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Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13869790903067683

1741-5918

David Enoch,

Free Will and Agency

Abstract More and more people seem to think that constructivism – in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally – is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position – mostly in the realm of practical reason – and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason to suspect that there cannot be a coherent constructivist view about practical reason as a whole, at least not if it is to be interestingly constructivist, in a sense I make reasonably precise. Keywords: constructivismpractical reasonKorsgaardmetaethics Acknowledgments For helpful conversations and comments on earlier versions of this paper I thank Hagit Benbaji, Mary Coleman, Mark LeBar, Yair Levi, Mark Schroeder, Russ Shafer-Landau, Nicholas Southwood, Sigrun Svavarsdóttir, and Bruno Verbeek. Notes It is not at all clear what Korsgaard's precise view is. The sketch in the text is, I take it, recognizably Korsgaardian, and represents at least one way of understanding her. This suffices for its role as an example here. Gibbard (Citation1999, 148–9) also notes that there are in Korsgaard's text (1996) troubling inconsistencies, and evidence both for and against his reading. For Korsgaard's characterization of her view as an instance of 'procedural realism' – essentially, constructivism – see Korsgaard (Citation1996, 36–7). For some doubts about this terminology, see Hussain and Shah (Citation2006, 289). For a different characterization, see Brink Citation(1989). Nevertheless, I think what follows is now the canonical way of understanding this term. See Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (Citation1997, 13), and the references there. Street Citation(forthcoming) characterizes constructivism in terms of points of view rather than procedures, but it is not clear to me that this makes a difference, or at least not a difference we need to worry about in our context. And James's Citation(2007) characterization of constructivism seems to me to be a particular instance of the one that follows in the text, with the relevant procedure being one of reasoning. I do not, of course, claim to cover here all theses in moral philosophy some people call constructivist. Rawls is not always careful enough about this distinction. See Rawls (Citation1980, 519). For now, let me not distinguish between normative and evaluative discourse. I will return to this distinction later. Street (Citation2008, 208) introduces a similar distinction, using the terms 'restricted constructivism' and 'metaethical constructivism' where I use 'local constructivism' and 'global constructivism'. And James's (Citation2007, 310) distinction between specificatory constructivist theories and explanatory constructivist theories bears some similarities to the distinction in the text, but it is not exactly the same distinction – his is primarily about the theoretical aspirations of the relevant theory, rather than its target discourse. It is especially unclear in Korsgaard. For some relevant discussion here, see Hussain and Shah Citation(2006). See Street (Citation2008, 217, footnote 22) for the claim that some versions of constructivism threaten to collapse the distinction between ethics and metaethics. Street does not argue for this claim. For one characterization of metaethics, see Sayre-McCord Citation(2007). For a review of the distinction, see Hussain and Shah (Citation2006, 266–9). This is perhaps clearest in James (Citation2007, 305–6). Full disclosure: I am a robust realist. See my (2007a) and (forthcoming b). For my suggested way of dealing with the epistemological challenge to such realism, see my (forthcoming a). Indeed, Scanlon's (Citation1998, chap. 1) metanormative view is a rather robustly realist view, one that is inconsistent with attempts at global constructivism. Because of the vagueness with which her view is presented, it is not clear whether Korsgaard's constructivism is a local or a global constructivist view, and whether hers is or is not a reductionist view. For what seems to be an indication that Korsgaard is only a constructivist about obligation, but not about evaluative discourse more generally (which she may not think of as part of normative discourse), see Korsgaard (Citation2003, 112). (James [2007, 304] also reads Korsgaard as a constructivist just about moral obligation). For what looks like the affirmation of global constructivism, see Korsgaard (Citation2003, 118). For her denial of a reduction, see Korsgaard (Citation1996, 161). For her flirt with reductionism, see footnote 15 below. For the claim that Korsgaard fails in offering an alternative to realism, again see Hussain and Shah Citation(2006). The vagueness of Korsgaard's view allows Smith Citation(1999) – a dispositionalist and a normative naturalist of sorts – to understand Korsgaard's constructivism as the view of a kindred naturalist spirit, and Gibbard Citation(1999) – an expressivist – to understand her view as a fellow-expressivist one. This (sketch of a) view bears similarities to Lewis's Citation(1989) view of values and Williams's Citation(1980) view of reasons. Railton (Citation1986, 23–5) explicitly concedes this point regarding his own version of an Ideal Advisor Theory. Butler (Citation1988, 21) and Krasnoff (Citation1999, 398) also mention the possibility of superficially constructivist views where the constructivist procedure is really merely a heuristic device. Nagel (Citation1996, 205) expresses the suspicion that constructivist views are really reductionist views in disguise. And Shafer-Landau Citation(2003) uses the term 'constructivism' to refer to all response-dependence theories. James's (Citation2007, especially 306, 308, 323) understanding of constructivism is very close to a response-dependence naturalist reduction, though the response he has in mind is a rather complex one (that of reasoning), and the reduction is qualified to reasoning well, or in accordance with the norms of reasoning, so it's hard to tell whether we are presented with a genuine reduction or not. If not, his constructivism seems to be merely an instance of local constructivism. Though Street Citation(2008) characterizes constructivism in a way very close to my own, still at the end of the day her view seems to me to be merely an instance of a response-dependence naturalist reduction. In her (forthcoming) Street attempts to show in what way her view differs from a naturalist reduction, but not, I think, successfully. Her discussion utilizes a problematic entailment relation, and her claim that she avoids a natural reduction depends, I think, on a crucial equivocation regarding this entailment (sometimes assuming it is a normative relation, sometimes assuming it isn't). At other times, Street declares that on her account moral judgments do not express beliefs, so she seems to be flirting with