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Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636412.2011.572671

1556-1852

Jonathan N. Brown, Anthony Marcum,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Abstract We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders' behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes. We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders' ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions' view. A reassessment of us-ussr diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the conventional wisdom, indicates the plausibility of our theory in the context of security crises. Acknowledgments Jonathan N. Brown is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His dissertation is on leaders' use of secrecy in pursuit of controversial security cooperation, with a focus on the establishment of the us overseas military basing system. Anthony S. Marcum is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His dissertation is on the role of domestic politics in the postwar relations of states, with a focus on leaders' decisions to employ and maintain military occupations against their opponents. The authors thank Jacob Aaronson, Sarah Croco, Alma Gottlieb-McHale, Nick Grossman, Paul Huth, Scott Kastner, Cyanne Loyle, Jesse Mathewson, George Quester, the editors, and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback. Earlier drafts were presented at University of Maryland workshops and recent annual conferences of the International Studies Association and the International Studies Association—Northeast. A previous version of this article received the 2009 Alexander George Award from the International Studies Association for the best graduate student paper presented on a Foreign Policy Analysis section panel. Notes 1See, for example, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics," American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 30. 2James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92; James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90; Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (September 1998): 623–38; Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002): 175–200. 3Joe Eyerman and Robert A. Hart, Jr., "An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder than Words," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 597–616; Peter J. Partell and Glenn Palmer, "Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (June 1999): 389–405; Christopher Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94," American Political Science Review 95, no. 3 (September 2001): 633–47; Brandon C. Prins, "Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816–1992," Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1 (January 2003): 67–84; Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," International Organization 61, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 821–40. 4Branislav L. Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (June 2006): 445–77; Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 35–64. 5Matthew A. Baum, "Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in u.s. Foreign Policy Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (October 2004): 603–31; David Stasavage, "Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining," International Organization 58, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 667–703; Shuhei Kurizaki, "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy," American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (August 2007): 543–58; Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoğlu, "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (September 2009): 817–39. 6See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2003); Roger B. Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (February 2008): 125–39; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs"; Milan V. Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 477–94. 7Kenneth A. Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (February 2001): 32–60. 8Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1, Political Science: Scope and Theory, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, ma: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2005), 120–23. 9Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 104, 109, 118, n. 33. 10John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 78. 11Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, d.c.: Brookings, 1994), 92. 12Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 180. 13Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 202. 14On the mid dataset, see Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 163–213; Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The mid3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 133–54. On icb, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). 15Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, 703. 16George and Bennett, Case Studies, 19–22; W. Phillips Shively, The Craft of Political Research, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, nj: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 41–73. 17Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 6–7. 18Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival. 19Michael L. Katz, "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 307–28. 20Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics"; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs," 42. 21Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer, "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of a Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution," Economic Inquiry 24, no. 3 (July 1986): 367–88; Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 25–26; Baum, "Going Private"; Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs"; Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 39–65. 22Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Boston: Addison Wesley, 1957), 79–80; Cukierman and Meltzer, "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy"; Xinyuan Dai, "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," International Organization 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 363–98; Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs"; Michael Colaresi, "The Benefit of the Doubt: Testing an Informational Theory of the Rally Effect," International Organization 61, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 99–143. 23Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 207–19; Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 100–14. 24Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1965); Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 25Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 135–50. 26Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem"; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs"; Svolik, "Power Sharing." 27Although Kenneth Schultz and Kristopher Ramsay evaluate the role of opposition groups in audience cost theory, neither addresses the private aspects of democratic politics or the opposition's ability to credibly reveal unfavorable information about the leader to the general citizenry. See Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kristopher W. Ramsay, "Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4 (August 2004): 459–86. Branislav Slantchev formally demonstrates that opposition groups cannot credibly reveal unfavorable information about the leader to the general citizenry and that the media can serve as an unbiased source of information only with significant legal protections from political manipulation. See Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." As discussed above, freedom of information laws in most democracies favor the executive's ability to withhold information, increasing the ability to manipulate information. On oppositional/legislative oversight, see John D. Lees, "Legislatures and Oversight: A Review Article on a Neglected Area of Research," Legislative Studies Quarterly 2, no. 2 (May 1977): 193–208; Riccardo Pelizzon and Rick Stapenhurst, "Democracy and Oversight," in Parliamentary Oversight for Government Accountability, ed. Riccardo Pelizzon, Rick Stapenhurst, and David Olson (Washington, dc: World Bank Institute, 2006), 6–22. On the media as a source of information during international disputes, see Ted Galen Carpenter, The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment (Washington, dc: Cato Institute, 1995); John D. Zaller and Dennis Chiu. "Government's Little Helper: u.s. