I collected governmental documents, research reports, and press releases which allowed me to examine the changes in the official policies of North Korea. I also conducted interviews with researchers and governmental officials there to probe the processes which operate in particular contexts but cannot be completely explained through archival research. These archival and interview data from the North are cross-checked with those from China and South Korea. 27. D. Kang, 'North Korea: Deterrence through Danger', in M. Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998) p. 236. 28. B. Cumings, Domination from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2009). 29. Ibid., p. 395; Cumings explicates that this novel phenomenon in the late twentieth century, which is distinctively different from previous colonial empires, reveals that the US "runs a territorial empire – the archipelago of somewhere between 737 and 860 overseas military installations around the world, with American military personnel operating in 153 countries"; Ibid., p. 393. 30. B. Cumings, 'Fear and Loathing on the Pyongyang Trail: North Korea and the United States', Japan Focus, 12 Dec. 2005, available at , accessed 6 April 2013. 31. N. Eberstadt, 'What Is Wrong with the North Korean Economy', American Enterprise Institute Policy Studies, 1 July 2011, available at , accessed 26 March 2013. 32. K. Dawnay, 'China's North Korea Double Bind', Current Intelligence, 29 Nov. 2010, available at , accessed 18 April 2013. 33. B. Cumings, 'The Kims' Three Bodies: Toward Understanding Dynastic Succession in North Korea', in K.-A. Park and S. Snyder (eds.), North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2013) pp. 77–78. See also Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (note 4) p. 87; K. Gordy and J. Lee, 'Rogue Specters: Cuba and North Korea at the Limits of US Hegemony', Alternatives 34 (2009) p. 231. 34. S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2007) p. 81. 35. Kang, 'North Korea' (note 27) p. 243. Neither China nor the Soviet Union deeply engaged in the Vietnam War. For this reason, North Korea did not have faith in the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty and the Soviet–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, both of which were signed in 1961 to guarantee regime security; J. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011) p. 60. According to the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center, North Korean troops were in conflict with Chinese in the border regions in March 1969, and the two countries were on the verge of war; B. Schaefer, 'North Korean 'Adventurism' and China's long shadow, 1966-1972', Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper 44 (2004). Shanghai-based North Korean expert, Dingli Shen says, "North Korea never relies on alliance and never trusts security assurance. It believes that its destiny is only in its own hands []"; D. Shen, 'The Withdrawal from Six-Party Talks Is North Korea's Realistic Inevitabilities []', Oriental Morning Post [], 15 April 2009, available at , accessed 3 April 2013 (in Chinese). 36. J. Cai, 'The North Korea Nuclear Crisis and the Changing Sino-DPRK Relationship', Asian Perspective 34/1 (2010) p. 139. 37. Kim Jong Il, 'Let's Fight Together Uniting Behind Our Party for a New Victory ', Kim Jong Il Sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Jong Il) 14 (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa 1995) (in Korean) . 38. Y.-S. Oh and J.-S. Bae, 'A Study on North Korea's Legal System on Foreign Investment', in Ministry of Government Legislation (ed.), 2004 Legal Sourcebook on the North Korean Economy (Seoul: Ministry of Government Legislation 2004) p. 158 (in Korean). 39. Y.-S. Dong, 'Special Economic Zones, which Ended up as a Point, Can Be Extended into a Line and a Surface?', Pressian, 1 May 2006, available at <http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=60060427112315&Section=>, accessed 11 April 2013 (in Korean). 40. International Crisis Group, 'North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?', Asia Report 96 (2005) p. 3. 41. Y. Chung, North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and 'Silli (practical) Socialism' (Seoul: Sunin 2004) p. 158 (in Korean); Y.-C. Kim, North Korea's Industrialization and Economic Policy (Seoul: Yeoksabipyungsa 2001) p. 322 (in Korean). 42. Kim Il Sung, 'New Year's Address ', Kim Il Sung jojakjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) 17 (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa 1963) no page, my emphasis (in Korean); Kim Jong Il, 'About the Improvement and Reinforcement of Management Project for National Territory []', Kim Jong Il Sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Jong Il) 8 (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa 1984) no page, my emphasis (in Korean). 