noncognitivist views. It is not clear how to reconcile all these different things Street says. But I cannot discuss this in detail here. At times Korsgaard is clear about our practical identity – the source of all our reasons, according to Korsgaard – being utterly contingent, something we just find ourselves with (e.g. 1996, 239). To the extent that this is her considered view, the point in the text applies also to her identity-constructivism. And for a constructivist view that explicitly relies on radical choices, see Street (Citation2008, 237). There is another option worth mentioning here, but one that I do not need to discuss at length. It is that the kind of dispositionalist view some constructivist views are best seen as is a no-priority view, according to which the relevant normative facts or properties are not prior to our relevant responses or dispositions, nor are the latter prior to the former, but rather both are 'made for one another' (Wiggins Citation1987, 199). Such no-priority views, however, do not seem to be consistent with the constructivist insistence on the priority of the relevant procedure – usually, the relevant deliberative procedure – over its result. For some discussion in our context, see James (Citation2007, 312). For another such attempt, see, for instance, Miller (Citation2003, 8). For some doubts about such flowcharts – though not in the context of defending constructivism – see Schroeder (Citation2009, 257). It is hard to see, for instance, how a global constructivism of this kind can motivate the kind of idealization often incorporated in its constructivist procedure. See my 'Why Idealize?' (2005). Another – related – way of attempting to achieve objectivity on constructivist grounds is by offering an understanding of objectivity according to which some kind of intersubjective agreement suffices for objectivity. For such a move – in the context of a general discussion of contractualism as the account of the ground of morality – see Southwood Citation(2008). Notice that Southwood – unlike constitutivists – embraces the contingency of morality (2008, 200). Michael Smith's Citation(1994) rationalist dispositionalism may be thought of as a kind of constructivism (broadly understood). And he too rejects contingency. His attempt at rejecting contingency (which, in the terms of his theory, comes down to defending the claim that the desires of all ideally rational agents converge) can perhaps be seen as a version of constitutivism. For more on this, see Enoch Citation(2007b). In conversation, Mary Coleman suggested that constitutivism may play a different role in the constructivist story – that of supporting the claim that a specific procedure is the procedure that constructs reasons. See also her 'Modest Constructivism'. Though Korsgaard is clearly optimistic about the possibility of vindicating the whole of morality employing a constitutivist strategy, there is already somewhat of a constructivist trend to settle for less. See Velleman's (Citation2009, 149) 'Kinda Kantian strategy', and Coleman (working paper). Had we known ahead of time what the result of the coin toss will be, would the coin toss procedure have been redundant? Well, had we known ahead of time what the result of the coin toss will be, the coin toss procedure would no longer qualify as a fair procedure for deciding who should serve first. I take it this is indication of the constraints beyond which the coin toss example is no longer helpful, rather than an indication of some deeper issue here. I thank Mark Schroeder for suggesting this kind of ineliminability to me. Perhaps something like the point in the text led Rawls – surely a prominent figure in the constructivist tradition – to write: '[N]ot everything, then, is constructed; we must have some material, as it were, from which to begin' (Rawls Citation1993, 104). Mark LeBar tells me that he intends to develop his constructivism – see LeBar (Citation2008; forthcoming) in the direction described in the text. Again, a point that Rawls Citation(1971) may very well have realized. The parties in his original position, remember, do not deliberate about justice. Such a deliberation is precluded by a consideration analogous to the one in the text. Rather, they vote on (veiled) self-interest, thereby purportedly constructing the principles of justice. James's (Citation2007, 322) solution to what he calls 'the circularity objection' to constructivism relies heavily on the possibility of there being relevant norms – norms of reasoning – that do not depend on any independent normative truths. But this only helps if such norms are in any way better – perhaps less suspicious – than normative truths. And James (Citation2007, 307) postpones the discussion of this point to another occasion. The problem is exacerbated if we notice the following dilemma: either these norms have their status independently of us and our responses and practices, or else they don't; if the former, it is very hard to see how they are less suspicious than independent normative truths; if the latter, the problem in the text for deliberative constructivist theories stands. For an initial discussion of picking, see Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser Citation(1977). Some expositions of the idea of deliberative democracy seem to fall prey to a similar objection: On the one hand, the intuitive plausibility of the view relies heavily on the deliberative nature of the relevant procedure (people, after all, are supposed to be engaging in collective deliberation, in the giving and asking for reasons). On the other hand, though, some commentators emphasize that there is no (political) criterion of rightness that applies to the consequences of such collective deliberation independently of it being the result of this procedure. (On this picture, then, deliberative democracy is a constructivist political theory.) But if this is so, what exactly are the citizens participating in the deliberation supposed to be deliberating about? Presumably, they are not supposed to just be maximizing self-interest (see the note about Rawls in footnote 28 above). Are they supposed to just pick? If so, then the idea that this procedure constructs political justice loses much of whatever appeal it may have had. Let me emphasize, though, that if deliberative democracy theorists are willing to treat their constructivism as a local constructivism – so that some normative truths, presumably not political ones, are taken as given independently of the political deliberation procedure – then they are off the (or at least this) hook. For some discussion of deliberative democracy in the context of a general discussion of constructivism, see Southwood Citation(2008). I thank Bruno Verbeek for this objection. Is it an instance of local constructivism, or rather just relevantly like local constructivism? Because the term 'local constructivism' was introduced earlier by stipulation, this difference makes no difference.