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1946–1999," in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanham, md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000): 61–84; Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy." 28On the withholding of information, see Francis E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961); Itzhak Galnoor, ed., Government Secrecy in Democracies (New York: New York University Press, 1977); John M. Orman, Presidential Secrecy and Deception: Beyond the Power to Persuade (Westport, ct: Greenwood Press, 1980); K.G. Robertson, Public Secrets: A Study in the Development of Government Secrecy (London: MacMillan Press, 1982); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On misrepresenting information, see Tullock, Toward A Mathematics of Politics, 133–43; David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power (New York: Random House, 1973); Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 37–64; Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 124–52; Lionel Cliffe, Maureen Ramsay, and Dave Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). 29The median and modal mandated lag-times were thirty years. The data on freedom of information protections come from David Banisar, Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws (London: Privacy International, 2006). The sample of democracies comes from the Polity IV dataset. A state was included if its combined Polity score in 2006 was greater than or equal to six. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2008, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 30Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices (Washington, dc: Brookings Institution, 1984), 92–93. 31Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits? At What Cost? (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1987), 56. 32See Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy, and Propaganda (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 175–202; Wise, The Politics of Lying; Goodin, Manipulatory Politics; Hess, The Government/Press Connection, 75; Abel, Leaking, 2; Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy, 125–28; Zaller and Chiu, "Government's Little Helper"; Entman, Projections of Power. 33Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office, 135–50; Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 304–5. 34Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Hardin, Collective Action. 35Mark Irving Lichbach, The Cooperator's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 68–78. 36See, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer, "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy"; Baum and Potter, "The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 50. 37James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randall M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy," American Political Science Review 102, no. 3 (August 2008): 393. 38Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival. 39Brandon J. Kinne, "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective," International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 1 (February 2005): 119. 40Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 65–68. 41Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs," 41. 42Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 48. 43Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem." 44The data on coup d'état come from Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, Coup d'État Events, 1946–2009, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. The data on winning coalition size come from Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival. During 1946–99, 191 coups were attempted against leaders with the smallest coalition size (W = 0), of which 113 were successful. 45Svolik, "Power Sharing," 477–78. 46The probability of being hit by a car going to or from the polls is greater than the probability of casting a decisive vote in a democratic election. This potential cost alone should deter any instrumental voter. Obviously, though, millions of individuals vote in elections. Explanations of this paradox that relax components of the assumption of rational, self-interested, instrumental behavior, however, fall outside the bounds of our theory. See Mueller, Public Choice III, chap. 14. 47Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs." 48Gordon Tullock, Autocracy (Dordrecht, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 21; Stephen Haber, "Authoritarian Government," in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 698–99. 49James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–65; Haber, "Authoritarian Government," 702–4. 50Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing"; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs." 51Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 52On Stalin, see, for example, Yoam Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him (New York: Random House, 2004) On Hussein, see, for example, Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing," 139–41. 53Svolik, "Power Sharing," 477–78. 54Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs," 46. 55In this regard, there is no correlation between personalist dictatorships and winning coalition size. A cross-tabulation of personalist regimes with winning coalition size for the period of 1946–99 shows that, of the 720 personalist dictatorships in the sample, 150 corresponded to W = 0, 265 to W = .25, 292 to W = .5, 13 to W = .75, and 0 to W = 1. Specifically, Stalin's coalition size was W = .25, while Hussein's was W = .5. The data on personalist regimes come from Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs." The data on winning coalition size come from Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival. Moreover, as indicated above, of the 191 coup attempts that occurred against leaders with the smallest coalition size (W = 0) during this time period, approximately 60 percent succeeded. If such leaders were unaccountable, then the rate of successful coups launched against them by coalition members would be significantly lower, presumably close to 0. 56Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 132–36; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 543–44; Charles Lipson, "Why are some international agreements informal?" International Organization 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 495–538; Stasavage, "Open-Door or Closed-Door." 57On typological compression/reduction, see Colin Elman, "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics," International Organization 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 293–326; George and Bennett, Case Studies, 249–51. 58Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences"; Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs"; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs." 59Dean Pruitt, "Strategy in Negotiation," in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2nd ed., ed. Victor A. Kremenyuk (San Francisco; Jossey-Bass, 2002), 85–96; Tarar and Leventoğlu, "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." 60Stasavage, "Open-Door or Closed-Door"; Kurizaki, "Efficient Secrecy." 61Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 243; Dean Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 19; Carrie A. Langner and David G. Winter, "The Motivational Basis of Concessions and Compromise: Archival and Laboratory Studies," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 4 (October 2001): 711–27. 62See Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 134–35; Morrow, et al., "Retesting Selectorate Theory." 63John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga, and Erik van Ree, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 164; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: Norton, 2006), 18–21. 64 us National Archives and Records Administration, Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box Score 1960, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/scores.html#1960. 65Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 61–122; Thomas G. Paterson and William J. Brophy, "October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962," The Journal of American History 73, no. 1 (June 1986): 87–119; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), 77–131, 320; Robert Weisbrot, Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 40–75. 66Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 420. 67Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, "The Cuba Project," 20 February 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, ed. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1998), 23–37; James G. Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 237–80; Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 142–50. 68Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 177–98; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton, 2003), 536–37; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 410–11, 428–29. 69James G. Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 127–28, 137. 70Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 153–54, 158–59. 71Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October'," 250. 72Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 166–70. 73Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 435–36. 76"The President's News Conference," 13 September 1962, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, dc: gop, 1963), 674–75. 