43. Yonhap News Agency, North Korean Handbook (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2003) p. 676, my emphasis. 44. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby, 'Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics', Rethinking Geopolitics (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p. 4. 45. C.-W. Jung, A Guidebook on Chosun Investment Laws (Pyongyang: Bubryul Chulpansa 2007) p. 31 (in Korean). 46. International Crisis Group (note 40) p. 10. 47. J. Jo and C. Ducruet, 'Rajin-Seonbong, New Gateway of Northeast Asia', Annals of Regional Science 41/4 (2007) p. 929. 48. Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (note 4) p. 51. 49. For instance, it is widely known that the Clinton administration seriously considered an air strike on the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea in the summer of 1994; 'Washington Was on Brink of War with North Korea 5 Years Ago', CNN, 4 Oct. 1999, available at , accessed 15 April 2013. 50. V. Cha and N. Anderson, 'A North Korean Spring?', The Washington Quarterly 35/1 (2012) p. 7. 51. S. Hecker, 'Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crisis', Dædalus 2/4 (2010) p. 49; R. Kim, 'The Great Leader Kim Jong Il's Immortal Achievement to Arrange a Spring Board for the Construction of Socialist Economic Power', Kyongje Yongu [Economic Studies] 142 (2009) p. 2 (in Korean). 52. Y. Chung, 'The Hypothesis of North Korean Collapse Is Haunting Like a Specter: Is '3·3·3 Hypothesis' Reviving?', Pressian, 7 April 2010, available at , accessed 29 March 2013 (in Korean). 53. Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (note 4) p. 65. 54. Kim Jong Il, 'The Songun Revolution Line Is the Greatest Revolutionary Line in Our Era and an Ever-Victorious Banner of Our Revolution [ ]', Kim Jong Il Sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Jong Il) 15 (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa 2003) p. 355 (in Korean). 55. M. Park, 'The Fundamental Economic Principles of Socialism and its Realization in the Economic Construction in the Songun Era', Kyongje Yongu [Economic Studies] 120 (2003) p. 12 (in Korean). 56. 'Sino-DPRK Exchange Good for World', Global Times, 21 May 2011, available at , accessed 12 April 2013. 57. Despite ongoing advice from Chinese leaders to introduce economic reform, North Korea refused for the reason of security: "When North Korea's Kim Young Nam visited Beijing in 1999, Chairman Jiang Zemin suggested conducting economic reform so as to promote economic growth, but Kim responded that national defense was still the number one priority for North Korea"; Z. Xizhen and E. Brown, 'Policies toward North Korea: A Time for New Thinking', Journal of Contemporary China 9/25 (2000) p. 542. In a personal interview with a North Korean governmental official, she acknowledged that people at first did not understand Kim Jong Il's call to prioritise national defence and security when the food crisis was extreme. She said that this confusion was attributable to the fact that government had guaranteed everything people needed before the crisis. 58. At times of security crises, North Korea has strengthened export controls and even closed the border; C. Freeman and D. Thompson, 'China on the Edge: China's Border Provinces and Chinese Security Policy', The Center for the National Interest and Johns Hopkins SAIS, 8 April 2011, p. 35. 59. N.-J. Lee, 'Rising China and the Korean Peninsula: Beyond the Dichotomy between Opportunity and Threat', available at , accessed 22 March 2013 (in Korean). 60. A. Lankov, 'Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002–08 and Attempts to Reverse De-Stalinization from Below', Asia Policy 8/1 (2009) p. 56. 61. Cumings, Domination (note 28) p. 401. 62. Kim Jong Il, 'Let's Make this year Glorious as a Year of Great Transformation for the Construction of Strong, Prosperous, and Great Country [ ]', Kim Jong Il Collection 14 (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa 1999) (in Korean) p. 452. 63. Nanto and Chanlett-Avery (note 2) p. 7. 64. S. Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009) p. 124. 65. D. Kang, 'They Think They're Normal', International Security 36/3 (2011) pp. 142–171; F. Ruediger, 'Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998–2004): Systemic Restrictions, Quantitative Analysis, Ideological Background', Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 10/3 (2005) pp. 278–311; G. Toloraya, 'The New Korean Cold War and the Possibility of Thaw', Japan Focus, 9 May 2009, available at , accessed 19 April 2013. 66. National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House 2002) p. 14. 67. Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (note 4) p. 91. 68. S.-C. Park, 'The Legitimacy of Our Party's Economic Policy to Build Up Basic Industry, a Priority in the Contemporary People's Economy', Kyongje Yongu [Economic Studies] 149 (2010) p. 4 (in Korean). 