74"National Security Action Memorandum No. 181," 23 August 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 74–75. 75W. W. Rostow, "Memorandum to the President," 3 September 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 77–78; "News Conference at the White House with Pierre Salinger," Digital National Security Archive, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, Document CC00343. 77Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 110–11. 79Robert McNamara, quoted in Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 91–92. 78The ExComm included primarily Under-Secretary of State George Ball, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, un Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, and Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson. See Sheldon M. Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 41–47.On the military scenarios, see Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 224–25. 80John F. Kennedy, quoted in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1997), 92. 81Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 259–63. 82Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 272–74. 83"Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy," 26 October 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 195–98. 84Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security 14, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 158–59; Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 289–90. 85"Communiqué from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy," 27 October 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 207–9. 88Bundy, Danger and Survival, 432–33. 86"White House Statement on Soviet Proposals Relating to International Security," 27 October 1962, in Public Papers of the Presidents, 813; Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 88–91; Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 278–81. 87This group's composition remains unclear. In addition to the Kennedy brothers, McGeorge Bundy suggests that he, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Gilpatric, Thompson, and Sorensen attended. See McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 432. Dean Rusk suggests inconsistently that six advisors—or possibly only Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara—attended. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Norton, 1990), 240; Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27–28, 1989 (Lanham, md: University Press of America, 1992), 93. 89Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 86–88; Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 282. 90"Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev," 27 October 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 234 (emphasis added). 91Scholars debate exactly when news of Kennedy's Jupiter concession reached the Presidium. Some argue that Khrushchev dictated his response to Kennedy prior to the arrival of Dobrynin's report. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 490. Others maintain that Khrushchev dictated his response only after receiving news of the secret concession. See Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 285–86; Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Knopf, 2008), 323–24, 401–2, n. 323. Given that Fursenko and Naftali present conflicting accounts, we follow Dobbs. 92Robert F. Kennedy, quoted in Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 403. 95"The President's News Conference," 20 November 1962, in Public Papers of the Presidents, 831–35 (emphasis added). 93Raymond L. Garthoff, "American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978," Political Science Quarterly 95, no.3 (Fall 1980): 434. 94Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 307–10. 96Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 92. 97"Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State," 16 March 1963, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1961–1963, vol. 11: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, dc: gop, 1996), 721. 98Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 314. 99This claim was popularized in Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 141–43, 225–26. 100Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 97–125; Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," 55–129. The second edition of Essence of Decision accepts this new evidence. See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 252–53. 101Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969), 108–9. 102Allyn, et al., Back to the Brink, 92–93. 103See, for example, David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," International Security 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987/88): 12–15; Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 138–39. 104See, for example, Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 307–8; John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 271–72. 105Rusk, As I Saw It, 240–41; James G. Blight and David A Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 83–84. 106Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: MacMillan, 1996), 202–3. 107See, for example, May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 606, n. 3. 108Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey's Jupiter Missiles and the u.s.-Turkish Relationship," in John F. Kennedy and Europe, ed. Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 121. 109"United States and Soviet Union Agree on Formula for Ending Cuban Crisis," Department of State Bulletin 47, no. 1220 (12 November 1962): 741–46. 110 us House Committee on Armed Services, Robert McNamara Testimony, Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 January 1963, 274. 111See "Summary Record of the 28th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council," 20 November 1962, and "Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations," 21 November 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 502–3, 514–17. 112See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, dc: Brookings Institution, 1987), 5; Allyn, et al., "Essence of Revision," 144–47. 113Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October'." See also May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 57–58, 66–69; Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 66–67, 73–74. 116 us House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, Robert McNamara Testimony, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 6 February 1963, 57. 114Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 388. 115 us Senate Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, Dean Rusk Testimony, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1963, 106. 117Charles Bartlett, quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 321–22. 118Stewart Alsop, quoted in Walter Johnson, ed., The Papers of Adlai Stevenson, vol. 8, Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961–1965 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 348–52. 119Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," Saturday Evening Post 235, no. 44 (8 December 1962): 20. 120"Transcript of McGeorge Bundy Interview," 16 December 1962, Digital National Security Archive, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, Document CC02755. 121Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind, 156; Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 324. 122See, for example, "The Present International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev delivered to Session of the ussr Supreme Soviet, 12 December 1962, Pravda, reprinted in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 14, no. 51 (16 January 1963): 3–8. 123Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 92. 124Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," The New Yorker, 3 November 1962, 120. 125Walter Trohan, "Report from Washington," Chicago Tribune, 27 October 1962. 126Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 492. 127Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind, 154. 128Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 202; Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 355. 129Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 353–54; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 532–40. 130Taubman, Khrushchev, 13. 131Tarar and Leventoğlu, "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining," 821(emphasis added). 132See, for example, Daniel Y. Kono, "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 369–84; Xinyuan Dai, "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5 (October 2006): 690–713. 133See, for example, Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 134See, for example, Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Prevention in Cuba," in U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 285–98; Raymond Garthoff, "Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis," International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 46–66.