69. Both SEZs are now being suspended. Mt. Kumgang was shut down by the South Korean government in October 2008 after the shooting death of a South Korean tourist by a North Korean guard. The North pulled out its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex in April 2013 in the midst of escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula. 70. S. Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press 2009) p. 65. 71. 'Transcript: North Korea interview', BBC, 6 Feb. 2003, available at , accessed 19 April 2013. 72. S.-J. Lee, 'About DPRK Songun Politics and Peace, Security, and Development of Northeast Asia', The Tumen River Academic Forum, 1–2 Nov. 2010, p. 219 (in Korean). Some Chinese scholars also share this view: "North Korean leaders have always been fearful of their security, and these fears were exacerbated by the American invasion of Iraq. Pyongyang believes that if Saddam Hussein had had nuclear weapons at his disposal, the United States would not have dared to attack and topple his regime"; Cai (note 36) p. 142. 73. K.-s. So, 'Situation in the Korean Peninsula – A North Korean Perspective', PacNet 55 (6 Aug. 2009), available at , accessed 11 April 2013. 74. Y. Ji, 'Dealing with 'North Korea Dilemma: China's Strategic Choice', RSIS Working Paper 229 (2011) pp. 15–16; X. Zhang, 'China and the North Korean Nuclear Issue', in A. Ojeda and A. Hidalgo (eds.), North Korea and Regional Security (Madrid: Editorial Verbum 2006) p. 132. 75. M. Fitzpatrick, 'North Korean Security Challenges: A New Assessment', International Institute for Strategic Studies, Launch Statement (21 July 2011); S. Snyder, 'Responses to North Korea's Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?', The Washington Quarterly 30/4 (2007) pp. 33–43. 76. Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (note 4) pp. 101–102. 77. S. Yu, 'The DPRK Nuclear Issue During the Obama Administration', China International Studies 18 (2009) p. 155. 78. D. Shen, 'Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea', The Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009) p. 183. 79. J. Feffer, 'Why 2012 Will Shake Up Asia and the World: Can Washington Move from Pacific Power to Pacific Partner?', TomDispatch.com, 4 Oct. 2011, available at , accessed 4 April 2013. 80. DPRK Foreign Ministry, 'Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces US Military Attack on Libya', Korean News Service, 22 March 2011, available at , accessed 30 March 2013. 81. Y. Su, 'North Korea Takes Aim at Foreign Investors', Asia Times, 24 May 2011, available at , accessed 18 April 2013. In a similar vein, Delury and Moon argue that "if Kim Jong Il could claim nothing else, he did achieve at least one thing for North Korea – the ultimate 'strength' of nuclear deterrence. Now, it's up to his son Kim Jong Eun to achieve the other half of the equation: prosperity"; J. Delury and C.-i. Moon, 'The Death of Kim Jong Il: Now What?', Global Asia Forum (2011), available at , accessed 4 April 2013. 82. Ibid. 83. See more in S.-H. Yoon and S.-O. Lee, 'From Old Comrades to New Partnerships: Dynamic Development of Economic Relations between China and North Korea', The Geographical Journal 179/1 (2013) pp. 19–31. 84. A host of scholars and media argue that this joint development will lead to the North following the Chinese reform model; J. Anderlini and C. Oliver, 'China to Develop N Korea Trade Zones', The Financial Times, 9 June 2011, available at , accessed 10 Aug. 2013; 'Comrades in alms [sic]', China Economic Review, 26 March 2013, available at , accessed 11 Aug. 2013. Yet, North Korea's territorial logics are different from China's recent territorial strategies; see Yoon and Lee (note 83). 85. Kim Jong-un also emphasises the same logic in territorial policies. In a recent speech, he asserted that the struggles to develop the economy and improve people's lives would be effective only after they are guaranteed by strong military and nuclear power; 'The Report that Marshal Kim Jong-un Made at the March 2013 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea', The Chosun Sinbo, 2 April 2013, available at , accessed 29 Aug. 2013. 86. S. Choi, 'Changsung County, Shining Example of … ?', DailyNK, 9 Aug. 2012, available at , accessed 20 Aug. 2013 (in Korean); C.-H. Chung, 'Will the 'Revival of the Local Economy' Succeed?', Tongilnews, 15 July 2013, available at , accessed 20 Aug. 2013 (in Korean). 87. 'DPRK Law on Economic Development Zones Enacted', KCNA, 5 June 2013, available at , accessed 20 June 2013. 88. C. Kim, 'The Ground-Breaking Ceremony for Sinuiju SEZ Is Imminent?', Minjog 21 148 (2013) pp. 34–39 (in Korean). 89. S. Sassen, 'When National Territory Is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings', New Political Economy 10/4 (2005) p. 527. 90. Kim (note 34) p. 83.

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